The most recent version of the newsletter will be available tomorrow, Nov. 6.

Lewis Rice is expanding its Kansas City presence with the addition of six experienced attorneys to its downtown office, effective December 1. The attorneys bring extensive experience in litigation, commercial real estate, corporate and business transactions, tax and estate planning, and related areas, further strengthening the firm’s ability to serve clients throughout the Kansas City region and beyond.

Joining Lewis Rice are Ronald S. Bronstein, Jason L. Buchanan, Thomas R. Buchanan, Michael J. Gorman, Andrew Zarda, and M. Spencer Cook.

“We are thrilled to welcome Ron, Tom, Michael, Jason, Andrew, and Spencer to Lewis Rice,” said Tom Martin, Kansas City office Managing Member. “Conversations about the possibility of joining Lewis Rice began several years ago with a few members of this group and evolved over time. This is an exceptionally experienced group of attorneys whose practices add meaningful depth to our team. Their knowledge and perspective will benefit our existing clients while also giving their clients access to the broader range of services and resources available through Lewis Rice. We look forward to what we can accomplish together in Kansas City.”

Ronald S. Bronstein joins the Corporate, Tax and Estate Planning Department. Bronstein has more than 30 years of experience advising clients on tax planning, estate planning, trust administration, probate, business planning, and related matters. He earned his J.D. from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and an LL.M. in Taxation from New York University.

Jason L. Buchanan joins the Litigation Department. Buchanan has 24 years of experience handling complex civil litigation matters. He earned his J.D. from Wake Forest University School of Law.

Thomas R. Buchanan joins the Litigation Department. Buchanan brings more than four decades of experience in litigation, including complex civil litigation and trial practice. He is certified as a civil trial advocate by the National Board of Trial Advocacy and is licensed to practice in Kansas, Missouri, and Colorado. He earned his J.D. from the University of Kansas School of Law.

Michael J. Gorman joins the Litigation Department. Gorman brings 40 years of experience representing clients in commercial litigation, banking litigation, and creditors’ rights matters. He earned his J.D. with distinction from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law.

Andrew Zarda joins the Commercial Real Estate Department. Zarda has 13 years of experience representing clients in commercial real estate and business transactions. His practice includes commercial real estate acquisitions and dispositions, financing, leasing, development, and related corporate and transactional matters, including contract negotiation and preparation, entity formation and organizational documents, due diligence, title and survey review, closing and loan document preparation and negotiation, bond financing, and 1031 like-kind exchanges. He earned his J.D. from the University of Kansas School of Law.

M. Spencer Cook joins the Litigation Department as an associate and focuses his practice on civil litigation. He earned his J.D. from Washburn University School of Law.

The addition of the six attorneys represents an expansion of Lewis Rice’s Kansas City capabilities. Their combined experience strengthens the firm’s litigation, commercial real estate, corporate, tax, and estate planning practices, expanding the range of services and resources available to existing Lewis Rice clients.

The attorneys’ established client relationships will also benefit from the broader range of legal services and resources available through Lewis Rice. By bringing together complementary practices and areas of experience, the addition creates opportunities to provide clients with more comprehensive counsel as their legal and business needs evolve.

“We are very excited to join Lewis Rice and become part of a firm with such a strong reputation and talented team of attorneys,” said Jason L. Buchanan. “We look forward to working with our new colleagues and to expanding the services we can offer our clients through the resources and experience available across Lewis Rice. We are excited about the opportunities ahead and look forward to becoming part of the firm’s Kansas City office.”

The Missouri Lawyers’ Assistance Program presented the award during its luncheon on Oct. 30 at The Missouri Bar Center in Jefferson City.

Coopman founded Bridge Mediation LLC in 2020, and she conducts mediations on a wide range of civil disputes, including business, education, employment, and personal injury matters. She is a qualified neutral and approved mediator on Missouri and Kansas state and federal lists, a member of the National Academy of Distinguished Neutrals, and an FINRA arbitrator. She is on the Kansas City Metropolitan Bar Foundation Board of Directors and KCMBA Well-Being Committee.

Coopman said she supports efforts to mentor new mediators and enjoys learning well-being tips and practices. 

“I am grateful to be honored with the 2026 Dorothy Kaiser Award,” Coopman said. “MOLAP does such important work for lawyers across Missouri. It has been my privilege to … shine the light on this underused resource.”

Click here to learn more about annual awards presented by The Missouri Bar, the Missouri Bar Foundation, and other entities. Read about other 2026 award winners here.

Bates

Bates graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and clerked for Hon. Edith Messina in the Jackson County Circuit Court. He then worked in Jefferson City for the Missouri Department of Social Services, the Department of Revenue, and the Public Service Commission. He later practiced with Mid-Missouri Legal Services and has been in solo practice since 2010.

He said he feels fortunate to represent people who need a guardianship and/or conservatorship. He also represents children in cases of paternity, custody, or divorce involving alleged abuse or neglect.

“I am always so happy and fulfilled when I can help out someone who is in need of getting into a better situation,” Bates said. “There have been times in my life when I needed someone there for me and I want to be there for others. I know I am just part of the process, but it gives me meaning and a purpose, hoping that I have been of help to someone.”

He advised fellow lawyers to remember how fortunate they are to be able to practice law and that the welfare of clients and society is the most important thing.

“Never take for granted what a great thing it is to be able to use our talents as attorneys to make people’s lives better,” Bates said.

Doherty

Doherty graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and is a senior associate in the litigation department of Armstrong Teasdale in St. Louis. She helps those in need prepare pro se asylum applications, pro se divorce and child custody filings, and she assists the Legal Services of Eastern Missouri’s Neighborhood Advocacy and Small Business programs. She is a member of the Legal Services of Eastern Missouri Young Friends Board, the Bar Association of Metropolitan St. Louis Board of Governors, and the Women Lawyers’ Association of Greater St. Louis Board of Directors.

She said assisting underrepresented groups reminds her how proud she is to be a lawyer and how obligated they are to be a voice for the defenseless and oppressed.

“Knowing that I used to be a low-income mother in need of assistance colors my gratitude and appreciation for what being a lawyer has given me,” Doherty said. “I feel a deep and compelling need to give back to the community I was once a part of because I know this life I now have is not promised to me. It is such an honor and privilege to practice law and it’s not something I take for granted, considering how difficult it was for me to get here.”

Doherty said she hopes fellow lawyers realize the tremendous amount of influence they have and that it humbles them enough to give back to those who have neither.

Ferguson Adams

Ferguson Adams is an associate at Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP. She graduated from the University of Notre Dame Law School. She volunteers with Volunteer Lawyers and Accountants for the Arts, Concordance Academy, and St. Louis Survivors Legal Support.

Ferguson Adams said receiving the award is a “tremendous honor and a meaningful reminder” of the values her parents instilled in her early on: the importance of community and using what you have to help others.

“I am incredibly grateful for the opportunity to use the legal skills and education I have been fortunate enough to obtain to serve others in ways that can make a lasting difference — whether that means helping someone pursue their passion, rebuild their life, or get back on track toward realizing their full potential,” Ferguson Adams said.

She said pro bono service is about more than providing legal assistance, it is about helping people access opportunities, overcome barriers, and move closer to the futures they envision for themselves. Ferguson Adams said she was blessed to be able to make that kind of impact and that receiving the award only deepens her commitment to continuing that work.

Rhodes

Rhodes graduated from the University of Mississippi School of Law and began practicing in Dexter. He later established Donald Rhodes, Attorney at Law, in Bloomfield. His practice includes civil litigation, criminal defense, probate, guardianship, landlord-tenant matters, and family law.

Rhodes has provided extensive pro bono representation to low-income Missourians, often stepping in during emergencies to protect vulnerable clients, stabilize families, and ensure access to the courts. He helps with guardianship appointments, probate assistance, criminal defense for indigent individuals, and critical family law interventions

“At 89 years old, I am grateful to still be doing the work I love — helping the people of southeast Missouri,” Rhodes said. “Access to justice should never depend on a person’s ability to pay. Every Missourian deserves an advocate, and I have simply tried to be that advocate whenever I was needed.”

Yeretsky

Yeretsky is a partner at Stinson LLP. Through his partnership with the ACLU of Missouri, he has advocated for the civil liberties of all Missourians.

As a young associate, he said, Stinson LLP provided him with an opportunity to represent a pro bono client charged with involuntary manslaughter, which inspired engagement in the pro bono community from that point forward, including the opportunity to be a chair of Stinson’s Pro Bono Program for more than a decade.

“The most rewarding part of being a lawyer, specifically a litigator, is helping clients, whether individuals, companies, or organizations, tell their story in a way that is compelling and effective,” Yeretsky said.

He said being recognized for pro bono work is a “profound honor” and that it reflects the firm’s commitment to making sure Missourians can tell their stories through the justice system.

He encouraged fellow lawyers to “identify a space or a cause you are passionate about and then set out to find how you can use your skills and experience to make a difference.”

Click here to learn more about annual awards presented by The Missouri Bar, the Missouri Bar Foundation, and other entities. Read about other 2026 award winners here.

The Missouri Bar Financial Services & Insolvency Law Committee presents this award each year to a lawyer who manifests the highest standard of excellence in bankruptcy practice, who contributes distinctively to the development and appreciation of bankruptcy law, and who has made an outstanding contribution to the field of bankruptcy practice or administration. The award is named after Michael R. Roser, a prominent Kansas City bankruptcy lawyer.

Stolte is a shareholder at Sandberg Phoenix and is the leader of the firm’s Bankruptcy and Creditor Rights group. Her practice focuses on bankruptcy, Chapter 11 debtor and creditor issues, and Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 consumer debtor matters. 

Stolte said her practice has covered the full spectrum of bankruptcy work, as she’s represented debtors, creditors, and official committees of unsecured creditors.

“That range has given me an appreciation for each constituency’s perspective and for how much the system depends on balancing their interests fairly,” Stolte said. “I have always tried to bring the highest standards to every matter: careful preparation, creative problem-solving, candor with the court, and respect for everyone involved.”

Stolte said she has wanted to be a lawyer for as long as she could remember and understood that lawyers could help people when they needed it most. Bankruptcy practice has been “one of the most meaningful ways to do that,” she said, as those who come to her often are facing the hardest financial moments of their lives.

“Being able to guide them through that process, explain their options clearly, and help them toward a fresh start or workable restructuring is deeply rewarding,” Stolte said.

Stolte said the recognition is not hers alone, but reflects the mentors who invested in her, the colleagues who challenged and supported her, the judges and court staff who make the bankruptcy system work, and the clients who trusted her with their most difficult problems.

“More than anything, the award reaffirms why I became a lawyer in the first place,” Stolte said. “It tells me that the work of helping people, one case at a time, matters. It also inspires me to keep giving back to the bankruptcy community that has given me so much.”

Click here to learn more about annual awards presented by The Missouri Bar, the Missouri Bar Foundation, and other entities. Read about other 2026 award winners here.

Kansas City

Spencer Fane LLP is pleased to welcome Sean T. Foley to the firm’s Kansas City, Missouri, office as an Of Counsel attorney in the Litigation and Dispute Resolution Practice Group.

Foley represents companies and individuals navigating high-stakes, complex civil litigation matters, government investigations, and regulatory and compliance issues. As a former Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Western District of Missouri, he tried numerous jury trials and managed some of the most complex and high-profile investigations the district faced.

Over the course of nearly eight years as a federal prosecutor, Foley investigated and prosecuted a broad range of matters involving national security and cybersecurity, including domestic and international terrorism, transnational criminal organizations and cartels, export control violations, cybercrime, ransomware, data breaches, money laundering, fraud, cryptocurrency, and tax offenses, among others. He also served as the office’s National Security Cyber Specialist.

Foley notably tried nine jury trials, most recently serving as first chair in the district’s first-ever trial involving a conspiracy to provide material support for acts of violence and use of weapons of mass destruction abroad and participation in an international money laundering conspiracy. His work involved complex investigations with federal law enforcement, including the FBI, Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and Homeland Security Investigations, as well as engagement with state, local, and international law enforcement officials.

“Sean’s federal prosecution experience lends itself to confident, efficient advocacy even when faced with exceptional risks or complexities – a key skill set for success within our litigation team,” said Julia M. Vander Weele, office managing partner for Spencer Fane in Kansas City. “We know he’ll be a powerful collaborator here in KC and across offices and look forward to gaining his unique perspective.”

After completing his bachelor’s degree at Truman State University, Foley earned his Juris Doctor from the University of Kansas School of Law, where he served on the Kansas Law Review and was elected Order of the Coif.

Springfield

Spencer Fane LLP is pleased to welcome Rachel A. Riso to the firm’s Springfield, Missouri, office as a partner in the Litigation and Dispute Resolution Practice Group.
Riso represents individuals, insurance companies, municipalities, public entities, and businesses of all sizes in a broad range of defense matters, working closely with clients to address significant legal, financial, and operational concerns.

Beyond her practice, Riso serves as a Missouri Disciplinary Hearing Officer.

“Rachel’s extensive experience and active involvement in the Springfield legal and business communities complement our growing team,” said Jason C. Smith, office managing partner for Spencer Fane in Springfield. “She is a top-notch litigator who brings a diverse client base and positions us for exciting new opportunities.”

After completing her bachelor’s degree summa cum laude at the University of Northern Iowa, Riso earned her Juris Doctor from the University of Kansas School of Law. She is licensed to practice in both Missouri and Kansas.

2. The generation-skipping transfer-exempt Missouri dynasty trust allows family farmers to keep the land in the family while giving on-farm heirs sufficient control to keep the farm operating and off-farm heirs the benefit of the family’s resources. Read more about how Missouri’s rule against perpetuities reform and favorable trust law make it a prime jurisdiction for such dynasty trust planning in this article by Kathleen Overton.

3. Hon. W. Brent Powell, chief justice of the Supreme Court of Missouri, recently addressed hundreds of lawyers and judges during the opening lunch of the joint Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar and the Judicial Conference of Missouri on Sept. 17 in Kansas City. Read his full speech about how the oath of admission’s has endured over 250 years.

4. Congratulations to the 287 Missouri lawyers who were recognized as this year’s Senior Counselors! The Senior Counselor recognition includes those Missouri Bar members who currently hold an active license in good standing who have been admitted to The Missouri Bar for 50 years or will reach the age of 75 during the current bar enrollment year of Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 2026. View the list.

5. As determined by the Advisory Committee to the Supreme Court of Missouri, 11 new informal opinion summaries have been published in 2026. View the full compiled list here. 

Download and read the full Journal issue here.

Scott E. Vincent is the founding member of Vincent Law, LLC in Kansas City.

The U.S. Tax Court recently held residuary beneficiaries of a trust liable for gift taxes upon termination of the trust and established the values of those gifts.

In McDougall v. Commissioner,¹ the tax court found that when a surviving husband and children terminated the trust and distributed all assets to the husband, the children made taxable gifts to their father. In Lewis v. Commissioner,² the tax court addressed the valuation of these gifts.

Background

Clotilde McDougall died in December 2011, leaving a testamentary residuary trust consisting primarily of shares in a family real estate business. The residuary trust provided for distribution of income to her surviving husband, Bruce McDougall, during his life and distribution of principal in the trustee’s discretion for Bruce McDougall’s health, maintenance, and support in his accustomed manner of living.

Bruce McDougall had a testamentary power to appoint the principal among Clotilde McDougall’s descendants. To the extent Bruce McDougall did not make such appointments, the remainder of the residuary trust on Bruce McDougall’s death was to be divided into equal shares for the children of Clotilde and Bruce McDougall, Linda Lewis and Peter McDougall, “one share for each of [Clotilde McDougall’s] children who is then living and one share for each of [her] children who is then deceased with children then living.”³

The residuary trust provided that upon termination the remaining assets were to be distributed among its beneficiaries so that “the distributees receive assets of a value equal to the value of their respective interest in the trust at the time of distribution.”⁴ The trust also included a spendthrift clause providing that beneficiaries did not have power to give or otherwise dispose of their interest in the trust estate.

As the personal representative of Clotilde McDougall’s estate, Bruce McDougall made a qualified terminal interest property (QTIP) election with respect to the property in the residuary trust. Bruce McDougall also executed a will purporting to exercise his power of appointment under the residuary trust.

In 2016, Bruce McDougall, Peter McDougall, and Lewis entered a nonjudicial agreement terminating the residuary trust and distributing all the assets to Bruce McDougall.

In McDougall, the tax court held that Lewis and Peter McDougall made taxable gifts by directing trust assets to Bruce McDougall that they were otherwise entitled to receive, but the tax court did not set a valuation for the gifts.

For purposes of Lewis, the parties stipulated that these assets had a value of $117,604,143 at the time the trust was terminated. However, Lewis and Peter McDougall argued the gifts had only nominal value because of Bruce McDougall’s limited power of appointment.

They relied on a valuation expert who testified that each gift should be valued at $156,000. In making his calculations, the valuation expert treated Bruce McDougall as being 80 years old rather his actual age of 85 because of Bruce McDougall’s high level of income and used a discounted cash flow method to value the remainder interests held by Lewis and Peter McDougall. The valuation expert also discounted the value of the potential future distributions due to Bruce McDougall’s lifetime income interest.

The IRS valued the gifts by Lewis and Peter McDougall at $53,408,746 each and disregarded Bruce McDougall’s limited power of appointment because it was eliminated upon termination of the trust. The IRS argued that elimination of Bruce McDougall’s limited power of appointment by the nonjudicial agreement changed the remainder interests held by Lewis and Peter McDougall to prototypical property interests to be valued under the standard actuarial factors under Internal Revenue Code § 7520.

The IRS also maintained that the value of these gifts should not be reduced by the obligation Lewis and Peter McDougall may have under § 2207A for reimbursement of gift taxes.

Statutory background

Code § 2501(a)(1) imposes tax on transfer of property by gift, which applies regardless of the nature of the transfer or the property. Section 2512(a) provides that a transfer of property by gift is valued on the date of the gift. Section 2056 allows QTIP to qualify for the marital deduction, avoiding estate tax upon the first spouse’s death.

QTIP is property (1) that passes from a predeceasing to a surviving spouse, (2) in which the surviving spouse has an interest for life, and (3) in respect of which a QTIP election is made.⁵

Under the QTIP rules, a surviving spouse or their estate can be subject to gift or estate taxes on transfers that do not occur. Section 2207A provides that the surviving spouse or their estate can recover those taxes from the parties who own the property in question.

Section 7520 requires that the value of specified property interests, including remainder interests, must be determined under prescribed tables using an interest rate equal to 120% of the federal midterm rate in effect for the month of the valuation date. Section 7520 tables also use different rates based on the age of the life beneficiary. These standard actuarial factors in § 7520 tables are not to be used to value a “restricted beneficial interest,”⁶ which means a remainder interest subject to any contingency, power, or other restriction, whether by the terms of a trust, will, or other circumstances.

Tax court analysis

In McDougall, the IRS argued that termination of the residuary trust resulted in taxable gifts (1) by Bruce McDougall to Lewis and Peter McDougall and (2) by Lewis and Peter McDougall to Bruce McDougall. The tax court found that Bruce McDougall, as surviving spouse, ended up owning the property he was deemed to own under the QTIP rules prior to termination of the trust. As a result, he was not subject to a taxable deemed transfer under § 2519.

In contrast, the tax court found that Lewis and Peter McDougall plainly made gratuitous transfers of valuable remainder interests they held in the QTIP. The court confirmed in McDougall that the value of the gifts Lewis and Peter McDougall made to Bruce McDougall would equal the value of the distribution to which they would have been entitled under Clotilde McDougall’s will upon termination of the residuary trust if they had not agreed to distribute all trust property to Bruce McDougall in the nonjudicial agreement.

In Lewis, the valuation of these gifts was before the tax court. As noted, the taxpayers argued that the gifts had only nominal value, and the IRS argued that each gift should be valued at $53,408,746. The tax court took its own approach under the statutory framework and the terms of Clotilde McDougall’s will.

The court focused on three primary issues: (1) whether the value of the gifts should be reduced by reason of Bruce McDougall’s limited power of appointment, (2) whether those gifts should be reduced by operation of § 2207A, and (3) whether the value of the gifts should be determined by tables under § 7520.

The tax court first reviewed the testamentary limited power of appointment. While the court disagreed with the approaches of both parties, it did find that the power of appointment should be disregarded by giving effect to Clotilde McDougall’s will. The court found that allocating the residuary trust assets pursuant to Clotilde McDougall’s will required giving effect to her intention to leave a substantial remainder interest for her children rather than leaving the assets outright to Bruce McDougall, as was later effectuated by the nonjudicial agreement. The will thus reflects Clotilde McDougall’s preference that Bruce McDougall was not to have outright ownership of her share of her family business.

The court concluded that valuing the beneficiary’s interests in the residuary trust at the time of its termination would have resulted in distributing assets in equal shares to Lewis and Peter McDougall. Under this approach, the court found that the gifts had a value of at least $34.9 million each.

The tax court next considered the impact of § 2207A. The court noted the gifts should be valued by determining what would have happened if the parties had agreed to terminate the residuary trust without specifying a distribution of assets. Under this approach, the court concluded the petitioners, Lewis and Peter McDougall, would have been entitled, under the will, to assets with a value equal to their remainder interests. If those distributions had occurred, Bruce McDougall would have been liable for gift tax and entitled to recover that tax from Lewis and Peter McDougall under § 2207A.

The IRS argued these § 2207A reductions in value were hypothetical. But the court disagreed, holding that the value of the gifts by Lewis and Peter McDougall to Bruce McDougall should be reduced by the obligation to Bruce McDougall that they would have had under § 2207A if they had received distributions of trust assets under Clotilde McDougall’s residuary trust.

Under this consideration, the court found each gift was worth no more than $38,149,104.

The court then turned to the application of § 7520 valuation tables. The IRS argued the nonjudicial agreement eliminated Bruce McDougall’s limited power of appointment and transformed the remainder interests in the residuary trust into prototypical property interests that should be valued under § 7520 tables. The court instead found the beneficiaries’ entitlement to the trust was a matter of state law. The IRS had conceded that, under those circumstances, each gift would have a value of no more than $35,141,321, and the court found Bruce McDougall’s life expectancy should be determined on his actual age to confirm that valuation.

Based on this conclusion, the court issued the following holdings:

• Because Clotilde McDougall’s will must be interpreted to effect her intent, if the parties had terminated the residuary trust without specifying how the trust assets should be distributed, the distributions to which Lewis and Peter McDougall would have been entitled would not have been reduced due to Bruce McDougall’s limited power of appointment.
• Because the distributions Lewis and Peter McDougall were entitled to under Clotilde McDougall’s will would have carried obligations to reimburse Bruce McDougall for gift taxes under § 2207A(b), the gifts they made to Bruce McDougall in allowing him to receive all the residuary trust assets should be reduced by their avoided reimbursement obligation.
• The amounts to which Lewis and Peter McDougall would have been entitled under Clotilde McDougall’s will is a question of state law; consequently, the tables prescribed under § 7520 to value remainder interests for federal tax purposes do not determine the value of their gifts to Bruce McDougall.
• In valuing Bruce McDougall’s income interest in the residuary trust, and thus the gifts to Bruce McDougall, his high income alone does not justify departing from standard actuarial tables to determine his life expectancy.
• Considering the conclusions stated above and the IRS concessions, the gifts Lewis and Peter McDougall made to Bruce McDougall had a value of $35,141,321 each.

Conclusion

McDougall and Lewis highlight the complexity of the gift and estate tax framework generally and with respect to valuation of trusts and remainder interests. The cases also emphasize the risks associated with terminating or altering residuary trusts, particularly in the context of taxable estates.

Endnotes
1 McDougall v. Commissioner, 163 T.C. 112 (2024).
2 Lewis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2026-58 (2026).
3 Id. at 3-4.
4 Id. at 4.
5 Id. at 11.
6 Id. at 12.

“Accomplishment. I have accomplished so many things in my legal career that I would never have imagined. Forty-one years ago, I started my professional career as a police officer, serving 22 years on the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department. After returning to school and obtaining two master’s degrees and several promotions, I attended law school. I never dreamed I would be an attorney, prosecutor, candidate for public office, bar association president (Mound City Bar Association), ABA Delegate, Supreme Court [of Missouri] Disciplin[ary] Committee member, hearing officer, now municipal court judge. WOW!”
-Hon. Steven L. Harmon, Municipal judge for St. Louis County, Pasadena Hills

“My legal career has greatly surprised me because, never in my wildest dreams, did I ever think it would lead to me co-hosting (with my wife and law partner, Dana) two nationally syndicated daytime television courtroom shows — ‘Couples Court with the Cutlers’ and ‘Cutlers Court.’ I still practice law full-time as a civil defense trial attorney, but the TV part of my legal career still has me shaking my head at times in disbelief.”
-Keith Cutler, Attorney and partner at James W. Tippin & Associates, Kansas City

“The changes that have occurred over 47 years are astounding. We have gone from onion skins on copies to pdfs. What used to take me a day in a medical library now takes 30 seconds with medical databases and AI. A one-day trial now takes four due to artificially increased complexity of issues. Things keep getting more efficient and faster.”
-Alvin Wolff, Lawyer at Wolff Trial Lawyers, St. Louis

Answers have been edited for length, clarity, and style.

We were wondering ... What’s one boundary or rule you set for yourself that has improved your work life? Share your answer by emailing Journal@MoBar.org or filling out a form at MoBar.org/Closing-Statements.

National law firm Armstrong Teasdale is pleased to announce the addition of eight first-year associates across practice groups and offices nationwide. The new class includes Brian Christian, Savannah Fisher, Jaylen Hankins, Francine Lawler, and Adam Thomas. They join first-year Associate Tiara Arties, who joined the firm earlier this year.

Arties (Kansas City) is a member of the Litigation practice group. She leverages her background in nursing and public health to advocate for clients in a range of disputes, particularly those involving health care and employment-related matters. Before attending law school, she was a registered nurse working in clinical and public health settings.

Christian (Kansas City) is a member of the Litigation group and has experience conducting legal research and document review, drafting motions, complaints, responses to motions, research memorandums, and summarizing depositions. Christian also gained experience as a judicial extern for the Hon. Roseann A. Ketchmark in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri.

Fisher (St. Louis) is a Litigation member who gained experience during law school through the Midwest Innocence Project’s Wrongful Conviction Clinic at Washington University, where she worked on cases for clients seeking to overturn their convictions. In addition, Fisher brings her background in criminology as an investigator in public defenders’ offices in California and Colorado, where she investigated hundreds of felony, misdemeanor, and juvenile cases.

Hankins (St. Louis) has joined the Litigation group after gained experience through a judicial externship for the Hon. Jorge Alonso in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, including conducting legal research and drafting memoranda on a variety of civil and criminal matters, observing courtroom proceedings, and examining case strategy and judicial reasoning. During law school Hankins also participated in the Low Income Taxpayer Clinic and completed an externship at the Saint Louis Zoo.

Lawler (St. Louis) is a member of the Corporate Services practice group focusing on general corporate matters, mergers and acquisitions, and antitrust matters. Through her experience in both private practice and in-house legal environments, including work with a Fortune 200 reinsurance company and an externship with a global provider of engineering and software solutions, Lawler developed an understanding of the intersection between legal considerations and business objectives and the practical role of legal counsel in achieving those goals.

Thomas (St. Louis) has joined the firm’s Intellectual Property practice group. He has experience drafting patent applications and responses to office action requests, performing patentability and freedom-to-operate searches, and conducting patent searches and registering trademarks. He has also conducted research and prepared legal memoranda for pending cases. During law school, Thomas was a Rule 13 attorney in the Mizzou Law Entrepreneurship Legal Clinic, providing free legal services to local entrepreneurs. He also served as a venture capital analyst at the Allen Angel Capital Education (AACE) Venture Fund, a student-run VC fund.

Pursuant to Rule 5.30, written summaries of select informal opinions are published for informational purposes as determined by the Advisory Committee. Informal opinion summaries are advisory in nature and are not binding. The first four digits of the opinion summary number indicate the year the opinion was issued. The full text of lawyers’ requests and the Legal Ethics Counsel’s responses are confidential. Informal advisory opinions are issued by the Legal Ethics Counsel pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 5.30. The Legal Ethics Counsel issues opinions to members of the bar about Rules 4, 5, and 6 for prospective guidance about a lawyer’s own conduct involving an existing set of facts. 

Informal advisory opinions will not be issued about past conduct, hypothetical scenarios, or the conduct of a lawyer’s other than the one asking for the opinion. 

For a searchable database and information about requesting an informal opinion, go to www.mo-legal-ethics.org, click “For Lawyers,” and choose “Informal Advisory Opinions.”

2026-01 

Publication date: April 21, 2026 

Rules: 4-1.7 and 4-1.16 

Summary: representation of both driver and passenger in car accident when passenger has previously settled with driver’s insurer, withdrawal if common representation fails 

Question: Lawyer currently represents a minor, via a next-of-friend, who was a passenger in an automobile accident. The minor was riding with a family member when the accident occurred. A semi-truck passed the center line and struck the family’s car. The driver was killed in the accident and the minor suffered serious injuries. Lawyer filed suit against the driver’s estate, the truck driver, and the trucking company. Lawyer dismissed the driver’s estate from the lawsuit after the driver’s liability insurance paid the policy limits to the minor. Is it a waivable conflict of interest if Lawyer intervenes on behalf of driver’s spouse asserting a wrongful death claim in the minor’s lawsuit against the truck driver and the trucking company? Lawyer expects opposing counsel to assert that the driver was partially at fault for the accident by exceeding the speed limit. 

Answer: Rule 4-1.7(a)(1) and (2) provide that a concurrent conflict exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to other clients. Rule 4-1.7(b) allows representation of clients with concurrent conflicts if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client in the same litigation; and (4) each client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 

In most scenarios, Rule 4-1.7(a)(1) and (2) prohibit joint representation of a driver and the driver’s passengers when a third-party tortfeasor brings a valid claim of fault against the driver. It is considered a nonconsentable conflict of interest. This is because the lawyer would not be able to provide competent representation to the passengers without asserting a claim against the driver thereby compromising the representation. The lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the driver prevents the lawyer from making such claim. See Comment [15] to Rule 4-1.7 and Informal Opinion 950246. 

The fact-scenario presented here is different in that the passenger has settled and dismissed passenger’s claim against the driver, before the driver’s spouse sought the Lawyer’s representation. As a result, the spouse’s interest and the minor/ passenger’s interests may now be materially aligned, i.e., both the spouse and minor will want to minimize the level of fault attributed to the driver. If the driver and the next-of-friend are willing to give informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation, the conflict could be waived. See Informal Opinions 940053 and 950246. However, if at any point the clients’ positions diverge in a nonconsentable, material way, Lawyer will have to withdraw from representing all parties. See Rule 4-1.16, Comments [4] and [29] to Rule 4-1.7, and Informal Opinion 2021-04. 

2026-02 

Publication date: April 21, 2026 

Rules: Rule 4-4.2 

Summary: communication with represented party when lawyer is a party to the dispute 

Question: Lawyer is divorcing Spouse. Lawyer is pro se in the dissolution. Spouse is represented by counsel. Lawyer and Spouse had reached an informal agreement about the division of property before filing the dissolution action. Lawyer and Spouse continue to reside together while the dissolution is ongoing. Spouse discussed with Lawyer repairs needed at the marital home and payment for the repairs. Spouse initiated the conversation. After Lawyer spoke with Spouse regarding the repairs, Spouse’s lawyer advised Lawyer that all communications concerning the dissolution should be made through Spouse’s lawyer. As a party, Lawyer believes Lawyer has a right to communicate directly with spouse. Lawyer bases this belief upon a reading of Rule 4-4.2 and Comment [4] to the Rule. Rule 4-4.2 prohibits a lawyer who “is representing a client” from directly communicating about the subject of the representation with any other represented party. Comment [4] to the Rule provides that parties may communicate directly with each other. 

Is Lawyer correct in the interpretation of the rule and its comment? Is the interpretation the same, regardless of whether Lawyer is pro se or Lawyer has engaged counsel to represent Lawyer? 

Answer one: No, Lawyer’s interpretation is incorrect. Interpretation of the Rule and Comment [4] require consideration of both the Rule’s plain language and the policy purposes behind the Rule. The Rule protects a represented person against overreaching by other lawyers, interference with the client-lawyer relationship, and the uncounseled disclosure of information relating to the representation. See Comment [1] to Rule 4-4.2. Direct communications between a represented party and a pro se lawyer create the same risks that Rule 4-4.2 was designed to prevent. So, the pro se Lawyer is considered “self-representing” or, i.e., “representing a client,” and direct communication with the spouse regarding the dissolution is prohibited. See Informal Opinion 2011-03. This is true even if Spouse initiated or consented to the communication. See Comment [3] to Rule 4-4.2. 

Answer two: The same risks exist with direct communications for the represented party regardless of whether Lawyer is pro se or has counsel. Consequently, Rule 4-4.2 prohibits direct communication between the parties unless counsel for the parties consent to direct communications or the communication is authorized by law or court order. 

2026-03 

Publication date: April 21, 2026 

Rules: 4-1.2, 4-1.6, 4-1.16, 4-3.3 

Summary: action required when lawyer learns client has provided false document in discovery response 

Question: As part of a discovery request, Client produced a copy of a letter Client received from a third party. The letter is relevant to Client’s defense in the underlying lawsuit. Opposing counsel has requested to see the original letter. When Lawyer advised Client of opposing counsel’s request, Client confided to Lawyer that Client had altered the date of the letter on the copy produced. Client wants Lawyer to advise opposing counsel that Client no longer has the original letter. What are Lawyer’s ethical duties? 

Answer: Lawyer cannot refuse opposing counsel’s request to view the original document as this would be assisting Client in Client’s fraudulent conduct. Rule 4-1.2(f) and Comment [9] to the Rule. Because Client’s actions relate to the underlying lawsuit, Lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures to assure candor to the Court . Rule 4-3.3(b); see also Informal Opinions 2020-24 and 2020-25. First, Lawyer should speak confidentially with Client, advise Client of Lawyer’s duty of candor to the Court, and seek Client’s cooperation in the withdrawal or correction of the document. Comment [10] to Rule 4-3.3. If this fails, Lawyer is required to take further action. This includes seeking leave from the Court to withdraw from the representation and disclosing to the Court Client’s actions, even though such would reveal information which is otherwise protected by Rule 4-1.6. Id., Rule 4-3.3(b) and (c), and Rule 4-1.16(a). 

2026-04 

Publication date: April 21, 2026 

Rules: Rule 4-1.6 

Summary: disclosure of the existence of deceased client’s personal injury action to client’s next-of-kin 

Question: Lawyer was representing Client in a personal injury action when Client unexpectedly died from an unrelated matter. No estate has been opened for Client. The engagement agreement between Lawyer and Client does not address the release of confidential information by the Lawyer. May Lawyer contact Client’s next-of-kin to inquire about opening an estate to preserve the personal injury claim? 

Answer: Whether a personal injury claim survives the death of a plaintiff and whether a plaintiff’s estate can be substituted for a deceased plaintiff are substantive issues of law beyond the scope of this opinion. While the attorney-client relationship ceases upon the death of the client, the duty of confidentiality survives. See Rule 4-1.6 and Informal Opinions 20070016, 990146, 950125, 950256, and 940013. Confidential information encompasses all information related to the representation of the client, including information regarding the client’s death and client’s pending legal claims. See Rule 4-1.6, Comments [1] and [3]. Rule 4-1.6 permits disclosure of confidential information if disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. See Rule 4-1.6(a). Unless Client explicitly expressed otherwise to Lawyer, Lawyer may reasonably assume that Client would want the estate/heirs to recover for Client’s injuries. Thus, Lawyer may contact Client’s next-of-kin and make a limited disclosure regarding Client’s death and the existence of the lawsuit. This will allow the next-of-kin to consider whether to petition the court to open an estate to preserve the Client’s personal injury claim. 

2026-05 

Publication date: April 21, 2026 

Rules: 4-1.14; 4-1.6; 4-1.7 

Summary: lawyer’s considerations when concerned about diminished capacity of client and possible need for protective action 

Question: Lawyer represents an elderly client on the sale of some real estate. Client is entitled to significant proceeds from the sale. Client does not have any kind of formal diagnosis of dementia or other cognitive decline, but Lawyer has represented Client in the past on other unrelated matters and is now questioning Client’s mental capacity. Client does not have a guardian or conservator, and Lawyer asks if Lawyer is ethically required to provide the full proceeds to Client or if Lawyer is required to take other steps to secure the funds for Client given Client’s perceived mental decline by Lawyer. 

Answer: Lawyer should fully consider whether Client may be in need of protections pursuant to Rule 4-1.14, Client with Diminished Capacity. Rule 4-1.14(a) requires Lawyer to maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with Client as much as reasonably possible if Client’s capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation is diminished because Client may be suffering from a mental impairment or for some other reason. See also Informal Opinions 2020-27, 990095, and 2023-01. Guidance is provided in Comment [1] to Rule 4-1.14 that when a client is properly advised and assisted, there is a normal client-lawyer relationship, but if a client is suffering from a diminished mental capacity such that the client may no longer be able to make legally binding decisions, that relationship can be impacted. 

Rule 4-1.14(b) permits, but does not require, a lawyer to take protective action if the following conditions are met: (1) the lawyer has a reasonable belief that the client has diminished capacity; (2) the client is at risk of substantial physical, financial, or other harm unless action is taken; and (3) the client cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest. If these conditions are satisfied, “the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a next friend, guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.” Rule 4-1.14(b). 

In this situation, Lawyer must make a determination as to the condition of Client and whether or not Client is suffering from diminished capacity such that Client cannot adequately act in Client’s interest and is at substantial risk of financial harm as to handling the proceeds of the sale of the real estate. Lawyer should consider that there is a distinction pursuant to Rule 4-1.14 about representing a client with diminished capacity and maintaining the normal client-lawyer relationship versus dealing with a client who may have diminished capacity such that a client cannot make legal decisions and may not be competent as a matter of law, which is beyond the scope of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 

Since Client does not have a guardian or conservator, Lawyer may wish to start with the least restrictive protective measures, which could include: “consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decision-making tools such as durable powers of attorney, or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies, or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client’s best interests, and the goals of intruding into the client’s decision-making autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting the client’s family and social connections.” Rule 4-1.14, Comment [5]. Lawyer “should consider and balance such factors as: the client’s ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, variability of state of mind, and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision; and the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician.” Rule 4-1.14, Comment [6]. 

If Lawyer does find that there is a reasonable belief as to Client’s diminished capacity, and Client cannot adequately act in Client’s own interest, Lawyer must next determine if Client meets that high standard of being at substantial risk of financial harm. If all conditions are satisfied, Lawyer is permitted to take protective measures for Client if there are no other individuals or entities available to take appropriate actions on Client’s behalf, which may include “in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a next friend, guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.” Rule 4-1.14 ( b ) . Comment [7] to Rule 4 - 1.14 provides guidance that “[i]n many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client.” 

Throughout this assessment, Lawyer must remain mindful that, pursuant to Rule 4-1.14(c), information related to Client’s representation is still protected by the confidentiality provisions of Rule 4-1.6. However, Rule 4-1.14(c) recognizes that when Lawyer is taking protective measures pursuant to Rule 4-1.14(b), Lawyer is impliedly authorized to reveal a limited amount of information to the extent reasonably necessary to protect Client’s interests in accordance with Rule 4-1.6(a). See also Rule 4-1.14, Comment [8]. 

Finally, if Lawyer does determine, in Lawyer’s professional judgment, that appointment of a guardian, conservator, guardian ad litem, or next friend is reasonably necessary to protect Client, Lawyer should not seek to be appointed as Client’s legal representative, nor should Lawyer represent another person in the action. See Rule 4-1.7; Informal Opinions 2020-27 and 990095. 

2026-06 

Publication date: April 21, 2026 

Rules: 4-1.6, 4-1.22 

Summary: lawyer may not provide revoked trust documents from deceased client’s file unless a valid exception is met pursuant to Rule 4-1.6 

Question: Lawyer formerly represented an estate planning client, Client, who is now deceased. Lawyer has been engaged by Successor Trustees of the Trust for Client to assist Successor Trustees with handling the winding up of the Trust and making distributions to the beneficiaries. Lawyer provided the active trust documents to Successor Trustees. The bank is requesting prior trust documents even though the Second Amended and Restated Trust clearly state that prior amendments to the trust have been revoked and that it constitutes the current operating agreement going forward. Lawyer has maintained Client’s file in accordance with Rule 4-1.22, and still has the documents in question. 

Lawyer asks if the Rules of Professional Conduct allow disclosure to the Successor Trustees and/or the bank of any of the prior revoked trust documents? 

Answer: The analysis is the same for any possible disclosure of the prior revoked trust documents whether to the Successor Trustees or the bank. The duty of confidentiality to a client pursuant to Rule 4-1.6(a) survives the death of the client. See Missouri Informal Advisory Opinions 20070016, 20040004, 20030016, 20010154, 990146, 980172, and 970157. As applicable in this matter, Rule 4-1.6(a) prohibits Lawyer from revealing information relating to the representation of Client unless Lawyer had the consent of Client prior to Client’s death, Lawyer is impliedly authorized to disclose the information to carry out the representation, or Lawyer meets an exception pursuant to Rule 4-1.6(b). If Lawyer does not meet the criteria for disclosure in Rule 4-1.6(a), Lawyer must then comply with Rule 4-1.6(b). 

Rule 4-1.6(b) provides that “[a] lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:… (4) to comply with other law or a court order.” Whether other law permits or requires disclosure of the prior trust documents or amendments is a matter of law and beyond the scope of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyer should consult Comment [10] to Rule 4-1.6 for additional guidance as to any possible exception at law and use Lawyer’s independent professional judgment in making such a determination. 

Further, Lawyer may be required by a court order to disclose the prior trust documents per Rule 4-1.6(b)(4). Lawyer should be mindful that a subpoena is not enough to require disclosure, but there must be a court order. Comment [11] to Rule 4-1.6 provides guidance that if Lawyer does not have now deceased Client’s consent to disclosure, Lawyer should assert “all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law.”¹ Comment [11] further notes that an appeal should be considered in the event of an adverse ruling, but Lawyer is permitted by this rule to comply with the court’s order. See also Missouri Informal Advisory Opinions 20060004, 20010154, and 2017-04. 

In the event that disclosure is permitted by Rule 4-1.6(b), Lawyer should consult Comments [12] and [13] to Rule 4-1.6 for guidance on ensuring that the disclosure is only to the extent Lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to accomplish the specified purpose. 

2026-07 

Publication date: April 21, 2026 

Rules: 4-8.2 

Summary: lawyer who makes a statement regarding a judge with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the integrity of the judge engages in misconduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice 

Question: Lawyer is in open court representing Client before Judge. Judge makes an adverse ruling as to a motion made by Lawyer on behalf of Client on a pre-trial matter. Lawyer is outraged by Judge’s ruling, and states, “Do whatever you are going to do. I know you are not going to be fair to me, Judge. You are never fair to me.” Does Lawyer’s statement violate the Rules of Professional Conduct? 

Answer: Lawyer’s statement to Judge likely violates Rule 4-8.2: Judicial and Legal Officials, and Rule 4-8.4: Misconduct. Rule 4-8.2(a) states: “[a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.” Further, Rule 4-8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Such a statement by Lawyer is inappropriate under these Rules as it seems to question the integrity of Judge with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity, and may be prejudicial to the administration of justice as it is heard by others in the courtroom and damages faith in the impartiality and fairness of Judge. 

2026-08 

Publication Date: Aug. 3, 2026 

Rules: 6.03, 6.05, 4-7.1 

Summary: use of identification as “retired (inactive) lawyer” socially 

Question: Lawyer is retired and wishes to create a business card to use for social interactions, more as a calling or visiting card. Lawyer’s license is on inactive status. On that card, it states that Lawyer is a “Retired (Inactive) Attorney.” The card contains Lawyer’s residential address, personal phone number, personal email, and has the symbol of the Scales of Justice. Lawyer asks whether this would be appropriate under the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct. 

Answer: If Lawyer has retired and placed Lawyer’s license on inactive status, per Rule 6.03, Lawyer is prohibited from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law per Rule 6.05. Rule 4-7.1 – Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services – prohibits a lawyer from making false or misleading statements about a lawyer’s services. Since Lawyer clarified that Lawyer is a “Retired (Inactive) Attorney” on this card, it is the informal advisory opinion of this office that this is not false or misleading under Rule 4-7.1 and is appropriate for social interactions. 

2026-09 

Publication date: Aug. 3, 2026 

Rules: 4-1.1, 4-1.4, 4-1.5, 4-1.6, 4-3.4, 4-5.1, 4-5.3, 4-5.4 

Summary: use of AI Software in depositions including software with real-time “listening” capabilities 

Question: Lawyer asks about the ethical propriety of Law Firm’s possible use of a particular web-based, artificial intelligence (“AI”) deposition assistance software (“Software”). The Software “listens” while depositions are ongoing and provides real-time searchable transcripts. It also provides follow-up questions to lawyers and cross-references deponents’ statements with prior testimony, exhibits, and pleadings that have been uploaded into the Software’s system. Software Company, a vendor, has made numerous representations to Lawyer and Law Firm regarding how it operates and its security measures, and will agree in its contract that: (1) all data submitted to the Software Company is confidential and privileged material and will be treated in compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct; (2) none of the Law Firm’s data will be used to train AI; and (3) Software Company will maintain confidentiality of the uploaded information into perpetuity even if Law Firm cancels its contract. 

Lawyer asks the following questions:

1. Whether it is ethically permissible for Law Firm to use this Software?
   1. If so, what ethical issues should Law Firm consider when developing a policy for the Software’s use?
2. Whether the Software’s real-time “listening” feature complies with the Rules of Professional Conduct? This includes addressing whether:
   1. a deponent’s general consent to the taking of a deposition is sufficient consent to encompass the use of real-time AI analysis of the deponent’s testimony; and
   2. it is necessary to disclose the Software’s use to the client, court, opposing counsel, and the deponent prior to or during the deposition? 

Answer to question one: This office does not endorse or approve the use of a particular software or vendor by a lawyer or law firm. Software terms and conditions, as well as third-party vendors, may change throughout the term of a contract between Law Firm and Software Company. Law Firm will have to use its independent professional judgment in determining whether the Software’s use is permissible under the Rules of Professional Conduct. Similarly, this office does not develop or approve specific policies for lawyers or law firms and cannot give legal advice. 

Law Firm should consider the following Rules when deciding whether to use Software and for developing policies for use of any AI for deposition assistance software. 

• Rule 4-1.1 – Competence. This rule requires a lawyer to have a reasonable understanding of the capabilities and limitations of AI software, including the risks posed by the use of the software. This is an ongoing obligation, and a lawyer must stay abreast of any changing risks or benefits. It also requires a lawyer to independently verify the software’s output for accuracy and to consider whether the use of the software meets the client’s interests and objectives. See also Rule 4-1.1, Comment [6].
• Rule 4-1.5 – Fees. This rule requires a lawyer to communicate to the client at the time of commencing the representation or soon thereafter, preferably in writing, any charge or fee to be assessed to the client for the use of the AI software. Any hourly fees charged to the client by lawyers or paralegals using the software must be reasonable, i.e., the amount of time charged must reflect the efficiencies provided by the use of the software.
• Rule 4-1.6 – Confidentiality. Whether AI software may be ethically used requires an assessment of the risk that confidential client information may be revealed or accessed by others outside the firm. It also requires an assessment of the risk that confidential information may be improperly used by others in the law firm. See also Missouri Informal Opinion 2018-09. This could occur when the AI software uses confidential information from one client to assist another client. A lawyer must obtain informed consent from the client to the use of the AI software before inputting confidential client information into the AI software.
• Rule 4-1.4 – Communication. A lawyer should discuss the use of the AI software with the client as part of obtaining informed consent as required by Rule 4-1.6.
• Rule 4-3.4(c) – Court Orders. Use of AI deposition software requires compliance with any court rules or orders addressing the use of AI and compliance with all discovery rules.
• Rule 4-5.1 – Managerial Responsibilities of Other Attorneys. This rule requires clear policies regarding the permissible use of Software by lawyers in the firm. It also requires training for Software’s use, including the best practices for secure data handling, complying with privacy laws, and complying with Rule 4-1.6.
• Rule 4-5.3 – Managerial Responsibilities Concerning Nonlawyer Assistants. This rule requires a law firm to make sure that Software Company takes reasonable steps to ensure work is done competently and to protect client confidences. This would require a reference check of a vendor’s credentials, understanding the vendor’s security policies and protocols, using confidentiality agreements, and ensuring the availability and accessibility of a legal forum for legal relief for violation of the vendor agreement. See also Missouri Informal Opinion 2021-03.
• Rule 4-5.4 – Professional Independence. A lawyer must maintain independent judgment when using AI software and not rely solely on content created by the generative software.

Lawyer should also refer to Missouri Informal Opinion 2024-11 for additional guidance under the Rules of Professional Conduct for development of a generative AI use policy. 

Answer to question two: The issue of whether the Software’s real-time “listening” feature complies with the Rules of Professional Conduct is a complex issue which involves the application of evolving substantive law, court rules, and various Rules of Professional Conduct. 

This office cannot comment or opine on the specific issue of whether the notice of deposition constitutes consent by the deponent to use of the Software. This would require interpretation of substantive privacy laws, procedural discovery rules, and other rules, all of which are beyond the scope of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 

The Rules of Professional Conduct do not specifically address whether a lawyer must advise the client, the court, opposing counsel, or the deponent of the use of AI software. As discussed above, it is necessary to obtain informed client consent for the use of AI software if confidential client information is uploaded into the AI system. 

There are several Rules of Professional Conduct that may need to be considered regarding providing notice to the other entities Lawyer has listed in the question. Rule 4-3.4(c) requires a lawyer to obey court rules or orders. Rule 4-4.4(a), in turn, provides that in representing a client, a lawyer shall not use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of a person. Thus, if local rules, standing court orders, discovery rules, or privacy laws require notice to any of the entities set forth in your question, a lawyer must provide such notice. 

If there are no local rules, standing court orders, discovery rules, or privacy laws requiring disclosure, Rules 4-4.1(a) should be considered. Rule 4-4.1(a) requires that a lawyer not knowingly make a false statement of material fact to a third person. Under this rule, partially true, but misleading statements or omissions as to the use of AI software, may violate the Rule. See Rule 4-4.1, Comment [1]. 

Formal Opinion 123 also may offer insight into the application of the Rules of Professional Conduct to the questions Lawyer poses. This opinion addresses a lawyer recording a conversation without notification to the other party. This could be viewed as similar to the use of the “listening” feature of the Software without providing notice to all interested parties. The Missouri Advisory Committee opined that in some circumstances an attorney may record a conversation, to which the attorney is a party, without notifying the other party to the conversation if that is consistent with other law. The Missouri Advisory Committee noted that there were certain circumstances when notification was required. These include when: (1) laws prohibit the recording in the jurisdiction in which the recording would occur, (2) the attorney states or implies that the conversation is not being recorded, and (3) the conversation is between the attorney and the client. The Missouri Advisory Committee noted that the list of exceptions is not exhaustive. 

Based upon the requirements of Rule 4-4.1 and Formal Opinion 123, at a minimum, a lawyer should not misrepresent the use of any AI software. In accordance with Rules 4-3.4(c) and 4-4.4(a) and Formal Opinion 123, a lawyer should also review substantive law, procedural rules, and court orders to ensure that there are no disclosure requirements. If any disclosure requirements exist, a lawyer must comply with the requirements.

2026-10 

Publication date: Aug. 3, 2026 

Rules: 4-1.6 

Summary: lawyer’s disclosure of confidential information to establish a fee and necessary protective measures 

Question: Lawyer is pursuing an action for unpaid fees against Former Client. Lawyer asks whether it is permissible to present or discuss the factual basis, including disclosure of the time entries, associated with a claim against Former Client for payment of Lawyer’s fees before the court? 

Answer: Lawyer is permitted to make limited disclosures to establish Lawyer’s fee as provided in Rule 4-1.6(b), which states that “[a] lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: ... (3) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client….” Further, Comment [9] to Rule 4-1.6 states: “A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by Rule 4-1.6(b)(3) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary.” Missouri Informal Opinion 2013-02 addresses a similar factual scenario and encourages lawyers to consider protective measures as described in Comment [12] to Rule 4-1.6. This includes limiting access to information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it, or the use of appropriate protective orders or other arrangements be taken to limit the information revealed to establish the claim. It is also important to note that Missouri Informal Opinion 2015-09 provides that fees paid by clients are confidential, hence the need for the protective measures described in Comment [12] to Rule 4-1.6. 

2026-11 

Publication date: Aug. 3, 2026 

Rules: 4-1.6 and 4-1.9 

Summary: confidentiality issues for lawyer subpoenaed for deposition regarding a former client 

Question: Ten years ago, Lawyer A created a declaration of trust for property for a client, Grantor, and named one of Grantor’s children, Child 1, as trustee. Lawyer A also did additional estate planning for Grantor. Five years ago, Lawyer B amended the declaration of trust to add another child of Grantor, Child 2, as a co-trustee with Child 1. Two years ago, Grantor passed away. A dispute arose between the co-trustees as to the property in the declaration of trust, and Child 1 sued Child 2. Lawyer A has been subpoenaed to testify as to Grantor’s intent as to the property in trust, as well as the rest of the estate plan. Would Lawyer A violate any Rules of Professional Conduct if Lawyer A sat for a deposition or testified pursuant to a subpoena at trial in the underlying litigation between Child 1 and Child 2? 

Answer: The Rules of Professional Conduct do not prohibit Lawyer A, per se, from testifying during a deposition or at trial pursuant to subpoena in the underlying litigation, however, Rules 4-1.9(c) and 4-1.6 may severely restrict Lawyer A’s ability to testify to relevant issues in the underlying lawsuit. Rule 4-1.9 addresses a lawyer’s duty to former clients. Subsection (c)(2) provides that a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not reveal information relating to the representation except as permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 4-1.6(a), in turn, provides that a lawyer may not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives the lawyer informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by Rule 4-1.6(b). 

Rule 4-1.6 survives the death of a client. See Comment [17] to Rule 4-1.6 and Missouri Informal Opinion 990146. The confidentiality provisions of Rule 4-1.6 are much broader than the substantive law issues of attorney-client and work product privileges. Confidentiality covers all information related to the representation, no matter its source.² See Rule 4-1.6, Comment [3]. 

Thus, Rule 4-1.6 will prohibit Lawyer from revealing information about Grantor’s estate planning unless the disclosure was impliedly authorized, Grantor gave informed consent to Lawyer to do so, or one of the Rule 4-1.6(b) exceptions apply. 

Informed consent as used in Rule 4-1.6 is defined as the “agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” Rule 4-1.0(e). 

Rule 4-1.6(b) provides that “[a] lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: …(4) to comply with other law or a court order.” Determining if there is “other law” that permits disclosure of the Grantor’s confidences is a matter of law and beyond the scope of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyer A should consult Comment [10] to Rule 4-1.6 for additional guidance as to any possible exception at law and use independent professional judgment on this issue. 

A subpoena is not enough to require disclosure of client confidences. Rather it must be a court order and Lawyer A must assert “all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by other law or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or other applicable law.” Comment [11] to Rule 4-1.6. If the court orders the disclosure of client confidences and an appeal is not sought, Lawyer A may comply with the court’s order. See Comment [11] to Rule 4-1.6; see also Missouri Informal Advisory Opinions 20060004, 20010154, 2017-04, 2026-04, and 2026-06.

In the event that disclosure is permitted by Rule 4-1.6(b), Lawyer A should consult Comments [12] and [13] to Rule 4-1.6 for guidance on ensuring that the disclosure is only to the extent Lawyer A reasonably believes is necessary to accomplish the specified purpose.

Endnotes
1 Footnote 1 to Informal Opinion 2026-06. Rule 4-1.6 on confidentiality “not only applies to matters communicated in confidence by the client, but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source.” Rule 4-1.6, Comment [3]. Related bodies of law address confidentiality through attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine, which apply in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or to produce evidence regarding a client, but interpretations of those principles are matters of law and beyond the scope of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 4-1.6, Comment [3].
2 Footnote 1 to Informal Opinion 2026-11. Related bodies of law address confidentiality through attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine, but interpretations of those principles are matters of law and beyond the scope of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Rule 4–1.6, Comment [3].

View photos from the day’s celebration on The Missouri Bar's Facebook page.

David Sheilley, who recently graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law, said he felt relieved to be officially sworn in as a lawyer. 

“I’m glad that we’re finally here," Sheilley said. 

Looking back on his journey, he said, he appreciated the challenge of law school. He is currently employed at Watters Wolf Bub Hansmann in St. Louis and is looking forward to getting into the courtroom for the first time. 

Laura Rodriguez del Rey, a Chilean lawyer, said she recently got her second law degree, this time from Florida International University. She will practice business immigration law from her home in Miami, and will be one of the 21.7% of Missouri Bar members who practice outside of the state. 

She was joined by her family, including her son, at Friday's enrollment ceremony. 

“I think that the best also is showing years later to my son what I did and (that) he could have a role model to do whatever he wants," Rodriguez del Rey said. 

She said that getting to this point felt like an amazing accomplishment, and that it hadn't been easy.  

The Missouri Bar is here to help lawyers even better serve their clients and communities. Enrollees can view the plethora of resources available to them at MoBar.org/New-Members. In addition, The Missouri Bar Young Lawyers’ Section sent welcome packets to the state’s enrollees.

Jennifer M. Crompton is 2026-2027 Missouri Bar president and trial lawyer and chief operating officer at Crompton Pancoast in St. Louis.

Dear colleagues, 

It is a tremendous honor to serve as president of The Missouri Bar during the coming bar year. 

Serving on The Missouri Bar Young Lawyers’ Section Council and the Board of Governors has given me invaluable insight into the important work the bar performs each day on behalf of lawyers and all Missourians. Leadership, public service, and a desire to give back are enduring tenets of our profession. They connect us to one another, strengthen our communities, and help sustain public confidence in the rule of law. 

One focus especially important to me is education, particularly civic education that informs and engages our fellow Missourians and communities. As lawyers, we have both the knowledge and opportunity to help Missourians better understand our government, our rights, and the role of the courts in our constitutional system. 

The Missouri Bar also has a strong commitment to education, from high-quality continuing legal education for Missouri lawyers to programs for students, teachers, and adults who want to deepen their understanding of our system of government. 

During an election year, education involving the judicial branch deserves particular attention. The future of Missouri’s courts depends on an informed public, and many voters seek guidance about the judges appearing on their ballots. 

Adopted by voters in 1940 and later placed in the Missouri Constitution, the state’s Non-Partisan Court Plan, also known as The Missouri Plan, is addressed in Article V, § 25. All voters have the opportunity to vote regarding retention of judges of the Supreme Court of Missouri and the Missouri Court of Appeals for their region. Six circuit courts — the City of St. Louis and Clay, Jackson, Platte, St. Louis, and Greene counties — also have retention elections for all associate circuit and circuit judges under The Missouri Plan. 

The Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee — including lawyers, retired judges, and Missouri residents — completes an anonymous evaluation of each judge up for retention under The Missouri Plan to ensure they are meeting judicial performance standards. The committee reviews written opinions and surveys completed by lawyers who have appeared before the judge and, when applicable, jurors who have served in the judge’s courtroom. The committee then recommends whether a judge should or should not be retained, and its findings are publicly available online at YourMissouriJudges.org to help educate voters. 

Fifty judges under The Missouri Plan will be on the ballot in November, having gone through the judicial performance review process. 

In addition, to help the public even better understand the judicial branch and Missouri’s court system more broadly, The Missouri Bar Board of Governors recently created the Education Outreach Network, which connects volunteer lawyers with community organizations seeking informative, accessible presentations. 

The Missouri Bar provides participating lawyers with resources, including a presenter tool kit and audience handouts. The Missouri Bar offers both shorter and longer versions of the presentation, allowing each volunteer to tailor the program to the audience and the time available. Lawyers can present in classrooms, libraries, civic organizations, community centers, and many other settings.

You can sign up to present about civic education topics by completing the form at MoBar.org/EducationOutreach.

The bar’s goal is to give every Missouri lawyer an opportunity to serve as an educational resource in their community. Lawyers are uniquely positioned to advance civic understanding and provide reliable information. By encouraging thoughtful dialogue and sharing clear, accurate explanations, we help our neighbors appreciate the rule of law and the constitutional principles that guide our nation and our state. This service reflects the oath we took to uphold the Missouri Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. 

The Education Outreach Network needs lawyer volunteers throughout the state. A single conversation can help participants develop a stronger connection to their government and greater confidence in their role as citizens. 

I have seen the value of this outreach firsthand. During the spring, I spoke with American government high school students. This fall, I plan to present at the local library in conjunction with the area chamber of commerce and to a group of law students. Each audience brings different questions and perspectives, yet all share an interest in understanding how our system works and why it matters. These conversations

I invite each of you to consider volunteering. Whether you deliver one presentation or make outreach a regular part of your service, your participation will have a meaningful impact. Together, Missouri’s 31,000-plus lawyers can help build informed communities, strengthen confidence in our courts, and support the constitutional framework that serves us all. 

Thank you for the many ways you already lead and serve. I look forward to working with you during the coming year and to advancing The Missouri Bar’s mission.

Mischa Buford Epps is executive director of The Missouri Bar.

How fitting that, on Constitution Day during our Annual Meeting and this 250th anniversary year of the founding of our nation, Chief Justice W. Brent Powell led Missouri lawyers from across the state in reaffirming our oath of admission. We reaffirmed our allegiance to the constitutions of the United States and Missouri; reaffirmed our commitment to truth and professional, civil, and ethical service; and reaffirmed our responsibility to advance civic understanding and assist our fellow Missourians. Thank you, Chief Justice Powell, for an inspiring address reminding us of the distinct honor and responsibilities that come with our oath as lawyers. Read the full address here.

At Annual Meeting, we also recognized several Missouri lawyers and judges who have made impactful contributions to their communities and our profession. Read more about these individuals at MoBar.org/Awards, and remember to nominate a deserving individual next year when nominations open. Thank you to the sponsors, attendees, presenters, volunteers, and staff who helped make this year’s Annual Meeting a success.

I also want to take a moment to thank our 2025-2026 Missouri Bar President Athena Dickson for her service to the profession over the last year and her leadership in strengthening efforts to educate the public on the role of courts, judicial selection, and Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan.

I also welcome our 2026-2027 Missouri Bar President Jennifer M. Crompton. As a trial lawyer and adjunct professor, she brings a passion for education and a wealth of experience that will redound to the bar this year. Please take a few minutes to read her first “President’s Page” column and profile piece in this issue of the Journal.

Like President Crompton’s passion for education, you too can make an impact through The Missouri Bar this year, whether you’re in your first year of practice or are one of the recently recognized Senior Counselors.

Reaffirm your commitment to being involved. Joining a committee is an excellent first step. There are nearly 40 to choose from, so there’s sure to be one that suits your interests. Many of them will convene virtually Nov. 16-19, where you can keep up with the latest developments, network, and gain practical takeaways to help you in your practice.

There are other opportunities to volunteer through the bar such as presenting a CLE program, writing an article for the Journal, providing pro bono services through Missouri.FreeLegalAnswers.org, or speaking to students or community groups through the Education Outreach Network. You can learn about these opportunities and more at MoBar.org/Get-Involved.

As voters prepare for elections Nov. 3, we have the opportunity to educate our fellow Missourians about Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan, also known as The Missouri Plan, which has been adopted by dozens of states in some form. Regardless of your political affiliation, I encourage you to vote and help your friends and family understand how The Missouri Plan works and the importance of retention elections.

To help in these efforts, the Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee has completed its evaluations. The committee considered a variety of information about each of the 50 judges standing for retention, including lawyers’ ratings of the judges, jurors’ ratings of some trial judges, and written opinions from judges. Access these items and the committee’s recommendations at YourMissouriJudges.org.

Thanks to each of you who took the time to collaborate, encourage, and teach over the last year. Your contributions make not only our profession stronger, but our communities stronger. As we reaffirm our commitment and answer Chief Justice Powell’s call to action to use our education and privilege to serve others and endeavor every single day to fulfill our oath, I look forward to all we can accomplish together.

W. Dudley McCarter, a former president of The Missouri Bar, is of counsel with the firm of McCarthy, Leonard, Kaemmerer and Miller.

Homeowners association cannot prohibit solar panels

Eikmeier v. Granite Springs Home Owners Association, Inc., 727 S.W.3d 432 (Mo. banc 2026).

Homeowners Colleen Eikmeier and William Love purchased a lot in a subdivision subject to covenants banning solar panels. Shortly after, the Missouri General Assembly enacted § 442.404.3 proscribing any covenant from limiting or prohibiting installation of solar panels. The circuit court denied the homeowners’ injunctive relief, stating the statute could not apply to preexisting covenants. However, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the decision.¹

“[S]tatutes are presumed to operate prospectively”² unless “the legislative intent that they be given retroactive operation clearly appears from the express language of the act or by necessary or unavoidable implication.”³ If the statute can operate retroactively, it can “look or act backward from its effective date.”⁴ The Supreme Court of Missouri found, “based on the express language of the statute, the legislature intended broad applicability, extending to those covenants already in existence.”⁵

The homeowners argued Missouri’s public policy encourages solar energy usage,⁶ and solar energy is a recognized property right in the state.⁷ Considering this, the homeowners added the four-month delay before the statute’s enactment “could not have served any purpose other than to permit homeowners’ associations to (1) remove covenants limiting or prohibiting the installation of solar panels and/or (2) adopt the rules envisioned by section 442.404.3(2).” The Court agreed, stating § 442.404.3 “did not remove oversight from homeowners’ associations and their legitimate interest in harmonizing improvements within subdivisions. The statute removes the ability to impose merely one prohibition.”⁸

The circuit court erred in finding section 442.404.3 applies solely to newly created homeowners’ associations filing covenants after the statute’s effective date. Section 442.404.3 applies to all covenants, including those in existence before the statute’s effective date.⁹

Missouri Human Rights Act does not cover acts outside

Missouri Sciortino v. Ozark Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 726 S.W.3d 755 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).

Carrie Sciortino appealed the circuit court’s judgment dismissing her lawsuit asserting claims for relief under the Missouri Human Rights Act against employer Ozark National Life Insurance Company. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, affirmed the dismissal.¹⁰

The MHRA requires a person be “aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice” before filing a complaint with the MHRA.¹¹ While “aggrieved” is not defined by the MHRA, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that a plaintiff must have suffered an adverse impact from an unlawful discriminatory practice while physically present in Missouri before they can bring an actionable claim under the MHRA.¹² That logic is due to “the longstanding presumption that Missouri statutes, absent express text to the contrary, apply only within the boundaries of this state and have no extraterritorial effect.”¹³

In this case, the court found that Sciortino “failed to plead facts in her amended petition that entitle her to relief under the MHRA,” because Sciortino may have been aggrieved in Louisiana, not Missouri.¹⁴

Property owner has no duty to clear sidewalks from ice and snow accumulated from general weather conditions

Brandes v. Bothwell Reg’l Health Ctr., 725 S.W.3d 283 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).

Larry Brandes appealed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Bothwell Regional Health Center on his claim that Bothwell was negligent in failing to clear the ice and snow from its sidewalk that Brandes slipped on. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, affirmed the judgment.¹⁵

To prevail on a claim of negligence based on premises liability, “the plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, the defendant failed to perform that duty, and the defendant’s failure proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.”¹⁶ Generally, whoever possesses the land owes an invitee the duty to make the property safe from known dangers and dangers that should have been known.¹⁷ However, under the Massachusetts Rule, “an invitor has no duty to remove snow or ice on outside areas where the snow or ice accumulated naturally as a result of general weather conditions within the community.”¹⁸ The Massachusetts Rule is

reasonable[,] for where the condition is one general to the community it creates a natural hazard to everyone who ventures out at such time. The condition is brought about by no one and no one’s efforts can appreciably lessen the danger present.¹⁹

The Massachusetts Rule does not negate a duty owed, however, “where one is obligated to remove snow and ice either by agreement or a course of conduct over a period of time.”²⁰

The Missouri Court of Appeals found:

[I]n the absence of actual alteration of the snow or ice on the sidewalk before Brandes fell, the “course of conduct” exception to the Massachusetts Rule is not established. At best,the controverted facts Brandes has highlighted establish that Bothwell had general snow removal policies. However, “[t]he existence of a snow removal policy alone does not create a duty to remove snow or ice.”²¹

Public figure must show actual malice to prevail on defamation claim

Allsberry v. Flynn, 730 S.W.3d 271 (Mo. App. E.D. 2026).

Circuit Clerk Karla Allsberry filed a lawsuit against Hon. Patrick Flynn for defamation and other claims. The trial court granted summary judgment to Flynn, and the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed the judgment.²²

Defamation law protects an individual against harm to their reputation.²³ To prevail on a defamation claim, “the plaintiff must prove that, with the requisite degree of fault, the defendant published a false and defamatory statement identifying the plaintiff, which damaged the plaintiff’s reputation.”²⁴ The requisite degree of fault for a public figure like Allsberry is actual malice.²⁵

“Despite the ordinary understanding of the word ‘malice,’ in the defamation context, ‘[a]ctual malice’ is not about whether [the defendant] had ill will toward [the plaintiff]”²⁶ or that the defendant “acted out of spite, or to injure the plaintiff, or because of animosity.”²⁷ Rather, actual malice occurs when “a defendant had actual knowledge that the alleged defamatory statement was false or acted with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity at a time when the defendant had serious doubts as to its truth.”²⁸

The Court of Appeals noted that proof of falsity does not equal proof of malice,²⁹ so Allsberry’s “repeated insistence that the statements [made by Flynn] were untrue is misplaced as it does not show that Flynn … knew the statements were false.”³⁰

Even if there was evidence that Flynn’s … conduct in making the defamatory statements was indecent, atrocious, and intolerable, that would not necessarily be probative of whether [he] had actual knowledge that the statements were false when [he] made them.

Finally, to the extent that Flynn … harbored ill-will or animosity toward Allsberry, wanted to harm her reputation, or acted out of spite, those sentiments do not, without more, establish the element of actual malice in a defamation claim.³¹

Endnotes
1 Eikmeier v. Granite Springs Home Owners Association, Inc., 727 S.W.3d 432 (Mo. banc 2026).
2 Cedar Cnty. Comm’n v. Parson, 661 S.W.3d 766, 774 (Mo. banc 2023).
3 Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Mo. banc 1982).
4 Cedar Cnty. Comm’n, 661 S.W.3d at 774 (brackets removed from quote).
5 Eikmeier, 727 S.W.3d at 438.
6 Id.
7 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 442.012.1.
8 Eikmeier, 727 S.W.3d at 441.
9 Id. at 442.
10 Sciortino v. Ozark Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 726 S.W.3d 755 (Mo. App. 2025).
11 Tuttle v. Dobbs Tire & Auto Ctrs., Inc., 590 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Mo. banc 2019) (citing §§ 213.075.1, 213.111.1 (2016)).
12 Id. at 310-11.
13 Tuttle, 590 S.W.3d at 311 (citing Rostizky v. Rostizky, 46 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Mo. 1931); Stanley v. Wabash St. L. Ry. Co., 13 S.W. 709, 710 (Mo. 1890)).
14 Sciortino, 726 S.W.3d at 761.
15 Brandes v. Bothwell Reg’l Health Ctr., 725 S.W.3d 283 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).
16 A.R.R. v. Tau Kappa Epsilon Fraternity, Inc., 649 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (quoting L.A.C. ex rel. D.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W.3d 247, 257 (Mo. banc 2002)).
17 Ford v. Ford Motor Co., 585 S.W.3d 317, 332 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019).
18 Medlock v. St. John Health Sys., Inc., 426 S.W.3d 35, 38 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (quoting Willis v. Springfield Gen. Osteopathic Hosp., 804 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Mo. App. S.D. 1991)).
19 Woodley v. Bush, 272 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Mo. App. 1954).
20 Medlock, 426 S.W.3d at 38 (citing Willis, 804 S.W.2d at 419).
21 Brandes, 725 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting Medlock, 426 S.W.3d at 39 n.5).
22 Allsberry v. Flynn, 730 S.W.3d 271 (Mo. App. E.D. 2026).
23 Smith v. Humane Soc’y of United States, 519 S.W.3d 789, 798 (Mo. banc 2017).
24 Id.
25 Bauer v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 391 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012).
26 Allsberry, 730 S.W.3d at 279 (quoting Bugg v. Vanhooser Holsen & Eftink P.C., 152 S.W.3d 373, 377 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (emphasis added)).
27 Smith v. UAW-CIO Fed. Credit Union, 728 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Mo. App. W.D. 1987); Wright v. Over-The-Rd. & City Transfer Drivers, Helpers, Dockmen & Warehousemen, Loc. Union No. 41, 945 S.W.2d 481, 497 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997).
28 Bauer, 391 S.W.3d at 28.
29 Westhouse v. Biondo, 990 S.W.2d 68, 72 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999).
30 Allsberry, 730 S.W.3d at 280.
31 Id.; See Bugg, 152 S.W.3d at 377; Smith, 728 S.W.2d at 683; Wright, 945 S.W.2d at 497.

Jeff Schoenberger is a business coach for Lawyerist and a senior consultant for Affinity Consulting.

Year-end accounting is a little like a dental appointment. Putting it off does not make it go away, and waiting usually makes the eventual experience more unpleasant.

December will be busy, but it does not have to be chaotic. Do not wait until Dec. 31 to start preparing your law firm’s year-end accounting. A little work now means cleaner books, better information, and fewer surprises later, giving you space to focus on other year-end tasks and your clients, while also helping you remain in compliance with Missouri’s Rules of Professional Conduct.

Get your books up to date

Start with the obvious: Ensure your accounting records reflect reality.

Confirm checks, deposits, credit card transactions, electronic payments, and other activities have been entered and your bank and credit card accounts are reconciled. If your accountant provided adjusting entries after preparing last year’s tax return, confirm someone posted them.

Then, look for repeat offenders. If your accountant corrected something last year, see whether you are making the same mistake again. Accounting errors, like weeds, have an irritating habit of returning.

Pay particular attention to:

• Payroll: Confirm that payroll, payroll taxes, benefits, and related expenses are going to the appropriate accounts.
• Loans and lines of credit: Ensure principal and interest are recorded correctly.
• Credit cards: Do not let a payment to the credit card company obscure what you bought. Verify the underlying transactions are allocated to the appropriate expense or asset accounts.
• Owner transactions: Ask your accountant to review distributions, contributions, draws, reimbursements, and other owner-related transactions if you are unsure how they should appear on the books.

Do this while transactions are fresh. “I think that $487 charge was for the office” becomes considerably less persuasive months later.

Reconcile your trust accounts

Make sure every trust transaction has been entered and attributed to the correct client or matter. Review individual client ledgers for unusual balances, including negative balances and money sitting in trust after a matter concluded.

Then, reconcile the trust account. A three-way reconciliation compares: (1) the adjusted bank balance; (2) the trust account’s book or register balance; and (3) the total of the individual client ledger balances. Those numbers should agree. If they do not, find the discrepancy rather than treating “close enough” as an accounting principle.

Rule 4-1.15(a)(7) requires lawyers to reconcile client trust accounts “reasonably promptly each time an official statement from the financial institution is provided or available.” If your bank provides statements monthly, make reconciliation part of your monthly routine, not a December cleanup project.

While you are reviewing trust balances, pay particular attention to old funds. Money remaining after a matter closes may signal an uncashed check, an overlooked refund, an earned but untransferred fee, or another issue requiring investigation.

Turn work into money

Run an accounts receivable report. Identify invoices that are 30-, 60-, or 90-plus days old and clients who need a reminder, payment plan, or more direct conversation.

Then, look at unbilled work in progress. Time sitting in your billing system ages like milk, not wine. Ensure timekeepers have entered their time and expenses, review draft bills, and send invoices promptly.

If your firm uses evergreen retainers, review client balances against your replenishment policies and engagement agreements. Make sure clients who need to replenish funds are doing so.

Clean up vendor records

Collecting W-9s from vendors remains good advice, although the federal reporting rules changed for 2026.

For nonemployee compensation paid in 2026, the general Form 1099-NEC reporting threshold increased from $600 to $2,000. Different rules and exceptions apply to some payments — including certain payments involving lawyers — so work with your tax professional to determine which information your firm must file.

Regardless of the threshold, collecting a W-9 when you establish a vendor relationship is considerably easier than determining in January that you need one.

Review your vendor list now for missing tax identification information and inconsistent names or addresses. Going forward, make collecting a W-9 part of your vendor-onboarding process.

Review major purchases

If you purchased computers, furniture, equipment, or other significant assets during 2026 — or plan to before year-end — talk with your accountant about how those purchases should be treated.

Current federal tax law allows some qualifying business property to be deducted immediately or depreciated more quickly. Eligibility, timing, and state tax treatment can complicate matters, so this is an excellent place to let your accountant earn their keep.

Give your accountant better expense categories

Many qualifying business meals remain subject to a 50% federal deduction limitation. Beginning in 2026, however, employers generally can no longer deduct certain employer-provided meals that were previously deductible, including some meals provided for the employer’s convenience. Other expenses, including qualifying employee recreational or social events, may receive different treatment.

Give your accountant enough information to apply the rules. Ask how they want client meals, employee meals, office food, holiday parties, and similar transactions categorized. Do not dump everything into one giant “Meals” bucket and wish your accountant good luck.

Apply the same thinking to other expenses that regularly require reclassification at year-end.

Look beyond the tax return

Use year-end preparation to examine how the firm performed in 2026. Consider reviewing:

• revenue and collections
• accounts receivable and aging
• realization and collection rates
• unbilled work in progress
• expenses
• profitability
• timekeeper performance
• performance by practice area
• progress toward the firm’s annual goals

Pick a handful of numbers that tell you whether the firm is healthy and moving in the right direction.

Give people information while they can still act on it. “You missed your annual goal by 100 hours” is history in January. “You are 40 hours behind pace with three months remaining” is management information.

Use 2026 to plan 2027

Once the books are current, turn around and look forward.

Use actual 2026 results to begin a 2027 budget. Consider anticipated changes in staffing, compensation, rent, insurance, software, marketing, equipment, and other significant expenses. Discuss expected owner compensation and tax-planning issues with your accountant.

Then look at cash flow.

Estimate when significant expenses will occur and when revenue is likely to arrive. If January and February are traditionally slow collection months, knowing that before year-end gives you time to build an appropriate reserve.

Give your accountant a head start

Finally, ask your accountant what they want from you. Every accountant has a slightly different preferred process. They may want particular reports, reconciliations, loan statements, payroll information, asset-purchase documentation, or explanations of unusual transactions.

Your accountant may also identify tax-planning decisions that need to happen before Dec. 31. On Jan. 1, some planning opportunities become history. The specifics will depend on your firm’s entity structure, accounting method, jurisdiction, owners, and financial circumstances.

A better year-end starts before year-end

Good financial systems make a law firm easier to manage. Clean books help you understand what you earned, what you spent, what clients owe you, and where the business is headed. Regular trust-account reconciliation protects clients and the firm. Better processes also mean less time spent reconstructing the past at year-end.

Remember to utilize The Missouri Bar’s Law Practice Management Center for no-cost practice resources and member benefits to help law firms with end-of-year tasks. Access your member resources at MoBar.org/LPM.

Starting now will turn your year-end accounting from an emergency into a process.

St. Louis-based law firm Lewis Rice is pleased to announce eight new associates: Carrie Bennett, Emma Bruntrager, Matthew Hemmersmeier, Phoebe Leach, Darrwin Perkins II, Alexi-Julia Smith, Lawson Tyrone and M. Thomas Yang.

“We’re excited to welcome this very talented group of attorneys to join Lewis Rice,” said Chairman Richard B. Walsh Jr. “They strengthen our client advocacy and bring valuable experience from the courts, government and private practice. Their skills and dedication will serve our clients well and support our firm for years to come.”

Carrie M. Bennett shapes her attentive, client-focused approach in Lewis Rice’s Litigation Department by bringing 18 years of experience as a teacher, counselor and literacy specialist. She spent both law school summers at Lewis Rice and graduated cum laude from Saint Louis University School of Law, where she completed a judicial internship at the Missouri Court of Appeals.

Emma C. Bruntrager served in several roles at the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, including senior law clerk to Judge Renee D. Hardin-Tammons and term law clerk to Judge Christian M. Stevens prior to joining Lewis Rice’s Litigation Department. At Saint Louis University School of Law, she held a faculty fellowship and completed a judicial externship with Judge James M. Dowd.

Matthew R. Hemmersmeier joins Lewis Rice’s Corporate Department after spending two summers with the firm as a summer associate. At Washington University School of Law, he completed the dual J.D. and LL.M. in Taxation program and served as executive notes editor of the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, which published his article on the Corporate Transparency Act.

Phoebe D. Leach advises clients on estate and gift tax matters in the firm’s Estate Planning Department. Before joining Lewis Rice, she clerked for Judge Mark V. Holmes of the U.S. Tax Court. At Georgetown University Law Center, she served as chief executive editor of the Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy and externed for U.S. Sen. Eric Schmitt.

Darrwin E. Perkins II joins the firm’s Corporate Department after spending both law school summers at Lewis Rice. At Saint Louis University School of Law, he earned a concentration in health law and served as editor-in-chief of the Saint Louis University Journal of Health Law & Policy. He also completed a legal externship with BJC HealthCare.
Alexi-Julia Smith represents buyers and sellers in mergers and acquisitions and other strategic and private equity transactions in the firm’s Corporate Department. She earned her law degree from Howard University School of Law and practiced in the Washington, D.C., office of Goodwin Procter LLP, advising private equity sponsors and portfolio companies on domestic and cross-border deals before returning to her hometown of St. Louis.

Lawson C. Tyrone focuses on construction law in the Corporate Department. Before law school, he worked in project management for JE Dunn Construction in Austin, Texas, including on Apple Inc.’s corporate campus. At the University of Arkansas School of Law, he served as articles editor of the Journal of Food Law & Policy and spent both summers at Lewis Rice.

M. Thomas Yang joins the Litigation Department after spending his law school summers at Lewis Rice. At the University of Missouri School of Law, he received the Guy A. Thompson Award for Best Student Note in 2025 while serving as senior note and comment editor for the Missouri Law Review. He also served as a student advocate in the Mizzou Law Veterans Clinic, helping draft briefs supporting veterans’ disability appeals before the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.

Kathleen Overton is a lawyer at Paths Law Firm in the Kansas City area and will join Chinnery, Evans & Nail in November 2026. Her practice focuses on estate planning, elder law, Medicaid planning, probate, and trust administration. She earned her J.D. from the University of Oklahoma College of Law, graduating with distinction, and her LL.M. in taxation, with a certificate in estate planning, from Boston University.

The Holloways 

Jack and Susan Holloway, a fictional married Missouri farm couple in their late 60s, own and control a multigenerational northwest Missouri farming operation comprising approximately 4,800 acres of highly appreciated farmland, acquired through inheritance and purchase.¹ In addition to the land, the family’s balance sheet includes equipment, grain inventory, and other farm operations. Combined, the family’s aggregate wealth exceeds $27 million. But as is common among farming families, much of that value is illiquid land and operating assets, not cash. 

The Holloways have three adult children: Ethan, a full-time farmer on the family farm; Claire, a certified public accountant in Kansas City; and Megan, a teacher in St. Louis. Jack and Susan’s goals include preserving the farm indefinitely for their descendants, treating all descendants fairly, providing ongoing benefits to future generations, and allowing descendants who farm to maintain operational control. 

One possible solution is to use generation-skipping transfer-exempt Missouri dynasty trusts to keep the land in the family while giving on-farm heirs sufficient control to keep the farm operating and off-farm heirs the benefit of the family’s resources. Indeed, Missouri’s rule against perpetuities reform and favorable trust law make it a prime jurisdiction for such dynasty trust planning. This article examines the GST tax framework, Missouri’s reform of the rule against perpetuities, and factors to consider when designing and drafting a GST-exempt Missouri dynasty trust.

Federal generation-skipping transfer tax framework 

The Holloways’ plan must consider more than just dispositive provisions. To achieve their goals of providing for future generations and maintaining ownership of the family farm, the plan must also address the generation-skipping transfer tax. Before crafting a successful plan for them, the estate planner must understand the GST tax structure and why minimizing it is critical to the family. 

Purpose of the GST tax 

When structuring the federal transfer tax, the federal government assumed that each generation would pass on wealth to the next and that it would impose a transfer tax on each transfer. Before 1976, wealthy families could avoid one level of the transfer tax by leaving a portion of their wealth to grandchildren or future generations, either outright or in trust. When left in trust, one or more individuals could still have beneficial enjoyment of the assets, including powers over and interests in them, without incurring transfer tax liability, so long as the property remained in trust. Recognizing this planning technique, in 1976 Congress enacted the generation-skipping transfer tax as a backstop to prevent wealthy families from avoiding transfer taxes by skipping over generations of beneficiaries. 

The GST tax is housed in 26 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2664 and applies to assets that skip one generation and transfer to the next without being subject to the estate or gift tax. Every individual, however, is allowed a GST exemption amount — separate from the federal estate and gift tax exemption — that may be allocated to property transferred by the individual to insulate it from GST tax.² Beginning in 2004, I.R.C. § 2631 tied the GST exemption amount to the estate/gift unified credit system, making it equal to the estate tax applicable exclusion amount,³ currently $15 million per person, indexed for inflation.⁴ 

GST tax applicability 

GST tax is imposed when property is subject to a generation-skipping transfer. Such a transfer occurs when property passes to a “skip person,” or a person assigned to a generation that is at least two or more generations younger than the transferor’s generation.⁵ There are generally three types of generation-skipping transfers: (1) the direct skip, (2) the taxable distribution, and (3) the taxable termination. 

A direct skip occurs when the transferor transfers the asset, either during life or at death, directly to a skip person or to a trust that qualifies as a skip person.⁶ For example, if the Holloways were to transfer the land directly to their grandchild or a trust for the benefit of their grandchildren, bypassing Ethan and his sisters, either now or at the survivor’s death, the transfer would be subject to both the estate/gift tax and the GST tax as soon as the transfer occurs.⁷ 

Next, the GST tax applies to a taxable distribution. A taxable distribution occurs when income or principal is distributed from a trust to a skip person.⁸ For example, Jack and Susan could create a trust for the benefit of Ethan, Claire, Megan, and their grandchildren. The trust could provide for distributions of income and principal to all beneficiaries, at the trustee’s discretion. Because Jack and Susan’s children, who are non-skip persons, are beneficiaries of the trust, the trust is not a skip person, and the transfer to the trust is not a direct skip. But, when the trustee distributes either income or principal to Jack and Susan’s grandchildren, it is a taxable distribution and subject to GST tax. 

The final situation in which GST applies is a taxable termination. A taxable termination occurs when a beneficiary’s interest in a trust is terminated.⁹ For example, the Holloways create a trust that pays income to Ethan, Claire, and Megan for their lives, but upon the death of the last of them, the remainder is distributed to Jack and Susan’s grandson, if living. At the death of the last Holloway child, there is a taxable termination because the trust property passes to a skip person, a grandson. 

GST tax calculation 

Calculating the GST tax due is a two-step process: (1) determining the applicable fraction and (2) determining the inclusion ratio. The applicable fraction determines the portion of a trust or property transferred in a direct skip that is exempt from GST tax because of the GST exemption allocated to that trust or property.¹⁰ The numerator of the applicable fraction is the amount of the GST exemption allocated to the property transferred to a trust or to the direct skip.¹¹ The denominator of the applicable fraction is the fair market value of the transferred property at the time of the transfer.¹² 

Next, the inclusion ratio is calculated by subtracting the applicable fraction from one.¹³ It determines which portion of the trust or property transferred to a direct skip is subject to GST tax. To determine the applicable tax rate, the inclusion ratio is multiplied by the highest marginal estate tax rate in effect at the time, currently 40%.¹⁴ 

For example, if Jack creates a trust for the benefit of Ethan, Claire, and Megan for their lives, with the remainder passing to his grandchildren, and transfers $10 million of land to the trust while allocating only $2 million of GST exemption to the trust, the applicable fraction would be 1/5 ($2 million/$10 million). The inclusion ratio would be one minus 1/5, or 4/5. The applicable tax rate on any GST arising from the trust would be 32% (40% x 0.80). 

Importance of skipping the GST tax 

If Jack and Susan, like many families, pass the estate equally to Ethan, Claire, and Megan, the children will own the inherited property in their own names, even if the estate tax is avoided in the first generation. Assuming the children do not lose the property through involuntary transfers such as divorce, remarriage, or creditor claims, the land will continue to appreciate, possibly resulting in taxable estates at the deaths of Ethan, Claire, and Megan. When Jack and Susan’s children subsequently transfer the property to their children, another transfer tax may be imposed. As the same land is passed down from generation to generation, ownership and control become fractionalized, and the property is repeatedly exposed to transfer taxation as it descends the family tree. Because of the illiquid nature of much of the Holloways’ estate, the repeated need to pay transfer taxes could result in the sale of farming assets to provide sufficient liquidity to pay the assessed tax. 

If Jack and Susan, however, create a coordinated estate and GST plan, they may be able to preserve the land for generations to come. For example, Jack and Susan may transfer their farm-related assets into dynasty-style trusts that are exempt from the GST tax. They could allocate their GST exemption to the trusts, resulting in an applicable fraction of one and an inclusion ratio of zero. Ethan, Claire, and Megan may be beneficiaries but are not outright owners. The land is protected from divorcing spouses, remarriage, and creditors, and family control is maintained. As appreciation continues over the next 20-30 years, the farm is not included in the children’s estates at their deaths, and no additional transfer tax is due. The farm is not treated as though it must be “re-purchased” from the government every time one generation passes away. Further, assuming the original allocation from Jack and Susan was effective and that no later additions or other events have tainted the trust’s GST-exempt status, future generations may become beneficiaries of the trust, and subsequent distributions will not trigger GST liability. 

Missouri’s modification of the rule against perpetuities and dynasty trust planning 

One obstacle to the tax-free transfer of assets through dynasty trust planning has been the rule against perpetuities. Originating in England in 1685, the rule against perpetuities arose from public policy aimed at preventing restraints on the alienation of property.¹⁵ In Missouri, the rule against perpetuities “prohibits the granting of an estate which will not necessarily vest within a time limited by a life or lives then in being and twenty-one years thereafter together with the period of gestation necessary to cover cases of posthumous birth.”¹⁶ This rule was the sole limitation on a settlor’s ability to create a perpetual trust to avoid transfer taxes. 

The rule against perpetuities remained largely intact until recently.¹⁷ After Congress enacted the GST tax in response to the use of trusts to avoid transfer taxes, estate planners sought new ways to minimize estate taxes and maximize the use of the GST exemption. They began allocating the GST exemption to trusts that could hold appreciating assets, which were then exempt from GST tax throughout the trust term. The rule against perpetuities, therefore, became a significant constraint on the use and continued benefit of such a trust. As a result, many states, including Missouri, began perpetuities reform.¹⁸ 

Perpetuities reform in Missouri 

In 1993, Missouri enacted Mo. Rev. Stat. § 442.557, which extended the perpetuities period by using powers of appointment. The statute provided that, in determining the validity of limitations arising from the exercise or lapse of a testamentary general power of appointment, the perpetuities period began to run from the death of the donee of the power, not from the creation of the power. While this statute signaled a weakening of the strict application of the rule against perpetuities, the rule was not effectively abolished as to trusts until Mo. Rev. Stat. § 456.236 was enacted in 2001. After its enactment, trusts created or amended on or after Aug. 28, 2001, were not subject to the rule against perpetuities if the trustee had the power to sell the trust assets for as long as the trust continued beyond the period of the rule against perpetuities. The drafting committee comment at the time the statute was enacted explained the rationale for amending the rule centered on the ability of the state’s banks and trusts to retain the trust business of Missouri residents.¹⁹ 

Missouri trust law 

In addition to the effective abolition of the rule against perpetuities for trusts, Missouri trust law further strengthens the state’s standing as a top-tier jurisdiction for dynasty planning.²⁰ Missouri statutes allow the trustee to retain and operate the farm, delegate operations when appropriate, and amend the trust to reflect the family’s changing dynamics while preserving the GST exemption. 

As an initial matter, unless a mandatory rule provides otherwise, Missouri lets the trust instrument control.²¹ If a dynasty trust expressly authorizes the trustee to retain and operate the farmland, those terms govern the trustee’s powers and duties. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 469.901 states the settlor may expand or restrict the prudent investor rule by express provisions in the trust instrument. When a trust’s purpose is to preserve a family farm, the statute’s language supports maintaining a concentrated farmland position rather than requiring diversification.²² 

Moreover, Missouri statute gives the trustee the powers conferred by the trust, “all powers over the trust property which an unmarried competent owner has over individually owned property,” and any other powers appropriate for the investment, management, and distribution of trust property.²³ The statutes provide for broad umbrella powers necessary to hold and manage a family farm. In addition to the broad powers conferred upon a trustee, the statute also supplies the specific operational powers necessary for managing farmland, i.e., the power to borrow money and mortgage or pledge trust property; continue a business; improve and repair real property; enter into leases; insure trust property; handle environmental issues; pay employees; hire advisors; and sign contracts and other instruments useful for exercising trustee powers.²⁴ 

Missouri also permits delegation. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 469.909 allows a trustee to delegate investment and management functions that a prudent trustee could properly delegate, with appropriate oversight. The trustee is not required to perform every management function. In a farm setting, Missouri law allows the trustee to hire and rely on professionals such as a farm manager, operating tenant, crop consultant, accountant, lawyer, bookkeeper, land manager, appraiser, or environmental consultant, if doing so is prudent for the trust and the farm. Although a subsequent trustee may lack agricultural expertise, the trustee may delegate farm management to qualified experts. 

The trust may also be a directed trust. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 456.8-808 provides for bifurcated authority, allowing a trust protector or other directing party to direct investment and management decisions while the trustee retains administrative authority. For a farm dynasty trust, an estate planner can use a directed trust to separate administrative trusteeship from farm management control. A bank or professional fiduciary may serve as an administrative trustee responsible for keeping the books, filing taxes, and making distributions. At the same time, a trust protector, a farm-savvy person, or a committee directs farm management, including selecting the farm manager or operator and deciding whether the land is leased or cash-rented. 

Finally, Missouri trust law offers significant flexibility for trustees managing perpetual trusts using trust protectors and decanting. The trust protector statute allows the settlor to designate a nontrustee power holder to adapt the trust over time without replacing the entire structure or going to court to modify it.²⁵ The ability to adapt the trust is especially valuable in a farm dynasty trust because farmland is a long-term, illiquid, operational asset. The trust can grant a protector the authority to help maintain the trust’s alignment with the family’s needs. For example, the trust protector may be able to replace a trustee, change the situs to a more favorable jurisdiction, or amend the administrative language to reflect changes in farm entities, financing practices, or tax rules. 

Missouri’s decanting statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 456.4-419, also allows a trustee with discretionary distribution authority to transfer trust property from an existing trust to a new trust with revised terms without first seeking court approval. The statute gives the trustee flexibility to update administrative provisions, split a large farm trust into separate branch trusts, or improve the trustee-succession language. Although Missouri provides guardrails intended to preserve the zero-inclusion ratio under I.R.C. § 2642(c), decanting a trust which has a GST-exempt status derived from an affirmative allocation of exemption requires careful federal transfer tax analysis to ensure the revised trust does not jeopardize the original transfer’s exempt status.²⁶ 

Missouri as the situs for the trust 

Missouri’s amendment to the rule against perpetuities, along with favorable trust law, creates an ideal environment for trust administration. Administering a dynasty trust in Missouri, when both the settlor and the trust’s principal asset are located there, strengthens the trust’s connection to Missouri law and to the favorable provisions governing dynasty trusts. 

State tax laws are also favorable for trust administration in Missouri. Effective Jan. 1, 2005, Missouri repealed its state estate tax, so dynasty trusts avoid state estate tax at each generational transfer.²⁷ However, Missouri has a state income tax, and trust income “shall be computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual except as otherwise provided.”²⁸ 

Designing and drafting a GST-exempt dynasty trust for a family farm 

The benefit of GST tax planning is realized only if the GST exemption is properly allocated to a well-drafted dynasty trust funded with appreciating assets. Planning continues to protect assets only if sufficient flexibility is built into the trust to allow future generations to adapt it to changing needs. The estate planner should consider the following structural elements to maintain tax efficiency and ensure smooth trust administration for generations to come. 

Structural elements of the trust 

First and foremost, there is no general federal rule requiring a trust to include special GST language to obtain the GST exemption. Instead, a trust becomes GST-exempt when the GST exemption is properly allocated to it under I.R.C. §§ 2631 and 2632, either on Form 709 if funded during life or on Form 706 if funded at death. Nevertheless, the trust terms remain important. 

In addition to expressly including the trustee powers provided under Missouri law, the following is a brief list to consider when structuring a farm dynasty trust in Missouri: 

• Express statement of purpose. The trust should explicitly state that the grantors intend it to operate as a long-term or perpetual family trust for the preservation of family farmland and the management of transfer taxes. Although Missouri generally allows trust terms to control and gives trustees broad management powers over trust property, an express statement of purpose may guide the interpretation of trustee decisions regarding nondiversification, retention of farmland, and subsequent modifications.
• GST allocation and separate accounting provisions. The trust should authorize the trustee to divide trust property into GST-exempt and nonexempt shares when appropriate and to maintain separate accounting and administration for those shares. Although not required, this authority provides flexibility to accommodate different GST exemption allocations and helps preserve the intended transfer tax treatment of each share.
• Qualified severance and partition authority. The trust should authorize the trustee to sever or divide the trust into separate trusts or shares as appropriate. The authority should extend beyond divisions between GST-exempt and nonexempt property to permit separate branch trusts or trusts for different family lines. This flexibility may be particularly helpful in a case like the Holloways’ situation, where one descendant farms while the others do not.
• Limitations on beneficiary powers. The trust should carefully limit beneficiary powers to avoid unintended estate inclusion, taxable gifts, or other transfer tax consequences. For example, the trust may allow a beneficiary to borrow from the trust, but if the power is too broad or exercised carelessly, it may be treated as a withdrawal right or a power to compel access, potentially resulting in estate inclusion. Poorly drafted beneficiary powers may thwart even the best-designed GST tax planning.
• Flexible, tax-conscious powers of appointment. The trust should use carefully limited powers of appointment to provide flexibility for future generations without triggering unintended transfer tax consequences. Properly structured powers can allow the trust to respond to changing family circumstances and tax laws, but overly broad powers may result in estate inclusion or other adverse transfer tax outcomes.
• Dynasty planning distribution standards. The trust should use distribution standards that provide sufficient flexibility for long-term administration without creating unnecessary estate or gift tax exposure. Broad discretionary authority may be useful if the trust must be decanted later, as Missouri’s decanting statute depends on such authority. However, granting excessive discretionary distribution authority to the wrong party may create estate and gift tax issues. 

A well-drafted and thoughtful dynasty trust provides sufficient flexibility to be workable in the long term while offering guardrails to ensure the GST exemption is not wasted, and that family wealth is preserved. 

Ownership and control

Although popularized as a tax-avoidance mechanism, the dynasty trust enables a family farmer to create an entity that separates operational control from beneficial interest and enjoyment. Such a structure can be critical when there are on-farm and off-farm heirs, as with the Holloways. To provide even greater ease of management, the Missouri dynasty trust structure may be combined with a business entity, such as a limited liability company, further separating ownership, control, and enjoyment. 

For example, the farming operation may be placed in an LLC, “the Farm LLC.” The LLC interests are then funded into a dynasty trust. The estate planner drafts the dynasty trust to include an independent trustee, a distribution trustee, and a farm management advisor or trust protector. The Farm LLC is structured with a manager to handle farm operations, while the trust owns the Farm LLC interests and the trustee administers the trust. The trust protector appoints or removes the Farm LLC managers and advises on farm retention and sale issues. The distribution trustee handles distributions to on-farm and off-farm heirs. Missouri law supports this structure by recognizing the trustee’s powers granted in the trust. 

For families like the Holloways, this means the nonfarming heirs, Claire and Megan, may receive rights such as discretionary distributions, mandatory income rights, and remainder interests. However, they do not necessarily have equal voting power over whether a tract is sold, leased, mortgaged, improved, or operated. Instead, Ethan or a subsequent farm manager may make those decisions. Moreover, even if future generations choose not to stay on the farm, Jack and Susan’s farming legacy is preserved because professional trustees administer the trust and manage the Farm LLC. At the same time, the heirs continue to enjoy the financial benefits. 

Conclusion 

Dynasty trusts are an efficient way to pass the family farm to future generations. They not only limit transfer taxes but also allow the family farmer to pass the farm’s benefits to future generations efficiently and fairly while keeping the farming operation intact for on-farm heirs. Because of the weakening of the rule against perpetuities and Missouri’s favorable, flexible trust law, Missouri is a prime jurisdiction for dynasty trust planning and administration. Jack and Susan would be wise to create a Missouri dynasty trust now to protect the family’s largest asset from future transfer taxes while allowing Ethan to continue his livelihood and both daughters to enjoy the benefits of the family farm.

Endnotes 
1 The family and factual scenario described in this article are fictional and were created for illustrative purposes. Any resemblance to actual persons, families, or circumstances is coincidental. 
2 I.R.C. § 2631. 
3 EGTRRA amended I.R.C. § 2631 to tie the GST exemption amount to the estate/gift unified credit system. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 521(c)(2), 115 Stat. 38, 72; I.R.C. § 2631(c). 
4 Act of July 4, 2025, Pub. L. No. 119-21, 139 Stat. 72. 
5 I.R.C. § 2613(a)(1). 
6 I.R.C. § 2612(c). 
7 I.R.C. § 2613(a)(2). 
8 Id. § 2612(b). 
9 Id. § 2612(a). 
10 Id. § 2642(a)(2). 
11 Id. § 2642(a)(2). 
12 I.R.C. § 2642(a)(2). 
13 Id. § 2642(a). 
14 Id. § 2641(b). 
15 41 AM. JUR. 2d, Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 6, at 53. 
16 Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580, 46 S.W.2d 135, 138 (1932). 
17 Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465 (2006) (examining the reasons for perpetuities reform to include not only transfer tax avoidance, but also a settlor’s continued control). 
18 Id. at *2495, noting 21 states have abolished the rule against perpetuities as applied to trusts. 
19 BORRON, MISSOURI PRACTICE: PROBATE AND SURROGATE LAWS MANUAL § 456.025 (2d ed. current pocket part). 
20 See Steven J. Oshins, 9th Annual Dynasty Trust State Rankings Chart, Oshins.com, https://www.oshins.com/_files/ugd/b211fb_79b9ea83b72543e995ad71695279d4e3.pdf (last visited April 4, 2026). 
21 MO. REV. STAT. § 456.1-105. 
22 Id. § 469.903 requires diversification unless the trustee reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purpose of the trust is better served without diversifying. 
23 Id. § 456.8-815. 
24 MO. REV. STAT. § 456.8-815. 
25 Id. 
26 MO. REV. STAT. § 456.4-419 prohibits the second trust from including or omitting terms that would have caused the original transfer to fail the zero-inclusion ratio treatment under I.R.C. § 2642(c). 
27 MO. REV. STAT. § 145.01. 
28 MO. REV. STAT. § 143.311.