Appellate

Time for appeal from special order after judgment explained
Appellate courts had authority only as statutes and rules provided. All judgments were orders, but not all orders were judgments. Special orders after judgment were not judgments so the time to appeal judgments did not generally apply to special orders after judgment. Specifically, judgments were effective after entry and special orders after judgment were effective immediately on entry. Special orders after judgment included any order on enforcement of, or collateral attack on, any judgment. That described the appellant’s motion for satisfaction of judgment. The appellant did not file the notice of appeal in time so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Kenneth Chailland, II, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Speed and Specialties Autobody, LLC, Defendant, and Jesse Woodrow Long, Defendant/Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114213

Theory not raised in circuit court barred in appellate court
“A defending party is entitled to a summary judgment if it demonstrates: … that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of the facts necessary to support movant’s properly pleaded affirmative defense.” Affirmative defenses were also subject to affirmative defenses, also called affirmative avoidance, and all had to be pleaded or were waived. That applied to estoppel. In its amended answer and motion for summary judgment, the defendants cited statutes of limitation and alleged facts relevant to those statutes. The plaintiff did not file a reply mentioning estoppel and so waived that theory. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred because estoppel prevented the defendants from raising statutes of limitations. The circuit “court never ruled on that issue and it has been waived.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
CLINT A. WILKERSON, in his capacity as SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE OF THE MIKE ALAN WILKERSON TRUST DATED 8/9/1995, and in his individual capacity, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SCOTT L. WILKERSON and KIMBERLY D. WILKERSON, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39231

Fictitious citations resulted in dismissal
Appellate rules protected the appellate courts’ neutrality. Those rules included a duty of candor. Filing an appellate brief constituted a certification that all theories were not frivolous. The appellant’s brief violated multiple rules, including citation to inapplicable authorities. “Most notably, three cases in [appellant]’s brief are completely fictitious.” Unable to conduct any meaningful review, the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Willie C. Fortune v. CTA Certified Transmission
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88370

Civil

Class action certification denied over predominance
The elements of class action certification included predominance of common questions of law and issues of fact over individual matters among the class. “[A]n extensive analysis of state law variances” was necessary “to demonstrate class certification did not present insuperable obstacles.” Separate arbitration agreements and divergent statutes applicable to members of a proposed nationwide class showed the opposite. The circuit court denied certification and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Crown Asset Management, LLC, Respondent, v. Lisa Lawson, Appellant, v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114220

No meritorious defense stated
The elements of an action to set aside a default judgment included a meritorious defense. A meritorious defense meant “an arguable theory” of defense to the plaintiff’s claim as described in allegations of fact with supporting evidence. A verified answer merely setting forth denials of the plaintiff’s allegations was insufficient. The circuit court erred in setting aside the default judgment so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and ordered the circuit court to reinstate the default judgment.
(Overview summary)
Gregory Ernst, et al., Appellant, v. Tainter Landscape, LLC, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114018

Good cause to set aside default not shown
Parties could set aside a default judgment on showing a meritorious defense to the claim and good cause for the default. Good cause included negligence but not recklessness. Recklessness included “a deliberate choice to risk the possibility of a default judgment” like ignoring litigation, especially at upper management levels. The defendant had notice of the subject matter, and the action, and that neither the defendant’s insurer nor the defendant’s own lawyer would defend the action. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
HARRY MENKE, Plaintiff-Respondent v. JAI GANESH LAXMI LLC, d/b/a LIBERTY LODGE, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39201

Criminal

Accomplice liability shown for attempted offense
An attempted offense meant a substantial step showing a firm purpose to complete the offense. The State carried its burden on that element with evidence that the defendant drove the vehicle that circled the crime scene where the victim was killed by the defendant’s associate. No plain error occurred when the circuit court admitted a surveillance video that was “highly probative and otherwise displayed . . . strong indicia of reliability.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. James C. Armstrong, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113515

Recklessness shown
The elements of involuntary manslaughter included criminal recklessness, meaning to consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk. On that element, the State carried its burden of proof with evidence that the defendant passed six miles of lighted signage toward slowed and stopped traffic at 50 or 60 miles per hour without trying “to slow, stop, or swerve his vehicle [.]” The State showed that the defendant was the driver with a judicial admission that the defendant caused the wreck and evidence that the defendant matched the description of the only person in the vehicle. “An in-court identification . . . is not always required.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. ADMIR KULOVAC, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39130

CDL did not bar expungement
Unambiguous statutes required no construction. Holders of a commercial driver’s license were ineligible for expungement of driving-related offenses. When the driver committed a driving-related offense, the driver did not hold a commercial driver’s license. Therefore, the driver was not barred from expungement. Neither the appellant’s later receipt of a commercial driver’s license, nor other standards for expunging other offenses, nor statutes preserving records of offenses, altered that result. The circuit court expunged the driver’s record and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
D.P.U. v. Director of Revenue, State of Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88190

Elections

Certification of insufficiency for initiative and referendum proposals was insufficient
The only possible pre-election challenges to an initiative petition before a vote were those related to form like the one-article limit, and single-subject limit for new articles, for constitutional amendments. On receipt of proposed initiative petition forms, the Missouri Secretary of State must certify ballot titles and summaries within “a strict statutory deadline.” On receipt of an initiative petition with signatures, the Secretary of State must examine the petition and signatures and certify sufficiency or insufficiency of compliance with the Missouri Constitution and statutes. A certificate of insufficiency required “a certificate stating the reason for the insufficiency.” On an initiative petition with signatures, the Secretary of State issued a certificate of insufficiency. The certificate did not set forth reasons for insufficiency. Failure to set forth reasons preserved no challenge to the initiative petition for judicial review. The face of the petition showed compliance with the one-article and single-subject limits, and it was too late to change the ballot title and summary already certified. The Supreme Court of Missouri ordered the initiative petition certified and placed on the ballot with the title and summary as already certified.
(Overview summary)
Claire Harris, et al., Appellants, vs. Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity as the Missouri Secretary of State, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101806

Legislative re-districting map was subject to referendum
“[T]he United States Constitution permits a state to authorize a referendum as to legislation drawing new congressional districts,” and the Missouri Constitution allowed the voters to subject any legislation to referendum with limited exceptions. An exception for re-districting applied only to state re-districting, which was a separate process. An exception for “the immediate preservation of the public peace” required an emergency clause, which the legislation did not have. An exception “for the maintenance of state institutions” applied only to appropriations. Therefore, the General Assembly’s congressional re-districting legislation was subject to a referendum. Pending that referendum, the legislation did not take effect and only “shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.” The circuit court declared otherwise, so the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed. The Court ordered the initiative petition certified and placed on the ballot and barred the use of the legislation unless approved by the voters.
(Overview summary)
Richard von Glahn, Appellant, vs. Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity, et al., Respondents.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101805

Certification mooted declaratory judgment action
Courts did not rule on actions that were moot, meaning that no live dispute or effective relief remained. In an action for declaratory judgment, the parties litigated whether certain signatures counted toward the number required for an initiative petition to reach the ballot. The Missouri Secretary of State’s certification stated that the number of signatures was sufficient even without the disputed signatures. That certification mooted the litigation, but the circuit court issued judgment. The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated that judgment and entered judgment of dismissal.
(Overview summary)
People Not Politicians, et al., Appellants, vs. Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins, et al., Respondents.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101801

Employment

Substantial identity of interest forgave misidentification of employer
Summary judgment was available only to parties who showed the right to a favorable ruling on undisputed material facts. In actions under the Human Rights Act, attorney fee awards to employers were possible in actions brought “without foundation,” meaning on frivolous claims. That did not describe the state of the summary judgment record as to confusion over employer’s identity, especially when the parties genuinely disputed whether that identity was reasonably ascertainable, and an initially named defendant and the eventually named employer shared a substantial identity of interest. The claimant’s substitution of parties was timely and related back to the initial filing. The circuit court entered summary judgments against the claimant, and the Missouri Court of Appeals vacated those judgments and remanded the action to the circuit court.
LOGAN NUMBERS, Appellant v. 76 MALL INN, INC., and GRAND COUNTRY FUN SPOT, LLC, Respondents
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39172

Evidence

No prejudice shown
Appellate courts reviewed not merely for error but also for prejudice. Prejudice in the admission of evidence meant a reasonable likelihood of acquittal without the disputed evidence. That did not describe sympathetic background testimony, even if not relevant logically or legally; as shown by jury deadlock on one of the charges. It also did not describe a surveillance video, even if not subjected to a sufficient foundation, that the defense cited in evidence and argument. Accomplice liability for an offense required the State to show participation in the offense, which the State did with evidence of where and when defendant and victim were together. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Antonio Steed, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113711

Juvenile

Due process was satisfied
In actions for protective custody, parents had the right to receive certain documents in discovery and present evidence at hearings. But the juvenile officer did not offer any documents, and the circuit court excluded no evidence relevant to the judgment, at any hearing so no due process violation occurred. The circuit court encouraged circuit courts to be accessible to pro se litigants, abjured the Division of Children’s Services to participate in appellate proceedings, and affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
In the interest of: E.S.W.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113858

Orders of protection

Domestic abuse not shown
In an action for a full order of protection, the plaintiff argued that the defendant committed domestic abuse by battery, which required proof of physical harm. “Neither party testified that [plaintiff] suffered pain, bruising, soreness, injury, visible marks, or impairment of bodily function, or required medical treatment.” And the plaintiff also argued that the defendant committed domestic abuse by assault, which required evidence that the plaintiff feared for her physical safety. “[T]here was no evidence [plaintiff] received threats of physical harm or actions of physical violence.” The plaintiff also argued that the defendant committed domestic abuse by harassment, which required evidence of substantial emotional distress. The evidence showed that the defendant was “‘annoying and boorish,' [but] his conduct would not cause ‘substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person.’” The record also showed that the circuit court issued the full order to separate the parties before their conflict escalated further. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the action with instructions to dismiss.
E.M., Petitioner-Respondent v. H.M.M., Respondent-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39109

Personal injury

Pleading of punitive damages against SLEF prohibited
Writs of prohibition were discretionary remedies for actions in excess of authority. The State Legal Expense Fund covered the defense of State employees, and was an exclusive remedy, in actions for money damages based on official activities. Relators were a judge and another State employee, both defendants in an underlying action seeking money damages for conspiracy and abuse of process, so relators were within the Fund’s scope. In an earlier action, the relator could not get a writ barring such action but no opinion accompanied the denial, so it did not address the merits. Governing statutes expressly barred punitive damages against the Fund, which also barred prayers for relief in the form of punitive damages. The respondent circuit judge in the underlying action nevertheless ordered that the plaintiff in the underlying action could amend the petition to seek punitive damages. The Missouri Court of Appeals made permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition barring the circuit court from enforcing that order.
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. JUDGE STEVEN A. PRIVETTE, and ALICE BELL, Relators v. THE HONORABLE JAMES K. JUSTUS, SENIOR JUDGE, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38977

Post-conviction

No extra time for newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence
Time limits for filing were mandatory and failure to comply waived all relief with few exceptions. Those exceptions did not include newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence. Newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence were not grounds for post-conviction relief though they might support a writ of habeas corpus or a pardon. The circuit court dismissed the motion and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Mark David Adams, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113896

Workers’ compensation

Reduction in disability rating affirmed
On the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s administrative review of administrative law judge rulings, no deference was due. The Commission’s findings of fact were subject to deference on judicial review. Expert testimony was not necessary to sustain such findings and lay testimony could suffice. The record showed that the Commission did not exceed its authority by relying on one source of proof to the exclusion of all others. The record supported a finding that part of the claimant’s continuing disability was due to the claimant’s failure to perform rehabilitative exercises, rather than the claimant’s job-related injury, even crediting the claimant’s testimony. Clarification could occur before the Commission, not in the Missouri Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision.
(Overview summary)
Bradley Barnett v. Kawasaki Motors MFG Corp USA and Sentry Casualty Company
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88459

• District 3 (Jackson County)
• District 4 (Cass, Clay, Johnson, Lafayette, Platte and Ray Counties)
• District 9 (City of St. Louis)
• District 14 (Butler, Carter, Dent, Dunklin, Iron, Madison, Mississippi, New Madrid, Oregon, Pemiscot, Reynolds, Ripley, Scott, Shannon, Stoddard and Wayne Counties)
• Eastern Appellate District (all counties encompassed by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District).

The YLS Council will fill these vacancies by majority vote. The terms for these council seats will begin September 2026 and will end September 2028.

The council requests that those interested in serving complete the nominating petition and file it with Brett Rolwes, The Missouri Bar YLS liaison, by Sept. 28.

The council invites those who file to include a resume and brief statement explaining their interest in serving on the YLS Council. Nominations for the Eastern Appellate District seat also require the submission of a statement describing the nominee's unique experience, knowledge, and qualifications to represent diverse elements of The Missouri Bar to accompany their nominating petition.

All eligible petitions received will be submitted to the YLS Council for consideration.

What is the YLS Council?

The YLS Council is the governing body for the Young Lawyers’ Section of The Missouri Bar. It is composed of approximately 35 young or new lawyers elected to serve two-year terms from districts across the state. Officers and executive committee members are elected from within the ranks of the council’s membership.

What does YLS do?

YLS sponsors, in full or in part, a variety of public service projects, continuing legal education programs, and social networking events across Missouri that are geared toward young and recently admitted lawyers. The section collaborates with several affiliate organizations that also have great opportunities to help new and young lawyers integrate in the profession and serve their communities.

Visit News.MoBar.org to learn more about what YLS and the council have been doing recently.

The Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee — comprised of lawyers, retired judges, and Missouri residents — completes an anonymous evaluation of each judge up for retention under Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan, also known as The Missouri Plan, to ensure they are meeting the judicial performance standards. The committee reviews written opinions and surveys completed by lawyers and jurors who, when applicable, have worked with the judge. The committee then recommends whether a judge should or should not be retained, and its findings are publicly available through YourMissouriJudges.org to help educate voters.

Dodge

Dodge has been a trial lawyer with Hall Ansley, P.C. for over 32 years. A former member of The Missouri Bar Board of Governors, Dodge is past president of the Springfield Metropolitan Bar Association and is a founding member of the Southern Missouri Women Lawyers Association. She is the current chair of the Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee and was on the 31st Judicial Commission, which helps fill judicial vacancies under The Missouri Plan in Greene County.

“I am very honored to receive this award from our president, Athena Dickson,” Dodge said. “She has spent tireless hours traveling around the state sharing the important work of the Judicial Performance Review Committee and its role in the Non-Partisan Court Plan.”

Dodge said she was “especially honored” to receive the President’s Award alongside Tucker.

“He successfully directed the statewide evaluation of the JPR Committee and public dissemination processes for both the 2022 and 2024 terms,” she said. “He continues to educate us on the many positive benefits of The Missouri Plan.” 

Tucker

With over 44 years of practice, Tucker is of counsel at Armstrong Teasdale LLP, supporting its general counsel’s office with legal ethics, conflicts of interest, risk management, and continuing legal education. Before stepping into that role, Tucker was a litigation partner at Armstrong Teasdale.

A graduate of the Duke University School of Law, Tucker served on The Missouri Bar Board of Governors and was 1995-1996 Missouri Bar president. Tucker has served on the Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee and its predecessor, the Judicial Performance Evaluation Committee, since 2008. He was chair of the Judicial Performance Review Committee from 2022-2026.

Tucker said he was “proud of the work” of the Judicial Performance Review Committee.

“Each member has diligently undertaken the serious responsibility to objectively evaluate the performance of the judges up for retention election,” he said. “… The committee has worked collaboratively and efficiently to complete its tasks over each two-year election cycle. The voters of Missouri have benefited [from] the committee’s work.”

Tucker encouraged lawyers to get involved with The Missouri Bar as the work is “important and meaningful.”

“A long-term belief in the need to seek the improvement of the laws and the administration of justice for all persons in Missouri has been my inspiration for the work I have done,” he said. “Those principles have led me to work in a way which I hope has been useful, ethical and effective in both my private practice and in my public service.”

Dodge and Tucker will accept the President’s Award in Kansas City during the Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar and Judicial Conference, Sept. 16-18.

Click here to learn more about annual awards presented by The Missouri Bar, the Missouri Bar Foundation, and other entities. Read about other 2026 award winners here.

Appellate

No review of unpreserved matters without asking for plain error review
In any jury trial, to preserve error, parties must raise the matter contemporaneously and raise the matter again in a motion for new trial. Preservation also required citing the matter in a point relied on that was compliant with appellate rules. Appellate courts could not correct the appellant’s brief and rule on the appeal from there because those activities would constitute advocacy for the appellant. The appellants further had to file all portions of the record referenced in their briefs. The appellant claimed that the circuit court erred by overruling its objection to the defendant’s closing argument and sought a mistrial. The appellant’s motion for new trial cited the ruling on mistrial, which did not preserve error in ruling on the objection. The burdens of proof and standards of review for the rulings were different, and the appellant cited the wrong one for the objection. A point relied on citing awards for both future lost wages and future medical expenses was multifarious and preserved error in neither award. The appellant also cited differing standards of review in its point relied on associated argument. The appellant further failed to file transcripts to which it referred. The appellant preserved no error for review and appellate courts “will not sua sponte review for plain error [.]” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
Tara Straussner, Respondent, v. City of St. Louis, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114085

Judgment too vague for appellate review
Appeals were possible from final judgments. Judgments granting permanent injunctions were final only when, among other things, their provisions were “clear, precise, and definite” as to what was barred, and for how long, without reference to any other document. In an action to enforce a covenant not to compete, the plaintiff sought to bar the defendants from selling at retail online and from any brick-and-mortar location. The circuit court barred the opening of “a retail store” without stating whether that included online and for how long. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Pretzel Boys Licensing, LLC, Respondent, v. Pretzel Pretzel-Telegraph, LLC, Amber Scurlock, and Anthony Simmons, Appellants.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113968

Wrong reason, right result
An appellate court “will affirm the circuit court’s judgment ‘if it is correct on any ground supported by the record regardless of whether the circuit court relied upon it.’” The petitioner sought an exemption from registration as a sex offender and the circuit court dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. That reasoning was erroneous because the constitution gave circuit courts jurisdiction over all matters civil and criminal. But the result was correct because statutes provided the conditions for that relief and the appellant did not meet those conditions. Couching the action as an action for declaratory judgment did not alter that result. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
(Overview summary)
Sherma Johnson, Appellant, v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, et al., Respondents.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113828

Deficient briefing required dismissal
Rules of appellate procedure preserved the appellate courts’ impartiality by avoiding speculation on the appellants’ theories. Non-compliant statement of facts, points relied on, and argument were so incoherent that they either failed to preserve or abandoned the appellant’s claims of circuit court error. After notice and opportunity to cure, the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Tower Loan of Missouri, LLC, v. Michael Session
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88455

Civil

Voiding of judgment reversed
Circuit courts could grant relief from judgments, including default judgments, void for lack of due process. Due process included personal jurisdiction, which included notice and an opportunity to be heard, which occurred by service of process. Service of process on a person living outside of United States was possible under Missouri law but was also possible under the Hague Convention, which the plaintiff satisfied by delivery to the defendant through Scotland’s central authority. The central authority’s return of service constituted prima facie evidence of due process that the defendant failed to refute. A spelling error in the defendant’s name was a mere misnomer, not a misidentification, that the circuit court could correct at any time. “When summons is actually served on the correct party but by the wrong name, the error becomes immaterial because the correct party has notice of the suit." Once the party served defaulted, the circuit court could enter default, including an award of damages. “Defendant’s contention regarding the lack of probative evidence to support the award is a merit defense disguised as a due process argument.” The plaintiff’s affidavit supported the amount of damages awarded and, even if it didn’t, that would have been a mere error of law and not a jurisdictional error.
(Overview summary)
Mindy Reaves, Appellant, v. P. Harvey's Mold Lady and Construction Services, LLC, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114152

Statutes determined standing
The plaintiffs had the burden to establish standing, meaning the legally protected interest necessary to file an action for relief. Missouri statutes determined standing for Missouri statutory actions, not United States caselaw, so that interest need not be in monetary damages. Statutes created a cause for action for a borrower whose lender did not timely file a release of lien. The plaintiff alleged that the plaintiff’s lender did not timely release the lender’s lien. That pleading alleged standing, so the circuit court erred in dismissing the action. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of reversal and remanded the action to the circuit court.
(Overview summary)
Robert J. Gallagher, Appellant, v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113806

Amended schedule did not extend time for response to summary judgment
On a motion for summary judgment, any numbered paragraph in the statement of undisputed facts that the responding party failed to deny constituted an admission. Circuit courts generally had authority to extend deadlines; and the rule governing summary judgment specifically contemplated discovery pending, and extensions of time for discovery for responding to, motions for summary judgment. None of those things happened in the parties’ action. The circuit court issued an amended schedule that extended the deadline for discovery and continued the trial date, but that order did not void the pending summary judgment motion, nor extend the time to respond to the motion. The appellant did not file a response to the motion, the circuit court deemed the movant’s allegations admitted and granted the motion, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgement.
(Overview summary)
Wendy Anderson v. Truman Medical Center, Inc. D/B/A University Health
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88285

Criminal

Reference to questions unanswered by the defense was okay
The elements of plain error review included an obvious error. An indirect reference to the defendant’s failure to testify could support reversal when the record showed a calculated intent to highlight the matter. But the State did not reference the defendant or failure to testify, only “unanswered questions” that the State attributed to the defense. The circuit court did not plainly err in refraining from intervening sua sponte so the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Joseph O. Fuller, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113750

Trespass conviction affirmed
The elements of trespass in the first degree as charged included remaining on real property unlawfully. Unlawful presence did not require evidence of the title to real property, nor of the property’s metes and bounds. Evidence that another person had the right to use, possession, or occupancy was sufficient. Such evidence came from the occupant’s general manager and was sufficient to support the element of remaining unlawfully. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri v. Samuel David Todd Cornell
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88419

Circumstances implied knowledge
The elements of class E felony leaving the scene of an accident included knowledge that property damage had occurred. The State supported that element with evidence of a collision between the defendant’s vehicle and the victim’s vehicle, extensive damage to the victim’s vehicle, and the defendant’s flight from the collision. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri v. Jerry Cook
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88131

Appeal violated plea bargain
Plea bargains were contracts, in which “both parties relinquished rights and received benefits [,]” subject to equitable principles. Sentencing was a material provision. The appellant agreed to enhanced sentencing for some charges in exchange for dismissal of other charges including resisting arrest. The defendant’s post-judgment motion challenging the enhanced sentencing, though successful on appeal, constituted a breach of the agreement great enough to support rescission, so the circuit court did not err in denying enforcement of the dismissal. When the State re-filed the charge of resisting arrest, the State showed flight with arresting officer testimony, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri v. Christopher Lynn Baker
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88023

No right to inform jury of consecutive sentence mandate
When considering their recommended sentences, juries cannot consider whether sentences could be concurrent or consecutive because that was a collateral matter for the judge alone. The sentences for the defendant’s offenses had to be consecutive, the circuit court barred the defense from mentioning that law during argument on sentencing, and that ruling was no abuse of discretion. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri v. Kam Deih Kap
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87925

Employment security

No good cause to backdate benefits
Benefits began in the month of the filing of a claim unless the claimant showed good cause for starting them earlier. Good cause meant “beyond the reasonable control of the claimant and then only if the claimant acts as soon as practical.” That did not describe the claimant’s ignorance of the law allowing a claim while working part-time. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that decision.
(Overview summary)
Sharonda White, Appellant, v. Division of Employment Security, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114000

Appellant must appeal the Commission’s dismissal, not the ALJ’s decision
An administrative law judge decided the claimant’s claim on the merits, the claimant filed a petition for review with the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, and the Commission dismissed petition for review for failure to appear. The Missouri Court of Appeals had authority only to review the Commission’s rulings. The claimant’s notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals challenged the ruling on the merits of the claim, not the Commission’s dismissal. Because the Commission never ruled on the merits of the claim and only dismissed the petition for review, the Court of Appeals had no authority over the merits of the claim. The Court of Appeals dismissed the notice of appeal.
(Overview summary)
Torie Nave v. Barnes-Jewish Hospital, Employer, and Division of Employment Security
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88602

Family

No new grounds alleged in motion to modify
Appellate courts affirmed dismissal on any ground charged in a motion to dismiss even if the circuit court did not rely on it. To support a motion to modify child custody, the movant had to show facts unknown at, or that arose since, the earlier custody order. The movant alleged a breakdown in communication and cooperation between the parties, but that was nothing new. “These parents have engaged in protracted and hostile litigation since 2018 when their child was less than a year old. Even accepting Father’s multiple averments in his motion as true, his allegations regarding Mother are hardly a surprise.” The circuit court dismissed the motion for failure to state a claim and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
(Overview summary)
James Bryan Steele, Jr., Appellant, v. Amanda Marie Perkins, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114077

No Form 14, no appeal
Except when the appellants sought plain error review, appellate courts reviewed only preserved errors. To preserve error in awards of child support, parties had to file a Form 14 in circuit court. The appellant challenged the award of child support on appeal but did not file a Form 14 in circuit court and so failed to preserve the matter. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the award.
(Overview summary)
M.F., Appellant, v. S.B., Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113585

Juvenile

No colloquy was necessary to accept an admission of guilt
Plain error review was within appellate courts’ discretion for obvious errors that “seriously” undermined circuit court judgments by their effect on substantial rights. The rights of a juvenile in an adjudication hearing included the essentials of due process in a criminal action. The appellant juvenile did not show that those essentials included the colloquy due in circuit court to determine whether an admission was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. And the record showed that the appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made the admissions. No plain error occurred when the circuit court accepted the guilty plea so the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of commitment.
(Overview summary)
In the Interest of B.L., a Minor v. Juvenile Officer
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88431

Post-conviction

Overwhelming evidence of guilt negated prejudice
The movant had to show that counsel performed below professional standards. The movant cited the advice not to testify and failure to call the movant to testify. But the circuit court’s colloquy showed that the movant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to testify and that the waiver was strategic. The record showed that such strategy was sound because it avoided damaging cross-examination. Dealing with the State’s closing arguments in the defense’s closing argument, rather than objecting contemporaneously, was reasonable trial strategy. One point relied on alleging deficient performance by the appellate counsel as to three convictions was multifarious and preserved no errors. Also, no prejudice resulted from counsel’s alleged deficiencies because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Kevin M. Fields, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113721

Post-conviction relief

Refraining from an objection was sound strategy
Judgments on post-conviction relief motions were subject to reversal only when the whole record left appellate courts with a definite and firm impression that the circuit court had made a mistake. On a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the elements included deficient performance, which a reasonable trial strategy negated. When the claimed deficiency was the absence of an objection to evidence, trial counsel presumptively had a strategic reason for not objecting, even when trial counsel offered none. Trial counsel chose not to object to a witness’s testimony because it was likely to appear not credible and trial counsel was then able to further undermine the witness’s testimony on cross-examination. And, even if trial counsel’s performance were deficient, there was no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
ANDREW LUKE LEMASTERS, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39108

Witness would not have been helpful
Reasonable trial strategy negated claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Claims for ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to call a witness required the movant to show that the witness was available and would have helped the movant “unqualifiedly.” As to both, the record supported a finding to the contrary and the circuit court found that the witness’s testimony in favor of the movant was not credible. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Sadiq J. Moore v. State of Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88073

Real estate

Road remedy was an easement, not a transfer of ownership
Circuit courts could establish private roads when strictly necessary for access, but only with the least “damage or injury and . . . inconvenience as practicable to the owner or owners of the real property over which the private road shall pass.” Specifically, the road had to be a permanent easement appurtenant. The circuit court granted the private road in fee simple absolute, so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, and remanded the action.
CLINT BOWEN, and MOGAN BOWEN, Respondents v. DYLAN ROEDER, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39014

Meet Aleigh Flournoy, a member of the 2025-2026 Missouri Bar Leadership Academy class! A graduate of the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, Flournoy is associate general counsel for North Kansas City Health. She previously was a judicial extern to Hon. Brian C. Wimes and Hon. Jill A. Morris.

Every year, The Missouri Bar brings together a select group of new and young lawyers to serve on the Leadership Academy. Each class completes a service project, engages in leadership workshops, networks with leaders in Missouri’s legal profession, and attends bar meetings. Following graduation, members continue to serve The Missouri Bar in an active capacity for two years. 

Flournoy recently chatted with The Missouri Bar about her unique path to becoming a lawyer, her favorite parts of Leadership Academy, her advice to new lawyers, and more.

What has been your favorite part about being on Leadership Academy so far?

“My favorite part of Leadership Academy has been everything I never saw coming. While the formal programming has been outstanding, some of the most meaningful growth has come from the relationships formed along the way … It is the phone calls, text messages, and emails that continue long after a meeting ends. It is the willingness to ask, ‘Have you dealt with this before?’ ‘What do you think about this situation?’ or, in those inevitable rookie-attorney moments, ‘Did I completely screw this up?’ Those conversations have reminded me that good lawyers seek answers, but great lawyers are not afraid to ask for help finding them.”

Why did you decide to apply for Leadership Academy?

“The reason I applied for Leadership Academy can be summed up in four words from my nominator and lifelong mentor: “You're ready. Apply.” … I am grateful not only for Rita Luukkonen’s confidence in me, but also for her willingness to give me the push I needed. Her faith in me gave me the confidence to act on that nomination, and applying for Leadership Academy has been one of the most rewarding professional decisions I have made.”

What do you value most about The Missouri Bar and its mission?

“What I value most about The Missouri Bar is its recognition that the legal profession exists to serve something greater than itself. Its mission is ‘to improve the legal profession, the administration of justice, and the law on behalf of the public.’ Those goals are inseparable. Stronger lawyers strengthen the profession, and a stronger profession strengthens public trust in our legal system.

“… The Missouri Bar reminds us that being a lawyer is about more than practicing law. It is about being a steward of the profession, a champion for the rule of law, and a servant to our communities. That commitment to both professional excellence and public service is what makes The Missouri Bar such an important institution.”

This year's class service project centers around learning about new lawyers’ needs, wants, and perceptions of The Missouri Bar. How do you see this work shaping the bar’s overall ability to continue helping lawyers even better serve their clients?

“By intentionally seeking input from newer attorneys, The Missouri Bar is … investing in the future of the profession. Understanding what new lawyers need to succeed helps the bar develop programs and resources that are relevant, practical, and impactful. When attorneys have access to meaningful … opportunities to build professional relationships, they are better equipped to navigate challenges, exercise sound judgment, and serve their clients effectively.”

Why should new/young lawyers consider applying for Leadership Academy?

“Leadership Academy goes beyond teaching traditional leadership skills; it is grounded in real-life leadership. There is something powerful about hearing Supreme Court of Missouri and Court of Appeals judges, along with some of the state’s most respected attorneys, speak candidly about the challenges they have faced … If a lawyer is unsure whether the program is worth it, my answer is simple: Apply … The relationships, perspectives, and lessons you gain will stay with you long after the program ends.”

Why did you want to become a lawyer?

“My first job was dusting those massive print law books and the tall shelves that held them in a Kansas City law firm’s library … There was something remarkable about holding those books and knowing that the words bound between those leather covers had the power to change, well, the world. I wanted to be part of that, but my path to the law was not direct. I earned degrees in journalism and business and built a career outside the practice of law. Then, in 2016, I became a mother and it changed my perspective …

“I became a lawyer because I wanted to help people, because I had witnessed the difference lawyers can make in people’s lives, and because I have always been drawn to stories and their impact. Somewhere between dusting those law books and reading them, albeit online by that point, I realized the law gave me a way to do both.”

What advice would you give to new/young lawyers?

“Winning is gratifying and losing is painful, but neither is as important as what you learn from the experience. Success can create the illusion that there is nothing left to learn; humility reminds us there always is … The best lawyers are not those who always have the answers. They are the ones willing to keep searching until they find them.”

Editor’s note: These answers have been edited for clarity and conciseness. Learn more about Leadership Academy here. 

Constitutional

No concealed carry permits for felons 
The United States Constitution’s Second Amendment protected the right of law-abiding citizens to “keep and bear Arms [.]” Restrictions on felons bearing arms were constitutional because felons were not law-abiding citizens and such restrictions had a long history in “our Nation’s tradition of firearm regulation.” Grounds to deny a concealed carry permit included felony convictions and guilty pleas. Substantial evidence of those convictions included the applicant’s testimony and other undisputed evidence. The circuit court affirmed the denial and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary)
Anthony Hayes, Appellant, v. Saint Louis County Police Department, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113903

Criminal

Trespasser had no standing to challenge search 
Appellate courts reviewed the record from the pretrial hearings and at trial. Guests of a tenant had standing to challenge searches of tenants’ premises, but the record supported a finding that the defendant was a trespasser and not a guest. The elements of possessing contraband included control of the contraband and knowledge of the contraband’s nature. Actual possession of contraband supported an inference that the defendant knew what the contraband was. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ritchie A. Jones, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113690

No plain error in multiple sentences for one incident
Defendant had to raise constitutional issues at the first opportunity, except double jeopardy, because double jeopardy went “to the very power of the State to bring the defendant in the court [.]” Unpreserved double jeopardy claims were within the courts’ discretionary plain error review. Plain error review required the defendant to show that an obvious error affected a fundamental right and caused a manifest injustice. Double jeopardy barred conviction for an offense under both a general description and a specific instance. One course of conduct could constitute multiple offenses if the statutes setting forth those offenses had differing elements. First-degree assault required the State to show that the defendant caused serious physical injury, while unlawful use of weapon by shooting at a motor vehicle did not. Unlawful use of weapon by shooting at a motor vehicle required the State to show that the defendant used a firearm, while first-degree assault did not. Each armed criminal action conviction required the State to show a separate underlying offense. Therefore, no error occurred when the circuit court imposed multiple sentences for those multiple offenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. BRYAN W. GRISSOM, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD

Family

Findings were sufficient 
When substantial admissible evidence in the record [supported a] judgment [,]” reversible error in the admission of evidence was “practically impossible” to show. The appellant challenged the admission of financial records authenticated by deposition but showed no prejudice from that evidence because other, undisputed evidence supported the judgment. In actions to modify child custody, statutory factors guided circuit courts’ determination of the children’s best interest. Conclusory recitations of which factor favored which party were insufficient because they did not allow meaningful appellate review. Circuit courts had to support their application of those factors made relevant by the allegations and evidence with findings of fact. The circuit court met that standard with “numerous factual findings corresponding to several statutory best-interest considerations” that “extensively considered allegations” and relevant evidence. “[T]he findings are relevant to the requests of the parties, easy for this Court to ascertain, and clearly attributable to [applicable] factors [.]” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 
COLBY L. DAVISON, Appellant v. BOBBIE S. FOLEY f/k/a DAVISON, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD39296

Insurance

Insurers need not cover sales tax for replacement vehicle when vehicle not replaced
Judgment on the pleadings was due when the petition alleged facts on which no relief was due under any theory. An earlier appellate ruling on a motion to dismiss held that relief was due if the insured’s reading of a policy was correct but did not decide that the insured’s reading of the policy was correct. The parties’ automobile policy’s collision coverage gave the insurer the option of repair or replacement. Replacement was at comparable value. Comparable value included any tax that the insured had to incur to “acquire ownership” of a replacement vehicle. Insured’s vehicle suffered a collision, the insured did not acquire ownership of a replacement vehicle, the insurer paid replacement value that did not include an amount for sales tax. In an action for breach of contract, the insured sought an amount for sales tax, but no relief was due because the insured never incurred sales tax. The circuit court granted the insured’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary)
Yolanda Bell v. Shelter General Insurance Company
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88275

Post-conviction

Abandonment inquiry required 
With exceptions inapplicable to the movant’s action, timely filing was mandatory. Among those exceptions was abandonment by appointed counsel. When appointed counsel filed amended motions out of time, circuit courts had to conduct an inquiry into whether the appointed counsel had abandoned the movant because abandonment excused untimely filing. The circuit court failed to conduct that inquiry. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the action to the circuit court for an inquiry into abandonment. 
TERRANCE LAMONTE JOHNSON, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD39268

“To have made an impact in someone’s life so their view of the legal system isn’t always negative.”
-Lillian Mehler, staff attorney with Legal Aid of Western Missouri in Kansas City

"To leave the world in better shape than I found it in.”
-Emily K. Price, Assistant circuit attorney at the St. Louis Circuit Attorney’s Office in St. Louis

Answers have been edited for length, clarity, and style.

We were wondering ... How has your legal career surprised you? Share your answer by emailing Journal@MoBar.org or filling out a form at MoBar.org/Closing-Statements.

W. Dudley McCarter, a former president of The Missouri Bar, is of counsel with the firm of McCarthy, Leonard, Kaemmerer and Miller.

For personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the defendant’s conduct must fall within Missouri’s long-arm statute

Cox v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon, WD87512 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).

Jeffrey Cox, one of the representatives of a class action lawsuit (collectively, the borrowers), appealed the circuit court’s order and judgment granting The Bank of New York Mellon’s motion for summary judgment, arguing the exercise of personal jurisdiction over BNYM would not comply with due process. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, affirmed the judgment.¹

“The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient when personal jurisdiction is contested.”² To assess personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, Missouri courts use a two-prong test:³ (1) the defendant’s conduct must fall within Missouri’s long-arm statute under § 506.500, and (2) the defendant “must have sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to satisfy due process.”⁴

The appellate court noted that the borrowers “have not set forth any disputed material facts to establish that BNYM transacted business in Missouri or used or possessed Missouri real estate that would subject it to specific jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.”⁵ BNYM does not have any “officers, directors, employees, or offices in Missouri, it did not sell any products or services in Missouri, and it did not loan money to Missouri consumers.”⁶

… [T]here is no genuine issue as to the material facts that BNYM, neither individually or through an agent, engaged in at least one of the acts enumerated in the long-arm statute subjecting it to personal jurisdiction in Missouri.

Private membership club is exempt from the Missouri Human Rights Act

Littlefield v. Norman Rigdon Post No. 5896, 723 S.W.3d 874 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).

Rayne Littlefield appealed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Norman Rigdon Post No. 5896 for Veterans of Foreign Wars, claiming the court erred in finding the VFW exempt from the definition of employment discrimination claims. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed the judgment.⁷

Littlefield argued that the VFW is not a “bona fide private membership club” that is exempt from the Missouri Human Rights Act’s definition of “employer” solely because it holds public events advertised on its website.⁸

Missouri courts have not yet defined “bona fide private membership club” under the MHRA, “making this a matter of first impression.”⁹ Thus, the court “must construe exemptions to remedial statutes like the MHRA narrowly.”¹⁰

Federal courts have considered many factors to determine whether a group is a bona fide private membership club, including:

(1) the genuine selectivity of the group, (2) the membership’s control over operations of the establishment, (3) the history of the organization, (4) the club’s purposes, (5) the use of facilities by nonmembers, and (6) whether the club advertises to the public to solicit members or promote the public’s use of its facilities.¹¹

“Courts consider an organization’s membership selection process as the most important factor in finding a club is a bona fide private membership club.”¹² To become a VFW post member, the applicant must have honorably served in a foreign war, insurrection, or expedition.¹³ “These criteria demonstrate the exceedingly selective nature of VFW membership,” the court noted.¹⁴

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Littlefield, VFW remains a bona fide private membership club in spite of its public events and advertising. Four of the six factors [considered by the federal courts] support the finding that VFW is a bona fide private membership club. Additionally, the most important factor — selectivity of the membership — leads one to the same conclusion.¹⁵

Requirements for registering a foreign judgment are mandatory

Sophia Chu v. Nanna, ED113487 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).

William Nanna appealed the circuit court’s order denying Nanna’s motion to dismiss Sophia Chu’s motion to register a foreign judgment. Because Chu failed to comply with the statutory requirements for filing a verified petition, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, reversed the circuit court’s judgment.¹⁶

The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Law, under § 511.760 and Rule 74.14, governs the registration of foreign judgments in Missouri. Section 511.760 states “any judgment, decree or order of a court of the United States or of any state or territory which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state” qualifies as a “foreign judgment” under the UEFJL.¹⁷ Registration of a foreign judgment happens when an authenticated copy of the judgment is filed in the circuit clerk’s office.¹⁸ “Compliance with the statutory procedure has been regarded as being mandatory.”¹⁹ Section 511.760.3 adds:

A verified petition for registration shall set forth a copy of the judgment to be registered, the date of its entry and the record of any subsequent entries affecting it, all authenticated in the manner authorized by the laws of the United States or of this state, and a prayer that the judgment be registered.

The Court of Appeals found that the circuit court erred in denying Nanna’s motion to dismiss Chu’s motion to register the foreign judgment because Chu failed to comply with the statutory requirements for filing a verified petition.²⁰

Inverse condemnation is sole avenue for recovery from a city for property damage

State ex rel. City of Osage Beach v. Koeppen, SD38855 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).

The Grand Harbour Condominium Owners Association, Inc. filed a lawsuit against the City of Osage Beach alleging two counts of negligence, a claim of nuisance, a claim of trespass, and a claim for ejectment.²¹ The city sought a writ of prohibition to order Hon. Aaron G. Koeppen to not proceed further other than to grant the city’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, held that Grand Harbour’s sole avenue of recovery was through an inverse condemnation action.²²

Article I, § 26 of the Missouri Constitution mandates that “private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”²³ The Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in Ferguson v. City of Sunrise Beach²⁴ and reaffirmed that “[i]nverse condemnation is the exclusive and proper remedy for an alleged nuisance or other damage caused to private property by an entity having the power of eminent domain.”²⁵ “The fact that the nuisance is alleged to have been caused by the public entity’s negligence is immaterial.”²⁶

Endnotes
1 Cox v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon, WD87512 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).
2 Id. at 10 (citing Bryant v. Smith Interior Design Grp., Inc., 310 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Mo. banc 2010); Ingram v. Johnson & Johnson, 608 S.W.3d 663, 687 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020)).
3 Andra v. Left Gate Prop. Holding, Inc., 453 S.W.3d 216, 225 (Mo. banc 2015); Noble v. Shawnee Gun Shop, Inc., 316 S.W.3d 364, 370 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).
4 Andra, 453 S.W.3d at 225.
5 Cox, WD87512 at 17-18.
6 Id. at 19.
7 Littlefield v. Norman Rigdon Post No. 5896, 723 S.W.3d 874 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).
8 Id. at 879.
9 Id. at 880.
10 Id.; See also Lampley v. Missouri Comm’n on Human Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Mo. banc 2019)
(internal quotation omitted) (“Remedial statutes should be construed liberally to include those which are within the spirit of the law and all reasonable doubts should be construed in favor of applicability to the case.”)
11 Id. at 881 (citing Quijano v. Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1980); Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1276 (7th Cir. 1993)).
12 Id. at 882 (citing Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1276).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 883; See also Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1276.
16 Sophia Chu v. Nanna, ED113487 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).
17 MO. REV. STAT. § 511.760.1(1).
18 Berman, Deleve, Kuchan & Chapman, LLC v. 417 Rentals, LLC, 598 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020).
19 HBE Leasing Corp. v. Eckilson, 769 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Mo. App. S.D. 1989).
20 Chu, ED113487. See also Am. Indus. Res., Inc. v. T.S.E. Supply Co., 708 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986) (“… strict adherence to the statutory requirements has great importance where one attempts to enforce the liability imposed by another jurisdiction on a citizen of Missouri through registration of a foreign judgment. This court is reluctant to uphold the dismissal of what may be a valid judgment; the requirement of verification, however, is sound practice and should be enforced.”).
21 State ex rel. City of Osage Beach v. Koeppen, SD38855 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).
22 Id.
23 Ferguson v. City of Sunrise Beach, 710 S.W.3d 620, 625 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
26 Heins Implement Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 693-94 (Mo. banc 1993).

Presented by The Missouri Bar Family Law Committee, the Roger P. Krumm Family Law Award honors a family law lawyer who has demonstrated an exceptional degree of competence, skill, integrity, commitment, and dedication toward the improvement and advancement of the practice of family law and the parties involved in family law matters.

Glesner Fines is the Rubey M. Hulen professor of law and dean emerita of the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. A graduate of the University of Wisconsin at Madison School of Law and Yale Law School, she has taught various law courses and co-founded the law school’s family law emphasis program, which includes multiple clinics and international and interdisciplinary coursework. 

“I have the awesome privilege of teaching students and attorneys how to do that work professionally, compassionately, and effectively,” Glesner Fines said.

Glesner Fines founded and directs the UMKC Self Help Clinic in a partnership with Legal Aid of Western Missouri, supervising students and helping as a volunteer lawyer counseling clients in family law matters and other civil issues.

She was the reporter on the revision of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers “Bounds of Advocacy,” the ethical standards for the organization’s fellows. She also wrote numerous articles and is a frequent presenter at conferences on ethics and family law topics.   

She was the chair of the American Association of Law Schools Section on Professional Responsibility, is a member of the executive committee of the AALS Section on Family Law, is a member of the American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility, and is on the editorial board of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts’ Family Court Review.

Glesner Fines said she is “incredibly honored” to receive this year’s Roger P. Krumm Family Law Award. She emphasized that family law is fundamental to the legal profession and society.

“Families are the foundation of society, and family law attorneys have impact far beyond their client's cases,” she said. “… Family matters are often an individual's first exposure to the law, lawyers, and the courts. If I have done my job well, the attorneys I have taught become professionals who enhance the public's trust in the rule of law.”

Click here to learn more about annual awards presented by The Missouri Bar, the Missouri Bar Foundation, and other entities. Read about other 2026 award winners here. 

Natalie Spangler is deputy chief disciplinary counsel at the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.

Although an admonition is not considered discipline under the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.12 authorizes the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel to issue an admonition when it determines there is “sufficient probable cause to believe that [a lawyer] under investigation is guilty of professional misconduct.”¹ An admonition is appropriate when “the professional misconduct is of such nature that further proceedings are not warranted.”² 

If the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel issues a letter of admonition, the lawyer has 15 days to either accept or reject it.³ If accepted, the admonition becomes a matter of public record and may be considered by the Supreme Court of Missouri in determining any future discipline.⁴ If rejected, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel must file an information and proceed through the formal disciplinary process.⁵ In other words, rejection of an admonition requires the matter to move forward as a disciplinary case.

While admonitions are public records, they are not routinely published. To determine whether a lawyer has received an admonition, an individual must request the lawyer’s public disciplinary records from the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.⁶ 

In 2025, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel issued 54 admonitions. Below are 10 examples of misconduct that resulted in an admonition and the corresponding rule violations.

1. Improper deposit of an advanced flat fee

A client paid a $5,000 flat fee in two installments of $2,500. Before performing any work, the lawyer deposited both payments directly into the operating account rather than the client trust account. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rule 4-1.15(a).⁷ Advanced fees generally must be held in trust until earned. Although Rule 4-1.15(c)⁸ permits certain flat fees to be deposited directly into an operating account, the exception applies only when the total flat fee is less than $2,000. Dividing a larger flat fee into installments under $2,000 does not bring the fee within the exception.

2. Lack of diligence resulting in litigation sanctions

The lawyer failed to appear for two court hearings and failed to provide court-ordered discovery responses. As a result, the court sustained a motion for sanctions and struck the client’s pleadings. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rule 4-1.3.⁹ This matter illustrates how missed deadlines, ignored court orders, and a lack of diligence can materially prejudice a client’s interests and expose the client to severe litigation consequences.

3. Failure to adequately communicate the basis of the fee

A criminal defense lawyer’s fee agreement provided that representation through investigation and resolution of the matter would cost $7,500 but stated that additional fees for trial, hearings, or certain motions would be negotiated later. The agreement did not explain the basis for those additional fees or when they would become due. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rule 4-1.5(b).¹⁰ Lawyers must adequately communicate the basis or rate of their fees and expenses. Leaving substantial portions of a fee arrangement to future negotiation may create uncertainty and fail to satisfy the rule’s disclosure requirements.

4. Failure to supervise a subordinate lawyer

A client delivered a $5,000 fee payment to a law office. A subordinate lawyer was expected to deposit the funds and handle the matter but failed to do so. The supervising lawyer was the signatory on the trust account and remained responsible for ensuring proper handling of client funds. 

The supervising lawyer in this case received an admonition for violating Rules 4-1.15(a) and 4-5.1(b).¹¹ The matter serves as a reminder that supervisory lawyers must implement reasonable measures to ensure subordinate lawyers comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and properly safeguard client property.

5. Failure to communicate and improper withdrawal

An expungement client was unable to communicate with counsel for approximately six weeks. The lawyer later explained that illness prevented communication but had no procedures in place to ensure client matters were addressed during the absence. The lawyer subsequently attempted to withdraw from the representation by notifying the court clerk rather than complying with the procedures required for withdrawal. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rules 4-1.4¹² and 4-1.16(c).¹³ Even during extended absences, lawyers remain responsible for maintaining reasonable communication with clients and ensuring that any withdrawal from representation complies with applicable court rules and procedures.

6. Failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation 

Following the filing of a disciplinary complaint, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel opened an investigation and requested information from the lawyer. The lawyer failed to respond to multiple requests. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rule 4-8.1(c).¹⁴ Lawyers have an independent obligation to cooperate with disciplinary investigations and respond to lawful requests for information from disciplinary authorities.

7. Unauthorized use of another lawyer’s signature and failure to redact

A lawyer filed court documents using another lawyer’s signature block without authorization. The filing also failed to properly redact information relating to a minor child as required by court rules. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rules 4-1.1,¹⁵ 4-3.4,¹⁶ and 4-8.4(c).¹⁷ Competent representation requires careful review of court filings and compliance with procedural rules, including redaction requirements. The unauthorized use of another lawyer’s signature also constitutes a misrepresentation concerning the identity of the filing lawyer.

8. Inadvertent disclosure of confidential information

A lawyer received a subpoena duces tecum seeking records relating to a former representation. Unable to reach the client, the lawyer responded to the subpoena by email and attached confidential documents. Several third parties copied on the email received the documents, resulting in an unauthorized disclosure. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rule 4-1.6.¹⁸ Even when responding to legal process, lawyers must exercise caution before disclosing client information and ensure that confidential materials are provided only to authorized recipients.

9. Failure to perform services and promptly refund unearned fees

A client retained a lawyer to prepare estate-planning documents, signed a fee agreement, and paid the agreed flat fee. The lawyer then failed to perform the work or communicate with the client for approximately five months. After the client terminated the representation and requested a refund, the lawyer delayed an additional five months before returning the unearned fee. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4. Lawyers must pursue client matters with reasonable diligence, maintain adequate communication, and promptly address requests relating to unearned fees when a representation ends. 

10. Sale of a law practice and failure to preserve records 

A lawyer sold a law practice and subsequently joined another private practice in the same geographic area and practice area. In addition, the lawyer discontinued payment for an electronic file-management system and lost access to client files and records maintained through that system. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rules 4-1.17(a)¹⁹ and 4-1.15(f).²⁰ A lawyer who sells a law practice must satisfy the conditions governing such sales, including ceasing private practice in the relevant geographic and practice area. The matter also serves as a reminder that lawyers retain continuing obligations to preserve trust account and client records, even after closing or selling a practice. 

Staying up to date on the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct can help you avoid admonitions like the ones outlined above. For more information or questions, contact the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel at MoChiefCounsel.org.

Endnotes 
1 Rule 5.12(b). 
2 Rule 5.12(b)(1). 
3 Rule 5.12(b)(4). 
4 Id.
5 Rule 5.12(b)(5). 
6 Rule 5.31(b)(3). 
7 Rule 4-1.15(a) states, in pertinent part: “A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. Client or third-party funds shall be kept in a separate account designated as a ‘Client Trust Account[.]’” 
8 Rule 4-1.15(c) states: “A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred, except that an advanced flat fee which does not exceed $2,000 is exempted from this requirement and may be deposited into another account.”
9 Rule 4-1.3 requires a lawyer to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Comment [3] talks about how procrastination can lead to a violation of Rule 4-1.3, in that “a client’s interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or change in conditions[.]” 
10 Rule 4-1.5(b) provides “the basis and rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client[.]” 
11 Rule 4-5.1(b) requires that that “[a] lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.” 
12 Rule 4-1.4 requires that a lawyer “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter[,]” “promptly comply with reasonable requests for information[,]” and the lawyer 
“shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” 
13 Rule 4-1.16(c) requires a lawyer to “comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating representation[.]” 
14 Rule 4-8.1(c) states, in pertinent part, that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority[.]” 
15 Rule 4-1.1 states “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”
16 Rule 4-3.4(c) states that it is professional misconduct to “knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of the tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists[.]” 
17 Rule 4-8.4(c) states, in pertinent part, that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” 
18 Rule 4-1.6 explains “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of the client unless the client gives informed consent” or that the disclosure is authorized by court rule. 
19 Rule 4-1.17 states that there are three conditions that must be met in order to sell one’s law firm, with the first being: “(a) The seller ceases to engage in the private practice of law, or in the area of practice that has been sold, in the geographic area in which the practice has been conducted, as defined by the agreement between the parties to the sale.” 
20 Rule 4-1.15(f) states, in pertinent part, “[c]omplete records of client trust accounts shall be maintained and preserved for a period of at least six years after the later of: (1) termination of the representation, or (2) the date of the last disbursement of funds.”