Civil

Separate transactions, separate claims, no claim preclusion
Parties could prevail by summary judgment when facts established beyond genuine dispute legally entitled them to a favorable ruling. An earlier final judgment barred any later claim that “arises from the same ‘act, contract, or transaction’” and could have been part of the earlier final judgment. The parties’ earlier judgment was not final because it was a consent judgment. The consent judgment only memorialized the parties’ agreement, which was not part of the record, and did not determine any matter as to any party. Even if the earlier judgment were final, it addressed a different loan, deed of trust, and promissory note from the loan, deed of trust, and promissory note at issue in the later action. “If the compulsory counterclaim rule does not apply, neither does claim preclusion (res judicata).” In the later action, the circuit court entered summary judgment based on the earlier judgment. That ruling was error, so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the judgment.
(Overview summary)
Padma Vegetila, Respondent, v. Swapna and Srinivas Chaganti, Appellants.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114342

Criminal

Alternative proofs for knowing conduct explained
There were two ways to prove that defendants’ conduct was knowing. Both focused on awareness, of either the practically certain result, or the circumstances and the conduct itself. The latter had sufficient evidence in the record: on a charge of making a terrorist threat, the State showed that the defendant was aware that his statements communicated a threat. Whether the State showed that any practically certain result was irrelevant. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. DUSTIN CHARLES ZOOK, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39212

Alternative perpetrator evidence excluded
Evidence of an alternative perpetrator had to include a direct connection from the putative alternative perpetrator to the offense. Without a direct connection, “the minimal probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its tendency to confuse or misdirect the jury” and was subject to exclusion. Direct connection required context and “unambiguous, specific evidence [.]” Relationship, opportunity, motive, suspicion, and other criminal conduct were insufficient. The circuit court did not err in excluding evidence related to two alternative perpetrators. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Lyle W. Miller, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113569

Hon. W. Brent Powell, chief justice of the Supreme Court of Missouri, delivered this address during the opening lunch of the joint Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar and the Judicial Conference of Missouri on Sept. 17 in Kansas City.

Thank you, President Crompton, good afternoon, and happy Constitution Day! I am thrilled to welcome you to this joint annual statewide bench and bar meeting here in my adopted hometown of Kansas City — famous for the best barbecue in the world and, of course — our Kansas City Chiefs. How about that game Monday night! I’d say Patrick Mahomes is back! And it’s been a good week for football here in Kansas City, Missouri, with those Tigers pulling out a victory over Kansas Friday night! MIZ! 

I was honored when our now-former bar president, Athena Dickson, asked if I would help celebrate Constitution Day by readministering the oath of admission to all of us lawyers gathered here today. It’s hard to believe: 30 years ago, I was at the Supreme Court of Missouri — along with my classmate and now colleague, Kelly Broniec — to be sworn in as a brand new member of our Missouri Bar. I remember feeling an odd mix of nervousness and exhilaration as I raised my right hand to take my oath, beginning my journey into our hallowed profession. My father, an attorney himself, was there that day to watch me be sworn in, and he is here today reaffirming his oath with all of us. Thank you, Dad, for being here. 

Give me a show of hands — who remembers taking their oath for the first time? Not bad! Well, if you don’t remember that day, I hope you fondly remember this afternoon — and my remarks do not taint your memory of this grand occasion. 

For me, it may have been 30 years, but I still feel the same excitement and weight of the occasion. Taking our solemn oath places us in a distinct position of honor and responsibility. Honor, because of the prestige our profession holds in our society — and responsibility, because as attorneys, we are entrusted to tend to the vast legal needs of our fellow citizens and community. 

I find it especially fitting to reaffirm our oaths now, 250 years after our nation declared its independence from England. Lawyers played a vital role in that monumental event. Nearly half the colonists who signed the Declaration of Independence were lawyers; many lawyers were elected to serve in the Continental Congress; and lawyers were instrumental in drafting our Constitution and shaping our nation’s government. For this reason, our profession is a living bridge, linking us to a time when our founders transformed revolutionary ideals of self-governance and democracy into a new government for a new nation. 

Our oath — the very oath you reaffirmed today — carries forward the same promises our founding lawyers drafted into our Declaration of Independence and Constitution. One of those lawyers was John Adams, who famously proclaimed our nation would be a “government of laws, not of men.” This simple proclamation defined who we are as a people: bound together — not by a monarch or politician — but by the laws enacted through our own self-government. We, as a people, agree to be governed and abide by this law because the law emanates from ourselves. This is our social contract enshrined in our federal and state constitutions, ensuring the rule of law — not autocrats or tyrants — govern our way of life. 

But we all must recognize what Adams and our legal predecessors understood: For our government to survive and thrive, the rule of law — this foundation on which we all coexist — must be guarded continuously and preserved purposefully. Recognizing the importance of this civic virtue, Benjamin Franklin famously remarked we have a republic, if we can keep it. This responsibility — the responsibility to preserve our republic — falls to us and all our brothers and sisters in our profession. 

With this in mind, let’s focus on the words of our oath and give those solemn words meaningful life. 

One of the first and paramount obligations our oath places upon us is to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the state of Missouri. This dual allegiance protects the grand experiment of federalism and the balance of governmental power our founders envisioned. Together, those constitutions establish a system of governance balancing authority between federal and state sovereigns and among three branches of government. They also preserve for all citizens the right to self-governance and guarantee their individual rights. 

This balance of governmental authority rests on a precarious fulcrum. The power reserved for our citizens, and the rights guaranteed to them, can easily be overlooked and abused. The scales can also be tipped — improperly shifting power among government authorities. Our oath requires us to safeguard this delicate balance, ensuring neither the people’s rights nor the authority bestowed upon each of our three branches of government are trampled or ignored. This is our collective role in a constitutional republic built on checks and balances. 

But today, we face threats — threats from those who seek to detract from the ideals of our republic and to undermine faith in our sacred institutions — including our legal profession and our courts. Unfortunately, some of these threats originate from within our own ranks. We must respond to these threats as our founders responded to the tyranny of an autocrat. It is incumbent on all of us as lawyers and judges to rise up and defend our constitutions and the rule of law. 

We must vigorously and emphatically advocate the values of our republic by educating our fellow citizens about how laws are passed, how courts work, how judges make decisions, and how we are bound by these laws and court decisions — even when we may legitimately disagree with them. We owe our allegiance to the Constitution and the law, not to our personal or political preferences — even, and especially, when doing so conflicts with our own views and beliefs.

For this reason, the trust endowed in us is extraordinary. Individuals trust their doctors with their health and well-being. They trust their accountants and bankers with their money and financial security. And they trust architects and engineers with the soundness of the structures and products they design and build. But they trust lawyers and judges — yes, all of us in this room — with the systems and institutions to provide the just and fair society in which we all live. 

This trust is immense and carries with it an equally somber recognition — that we must continue to earn that trust every day, through every action we take and every word we speak, to prove to our fellow Missourians we lawyers can carry the weight of their trust. 

How we prove we are worthy of this trust is demonstrated in the words of our oath. We promise to maintain the respect due to courts of justice, judicial officers, and members of our profession. We promise to conduct ourselves with dignity. We promise never to mislead a judge or jury by any artifice of false statement of fact or law. And we promise to conduct ourselves in accordance with the rules of professional conduct. 

Stated simply, our oath as lawyers instructs us to always act with the dignity and uprightness our profession demands. It applies not only inside conference rooms and courtrooms but in the community as well. Being a lawyer is not just a job; it must be who we are and what defines us as professionals. If we act dishonorably, we cannot expect anyone else to honor our legal institutions and the rule of law. If we act dishonestly, we cannot be surprised when others treat our laws and courtrooms with disrespect and disdain. 

Never forget it was tyranny of a monarch an ocean away that led the colonists to declare our independence, but history is full of lessons of tyranny reemerging and thriving when citizens lose faith in justice and the rule of law. Citizens rely on us as lawyers and judges — as professionals sworn to uphold the law — to make justice happen every day in every community in our state. Every transaction and every trial conducted fairly and openly reinforces the foundation laid in 1776. In this way, our profession — and our professionalism — are critical to preserving public trust in government. 

But professionalism does not require grandiose deeds or acts — and can be accomplished in quiet, effortless ways. We must seek to solve disputes, not create them. We must act with grace, honor, and a moral and just purpose. We cannot let zealous advocacy devolve into malice, acrimony, vitriol, meanness, or nastiness. And in a world in which it is increasingly difficult to tell fact from fiction, and hyperbole from downright lies, it is essential we — as lawyers bound by a common oath — never, ever forget we are bound to tell the truth. Your reputation as an individual lawyer — and the reputation of our entire profession — depends on never letting advocacy get in the way of truth. 

I don’t need to tell you that we live in a divided nation and state. This is not a new phenomenon, but technology provides new ways to divide us. Spurred by misinformation, disinformation, and the echo-chamber traps our social media algorithms build, the discord and viciousness in our society has invaded our schools, our churches, and even our family living rooms and dinner tables, where divisiveness was ordinarily absent.

Growing up, I watched my dad avoid the trap of letting his views and beliefs affect his relationships with clients and neighbors even when they expressed opinions he and our family could never support. Many times, I found this frustrating and unfair, but my father always responded, “Whoever said life was fair?” And you know what? He was right — and it remains great advice. 

We don’t have to sacrifice our beliefs and values. But we must listen to one another … including those with whom we vehemently disagree. We must show empathy … especially when doing so is uncomfortable. And we must care for others … particularly those we may find distasteful or disdain. These are important lessons I learned from my dad. And it’s what our oath requires of us. 

Another lesson I learned from my father is a shared commitment to service. Our oath commits all of us, as a profession, to serve others. Our oath requires us to practice law with consideration for the defenseless and oppressed. This ending to our oath is deeply rooted in our history, as both lawyers and as Americans. Our Declaration of Independence boldly proclaims all people are created equal. Throughout history, it has fallen on lawyers — and judges — to bridge the gap between this founding ideal and the realities in which we live. Because for too many, this promise remains unfulfilled. 

The promises secured for us in the Declaration of Independence and our Constitution are only as strong as our profession’s ability to deliver them. But today, some of those promises are beginning to collapse around us. Half of Americans think our legal system offer two systems of justice: one for those with money or connections, and one for everyone else. We struggle to provide quality legal services to people in every corner of our state at rates people can actually afford. More than three-quarters of our fellow citizens don’t know where to turn for legal help and they believe they must go to court, draft contracts, probate estates, or get divorced without a lawyer — because they can’t afford one. 

With the rise of AI, we must be concerned about pricing ourselves out of our own profession. Everyone in this room understands the value of an attorney in shepherding clients through their legal issues, both inside and outside the courtroom. But a short hop online illustrates the folly of this belief. The internet offers any number of AI “solutions” to address legal needs. But the World Wide Web is also full of cautionary tales of what happens when a lawyer or self-represented litigant relies too heavily on AI to “help” them with a case. An AI solution may look like help, it may sound like help, but the whole thing might just be a hallucination. And the types of legal issues people face in their everyday lives — contract disputes, family law issues, probate matters, and other civil disputes — are far too important to be left to hallucinations. People deserve human lawyers like you to assist them with their legal needs. 

Make no mistake: AI is here to stay. Every year, every month, every day, and every second, AI continues to revolutionize how things are done, in ways we struggle to comprehend. But we cannot just stand idly by, because others will fill any gap we choose to ignore. Our rules of professional conduct require us to remain vigilant and do our homework — including learning about new technology that may scare us at times. 

We also need to do some soul-searching, as a profession. More than ever, the rise of technology requires us all to remember our oath to serve others for the benefit of those in need of affordable legal services. We owe it to our fellow Missourians to demonstrate our value; embrace technology tools appropriately to enhance the services we provide the public; and keep the crucial role of human lawyers intrinsically involved in providing legal services to those who need it. 

In this vein, we must strive to step up and serve. Our duty is to our clients and the public at large, not our individual concerns. None of us should let personal success make us apathetic toward the needs of our fellow citizens. Instead, we should use our education and privilege to serve others. But giving of oneself — abiding by our oath as lawyers — is not easy. It means devoting our lives to others, overcoming our inherent desire to improve our own condition. I confess, I struggle with this. It’s hard to live up to such a high standard, and far easier to find comfort in serving my own needs and desires. 

Fortunately, I have been so very blessed to see my father modeling what being a lawyer is truly all about — diligent, ethical, and honorable service … to his clients, to his profession, and to his community. Throughout his decades of practice, he was a strong advocate, but he also knew how to disagree without being disagreeable, and how to build bridges through compassion and kindness rather than sowing seeds of dissention. In a nutshell, he fulfilled our solemn oath every single day. Let’s all strive to be a lawyer like my father. 

If I can ask one thing of all of you — just one thing — endeavor every single day to fulfill the oath you reaffirmed this afternoon. By fulfilling our solemn oath, we can build upon the blueprint of the Declaration of Independence and our constitutions, ensuring the rule of law and our way of life endure for the next 250 years. If we do this one thing, then I have faith and hope the stability of our republic and civil society will be sustained. And you, I, and those who come after us will all be better off because of it. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today.

Administrative

No substituting lay opinion for expert opinion
A licensing agency decided license applications under an objective system that assigned numerical scores to questions on the applications. The agency required contracted scorers to possess qualifications for scoring, making their scores a form of expert opinion. The agency repeatedly emphasized that identical answers merited identical scores. Nevertheless, the scorers assigned differing scores to identical answers on which the agency denied the applications. On review at the Administrative Hearing Commission, the applicant showed what the disputed scores should have been through expert evidence that the agency did not contest. Moreover, the record impeached the qualifications of the agency contractor scorers. “The [agency] did not present any expert testimony of its own on any issue.” The Commission re-determined the disputed scores using neither the method of the scorers nor the applicant’s experts. Instead, the Commission substituted its own lay opinion based on its perception of what the scorers’ subjective intent was: the score most frequently appearing. No evidence supported that method, resulting in an unreasonable and arbitrary decision. Nevertheless, the circuit court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the action to the circuit court, ordering the circuit court to grant the applications. After transfer to the Supreme Court of Missouri and re-transfer to the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals re-issued its opinion.
HIPPOS, LLC, Petitioner-Appellant v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVICES, Respondent-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38218

Appellate

No final judgment while related claims remained pending
Appeals were possible from final judgments and from judgments less than final when circuit courts certified that there was no just reason for delay. Certification was possible for judgments that disposed of all claims “by or against” a party; or disposed of a claim arising from facts, transactions, or occurrences distinct from those giving rise to remaining claims. The plaintiff claimed damages against the defendant gym for a slip and fall. The gym counterclaimed litigation expenses from the plaintiff, and claimed litigation expenses from the plaintiff’s spouse, both under provisions of the same contract. The partial judgment disposed only of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant and stayed the rest of the action. That left unresolved claims by and against all parties, all claims arose from the same event, and the stay was only necessary because the facts and claims were related. The partial judgment was not subject to appeal so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Charles Voyer, Appellant, v. LTF Club Operations Company, Inc., d/b/a Lifetime Fitness, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114229

Civil

Motion for leave to amend was pending when circuit court issued summary judgment
Circuit courts were to freely grant leave to amend pleadings. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The appellant plaintiffs filed a response to the motion for summary judgment, and timely filed a motion for leave to amend the petition that added an alternate theory of recovery that the motion for summary judgment did not address. The plaintiffs also filed notice of calling up the motion. Nevertheless, the circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant while the motion for leave was pending. Failure to rule on the motion for leave constituted an abuse of discretion because abuse of discretion included failure to give careful consideration and the record showed no consideration. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment for the defendant and remanded the action for a ruling on the motion for leave.
GREGG HARDING and ANDREA DAWN HARDING, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. DENNIS J. YOUNG, individually and in his capacity as the Trustee of the Dennis J. Young Revocable Trust, Defendant-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39291

Contract

Contracts were valid under Grain Dealer Law and Grain Warehouse Law
Statutes derogated the common law only to the extent expressly stated. The Grain Dealer Law and the Grain Warehouse Law both required grain dealers and grain warehouses to post a bond against claims. Both also provided for deferred price contracts, meaning contracts under which title to grain transferred at a price to be determined later, but did not alter the common law of contracts as to consideration. The bonds did not secure grain under deferred price contracts. The parties had a storage contract that they modified with deferred price contracts. But the latter had no supporting consideration, so they were invalid and did not alter the storage contract. The appellant seller’s claims constituted dealer claims and storage claims against the bonds. The circuit court ruled otherwise, so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed that judgment and remanded the action.
STATE OF MISSOURI EX. REL. ANDREW BAILEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI and, CHRIS CHINN, DIRECTOR of the MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Plaintiffs-Respondents And, MANEVAL, INC. and CARSON MANEVAL, Respondents-Respondents v. FRIEDEN FARMS, LLC., and BRYNLEE FRIEDEN, Intervenors-Appellants
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39068

Criminal

No recusal needed
Recusal was discretionary with the circuit judge who was conducting the trial and subject to review for abuse of discretion. Circuit judges were presumptively impartial, so parties challenging judges’ partiality had the burden of proof on the whole record to show an appearance of impropriety. An appearance of impropriety required more than negative or hostile remarks. It required personal enmity toward one party or favor to another. The “‘repeated[] chastise[ment]’ of Defense Counsel” during rulings, some on the same issues, did not meet that standard. Also, admonitions to both parties and relatively lenient sentencing undercut defendant’s argument. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. BOYD EUGENE WILSON, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38952

Family

Presumption of marital property not rebutted
All property acquired during marriages was presumptively marital property. Rebuttal required clear and convincing evidence, which could include acquisition before the marriage. That was a matter of fact, the findings on which were subject to deference on appeal. The record supported a finding that the parties acquired real property with funds from their jointly-owned business, making it marital property. Exclusion could also occur after full disclosure of assets by written agreement. No written agreement appeared in the legal file, which the appellant had to assemble, only in the appendix to the appellant’s brief. The appendix was not part of the legal file. And the agreement did not exclude any marital property; it only provided for the respondent to receive one sum on marriage and another on divorce. Also, the appellant was not a party to the agreement. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
In Re the Marriage of: Wafa Al Mandalawi v. Ali Alobaidi
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88087

Probate

Thomas Hart Benton trust litigation resolved
Unlike actions for accounting, in action for breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff beneficiaries had the burden of proof. Will and trust documents — not statutes — defined the defendant trustee’s duties and authorities, which the trustees presumptively executed prudently. Within the bounds of acting “arbitrarily, fraudulently, dishonestly, or with an improper motive [,]” the trust gave the trustee broad discretion in the disposition of trust assets, so the statute governing the disposition of encumbered property did not apply. The trustee had authority to disclaim all interests in an asset then in a third party’s possession, and nothing required the trustees to give notice to the beneficiaries. When the beneficiaries showed self-dealing that harmed the trust or the beneficiaries, the no-further-inquiry rule dispensed with proof of damages to void a transaction. But a relationship between a trustee and a purchaser of trust assets did not necessarily constitute a conflict of interest and the plaintiffs did not show any harm. The record supported the circuit court’s findings that: when the trustee disposed of the trust’s paintings, prudent practice in the sale of art used informal means of valuation and did not require contemporaneous appraisals; the beneficiaries did not show that the trustee failed to consult with co-trustee; the beneficiaries did not show which works were subject to copyright and any damages from the trustee’s failure to copyright; and that the trustee was liable for engaging in a conflict of interest. The circuit court denied relief on those claims and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Anthony Gude and Cybele Benton McCormick, and Richie P. Guerin, Successor Trustee of the Jessie Benton Dynasty Trust v. UMB Bank, N.A.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87870 (consolidated with WD87871 and WD87890)

Looking for the profile piece on Jennifer M. Crompton? Read “Jennifer M. Crompton to emphasize education during 2026-2027 Missouri Bar presidency” here. 
 

Amber Christ is the executive director of Legal Aid of Western Missouri, a role she began in 2026. Previously, she spent a decade leading national policy advocacy at Justice in Aging, advancing healthcare and economic security for older adults facing poverty. A graduate of the Washington University School of Law, Christ began her legal career at Legal Aid as a lawyer from 2006-2012 and later served for five years on the Legal Aid Board of Directors before returning to lead the organization.

What does it mean to you to be back at the organization where you started your career?

“It feels like coming home ... For the last decade, I worked on national health policy, which I loved, but it is a view from 30,000 feet. Coming back to Legal Aid, to work directly in my own community, is a return to the work that shaped me.”

What goals do you hope Legal Aid of Western Missouri is able to accomplish in the next few years?

“My biggest goal is the core of what we do: reach more of the people who need us. Across the 40 counties Legal Aid serves, about 300,000 people live in poverty, and only a fraction know we exist or can access our services. Closing that gap means building our capacity to help more people than we do today. At the same time, I want to take what I learned from working at the national level and grow our systemic impact. Helping one person at a time will always matter, and we will never stop. But I also want us going after the larger problems that push people into crisis in the first place.”

How can Missouri lawyers balance pro bono service with demanding jobs and caseloads?

“Start smaller than you think you have to. You do not need to take a two-year case to make a difference. Spend a few hours volunteering at one of our clinics, taking a single discrete matter like helping a client with a beneficiary deed or power of attorney."

What aspect of Legal Aid of Western Missouri’s work is most meaningful to you?

“What moves me most is that we meet people at the hardest moments, an eviction notice, a benefits denial, a protection order, and we stand next to them so they do not have to face the system alone. We make legal rights real, and there is nothing more meaningful than being part of securing justice for those who face the most barriers to accessing it.”

Why are you passionate about increasing access to legal services?

“Because a right you can’t afford to claim isn’t really a right at all. A lawyer is often the difference between keeping your home and losing it, between getting the benefits you are owed and going without. Closing that gap is the most basic fairness I can think of.”

What is a topic you could give a TED Talk on without preparation?

“It would be about our VW bus. My family bought a 1970 Westfalia bus a year ago. I could easily talk about how a slow, loud, and wildly impractical vehicle turns out to be one of those things in the world that has the power to connect us at a time when we feel so disconnected.”

Answers have been edited for clarity, brevity, and style. Know a lawyer who you think should be featured in “Meet #MOLawyers”? Submit their name to journal@mobar.org.

Judicial performance review results available online 

Nonpartisan, independent reviews of the judges up for retention Nov. 3 under Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan are available for voters to view online before they head to the polls. Judges who serve under the plan run in retention elections after their first 12 months on the bench and at the end of each of their terms. See the reviews, plus writing samples, lawyer surveys, and more at YourMissouriJudges.org.
 

Tech tip: AI prompt writing

When you use an AI tool, the instructions you type, called a “prompt,” largely determine the quality of the answer you receive. Vague or incomplete prompts often produce generic or unhelpful responses that waste time and reduce confidence in the technology.

Prompt writing has become a necessary skill that lawyers must learn and develop. Many free online guides and short courses explain these techniques in plain language and can quickly help you build the skill. Treating prompt writing as a learnable ability — and seeking out those resources — can help you better research case law, analyze arguments, and conduct other legal work so you can even better serve your clients. 

Remember, lawyers must use AI in a way that is consistent with the duties of competence, candor, confidentiality, and supervision as outlined in Missouri Informal Opinion 2024-11 and the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct.

Get involved in The Missouri Bar 

The Missouri Bar offers many opportunities for Missouri lawyers to get involved in the bar or to serve their communities, including joining a committee, offering pro bono services, becoming a CLE speaker, or writing for the Journal of The Missouri Bar. Learn more about bar involvement opportunities at MoBar.org/Get-Involved.

Economic survey findings: How does your practice compare? 

The Missouri Bar’s 2025 Economic Survey provides insights into the economic realities of practicing law, giving you a closer look at trends and data affecting Missouri lawyers. Explore the Economic Survey at MoBar.org/EconomicSurvey.
 

Member benefit: Receive three months with no monthly fee when you start with 8am LawPay 

8am LawPay streamlines billing with secure online payments, flexible options like Pay Later financing, and next-business-day deposits. With built-in IOLTA compliance, trust and operating account reporting, and expense management, LawPay simplifies the process so you can spend more time practicing law. Learn more at LawPay.com/Member-Programs/Missouri-Bar.

MoBar memory 

Attendees of The Missouri Bar Annual Meeting in Kansas City in 2023 play with puppies as part of a well-being event sponsored by the Young Lawyers’ Section. The event was designed to allow attendees and their guests to interact with the puppies, as studies have shown having a pet reduces stress and anxiety, a common struggle among lawyers.

Save the date

Fall Enrollment Ceremonies | Oct. 16 | Jefferson City 
National Celebration of Pro Bono | Oct. 25-31 | nationwide 
Estate, Trust & Elder Law Institute | Nov. 5-6 | St. Louis 
Fall Committee Meetings | Nov. 16-19 | virtual 
Fall Board of Governors meeting | Nov. 20 | Jefferson City
For more information, visit MoBar.org.

Brian Andrew, age 74, of Chesterfield, on June 11, 2026. Andrew was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1978.

Diana Brazeale, age 54, of Branson, on July 6, 2026. Brazeale graduated from Cornell Law School and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1997. She was a litigation associate with Lewis, Rice & Fingersh before establishing her solo practice in Branson, specializing in bankruptcy, business law, real estate law, and probate.

James C. Busch, age 82, of Glendale, on June 6, 2026. Busch graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1976. He spent his career in private and public practice, retiring as an assistant prosecuting attorney in St. Louis County. Busch served in the U.S. Army.

John Joseph Charron, age 77, of Webster Groves, on July 18, 2026. Charron graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1973. He spent decades practicing in St. Louis County as an estate and general practice lawyer.

Michael Wade Clark, age 78, of Washington, on May 11, 2026. Clark graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1978. He was a public defender in Jefferson and Franklin counties for 12 years before entering private practice for 35 years.

Jack David Cooper, age 96, of Lenexa, Kansas, on June 3, 2026. Cooper graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1957. He was a certified property and casualty underwriter. Cooper worked 33 years for the Employers Reinsurance Corporation in Kansas City and Atlanta. He served in the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy Reserve.

Eugene Daniel “Gene” Cross, age 64, of Mount Carmel, Illinois, on May 22, 2026. He graduated from the Edinburgh Law School and joined the faculty at Leiden University. Cross was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1986. He worked with his wife on humanitarian aid projects providing technical assistance to governments of more than 30 countries. He was a senior fellow at the international Institute of Energy Law, was senior scientist at the Energie Centrum Nederland, and was a senior policy analyst at the International Energy Agency in Paris.

Hon. Raymond H. “Ray” Dickhaner, age 76, of Arnold, on June 28, 2026. He graduated from the Washington University School of Law, earned a Master of Laws degree from the Washington University School of Law, and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1974. He was legal counsel for Jefferson County 911, was the founding judge of the Jefferson County Municipal Court, and served as an associate circuit judge for Division 11.

Robert S. Drake Jr., age 87, of Springfield, on Nov. 13, 2025. Drake graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1963. Drake was Benton County prosecuting attorney and city attorney for Warsaw and Lincoln.

Joseph Ray Ebbert, age 69, of Lenexa, Kansas, on Feb. 9, 2026. Ebbert graduated from the University of Kansas School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1989. He had a legal career across Kansas and Missouri spanning decades.

Richard Francis Engel, age 73, of Princeton Junction, New Jersey, on March 2, 2026. Engel graduated from the University of Virginia School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1978. He worked in the Missouri Attorney General’s Office, then worked for the State of New Jersey for 45 years.

James E. Godfrey Jr., age 66, of St. Louis, on June 14, 2026. Godfrey graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1985. He spent 20-plus years at Evans and Dixon LLC, serving as a partner. He was a trial lawyer and tried about 300 cases to conclusion over his career.

Hon. Gary Wayne Henry, age 79, of Louisburg, Kansas, on June 15, 2026. Henry graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1974. He practiced law in Cass County for 30 years and served as associate circuit judge of the 17th Judicial Circuit (Cass County). Henry served in the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Naval Reserve.

Virgil B. Hill, age 86, of Chesterfield, on Nov. 24, 2025. Hill graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1971. Hill was a chemist for the Food and Drug Administration, then spent years working in research and development. He had a long tenure as a patent lawyer at Ralston Purina. He served in the U.S. Army and the National Guard.

Raymond Robert Hirsch, age 90, of Bonita Springs, Florida, on July 22, 2026. He was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1959. He was a corporate lawyer and served in the U.S. Armed Forces.

Stuart Irwin Kaufman, age 89, of Chesterfield, on May 27, 2025. Kaufman was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1961.

Hon. Kathryn Koch, age 67, of University City, on June 3, 2026. Koch graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1984. She was a litigator with Husch & Eppenberger (now Husch Blackwell) until 2000. She also was a prosecutor in Olivette and a municipal judge in Ballwin. After leaving Husch & Eppenberger, she became of counsel with Goldstein & Pressman.

Richard A. Koehler, age 85, of Butler, on March 4, 2026. Koehler was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1974.

Hon. Harold L. Lowenstein, age 86, of Kansas City, on July 22, 2026. Lowenstein graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1965. He practiced with a Kansas City law firm, then was an assistant attorney general. He served five terms in the Missouri House of Representatives and as a judge on the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, for 28 years.

Jean Ann Maylack, age 69, of Clayton, on May 6, 2026. Maylack graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1982. She completed a master’s degree in tax law at George Washington University Law School and had a law career in Clayton.

Hon. William Jerome McHugh Sr., age 79, of St. Louis, on May 8, 2026. McHugh graduated from the Drake University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1975. He was a staff attorney then chief warrant officer in the Juvenile Division of the 22nd Judicial Circuit Court. He served as a municipal court judge for the City of St. Louis. He worked at the Law Office of Wayne C. Harvey and in the partnership of Caldwell, Hughes, McHugh, and Singleton before starting his own private practice.

Larry Leroy McMullen, age 94, of Kansas City, on July 8, 2026. McMullen graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1959. He worked at Blackwell, Sanders, Matheny, Weary and Lombardi, now Husch Blackwell, for more than 60 years. McMullen served in the U.S. Navy.

Mary G. Murdock, age 98, of Columbia, on April 16, 2026. Murdock graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1953. She practiced law with Warrick, Brewer, Lamkin, and Myers, and later retired from the Jackson County Counselor’s office.

Ronald Edwin Parsons, age 95, of Bentonville, Virginia, on May 30, 2026. He graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1982. He worked in private practice with an emphasis on Social Security disability. Parsons served in the U.S. Marine Corps.

Steven Passer, age 68, of Overland Park, Kansas, on April 15, 2026. Passer graduated from the University of Kansas School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1992. He joined the Kansas City firm of Payne & Jones in 1991 and remained a principal there for the rest of his career. He also was a certified special education due process hearing officer for the State of Kansas.

Jean Bowling Quenon, age 95, of Kenwood, California, on May 4, 2026. Quenon graduated from the University of Houston Law Center and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1979. She was a solo practitioner and Ladue mayor.

Hon. Nicholas J. Riggio Sr., age 95, of St. Louis, on April 18, 2026. Riggio graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1960. He practiced law for 60 years and was also a real estate agent, travel agent, and judge. Riggio served in the U.S. Air Force.

Leo G. “Gary” Stoff Jr., age 81, of St. Louis, on July 11, 2026. Stoff graduated from the Notre Dame Law School and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1969. He had a long career as a corporate lawyer and was the director of elections for the City of St. Louis.

Kathy Jo Sullivan-Trader, age 72, of Lee’s Summit, on June 8, 2026. Sullivan-Trader graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2001. She worked at Sprint then practiced law alongside her husband at the law firm of Trader & Sullivan LLC.

Charles Webb Taylor, age 57, of St. Charles, on Aug. 3, 2026. Taylor graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1994. He started his career at the Cape Girardeau County Public Defender Office in Jackson. He then worked at the Law Office of Rory Ellinger in O’Fallon. In 2003, he opened his own practice, The Taylor Law Firm, P.C., handling bankruptcy, estate planning, traffic, and family law cases.

Robert Wexler, age 86, of Chesterfield, on July 23, 2026. Wexler graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1966. He practiced corporate law for more than 40 years.

Jason Paul Wiske, age 55, of Pittsburg, Kansas, on Nov. 3, 2025. Wiske graduated from the University of Kansas School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1998. He opened his own law practice in Pittsburg.

Eric G. Zahnd, age 58, of Platte City, on Sept. 17, 2026. Zahnd was Platte County prosecuting attorney and previously worked at the Missouri Attorney General’s Office, the Missouri Governor’s Commission on Crime, and Bryan Cave. He graduated from Duke Law School and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1996.

William J. Zollmann III, age 82, of Wentzville, on May 24, 2026. Zollmann graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1967. He was Wentzville city attorney and maintained law offices in St. Charles and Dutzow, specializing in estate planning and real estate law.

The 2026 Fall Enrollment Ceremonies will consist of swearing-in sessions beginning at 9 a.m. Oct. 16 at the Supreme Court of Missouri, located at 207 W. High St. in Jefferson City. If you passed the July 2026 Bar Exam and met all admission eligibility requirements, you and your immediate family are invited to attend the enrollment ceremonies and celebrate this amazing accomplishment.  

The enrollment ceremonies are an exciting event where you’ll take the oath of admission and be welcomed to the profession by the judges of the Supreme Court of Missouri, officers of The Missouri Bar, and members of the Missouri Board of Law Examiners.  

Here are a few tips to help you make the most of the day.

Parking  

Meter parking is available on various streets downtown, which can be paid using coins, by texting the posted parking code, or by scanning the QR code on parking signage. Do not park in the lot behind the Supreme Court building, which is reserved for Supreme Court of Missouri judges and personnel.  

Registration

Your first stop is registration on the fifth floor of the Harry S. Truman State Office Building, 301 W. High St., where you will check in; pick up your admittance card, license, and oath; and receive welcome materials. When you register, you will be assigned a time you must be in your seat for your ceremony at the Supreme Court building. This information will be listed on your admittance card.

To reduce the lines for registration, arrive at the time listed below based on the first letter of your last name. Registration times are staggered to control the number of people passing through security at any given time.

A – D   7:45 a.m.

E – K   8:15 a.m.

L – R   8:45 a.m.

S – Z   9:15 a.m.

Allow approximately 30 minutes to walk from the Truman building to the Supreme Court building, go through security, and be seated in your assigned courtroom.  

Security

You and your guests must present photo identification, as well as your ceremony admittance card, at the security checkpoint in the Supreme Court building. Guests must comply with security procedures to enter the building, including passing through a metal detector. Cellphones are allowed in the building to take pictures and videos, but no voice calls are allowed on the second floor or in the courtrooms at any time. 

Roll of Attorneys

Sign the Roll of Attorneys before or after your enrollment ceremony in the lobby of the Supreme Court building. This book contains the names of all lawyers enrolled by the courts, and you should ensure your name is included. 

Courtroom attire

Enrollees are expected to dress in business attire for the enrollment ceremony. Revealing clothing and jeans are not appropriate. 

Photography

Guests can take photos during the enrollment ceremony. Missouri Bar staff will also be on-site with photo props. Photos taken by Missouri Bar staff will be posted on the bar’s Facebook, LinkedIn, and Instagram pages. Share your images from the day on social media using #NewMOLawyers or by tagging @MoBarNews for the chance to be featured.  

Federal court ceremony

The United States District Courts for the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri will have two ceremonies at 10:20 a.m. and noon in the House Chambers on the third floor of the Missouri Capitol building. This enrollment ceremony is for lawyers who wish to practice in the district courts.  

Register at the federal court table when you register for your Missouri Bar enrollment ceremony (the federal court table will be located near The Missouri Bar registration tables). You must be sworn in by The Missouri Bar before attending the federal court ceremony.  

Guests can sit in the fourth floor gallery.   

For more information about the federal court ceremony, click here. 

Networking with Missouri Bar leaders

As a new lawyer, you have many great resources at your disposal. On enrollment day, the president, executive director, and staff of The Missouri Bar, as well as members of the bar’s Young Lawyers’ Section Council, will be available to answer questions. The bar also provides a host of information online at MoBar.org/New-Members.  

For more information about the enrollment ceremonies, visit the Missouri Board of Law Examiners website.  

Welcome to the profession. We can’t wait to celebrate with you! 

Nicole Roberts-Hillen is assistant director of communications and editor at The Missouri Bar.

As 2026-2027 Missouri Bar president, St. Louis lawyer Jennifer M. Crompton hopes to empower Missouri lawyers to even better serve their clients and communities through a focus on education — informing lawyers and Missourians about judicial retention elections, access to legal services in rural communities, and alternative dispute resolution programs. 

Crompton, a chief operating officer and trial lawyer, began her term Sept. 17 when she was sworn in during the Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar in Kansas City. 

Meet Crompton 

As a first-generation lawyer, Crompton said she did not know many lawyers growing up. During her undergraduate studies at Michigan State University, she began working at a law firm answering phones, organizing files, making copies, and other tasks. Crompton then decided to work as a hotline operator at Legal Services of South Central Michigan, helping women in crisis. 

“I had never met anyone in such dire situations who sometimes were unable to speak English,” Crompton said. “That was triggering for me … and I realized I could really help people.” 

Crompton graduated from Saint Louis University School of Law, launching the start of a more than two-decade legal career. 

She was first an associate attorney at a St. Louis law firm, with a focus in bankruptcy law, before becoming a trial lawyer for the St. Louis Circuit Attorney’s Office. There, for the next 11 years, she tried serious felony cases ranging from drug trafficking and robbery to child abuse and domestic violence. She later became counsel and director of ADR at Lexitas, where she managed the business components of the alternative dispute resolution company, assisted with litigation, communicated with parties involved in mediations and arbitrations, and more. 

Now, Crompton is chief operating officer and trial attorney at Crompton Pancoast, LLC, a role she has held since January 2025. No day is the same, she said. As COO, she is responsible for the procedural operations of the law firm, including case management, personnel needs, and day-to-day operations. As a trial attorney, she helps individuals impacted by crime and their families work through the justice system. 

“People are confused by the justice system and it’s overwhelming,” said Crompton. “It’s beneficial to have your lawyer’s experience and advice to counsel your way through it.” 

Crompton is also an adjunct professor at Saint Louis University School of Law, teaching courses in mediation and trial advocacy. 

Along with her work at Crompton Pancoast, LLC and SLU Law, Crompton has served on several Missouri Bar committees and boards including the Board of Governors, Young Lawyers’ Section Council, and Fee Dispute Resolution Committee. She is a past president of the Women Lawyers’ Association of Greater St. Louis, past chair of several Bar Association of Metropolitan St. Louis committees, and a member of the Missouri Bar Foundation and the National Conference of Women’s Bar Associations.

Presidency 

As Crompton steps into her new role as Missouri Bar president, she said she is both excited and nervous. 

“I love being of service, so this is the ultimate way to give back,” Crompton said. “We’re going to do our best to move the bar forward and improve the lives of Missourians.” 

While The Missouri Bar offers numerous services and resources to help improve the legal profession, the administration of justice, and the law on behalf of the public, Crompton said there are three areas she is particularly passionate about: judicial retention elections, access to legal services in rural communities, and alternative dispute resolution programs. 

Education Outreach Network 

Throughout her presidency, Crompton plans to highlight the Education Outreach Network, which The Missouri Bar created to help inform the public about judicial retention elections and Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan, also known as The Missouri Plan, by matching volunteer lawyers with interested community groups. 

By helping Missourians understand the benefits of merit selection and the judicial retention process, Crompton said, lawyers can help preserve confidence in the courts and the rule of law. 

“For the public, especially, faith in our system, faith in our lawyers, faith in our judges is imperative,” she said. “I think as lawyers, it’s our duty to get the real truth out there, educate the public … (and) set the record — this is what The Missouri Plan is, the history of it, why it’s so important, and why we’re proud of it.”

These presentations also humanize legal professionals, Crompton added, which is important since many Missourians only interact with lawyers or judges during stressful situations. 

Rural practice 

During her presidency, Crompton said she also wants to learn if all Missourians have access to legal services, and, if there is a disparity, how the bar can help bridge that gap. As a member of the bar’s Special Committee on Rural Practice, she emphasized its work in researching the state of rural practice in Missouri. 

“We are here to serve the people,” Crompton said. “If we are not accessible, they may turn to other resources or may never pursue their legal rights because they are unaware of the options available to them.” 

Crompton encouraged lawyers and judges to take the bar’s surveys regarding their experiences practicing in rural areas. Lawyers can take the survey at MoBar.org/MORuralLawyers. Judges can take the judicial survey at MoBar.org/MORuralJudges. 

Lawyers can also share the public survey with friends, family, neighbors, and groups they participate in. The public survey is available at MoBar.org/RuralLegalSurvey. The results will help the bar assess the state of rural practice in Missouri and determine if it can take any actions to help increase access to legal services. 

Alternative dispute resolution programs 

Lastly, Crompton would like lawyers and Missourians to know about The Missouri Bar’s three no-cost alternative dispute resolution programs:

• The Fee Dispute Resolution Program helps address fee disputes between Missouri lawyers and clients.
• The Lawyer-to-Lawyer Dispute Resolution Program offers a mediation-like process and binding arbitration to resolve disputes between lawyers over money and property issues, as well as complaints about professionalism matters.
• The Complaint Resolution Program works to improve the legal profession’s image through the resolution of complaints referred by the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.

As a long-time volunteer with the Fee Dispute Resolution Program, Crompton said she is a “big believer” in ADR and encouraged Missouri lawyers to volunteer with or utilize the programs. 

“Even if you don’t resolve the case immediately, you have gotten yourself one step closer, maybe 10 steps closer,” she said. “You’ve learned something, there’s some kind of line of communication that opened, something has happened so maybe you can settle at a later date.” 

If you are interested in joining The Missouri Bar’s efforts to educate the public and help lawyers even better serve their clients, the bar offers several opportunities to get involved. From serving on committees and presenting CLEs to talking with students at schools, there is something for every lawyer. Visit MoBar.org to learn more.

The Missouri Bar asked this year's class to share some words of wisdom with their fellow Missouri lawyers — specifically those recently admitted to the bar. Here's what some of them said:

Lawrence J. Altman: “Have empathy for everyone. Having empathy will help you break boundaries with everyone and will improve your moral compass.”

Michael D. Arnold: “It is important for lawyers to make a commitment to serve the community in which they practice in ways they enjoy and find personally rewarding because leadership is a vital part of our profession.”

Richard A. Barry III: “Ask the right questions.”

George A. Barton: “Put yourself in a position where you can learn from experienced attorneys in your chosen area of the law; and try to develop a specialized practice area, at least to some extent.”

Debra E. Behrendt: “Contribute to your community. Take time to help people in need. The practice of law is a noble profession.”

Gary Richard Bradley: “The legal journey is very rewarding and satisfying if you respect (1) your client’s needs and limitations, (2) the law’s certainty, [and] (3) the attorney’s best efforts in maintaining both professional and personal balance.”

Daniel Robert Brown: “I believe it is a rewarding career if you are diligent in representing your clients and stay current on developments in your chosen practice area.”

Hon. Charles D. Curless: “Be collegial with fellow lawyers. Don’t be a jerk.”

Sharon Ann Gerber Dickinson: “Making a detailed outline of the facts in all documents and pleadings helps identify the important issues. If the law is not in your favor on an issue, research other jurisdictions to develop creative arguments.”

Hon. Robert G. Dowd Jr.: “Always be prepared!”

Steven E. Faber: “Be kind to and respect the court staff — this is what my father told me before I got out of his car to start my internship in the circuit attorney’s office. Sidney Faber was a career D.A.”

Robert Edward Fox Jr.: “Always be honest, then you will have only one story to remember.”

Ty Steven Gaither: “Be prepared for court, answer all phone calls within 24 hours, and remember to take time off to recharge and relax.”

James Michael Gallen: “It is not about you. It is about your clients and others interested in matters entrusted to your care. Cultivate relationships within the bar.”

Nathan C. Harbur: “Always follow your conscience and you will do well.”

Eric C. “Ric” Harris: “‘Tis more important to take the right case than to know the law.’ This paper note was glued to my desk drawer in 1976 by the firm’s founder. I should have listened.”

Hon. Mark Jay Harris: “Always be ethical.”

Elizabeth Healey: “It is truly a noble profession — serve it well, be honest, be true, be sure to have fun.”

Hon. James Kingdon Justus: “My advice to lawyers would be to maintain professional integrity and dedication to the profession. Being truthful is crucial for your reputation. Learn to listen to what is being said at all times.”

David Jay Krauss: “Follow your judgement and protect your values.”

David O. Kreuter: “Enjoy your time with your adversaries. They are not the enemy.”

Steven C. Krueger: “Clients often do not know if they are getting good legal work, but they know if they are getting good service.”

John H. Lamming: “For superior professional development, be open and receptive to opportunities that may arise in unexpected practice areas you were not previously aware of or might not have known you could become qualified for. Moving upward in this manner may require related further development. After a short time in private civil practice, I moved into the field of patent/IP law, completed work for a BS and MS in a technical field, enjoyed more than 40 years of practice with multinational corporations, an elite private university, and the U.S. Army.”

Leo L. Logan III: “It is only a noble profession if you remain dedicated to the highest intellectual and ethical standards.”

Michael W. Manners: “1. Treat opposing counsel the way you want to be treated. 2. Remember that you work for your clients, not the other way around. 3. Be prepared when you go to court; your credibility depends on it.”

Michal A. Markenson: “In making early employment decisions, young lawyers make a few mistakes in selecting employers. First, all employers are not laboratories for training lawyers. The size of the firm may not dictate their ability to train young lawyers, create a culture, and promote them to positions of authority.

“A second mistake young attorneys make is placing primary emphasis on compensation. Instead, focus on a firm with an interest in you, training, and finding a specialty, and to move ahead financially in the future. The practice of law affords prestige, immense job satisfaction, and security, independence, and stability. However, it can and will interfere in family relationships and become stressful. The key is to balance the practice with those important family relationships. Clients will come and go, but your family will remain forever.”

William Nassau Marshall III: “You can be proud, but don’t be arrogant.”

Hon. Michael Robert McAdam: “Thank you for this honor. I appreciate all the good work that The Missouri Bar has done in the last half century. I can’t fully express my gratitude to all The Missouri Bar leaders over the past 50 years for advancing the standards of the legal profession and remembering that all our efforts as lawyers and judges is the honorable pursuit of justice for all.”

Christopher J. Miller: “Your character depends upon how you treat others, especially those who can do nothing for you.”

Max E. Mitchell: “Lawyers play a vital role in our society, and we must do everything in our power to protect the rule of law! Be passionate about the pursuit of justice and remember every day to take seriously our oath of admission. And … always consider the defenseless and the oppressed.”

Linda Marie Mustoe: “Start each day reading and reaffirming your oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Missouri. Then do it!”

George Edwin Proctor Jr.: “Read Abraham Lincoln’s notes for a law lecture.”

William Michael Quitmeier: “May every attorney treat their clients like they would want a family member treated by an attorney.”

Shari R. Rhode: “Always pay it forward. Help where you can, anyway you can.”

Edward A. Rose, Jr.: “Practice with ethics.”

Mark Sableman: “Precedent and black letter rules are important and useful, but only part of the picture. Lawyers should understand the principles behind the law and work to apply them wisely to a changing world.”

Daniel J. Schwartz: “Takes total focus to do it correctly.”

Kenneth A. Seufert: “Never give up; never surrender.”

Hon. Edwin H. Smith: “First and foremost, choose a practice that aligns with your strengths. Second, in developing your practice, learn from lawyers who are widely recognized for their excellence, but be authentic. Don’t try to imitate them. Cookie-cutter lawyers are boring and, therefore, less effective than they otherwise could be. Over the long term, the practice of law rewards individuality. While good character is essential to the practice of law, embracing your own unique personality and style — being the true character you are — will make you a more interesting, compelling, and effective advocate for your clients. Third, live you[r] life and practice law with great passion. Passion pays.”

V. Raymond Stranghoener: “Your reputation for honesty and integrity is crucial to effective representation, regardless of legal specialty.”

Mark W. Suardi: “‘Doubt is never a pleasant condition but certainly is an absurd one.’ – Voltaire”

Mike Svetlic: “Work hard, be honest.”

Robert M. Sweere: “Try as many jury cases as you can early in your career.”

Elgene C. Ver Dught: “Be kind, courteous, positive, and constructive in all relations and communications. Encourage clients and others involved in conflict to embrace mediation, utilize strategic negotiations skills, and the mediation process will transform the parties and you from adversaries into collaborators, enhancing your settlement resolution philosophy and vocabulary. Remember positive communication skills and cooperative future relationships will be enhanced and empowering for participants to control decisions affecting their lives and business affairs.”

John A. Vering III: “Treat other lawyers the way you want to be treated. Your word is your bond. Respond promptly to client requests and keep clients informed.”

Richard Donald Watters: “Always treat the court and your opponent with respect. You never know when today’s opposing counsel will be tomorrow’s co-counsel.”

John C. Weller: “Always meet your clients. If you don’t already know your opponent, call and introduce yourself. Consider talking about your case early with opponent.”

Dorothy L. White-Coleman: “The practice of law is a profession, and lawyers are professionals. Do your work with courage and skill, and practice with respect, integrity, and civility. Always endeavor to treat others the way you want to be treated even when they don’t deserve it. I said ‘endeavor;’ I know it is not easy. Be a student of the law and never stop learning or evolving. As I look at how the law has changed, and technology has altered the practice during the course of my career, it has indeed been a journey, not a destination.”

Branson L. Wood III: “There are all kinds of examples of different styles of the practice of law by great lawyers, but in the end, lawyers have to be themselves; they cannot be anyone else.”

Randell Keith Wood: “Remember that you are a counselor of law. You are there to provide advice to your clients in times of great need.”

Marie Spencer Woodbury: “Always protect your integrity. Once you lose it, it is very hard to recover it. Respect the law and the court and act respectfully to everyone involved in the legal process.”

Valarie Standefer Zeeck: “• As you begin the practice of law, pay attention to what the veteran lawyers say and do. There is wisdom there. Likewise, pay attention to the newcomers. They bring fresh skills and knowledge worth considering.

• Set an example. Speak truthfully, honor your commitments you make, be kind.

• Treasure your staff. The practice of law depends on the work of paralegals, interns, secretaries, and clerks. These invaluable colleagues will save you more times than you can count.

• Our rule of law is unique ... When you swear the oath to become a lawyer, defending it becomes your highest responsibility.”

Editor's note: Answers have been edited for style, clarity, and brevity.

Appellate

Appellant appealed one judgment and briefed another
Appellate courts preferred to resolve arguments on their merits but could not fashion arguments for the parties. To preserve judicial neutrality, appellate courts enforced rules on briefing that required appellants to set forth their challenges to give notice of the appellant’s theories to the Missouri Court of Appeals or the other parties. The appellant cited facts and made arguments related to a judgment that the appellant did not appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Audwin Porter vs. Dipasquale Moore LLC, et al.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88424

How to brief an appeal from summary judgment explained
Parties could prevail on motions for summary judgment by establishing facts beyond genuine dispute on which the law entitled the movant to a favorable ruling. Appellate courts reviewed summary judgments the same way that circuit courts ruled on motions for summary judgment: on the summary judgment record. The appellant failed to support its challenges with citations to the summary judgment record showing the facts established and the facts genuinely disputed. “It is unclear [whether the appellants] are arguing that there are material facts in dispute that preclude the grant of summary judgment in favor of [the respondents] but not in favor of [the appellants] or whether they are arguing that summary judgment in favor of [the respondents] was improper as a matter of law.” The appellants established neither, so the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
Midwest Contracting Services, LLC, et al. vs. Arch Insurance Company, et al.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88266

Attorneys

Commingling, concealment, and neglect resulted in disbarment
Respondent attorney commingled client property with his own property; kept trust account records inadequate for reconciliation; neglected a client’s action, resulting in dismissal, which damaged the client. The respondent attorney concealed the dismissal for three-and-a-half years and failed to deliver the client’s file. Those violations supported disbarment, which negated probation. And aggravating factors, like the respondent’s long experience in the law and failure to cooperate with the chief disciplinary counsel, met with no circumstances sufficient to mitigate discipline. Repeated violations supported an inference of knowing violations. “[T]he discipline imposed in prior, seemingly similar cases is not dispositive [because, w]hile the law governing a lawyer’s ethical obligations is consistent, the facts of different cases rarely are.” The Supreme Court of Missouri disbarred the respondent attorney.
(Overview summary)
In re: William Patrick Hogan, Respondent
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101636

Civil

Motion to set aside default was too late
Circuit courts could set aside default judgments on motions filed within a reasonable time. But that reasonable time could not exceed one year from the date on which the circuit court filed the judgment, even though the judgment was not final on that date. Due process did not require notice of the default judgment to the defaulting party. A post-judgment amendment to the return of service did not alter that result because the manner and place of service had always been correct and the amendment changed only the capacity of the person receiving service. Equitable tolling required the movant to show that it diligently pursued its rights, which the movant did not show. The circuit court denied the motion and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Laurie P. Staus vs. Federal Protection, Inc.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88160

Criminal

No alibi instruction was necessary
The defendants could offer evidence of good character as substantive proof of innocence, not generally, but as relevant to “the traits of character involved in the crime[.]” That did not describe evidence that the defendant behaved appropriately around children on charges of statutory sodomy. Circuit courts could not give instructions on an alibi defense without “evidence that the defendant was somewhere other than the place of commission, during the entire time of commission.” For child sexual offenses, time was not an element. And the defendant’s evidence showed that he was at the place of commission for only part of the time of the  commission, so the circuit court did not err in refusing an instruction on an alibi defense. A charge of error expanded on appeal was subject to plain error review only, which the Missouri Court of Appeals declined. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Kyle J. Huber, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114063

Conviction reversed on self-incrimination
Waiver of counsel required a signed form, and a Faretta hearing with a record adequate to determine whether the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. None of that occurred. The circuit court’s colloquy did not clarify that the defendant understood the charges and possible sentences. Those events constituted plain error, so the Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the convictions and remanded the action for a new trial.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. MICHAEL PAUL WILSON, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39228

No plain error in bench determination of persistent offender status
Objections to sentencing procedure as standing on insufficient jury findings, or as unauthorized by statute, did not preserve an objection that the procedure deviated from that to which the parties agreed. That left only plain error review, of which the elements included an obvious error affecting a substantial right and resulting in manifest injustice. And even on that showing, review was discretionary. Jury questions included facts in support of an enhanced sentence. Constitutional rights were structural and raised a presumption of prejudice. But the right to jury sentencing was statutory, constituted a recommendation only, and was not grounds for reversal. Besides, the defendant received a sentence without enhancement.  The Missouri Court of Appeals declined sua sponte plain error review.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri vs. Demont M. Vandunk
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88191

Evidence

Offers of proof discussed
"[M]ultiple claims of error in a single point relied on renders the point multifarious” and subject to dismissal. The appellant also failed to identify and discuss excluded evidence and its relation to the circuit court’s findings. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed that point. Offers of proof were necessary to preserve error in excluded evidence. Failure to make an offer of proof also supported an exercise of discretion against plain error review. Offers of proof showing that the disputed evidence was partly admissible but partly inadmissible were subject to exclusion entirely. The defendant’s offer of proof was largely irrelevant hearsay of little probity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. CARL JOE JETT, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39332

Evidence of uncharged conduct was admissible
Evidence of uncharged crimes was admissible to show a complete picture of the circumstances, which could include why the victims did not report events sooner, so evidence of the defendant’s generally violent and abusive nature was admissible. Evidence of false sexual contact allegations were admissible to impeach a witness, but the defendant did not show that anyone’s allegations were false. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri vs. William G. Noble
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87982

No prejudice from cumulative evidence
Evidence that was cumulative of other evidence entered without objection could not be prejudicial. The elements of property damage in the first degree included damage worth over a specified amount. Witnesses twice testified to the cost of repairing the damaged property without objection before the defendant made a hearsay objection the third time around. “Here, we need not decide whether Victim 2’s testimony regarding the dollar estimate of damage to his vehicle is hearsay or not because admission of his testimony — even if inadmissible — could not result in reversible error.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri vs. Denver Leon Newland
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87869

Family

Indian Child Welfare Act applied
Before terminating parental rights, the Indian Child Welfare Act required services to keep the family together. The Juvenile Office met that burden with evidence of “sustained outreach to Mother and Father, an individualized incarcerated-parent plan, institutional inquiries, assistance establishing paternity, repeated encouragement and information, involvement of the Tribe, a diligent family search for both parents, and efforts to preserve Child’s familial relationships.” The act also required evidence of causation between continued custody and likely harm to the child. The Juvenile Office met that burden with expert evidence that linked likely harm to the parent’s past and continuing issues, the absence of a relationship with child, and the child’s current placement. The judgment included all required findings of fact. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
In the Interest of W.M.G., Greene County Juvenile Office, Respondent v. R.D.G., II, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39476

Evaluation of business goodwill discussed
When arguing that a ruling was against the weight of the evidence, the appellants could not cite testimony found not credible for evidence contrary to a challenged proposition. And findings of fact were subject to review for abuse of discretion. In actions for dissolution of marriage, business assets were subject to property division, including goodwill, if characterized as marital property. Goodwill meant the likelihood that old customers would continue with the business and was present in “highly skilled personal services.” That included event planning. “[T]he value of goodwill that can be attributed specifically to the business is marital property, but the value of goodwill that is attributed to the reputation of the spouse is not.” The source of the business’s goodwill was the spouse owner’s skills and business connections.  The circuit court articulated no grounds for an award of attorney fees and none appeared in the record, so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the attorney fee award. Otherwise, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
Emily R. McNulty, Respondent, v. Daniel J. McNulty, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113778

Termination of parental rights affirmed on failure to rectify
Circuit courts could terminate parental rights on two elements: first, that clear, cogent and convincing evidence showed one statutory basis for termination; second, that a preponderance of the evidence showed termination to be in the child’s best interests. Each element had statutory factors for the circuit court’s consideration. Bases included failure to rectify the conditions that first supported the circuit court’s exercise of authority — abuse or neglect — which the record showed to continue unrectified. On appeal, the standard for reversal was no support in substantial evidence. The record supported the circuit court’s finding that the appellant failed to comply with a social service plan. And failure to challenge all factors left the remaining unchallenged factors to in support of the elements. The circuit court terminated the appellant’s parental rights, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
In the Interest of: W.I.M.P., Juvenile; Juvenile Officer vs. R.P. (Mother)
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88378

Termination of parental rights left other relationships intact
In every action, every claimant party had to have standing, meaning an interest sufficient to bring the action. In actions for wrongful death, statutes granted standing by classifying potential plaintiffs. One classification included siblings. The plaintiff’s decedent and the plaintiff were siblings and the plaintiff brought the wrongful death action. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, citing a judgment that terminated the parental rights of the plaintiff and the decedent. Judgments terminating parental rights severed parent/child relationships absolutely and had no effect on any other relationship. Adoption statutes were inapplicable because no adoption occurred. The circuit court granted summary judgment and dismissed the action for lack of standing. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed that judgment and remanded the action.  
NIKITA PASCHALL, Appellant v. SENATH SOUTH HEALTH CARE CENTER, et al., Respondents
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39215

Juvenile

Status offenses explained
Circuit courts could exercise authority over a juvenile found guilty in a civil action of a status offense, meaning an offense injurious to the welfare of the juvenile or others. That included driving a stolen car at over 100 miles per hour while fleeing police and in possession of a loaded pistol. The circuit court exercised authority over the juvenile and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.  
(Overview summary)
In the Interest of: M.L.K., Juvenile Officer vs. M.L.K.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88343

Personal injury

No settlement to enforce
On motions to enforce settlements, the movants had the burden to show by “clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence” that the parties had reached a settlement. Settlements were contracts and contracts existed only where there was consideration, an offer, and an acceptance. Acceptance of an offer had to be an unequivocal mirror image of the offer as to essential provisions. Provisions essential to the plaintiff’s settlement of an action against an insured for personal injuries included a release of further liability. The parties’ releases differed as to indemnification and hold harmless language. The circuit court denied the motion and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
(Overview summary)
Finiece Robinson, Respondent, v. Yvonna Walker, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114056

Post-conviction

Failure to appoint post-conviction counsel required reversal
Circuit courts had to appoint counsel for a movant who filed an initial motion and an in forma pauperis affidavit. No other forms were necessary so the omission of such other forms was irrelevant. Nevertheless, the circuit court dismissed the motion without appointing post-conviction counsel. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the action for appointment of counsel and further proceedings.
(Overview summary)
Jeffrey D. Gray vs. State of Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88701

Workers' compensation

Employee did not refuse treatment
Any employer could control treatment for employee claimants but was liable for the reasonable and medically necessary medical treatment that a claimant procured if the employer failed to provide treatment. Whether and when the claimant asked employer for treatment was a finding of fact that received deference on judicial review except when the record overwhelmingly showed otherwise. An estimate from the employee’s physician did not support an inference that the employee was going to reject the employer’s physician’s treatment. Three weeks was enough time for the respondent employer to provide treatment. “Employer could have reasserted control over Claimant’s treatment by simply sending him to a doctor of its choosing.” The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission did not err in denying an award of litigation expenses because the employer had evidence to contest the claim.  The Missouri Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of reviewing a multifarious point, reversed the commission as to past medical expenses, and remanded the action to the commission for an award of past medical expenses starting with the claimant’s demand.
(Overview summary)
Ronald Wills, Appellant, v. Fixture Contracting Co., Inc., et al., Respondents
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114391

JEFFERSON CITY, Mo. – The Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee released its performance findings today for the 50 nonpartisan judges who will be up for retention in the Nov. 3, 2026, general election. All Missouri voters will have at least two appellate judges appear in retention elections on their ballot this November.

"The Judicial Performance Review is a key component of Missouri's Non-Partisan Court Plan as it provides information to voters," Debbie Dodge, committee chair, said. "Ultimately, voters have the final say in Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan through judicial retention elections."

The committee reviewed the performance of 50 judges, including one Supreme Court of Missouri judge, five Court of Appeals judges, 28 circuit court judges, and 16 associate circuit court judges in circuits where the judges are appointed under Missouri's Non-Partisan Court Plan, also known as The Missouri Plan. The committee recommends all judges be retained.

"These reviews help make sure that the votes cast in the November elections are based on objective information about the performance of individual judges," Dodge said. "We urge Missouri voters to use this information to make sure we have judges who are fair, impartial, and skilled."

The complete performance review information of each judge is available at YourMissouriJudges.org. For quick reference, landing pages for voters by circuit are provided:

• Supreme Court of Missouri
• Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District
• Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District
• Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District
• Platte County (6th Circuit Court)
• Clay County (7th Circuit Court)
• Jackson County (16th Circuit Court)
• St. Louis County (21st Circuit Court)
• St. Louis City (22nd Circuit Court)
• Greene County (31st Circuit Court)
• All other counties

To schedule an interview with Debbie Dodge, Judicial Performance Review Committee chair, contact Communications Director Hannah Kiddoo Frevert at hkiddoo@mobar.org.

About the reviews

The committee considers a variety of information about each judge, including lawyers’ ratings of the judges, jurors’ ratings of some trial judges, and written opinions from judges. Access these items at YourMissouriJudges.org.

The lawyers’ survey focused on key traits that judges need to render justice effectively and fairly. Jurors were asked a series of questions about the judge’s courtroom conduct.

Circuit and associate circuit judges were rated in areas including a wide range of observable skills and traits, such as treating people fairly, competency in the law, and writing clear opinions. Supreme Court of Missouri and Missouri Court of Appeals judges were rated on a different set of criteria as they decide cases that are appealed because of possible legal errors, either procedural or through misinterpretations of the law. These judges were rated on areas such as whether their opinions were clearly written, whether they adequately explained the basis of the court’s decision, and whether they issued opinions in a timely manner.

All identifiable information was removed from the survey results and the judges’ written opinions to ensure the committee did not know the identity of each judge they reviewed.

About Missouri's Non-Partisan Court Plan

Missouri has used a constitutional merit system known as Missouri's Non-Partisan Court Plan for its judicial selection since 1940. The plan has since been adopted by other states across the country.

Under the plan, all judges are accountable to the voters, although their initial selection process may vary. Appellate judges and trial-level judges in the City of St. Louis and Clay, Greene, Jackson, Platte, and St. Louis counties are first appointed to the judicial seat and then stand for retention before the voters after their first 12 months on the bench and the end of each term. In other parts of the state, trial-level judges seek election in partisan races.

Before becoming a judge, all nonpartisan judges are screened by a nominating commission whose members include lawyers, non-lawyers, and a judge. The commission selects the three most-qualified candidates and forwards their names to the governor, who chooses one candidate to fill the position.

After their first year on the bench and again at the end of each term, nonpartisan judges must run in retention elections. In retention elections, the ballot reads: “Shall Judge X be retained?” To be retained, each merit-selected judge must receive a simple majority.

The Missouri Bar is tasked with sharing the independent committee’s findings with the public. The Missouri Bar funds the review process, which was created by a Supreme Court of Missouri rule in 2008.

For more information, visit YourMissouriJudges.org. 

• Savina Balano, Davis Bethune & Jones, Kansas City
• Austin Davis, Missouri Office of Administration, Jefferson City
• Ashley Flood, Clay County Prosecutors Office, Kansas City
• Mary Hirsch, Missouri State Public Defender-STL Trial Office, St. Louis
• Sarah Holt, Edmundson & Holt LLC, Poplar Bluff
• Sarah Johnson, Commerce Trust, Leawood
• Rebecca Langsam, Missouri Department of Social Services-Division of Legal Services, St. Louis
• Hannah Lundry, Greene County Prosecutor’s Office, Springfield
• Trevion McGhaw, Straight Talk Legal, St. Louis
• Audrey Pauls, Stubblefield Law LLC, Springfield
• Nandi Person, Attorney General’s Office of Missouri, St. Louis
• Mike Sinamon, Hartnett Reyes-Jones, St. Louis

The Missouri Bar’s Leadership Academy was developed in 2000 to encourage diversity among the bar’s leadership by recruiting young lawyers (those recently admitted to the bar under the age of 40 or those admitted for 10 years or fewer) who have already shown leadership qualities within their communities. Each class contains about a dozen lawyers who are diverse in terms of sex, race, ethnicity, practice area, and geography. Since its inception, about 300 Missouri lawyers have completed the Leadership Academy program.

The Leadership Academy class interacts with current leaders from the bench and bar, attends the Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar, makes a presentation to The Missouri Bar Board of Governors, and participates in workshops throughout the year designed to help the class learn more about the bar, develop leadership skills, and complete a service project.

At the end of the bar year, class members commit to serving the bar in an active capacity for two years, such as serving on the Young Lawyers’ Section Council or committees, presenting continuing legal education programs, or assisting with the bar’s civic education opportunities.

The 2026-2027 class will officially launch its year-long program in October.  

Learn more about Leadership Academy and the impact its graduates have had on the profession here.  

Sam Sherman received this year’s JoEllen Engelbart Award, presented by The Missouri Bar Young Lawyers’ Section, during the Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar in September.

The award is presented each year to a council member who exemplifies the spirit of the Young Lawyers’ Section Council. It honors the late JoEllen Engelbart, who was chair-elect of the council when she died in 2021. Engelbart, an assistant prosecuting attorney in Jackson County, dedicated her career to public service. YLS members at the time described her as an invaluable member of the council who always helped and mentored new members.   

Sherman has served as the YLS Council District 3 (Jackson County) representative since 2023 and was co-chair of the council’s pro bono/community service committee. Prior to serving on YLS Council, he was a member of The Missouri Bar Leadership Academy program. Sherman graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and is corporate litigation counsel for Tyler Technologies, Inc.

Sherman said he was “incredibly humbled” to receive the JoEllen Engelbart Award since Engelbart was known as “an exemplar for leadership, service, mentorship, and positivity.”

“Serving on YLS Council is a tremendous privilege, made most special by the other young lawyers I serve with,” Sherman added. “I am thankful to be recognized among this tremendous class of YLS Council members, and I look forward to seeing all that we accomplish this year.”

Click here to learn more about annual awards presented by The Missouri Bar, the Missouri Bar Foundation, and other entities. Read about other 2026 award winners here.

Administrative

No error preserved
Appellate courts reviewed agency decisions, not intervening circuit court judgments. On the exclusion of evidence, an offer of proof was necessary to preserve error, and the offer of proof had to be sufficiently specific for a reviewing court to identify the disputed evidence and the foundation for its admissibility. On the admission of evidence, a contemporaneous objection was necessary to preserve error. The agency disciplined the appellant’s license, the circuit court affirmed that decision, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
David E. Smock v. Missouri State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88558

ADR

Federal Arbitration Act was the parties’ choice of law
"Missouri courts generally enforce choice-of-law provisions.” The parties’ multiple agreements, including separate arbitration agreements, all included choice of law provisions naming the Federal Arbitration Act. No waiver of that provision occurred when an initial motion to compel arbitration did not cite the Federal Arbitration Act but a promptly filed amended motion did. That choice of law nullified a notice requirement in the Missouri Uniform Arbitration Act. The circuit court erred when it denied the appellants’ motion to compel arbitration for failure to comply with the Missouri notice requirement. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed that ruling, remanded the action, and ordered the circuit court to compel arbitration.
(Overview summary)
Jeannie Ashelin and Corey Scheideman, Plaintiffs/Respondents, v. Ed Napleton St. Louis Imports, Inc., d/b/a Off Lease by Napleton, et al., Defendants/Appellants
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114278

Appellate

Appellant’s brief required dismissal
Appellate courts did not convict circuit courts of error on arguments not made in circuit court, and the appellant did not show what arguments the appellant made in circuit court. Failure to comply with rules of appellate procedure jeopardized the appellate courts’ neutrality, preserved nothing for review, and constituted grounds for dismissal. The appellants had to file the record on appeal, including the legal file, including all documents necessary to rule, but the appellant omitted the decree of dissolution that was the source of the parties’ dispute. In the appellant’s brief, statements of fact had to favor the judgment, points relied on had to set forth a theory for reversal, arguments had to show the interaction of law and fact raised in — and only in — the points relied on. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Diane K. Wilson, nka Diane K. Almstedt, Appellant, v. Stephen D. Wilson, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114135

No participation, no preservation
Appellate courts seldom found errors in rulings as to which the appellants never objected, or failed to file after-trial motions, because circuit courts were due a chance to correct errors themselves. The day before trial, the appellant filed a notice. The notice waived all participation in the trial but purported to preserve any error at trial. And the appellant did not appear for trial, so whether the appellant’s appearance at trial would have required the appellant to assert the Fifth Amendment was mere conjecture. Cumulative plain error review required a showing of errors, and those errors had to be obvious, but no such error appeared in the “well-considered, detailed judgment [.]” If the judgment omitted required findings of fact, the remedy was a motion to amend. The appellant did not file any after-trial motions. The appellant preserved nothing for appeal, so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Heather Lynn Ruel, Respondent, v. Adam Roland Ruel, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113943

Business

No submissible case on breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent misrepresentation
After the discovery deadline, the plaintiff changed its theory of damages through supplemented responses to discovery. A motion in limine was not sufficient to preserve an objection to a late-disclosed witness; the objection had to be renewed at trial when the testimony was offered. The previous theory became obsolete, so no prejudice to the defendant resulted when the circuit court quashed a notice of deposition on the obsolete theory. And the defendant had remedies available that it did not seek, so that ruling was no abuse of discretion. Continuing objections could preserve error without further objecting but, otherwise, affirmative statements of “no objection” to documents offered at trial under the new theory of damages waived all appellate review. Instructions, approved or not, had to submit ultimate facts for the jury’s determination; otherwise, they constituted roving commissions. That described the defendants’ proffered instructions on the affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel because they merely recited principles of law, so the circuit court did not err in rejecting them. The merger doctrine limited damages to one award per wrong. Lack of a timely objection to an instruction on that basis waived all but plain error review. Plain error review was discretionary. The elements of plain error review included manifest injustice. No injustice occurred, as shown by awards of damages less than the evidence could have supported, so the Missouri Court of Appeals exercised its discretion against conducting plain error review of the instruction. And besides, the jury did not make three awards on one theory, it made three awards on three theories, one per theory. But two of those theories should not have gone to the jury because the plaintiff failed to support the elements of those two claims. The elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty included the existence of a fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary relationship existed when a “subservient party voluntarily cedes control to and places confidence in the dominant party with the reasonable expectation that the dominant party will act for the benefit of the subservient party.” That did not describe the relationship between the parties, an automotive dealer and an automotive auction house, because no evidence showed that the plaintiff ceded decision-making to the defendants. The elements of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation included reliance on a representation that was false when made. No evidence showed that the defendants made any false representation. Specifically, membership in a professional organization did not communicate adherence to that organization’s standards. And an insignificant percentage of failure to perform a promised service could have shown a breach of contract but did not show an intent not to perform when the defendant made the promise. On those claims, the circuit court erred in denying the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, so the Court of Appeals reversed the plaintiffs’ verdicts for breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals otherwise affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
J. Nuckolls, Inc. d/b/a Fenton Auto Sales, Respondent, v. America's Auto Auction St. Louis, Inc., et al., Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113904

Criminal

Disqualification of prosecuting attorney’s office discussed
“[O]nly in rare circumstances should a circuit court interfere with the democratic process and override the voters’ choice as to who is best suited to represent the interests of the people as prosecuting attorney, even with respect to a single case.” Appellate courts did not review rulings never sought. The appellant did not ask the circuit court to rescind its vacatur as to a specific assistant prosecutor, and for argument on the motion but not an evidentiary hearing, so the appellant preserved no error as to those matters. The appellant asked to disqualify a prosecuting attorney’s entire office, and the circuit court granted that relief, but then vacated that order. The appellant asked the circuit court to change its vacatur as to the entire office based on one assistant prosecutor’s former representation of the appellant in another action. The appellant did not show any conflict of interests and, even if the appellant had shown a conflict of interests, the appellant could not impute that conflict to the prosecuting attorney’s office. Also, the appellant showed no appearance of impropriety once the assistant prosecutor withdrew, never having used any protected information, and after only de minimis participation. Criminal defendants’ right to present a complete defense included a presumption that the exclusion of the defendant’s evidence was prejudicial but the State showed that the disputed evidence was cumulative and not probative of the relevant time frame. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri v. Francis Henry Kempker
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87593

Accomplice liability shown
Accomplice liability rendered co-defendants equally liable if one so much as encouraged the other. The record included evidence that the defendant helped steal goods and tried to sell some of them. That evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant of stealing more than $750. The elements of plain error included manifest injustice, meaning outcome-determinative. The circuit court included “physical interference” in an instruction on resisting appellant’s arrest. That language was not outcome-determinative, because the appellant did not deny using physical force, so the Missouri Court of Appeals denied plain error review. Circuit courts’ authority over their records continued after authority over judgments ended, so circuit courts could amend their judgments nunc pro tunc any time. The circuit court corrected the appellant’s sentence nunc pro tunc, mooting that point on appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. JUSTIN LEVI WATERDOWN, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39176

Child victim’s testimony discussed
The elements of plain error review included an obvious error. No obvious error occurred when a fact witness testified about questioning techniques without commenting on anyone’s veracity. The Missouri Court of Appeals declined plain error review. The elements of child molestation in the second degree as charged included contact with the victim’s anus, for which the State offered evidence that the defendant only made contact with the victim’s buttocks. That evidence did not support that element so the circuit court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for acquittal on that count. “Regardless of a child witness’s limitations, prosecution of criminal cases is not undertaken by children, but by adults who have been educated in the criminal law, criminal proceedings, and evidence. A child witness’s limitations do not lower the State’s evidentiary bar for a criminal conviction.” The Court of Appeals reversed that conviction, remanded the action for a judgment of acquittal on that count, and affirmed the remaining convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. RICKY LEE THURMAN, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38739

For unlawful use, the State need not prove that defendant pointed the weapon at victim
The elements of unlawful use of a weapon as charged included exhibiting the weapon in an angry or threatening manner. “[A] defendant need not actually point the gun at a victim to satisfy the element of acting in an angry or threatening manner[,]” And the evidence supported a finding that defendant did point a firearm at victim. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. CAMEO LORENZO GILMORE, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39181

Orders of protection

Distance not shown
Appellate review of criminal convictions viewed all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict but did not employ unreasonable, speculative, or forced inferences. The elements of violating a full order of protection included “entrance upon the premises of the petitioner’s dwelling unit … or being within a certain distance of the petitioner[.]” The full order of protection against defendant required the defendant to stay a certain distance from victim petitioner. The State’s evidence showed that the defendant was less than that distance from petitioner’s dwelling unit but was silent as to whether defendant was in the dwelling unit at the time. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. MEGAN A. HAAG, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39203

Personal Injury

Appellant’s summary judgment was not inextricably entwined with respondent’s motion
On motions for summary judgment, parties prevailed when “the motion, the response, the reply and the sur-reply show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Defending parties could do so by showing that claimant parties could not support any element of the target claim. A statute waived political subdivisions’ sovereign immunity for property in a dangerous condition. Sovereign immunity was not a defense, it was part of the plaintiff’s case to plead and prove. The plaintiff alleged that her injury resulted from someone impelling her into the defendant school district’s gymnasium wall during a race. Those allegations did not describe a dangerous condition of property, and the plaintiff offered no additional undisputed facts, so the summary judgment record on the defendant’s motion showed no dangerous condition. On that record, the law entitled the defendant to a favorable judgment. The plaintiff alleged that the wall was defectively designed in her own motion, but denial of her summary judgment motion was interlocutory and not subject to appeal. And the plaintiff’s motion offered different facts and theories so it was not inextricably intertwined with the defendant’s motion. Therefore, the denial of the plaintiff’s motion was not subject to review. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for the defendant.
HAILEY J. UNRUH, Plaintiff-Appellant v. WILLOW SPRINGS R-IV SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39136

Post-conviction

No appointment, no abandonment, no third-party interference, no final judgment
Appeal was possible only from a final judgment. A final judgment was a ruling that disposed of all claims, whether in the initial motion or a superseding amended motion. The amended motion stated “differing, and additional,” claims from the initial motion but was not timely. For either motion, timely filing was an element, without which circuit courts had no authority, subject to court-made exceptions. Exceptions included third-party interference but that exception applied only to initial motions and did not apply to amended motions. Exceptions for amended motions included abandonment, meaning no timely filing by counsel. But abandonment was limited “consistently, repeatedly, and emphatically” to appointed counsel. When counsel voluntarily entered an appearance without appointment, no appointment was necessary, and abandonment did not apply. Therefore, the amended motion was outside the circuit court’s authority. Nevertheless, the circuit court issued judgment on the amended motion only, and not the initial motion, so that judgment was not final. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and remanded the action to the circuit court.
(Overview summary)
Donald E. Nussbaum v. State of Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87727

No objection, no deficient performance
The elements of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel included deficient performance, against which the law presumed, and which the State could negate with evidence of a reasonable trial strategy. Reasonable trial strategy presumptively included choosing against making an objection to the State’s questioning even when plainly subject to objection. “[The] decision not to object was to avoid attracting additional attention to the improper questions and corresponding responses. This is a commonly recognized and accepted trial strategy.” Evidence to the contrary did not enter into appellate review. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
NICHOLAS J. BEROS, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39203

Probate

Standing to challenge trust administration shown
The appellants abandoned challenges, and the grounds for challenges, to rulings not cited in a point relied on. Anyone bringing any action had to show standing, meaning a sufficient interest in the subject matter. For parties bringing an action related to the administration of a trust, standing generally depended on the action and the terms of the trust. For reformation or other modification, only trustees and beneficiaries had standing. The plaintiff brought an action related to a trust that specifically excluded the plaintiff from any benefit. Whether success in an action could create such an interest was irrelevant. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiff’s petition to intervene in the administration, and for breach, of trust; and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling. The absence of an adequate remedy in probate, which the plaintiff could show by pursuit or futility of a remedy in probate division, was an element of tortious interference with an inheritance. Other elements included underlying tortious conduct that caused the interference, which the plaintiff adequately pleaded. The circuit court dismissed that claim, so the Court of Appeals reversed that ruling and remanded the action.
(Overview summary)
Ronald Jennings v. Debra J. Miner, et al.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88464

Utilities

Easement enforced, damages reversed
Rule and statute extended the circuit court’s authority over its judgment within which to issue an amended judgment, which it did within that time, vacating the original judgment and determining the matters subject to appeal. Appeal did not have to await resolution of attorney fees. Respondent property owners acquired land subject to appellant gas utility’s recorded easement for a pipeline, the terms of which included a tap and residential gas service to owners’ predecessors. The conveyance’s plain terms showed that the easement was real, meaning applicable to the land, rather than personal, meaning applicable only to parties to the conveyance. Therefore, the obligations of the conveyance bound successors to the original parties, replacement of the residence notwithstanding. On motions for summary judgment, citing stipulated facts, the circuit court found in the owners’ favor. But the only support for breach of contract damages was an exhibit attached to the owners’ proposed judgment, not in the stipulated facts. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the damages award and otherwise affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
Paul and Erin Tharp v. Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88122

Below are the Missouri lawyers who achieved the milestone in 2026. 

Richard Arthur Abrams 

Theodore D. Agniel 

Lawrence J. Altman 

John W. Amberg 

Donald Kenneth Anderson Jr. 

Jay B. Angoff 

Michael D. Arnold 

J. Nick Badgerow 

Jack T. Bangert 

Vito Charles Barbieri 

Richard Andrew Barry III 

John Francis Barry 

George A. Barton 

Kris R. Baumgartner 

Debra E. Behrendt 

James Harvey Bernard Jr. 

Paul F. Black 

Ira Leonard Blank 

Denise Helene Bloch 

Kevin Lawrence Bloomfield 

Gary Richard Bradley 

Louis R. Branz 

Bryan Craig Breckenridge 

Lance Christian Bretsnyder 

Charles E. Bridges 

Ronald S. Bronstein 

Hon. James Michael Brown 

Charles Ray Brown 

Daniel Robert Brown 

Donald E. Bucher 

Steve Dulle Burmeister 

Dennis Lee Callahan 

Michael R. Cannon 

Frank Kimberly Carlson 

Frank Chadwick Carnahan 

Lynn Chipperfield 

James B. Christensen 

Daniel Elliot Claggett 

Nicholas W. Clark 

Betsy Clarke 

Don Cary Collins 

Nathan F. Conley 

Daniel Joseph Conway 

James Christopher Cook 

Joan Amendola Coulter 

Joseph P. Cowin 

John Lester Crowe 

Hon. Charles D. Curless 

David N. Damick 

Hon. Michael Paul David 

Gilbert Richardson Dean III 

Johnnye L. Dennis 

Alan Harvey Deright 

R. Lawrence Dessem 

Sharon Ann Gerber Dickinson 

Gerard Thomas Diekman 

Dan Dildine 

Lynn W. Dippold 

John E. Dooling Jr. 

Sandra J. Doreson 

Hon. Robert G. Dowd Jr. 

Brian Harold Dunn 

Dennis E.  Egan 

Steven E. Emke 

Gayle Stutzman Evans 

James Eugene Ewan 

Steven E. Faber 

William David Farrar 

John Weldon Fay 

Hon. Arthur B. Federman 

Donna Kay Feinberg 

Hon. Kenneth Frank Feretti 

Brian J. Finucane 

James Michael Fischer 

Hon. Hannelore Depenthal Fischer 

Frank Bernerd Flink Jr. 

Robert Michael Fowler 

Carol Frenick Fowler 

Robert Edward Fox Jr. 

Maureen McCarthy Franz 

Ty Steven Gaither 

James Michael Gallen 

John C. Garavaglia 

James Dennis Gassen 

Judy Ann Gibbs 

Maurice Michael Gill 

Suzanne Rae Gladney 

A. Fuller Glaser Jr. 

James Glover III 

David Eckstein Goldman 

Terrance J. Good 

Hon. Jon Reginald Gray 

Hon. Stephen K. Griffin 

Gregory Ottis Grounds 

Nancy Hynson Grove 

Carolyn Ann Haimann 

Steven Milton Hamburg 

David T. Hamilton 

Judith L. Hancock 

Kenneth E. Hand 

Nathan C. Harbur 

Eric C. "Ric" Harris 

Paul J. Harris 

Hon. Mark Jay Harris 

Michael David Hart 

Charles Andrew Harter 

Hon. Randall Louis Head 

Elizabeth Healey 

Lewis Arthur Heaven Jr. 

Richard Helfand 

Hon. Robert M. Heller 

John Morgan Henderson Jr. 

Christopher Hoberock 

D. Warren Hoff Jr. 

Hon. Victor C. Howard 

Jonathan William Igoe 

Frank A. Isler 

Sylvester James Jr. 

Steven George Janik 

Thomas R. Jayne 

Frank William Jenny II 

Al W. Johnson 

Hon. James Kelso Journey 

Peter A. Joy 

Hon. James Kingdon Justus 

Michael Edward Kaemmerer 

Robert Nathan Kahn 

Patricia Aylward Kalb 

Hon. Elliot M. Kaplan 

Richard A. Kaufman 

John Thomas Kay 

John Mark Kell 

Mark Thomas Kempton 

James Jay Knappenberger 

Thomas Winsor Koelling 

David Jay Krauss 

David O. Kreuter 

Sanford Krigel 

Erlene Wienstock Krigel 

Steven C. Krueger 

John Wilson Kuebler 

Steven Paul Kuenzel 

Louis N. Laderman 

Hon. Isidore Ireland Lamke 

John H. Lamming 

Marsha Kay Duncan Laner 

Robert Charles Latz 

Timothy Gale Lee 

Douglas L. Levine 

Jay Lewis Levitch 

Mark S. Levitt 

Steven A. Levy 

Terry W. Liberman 

Richard Brent Lindenberger 

Bradley Harold Lockenvitz 

Leo L. Logan III 

Gary R. Long 

Michael Alan Love Sr. 

Carolyn Suzanne Love 

Theodore Joseph MacDonald Jr. 

Michael W. Manners 

Col. Gary Michael Manuele 

Michael Allen Markenson 

William Nassau Marshall III 

Hon. Michael Robert McAdam 

Newton G. McCoy 

Robert Paul McCulloch 

Donald F. McDonald Jr. 

Bernard Peter McDonnell Jr. 

Janet Goldberg McEnery 

John E. McKay 

Patrick Conlon McKenna 

Nancy Weeden McKimmy 

Hon. Maura Bridget McShane 

Lewis Eugene Melahn 

Daniel G. Menzie 

Keith C. Miller 

Christopher J. Miller 

Marilyn Grace Miller 

Max E. Mitchell 

L. Russell Mitten II 

Kim Roger Moore 

Philip Edward Morgan Jr. 

John Boyd Morthland 

Robert Spencer Moss 

Richard A. Mueller 

Thomas Hugh Mug 

Linda Marie Mustoe 

Robert Dale Nienhuis 

Gerard T. Noce 

Timothy F. Noelker 

Mary Kathleen O’Blennis 

Mary Anne O’Connell 

John Patrick O’Connor 

Robert G. Olson 

William D. O’Neill 

Mark Cannon Owens 

Virginia Gaddy Pasewark 

Charles Pauly Jr. 

James Michael Payne 

Hon. Jack N. Peace 

Bob L. Perica 

C. Edward Peterson 

Roger A. Potter 

Michalene Susan Powers 

Richard Louis Prebil 

George Edwin Proctor Jr. 

William Michael Quitmeier 

Dwight Emery Rahmeyer 

Hon. Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer 

Daniel A. Raniere 

Paul L. Redfearn III 

Shari R. Rhode 

Andrew A. Rimmel 

Edward A. Rose Jr. 

Terry Robert Rottler 

Mark Sableman 

Patrick Michael Sanders 

John David Schaperkotter 

Laurence Gavin Schmidt 

Hon. Mary Bruntrager Schroeder 

Daniel J. Schwartz 

Richard J. Schwartze 

Michele Kaido Schwent 

James J. Scott 

Maureen Scully 

Kenneth A. Seufert 

Michael Lawrence Sexton 

Judith A. Sharp 

Hon. Booker Thomas Shaw 

John William Shaw 

Michael P. Shea 

Bobette Shipman 

Nancy Lee Sido 

Douglas Ealey Sittler 

Kenneth Aubrey Slavens 

James Michael Smith 

James M. Smith 

Phillip Sanford Smith 

Hon. Edwin H. Smith 

Donald Williamson Smith 

Andrea Loring Smith 

Gary Edward Snodgrass 

David Alan Sosne 

Daniel Edward Speir 

Steven E. Spoeneman 

George Lee Stafford 

Eugene Girard Steinmann 

Paul R. Sterrett 

Bradford Lee Stevens 

V. Raymond Stranghoener 

Mark W. Suardi 

David F. Sullivan 

Mike Svetlic 

Robert M. Sweere 

Robert Jefferson Swift Jr. 

Dennis Herbert Tesreau 

Hon. Kenneth Foster Thompson 

Rodney William Thompson 

Judy R. Ullmann 

Hon. James Walter Van Amburg 

Thomas Kent Vandiver 

Elgene C. Ver Dught 

John A. Vering III 

Daniel L. Viets 

Steven Dee Waldman 

Hon. Barbara Wendy Wallace 

E. Waide Warner Jr. 

Roger W. Warren 

Russell F. Watters 

Richard Donald Watters 

Thomas Blumeyer Weaver 

Charles Edward Weedman Jr. 

John C. Weller 

Dorothy L. White-Coleman 

Steven Kent Wickersham 

Hon. Terry W. Wiese 

Les D. Wight II 

Michael E. Wilson 

Steven Douglas Wolcott 

Branson L. Wood III 

Randell Keith Wood 

Marie Spencer Woodbury 

William Lee Yocum 

Valarie Standefer Zeeck 

Candace Margaret Zierdt 

Nick Alexander Zotos 

Appellate

Wrong reason, right result
An appellate court “will affirm the circuit court’s judgment ‘if it is correct on any ground supported by the record regardless of whether the circuit court relied upon it.’” The petitioner sought an exemption from registration as a sex offender, and the circuit court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. That reasoning was erroneous because the constitution gave circuit courts jurisdiction over all matters civil and criminal. But the result was correct because statutes provided the conditions for that relief and the appellant did not meet those conditions. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
(Overview summary)
Sherma Johnson, Appellant, v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, et al., Respondents
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113828

Judgment was not final without resolving all claims
Appellate jurisdiction was a matter of statute and rule, not “waiver, acquiescence, or even express consent[.]” For the parties’ action, a final judgment was necessary before appellate jurisdiction was possible. The judgment was not final because it failed to address all the petition’s claims. Nevertheless, the Missouri Court of Appeals issued an opinion on the judgment in an earlier appeal. The law of the case doctrine was discretionary when an earlier opinion “arose from mistake or resulted in a manifest injustice” to the defendant. “Under these exceptional circumstances, we exercise our discretion not to apply the law of the case doctrine.” The Court of Appeals recalled its mandate and withdrew its opinion in the earlier appeal, which reversed the judgment issued pursuant to that earlier appeal and mooted the remaining matters on appeal, and it remanded the action for a final judgment.
(Overview summary)
Matthew Valdivia v. Missouri Department of Corrections
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88465

ADR

No contract, no arbitration agreement
Arbitration was a matter of contract. Contracts existed only when essential terms were agreed. Negotiations over contract terms did not constitute a contract. The parties agreed to arbitrate disputes arising from a prospective employment contract. “The only legally enforceable promise created out of at-will employment is the employer’s promise to pay the employee for the work he or she performs.” Therefore, essential terms of a contract for at-will employment included the start date. No start date was ever agreed, and the employer withdrew its offer of employment before employment started. Without a contract of employment, there was no arbitration agreement. The circuit court denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
(Overview summary)
Jeremy Bredwell v. Snap-On Incorporated, et al.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88325

Criminal

Self-defense theories had to be in disjunctive
Counsel affirmatively stating “no objection” to the State’s proffered instruction did not waive plain error review. Self-defense was a special negative defense, meaning that the defendant had to raise it and the State had to disprove it, like an extra element of the offense. The defendant raised general self-defense and castle doctrine self-defense, so the State had to disprove both. But the instructions allowed conviction if the State negated either general self-defense “or” castle doctrine self-defense. That lowered the State’s burden of proof and constituted plain error. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded the action for a new trial.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri v. Robert E. Matlock, Jr.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87929

Post-conviction

Findings of fact and conclusions of law required on timeliness.
Circuit courts had to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the timeliness of initial motions, and a motion to amend was not necessary to preserve that matter. Failure to make those findings and conclusions made no record for appellate review and therefore required a remand. The movant’s motion arrived late, but the movant alleged timely filing and alternatives to that requirement. The circuit court made no findings of fact on the matter of timeliness, so the Missouri Court of Appeals remanded the action to the circuit court.
(Overview summary)
Joshua C. Proffer, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114132

Probate

Non-probate transfer was non-recoverable
When a decedent’s liabilities were greater than the decedent’s estate, an action for accounting could re-capture “recoverable transfers,” meaning decedent property that a creditor could have seized and attached for the decedent’s debts. That did not describe a decedent’s individual retirement account because all amounts disbursed from such accounts to the account holder or a beneficiary were exempt from attachment and execution. A beneficiary of the decedent’s individual retirement account received their benefit and the estate’s personal representative brought an action for accounting to recover that transfer. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
In the Estate of: Dennis Hicks
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114395

Approval of final settlement affirmed
In an earlier appeal, the appellant challenged the circuit court’s order approving the sale of assets. The protectee’s death ended the respondent conservator’s authority over the protectee's assets except for winding up and making a final settlement. Final settlements did not dispose of all assets; they accounted for all assets. That accounting did not have to disclose that the former conservator participated in the auction. The only person who had standing to raise a conflict of interest objection was the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. The appellant did not show that any assets were sold at less than fair market value so the circuit court approved the settlement. When the appellant appealed, law of the case barred the appellant from raising an argument that the appellant could have raised in the earlier appeal. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the order approving the final settlement.
IN THE MATTER OF KYONG SPRUILL, INCAPACITATED AND DISABLED. J-PIA SPRUILL, Respondent v. ARTHUR J. SPRUILL, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39185

Appellate

Special orders after judgment explained
Appeals were possible from special orders after judgment. Special orders after judgment related to the accomplishing or preventing enforcement of a judgment. Special orders after judgment did not include a ruling on the appellant’s declaratory judgment action. That action sought clarification of an underlying circuit court action’s status but did not seek relief related to enforcement of the judgment in that underlying action. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
City of Richmond Heights, Missouri, Respondent, v. Clinton L. Watson, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114255

Appellant’s briefing deficiencies barred review
The appellants had the burden of showing that the circuit court committed reversible error by filing an appellant’s brief. Appellants’ briefs were subject to rules that protected the courts’ impartiality by requiring appellants to set forth their challenges in a specified format. That format included a statement of facts, with references to the record and without argument, relevant to the judgment. It also required points relied on that, in a specified template, alleged circuit court error and a theory for reversal. Each theory required support with an argument in a respective prescribed analysis. When the appellant charged reversible error in any ruling, the appellants had to state how they preserved that error for review and the standard of review for the ruling. The appellant’s brief failed to conform to those requirements, requiring an appellate to construct an argument for the appellant, which courts would not do. The Missouri Court of Appeals granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Steven M. Young, et al., Respondents v. William H. Young, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113691

Attorneys

Use of AI’s fictitious citations merited sanctions
Every filing in every tribunal constituted a certification that the allegations and arguments had a basis in law and fact, which required some pre-filing inquiry. Counsel violated both the inquiry and certification requirements when counsel cited fabricated authorities for fictitious legal propositions hallucinated by generative artificial intelligence results. “Improper or careless use of generative AI” might also have violated “multiple rules of professional conduct.” Failure to check AI results was objectively unreasonable and supported a monetary sanction against counsel. The Missouri Court of Appeals denied the petition and ordered petitioner’s counsel to pay an amount for the adverse parties’ reasonable attorney fees.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri ex rel. Steven Schnell, Relator, v. Honorable Rebecca Richardson, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114731

Criminal

Revocation of parole prohibited
Writs of prohibition issued “to avert the usurpation of power when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction[.]” Sentencing defendants to the custody of the Department of Corrections ended the authority of the circuit court and started the authority of the Department, including as to parole. The respondent circuit judge nevertheless issued a summons and a warrant on the State’s motion to revoke the parole of the relator. The Missouri Court of Appeals made permanent its writ of prohibition against the respondent circuit judge to bar any further action in the relator’s criminal action.
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. SARAH M. PRETTYMAN, Relator v. THE HONORABLE LYNETTE VEENSTRA, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39402

Revocation of parole prohibited, related jail board bill unauthorized
Writs of prohibition issued “to avert the usurpation of power when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction[.]” Sentencing defendants to the custody of the Department of Corrections ended the authority of the circuit court and started the exclusive authority of the Department as to parole. The respondent circuit judge nevertheless issued a summons and a warrant, and confined the relator to jail. The Missouri Court of Appeals made permanent its writ of prohibition against the respondent circuit judge to bar any further action in the relator’s criminal action, except to tear up jail board bill for the relator’s unauthorized confinement.
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. BRANDON LEE RUTZ, Relator v. THE HONORABLE R. CRAIG CARTER, CIRCUIT JUDGE, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39403

Elections

Secretary of State held in, then purged of, contempt
Civil contempt’s purpose was to encourage compliance with court orders by fine or commitment to jail. The elements of contempt included a court-ordered obligation and a breach of that obligation. In an action to determine which congressional redistricting map to use at the general election, old or new, the Supreme Court of Missouri required the use of the old map and barred the Missouri Secretary of State from “mandating the use of the” new map. The secretary emailed election authorities to mandate the use of a map three times: first, the old map; second, the new map; third, the old map. The second email put the secretary in contempt of court. A U.S. district court’s temporary restraining order did not change that result because that temporary restraining order did not require the second email and, even if it did, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the temporary restraining order. The third email purged the secretary of contempt. Because the Missouri Secretary of State purged himself of contempt, the Supreme Court of Missouri did not order any commitment or fine.
Richard von Glahn, Appellant, v. Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity, et al., Respondents
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101805

Family

Circuit court correctly characterized and awarded a non-existent asset
In actions for dissolution of marriage, circuit courts had to characterize and divide the parties’ assets. The source of funds determined whether assets, and increases in value, were subject to characterization as marital or separate assets. Assets subject to division were those existing on the date of trial, except that assets not existing on that date were also subject to division if secreted or squandered. Appellate courts could determine that circuit courts implicitly made findings of fact as to squandering and secreting assets from the circuit courts’ dispositions of assets. The record supported an implicit finding that the appellant tried to conceal an asset — by selling and deferring receipt of payment — in anticipation of dissolving the marriage, so the circuit court could characterize and divide that asset. And the appellant asked the circuit court to award an asset to a non-party so, if awarding that asset to the appellant was an error, the appellant invited that error. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
In RE The Marriage of: Andrew John Rottinghaus v. Kelly Ann Rottinghaus
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88229

Workers’ compensation

Additional significant evidence doctrine was stricken under strict construction
Workers’ compensation statutes were subject to strict construction. Strict construction barred judicially created doctrines. Temporary awards were subject to modification pending final awards. Final awards were subject to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s review. That review was de novo, so the judicially created requirement of “additional significant evidence” was not the standard for temporary or final awards. Final awards of the Commission only, not and ruling of an administrative law judge, were subject to judicial review. Judicial review included deference to findings of fact that had support in substantial and competent evidence on the whole record. The claimant had earlier work-related injuries for which the claimant received settlements and treatments. The claimant had a later injury that resulted in permanent partial disability and a temporary award. For the later injury, an administrative law judge’s award included amounts for a total knee replacement and future medical treatment. On review, the Commission denied those amounts in its award, finding less disability attributable to the later injury than the administrative law judge had. “The Commission is not bound by the experts' exact percentages of disability and is free to find a disability rating higher or lower than that expressed in medical testimony . . . because a claimant's degree of disability is not solely a medical question [, and] is a finding of fact within the special province of the commission.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s award.
(Overview summary)
Gabriel Gilbert v. City of Grandview, MO
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88375

MOLAP will have in-person and virtual office hours for law students on the following days during the fall 2026 semester unless otherwise indicated.

University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law

Sept. 23, 9 a.m.-2 p.m., Room 222 (Law Library)

Oct. 14, 9 a.m.-2 p.m., Room 208

Nov. 12, 9 a.m.-2 p.m., Room 222 (Law Library)

University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law

Sept. 23, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., virtual 

Oct. 21, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., virtual 

Nov. 18, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., virtual 

Dec. 2, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., virtual

Saint Louis University School of Law

Sept. 14, 10 a.m.-2 p.m., Room 1005D

Oct. 26, 10 a.m.-2 p.m., Room 1005D

Nov. 16, 10 a.m.-2 p.m., Room 1005D

Dec. 7, 10 a.m.-2 p.m., virtual

Washington University School of Law

Sept. 9, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., Anheuser-Busch Hall Office of Student Life, Suite 210

Oct. 21, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., Anheuser-Busch Hall Office of Student Life, Suite 210

Nov. 11, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., Anheuser-Busch Hall Office of Student Life, Suite 210

Dec. 2, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., virtual

Come in during MOLAP’s office hours, schedule an appointment, or access services outside the scheduled office hours by calling 1-800-688-7859 or emailing molap@mobar.org.

Appellate

Time for appeal from special order after judgment explained
Appellate courts had authority only as statutes and rules provided. All judgments were orders, but not all orders were judgments. Special orders after judgment were not judgments so the time to appeal judgments did not generally apply to special orders after judgment. Specifically, judgments were effective after entry and special orders after judgment were effective immediately on entry. Special orders after judgment included any order on enforcement of, or collateral attack on, any judgment. That described the appellant’s motion for satisfaction of judgment. The appellant did not file the notice of appeal in time so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Kenneth Chailland, II, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Speed and Specialties Autobody, LLC, Defendant, and Jesse Woodrow Long, Defendant/Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114213

Theory not raised in circuit court barred in appellate court
“A defending party is entitled to a summary judgment if it demonstrates: … that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of the facts necessary to support movant’s properly pleaded affirmative defense.” Affirmative defenses were also subject to affirmative defenses, also called affirmative avoidance, and all had to be pleaded or were waived. That applied to estoppel. In its amended answer and motion for summary judgment, the defendants cited statutes of limitation and alleged facts relevant to those statutes. The plaintiff did not file a reply mentioning estoppel and so waived that theory. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred because estoppel prevented the defendants from raising statutes of limitations. The circuit “court never ruled on that issue and it has been waived.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
CLINT A. WILKERSON, in his capacity as SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE OF THE MIKE ALAN WILKERSON TRUST DATED 8/9/1995, and in his individual capacity, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SCOTT L. WILKERSON and KIMBERLY D. WILKERSON, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39231

Fictitious citations resulted in dismissal
Appellate rules protected the appellate courts’ neutrality. Those rules included a duty of candor. Filing an appellate brief constituted a certification that all theories were not frivolous. The appellant’s brief violated multiple rules, including citation to inapplicable authorities. “Most notably, three cases in [appellant]’s brief are completely fictitious.” Unable to conduct any meaningful review, the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Willie C. Fortune v. CTA Certified Transmission
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88370

Civil

Class action certification denied over predominance
The elements of class action certification included predominance of common questions of law and issues of fact over individual matters among the class. “[A]n extensive analysis of state law variances” was necessary “to demonstrate class certification did not present insuperable obstacles.” Separate arbitration agreements and divergent statutes applicable to members of a proposed nationwide class showed the opposite. The circuit court denied certification and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Crown Asset Management, LLC, Respondent, v. Lisa Lawson, Appellant, v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114220

No meritorious defense stated
The elements of an action to set aside a default judgment included a meritorious defense. A meritorious defense meant “an arguable theory” of defense to the plaintiff’s claim as described in allegations of fact with supporting evidence. A verified answer merely setting forth denials of the plaintiff’s allegations was insufficient. The circuit court erred in setting aside the default judgment so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and ordered the circuit court to reinstate the default judgment.
(Overview summary)
Gregory Ernst, et al., Appellant, v. Tainter Landscape, LLC, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114018

Good cause to set aside default not shown
Parties could set aside a default judgment on showing a meritorious defense to the claim and good cause for the default. Good cause included negligence but not recklessness. Recklessness included “a deliberate choice to risk the possibility of a default judgment” like ignoring litigation, especially at upper management levels. The defendant had notice of the subject matter, and the action, and that neither the defendant’s insurer nor the defendant’s own lawyer would defend the action. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
HARRY MENKE, Plaintiff-Respondent v. JAI GANESH LAXMI LLC, d/b/a LIBERTY LODGE, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39201

Criminal

Accomplice liability shown for attempted offense
An attempted offense meant a substantial step showing a firm purpose to complete the offense. The State carried its burden on that element with evidence that the defendant drove the vehicle that circled the crime scene where the victim was killed by the defendant’s associate. No plain error occurred when the circuit court admitted a surveillance video that was “highly probative and otherwise displayed . . . strong indicia of reliability.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. James C. Armstrong, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113515

Recklessness shown
The elements of involuntary manslaughter included criminal recklessness, meaning to consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk. On that element, the State carried its burden of proof with evidence that the defendant passed six miles of lighted signage toward slowed and stopped traffic at 50 or 60 miles per hour without trying “to slow, stop, or swerve his vehicle [.]” The State showed that the defendant was the driver with a judicial admission that the defendant caused the wreck and evidence that the defendant matched the description of the only person in the vehicle. “An in-court identification . . . is not always required.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. ADMIR KULOVAC, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39130

CDL did not bar expungement
Unambiguous statutes required no construction. Holders of a commercial driver’s license were ineligible for expungement of driving-related offenses. When the driver committed a driving-related offense, the driver did not hold a commercial driver’s license. Therefore, the driver was not barred from expungement. Neither the appellant’s later receipt of a commercial driver’s license, nor other standards for expunging other offenses, nor statutes preserving records of offenses, altered that result. The circuit court expunged the driver’s record and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
D.P.U. v. Director of Revenue, State of Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88190

Elections

Certification of insufficiency for initiative and referendum proposals was insufficient
The only possible pre-election challenges to an initiative petition before a vote were those related to form like the one-article limit, and single-subject limit for new articles, for constitutional amendments. On receipt of proposed initiative petition forms, the Missouri Secretary of State must certify ballot titles and summaries within “a strict statutory deadline.” On receipt of an initiative petition with signatures, the Secretary of State must examine the petition and signatures and certify sufficiency or insufficiency of compliance with the Missouri Constitution and statutes. A certificate of insufficiency required “a certificate stating the reason for the insufficiency.” On an initiative petition with signatures, the Secretary of State issued a certificate of insufficiency. The certificate did not set forth reasons for insufficiency. Failure to set forth reasons preserved no challenge to the initiative petition for judicial review. The face of the petition showed compliance with the one-article and single-subject limits, and it was too late to change the ballot title and summary already certified. The Supreme Court of Missouri ordered the initiative petition certified and placed on the ballot with the title and summary as already certified.
(Overview summary)
Claire Harris, et al., Appellants, vs. Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity as the Missouri Secretary of State, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101806

Legislative re-districting map was subject to referendum
“[T]he United States Constitution permits a state to authorize a referendum as to legislation drawing new congressional districts,” and the Missouri Constitution allowed the voters to subject any legislation to referendum with limited exceptions. An exception for re-districting applied only to state re-districting, which was a separate process. An exception for “the immediate preservation of the public peace” required an emergency clause, which the legislation did not have. An exception “for the maintenance of state institutions” applied only to appropriations. Therefore, the General Assembly’s congressional re-districting legislation was subject to a referendum. Pending that referendum, the legislation did not take effect and only “shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.” The circuit court declared otherwise, so the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed. The Court ordered the initiative petition certified and placed on the ballot and barred the use of the legislation unless approved by the voters.
(Overview summary)
Richard von Glahn, Appellant, vs. Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity, et al., Respondents.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101805

Certification mooted declaratory judgment action
Courts did not rule on actions that were moot, meaning that no live dispute or effective relief remained. In an action for declaratory judgment, the parties litigated whether certain signatures counted toward the number required for an initiative petition to reach the ballot. The Missouri Secretary of State’s certification stated that the number of signatures was sufficient even without the disputed signatures. That certification mooted the litigation, but the circuit court issued judgment. The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated that judgment and entered judgment of dismissal.
(Overview summary)
People Not Politicians, et al., Appellants, vs. Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins, et al., Respondents.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101801

Employment

Substantial identity of interest forgave misidentification of employer
Summary judgment was available only to parties who showed the right to a favorable ruling on undisputed material facts. In actions under the Human Rights Act, attorney fee awards to employers were possible in actions brought “without foundation,” meaning on frivolous claims. That did not describe the state of the summary judgment record as to confusion over employer’s identity, especially when the parties genuinely disputed whether that identity was reasonably ascertainable, and an initially named defendant and the eventually named employer shared a substantial identity of interest. The claimant’s substitution of parties was timely and related back to the initial filing. The circuit court entered summary judgments against the claimant, and the Missouri Court of Appeals vacated those judgments and remanded the action to the circuit court.
LOGAN NUMBERS, Appellant v. 76 MALL INN, INC., and GRAND COUNTRY FUN SPOT, LLC, Respondents
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39172

Evidence

No prejudice shown
Appellate courts reviewed not merely for error but also for prejudice. Prejudice in the admission of evidence meant a reasonable likelihood of acquittal without the disputed evidence. That did not describe sympathetic background testimony, even if not relevant logically or legally; as shown by jury deadlock on one of the charges. It also did not describe a surveillance video, even if not subjected to a sufficient foundation, that the defense cited in evidence and argument. Accomplice liability for an offense required the State to show participation in the offense, which the State did with evidence of where and when defendant and victim were together. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Antonio Steed, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113711

Juvenile

Due process was satisfied
In actions for protective custody, parents had the right to receive certain documents in discovery and present evidence at hearings. But the juvenile officer did not offer any documents, and the circuit court excluded no evidence relevant to the judgment, at any hearing so no due process violation occurred. The circuit court encouraged circuit courts to be accessible to pro se litigants, abjured the Division of Children’s Services to participate in appellate proceedings, and affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
In the interest of: E.S.W.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113858

Orders of protection

Domestic abuse not shown
In an action for a full order of protection, the plaintiff argued that the defendant committed domestic abuse by battery, which required proof of physical harm. “Neither party testified that [plaintiff] suffered pain, bruising, soreness, injury, visible marks, or impairment of bodily function, or required medical treatment.” And the plaintiff also argued that the defendant committed domestic abuse by assault, which required evidence that the plaintiff feared for her physical safety. “[T]here was no evidence [plaintiff] received threats of physical harm or actions of physical violence.” The plaintiff also argued that the defendant committed domestic abuse by harassment, which required evidence of substantial emotional distress. The evidence showed that the defendant was “‘annoying and boorish,' [but] his conduct would not cause ‘substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person.’” The record also showed that the circuit court issued the full order to separate the parties before their conflict escalated further. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the action with instructions to dismiss.
E.M., Petitioner-Respondent v. H.M.M., Respondent-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39109

Personal injury

Pleading of punitive damages against SLEF prohibited
Writs of prohibition were discretionary remedies for actions in excess of authority. The State Legal Expense Fund covered the defense of State employees, and was an exclusive remedy, in actions for money damages based on official activities. Relators were a judge and another State employee, both defendants in an underlying action seeking money damages for conspiracy and abuse of process, so relators were within the Fund’s scope. In an earlier action, the relator could not get a writ barring such action but no opinion accompanied the denial, so it did not address the merits. Governing statutes expressly barred punitive damages against the Fund, which also barred prayers for relief in the form of punitive damages. The respondent circuit judge in the underlying action nevertheless ordered that the plaintiff in the underlying action could amend the petition to seek punitive damages. The Missouri Court of Appeals made permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition barring the circuit court from enforcing that order.
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. JUDGE STEVEN A. PRIVETTE, and ALICE BELL, Relators v. THE HONORABLE JAMES K. JUSTUS, SENIOR JUDGE, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38977

Post-conviction

No extra time for newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence
Time limits for filing were mandatory and failure to comply waived all relief with few exceptions. Those exceptions did not include newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence. Newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence were not grounds for post-conviction relief though they might support a writ of habeas corpus or a pardon. The circuit court dismissed the motion and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Mark David Adams, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113896

Workers’ compensation

Reduction in disability rating affirmed
On the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s administrative review of administrative law judge rulings, no deference was due. The Commission’s findings of fact were subject to deference on judicial review. Expert testimony was not necessary to sustain such findings and lay testimony could suffice. The record showed that the Commission did not exceed its authority by relying on one source of proof to the exclusion of all others. The record supported a finding that part of the claimant’s continuing disability was due to the claimant’s failure to perform rehabilitative exercises, rather than the claimant’s job-related injury, even crediting the claimant’s testimony. Clarification could occur before the Commission, not in the Missouri Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision.
(Overview summary)
Bradley Barnett v. Kawasaki Motors MFG Corp USA and Sentry Casualty Company
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88459

• District 3 (Jackson County)
• District 4 (Cass, Clay, Johnson, Lafayette, Platte and Ray Counties)
• District 9 (City of St. Louis)
• District 14 (Butler, Carter, Dent, Dunklin, Iron, Madison, Mississippi, New Madrid, Oregon, Pemiscot, Reynolds, Ripley, Scott, Shannon, Stoddard and Wayne Counties)
• Eastern Appellate District (all counties encompassed by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District).

The YLS Council will fill these vacancies by majority vote. The terms for these council seats will begin September 2026 and will end September 2028.

The council requests that those interested in serving complete the nominating petition and file it with Brett Rolwes, The Missouri Bar YLS liaison, by Sept. 28.

The council invites those who file to include a resume and brief statement explaining their interest in serving on the YLS Council. Nominations for the Eastern Appellate District seat also require the submission of a statement describing the nominee's unique experience, knowledge, and qualifications to represent diverse elements of The Missouri Bar to accompany their nominating petition.

All eligible petitions received will be submitted to the YLS Council for consideration.

What is the YLS Council?

The YLS Council is the governing body for the Young Lawyers’ Section of The Missouri Bar. It is composed of approximately 35 young or new lawyers elected to serve two-year terms from districts across the state. Officers and executive committee members are elected from within the ranks of the council’s membership.

What does YLS do?

YLS sponsors, in full or in part, a variety of public service projects, continuing legal education programs, and social networking events across Missouri that are geared toward young and recently admitted lawyers. The section collaborates with several affiliate organizations that also have great opportunities to help new and young lawyers integrate in the profession and serve their communities.

Visit News.MoBar.org to learn more about what YLS and the council have been doing recently.

The Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee — comprised of lawyers, retired judges, and Missouri residents — completes an anonymous evaluation of each judge up for retention under Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan, also known as The Missouri Plan, to ensure they are meeting the judicial performance standards. The committee reviews written opinions and surveys completed by lawyers and jurors who, when applicable, have worked with the judge. The committee then recommends whether a judge should or should not be retained, and its findings are publicly available through YourMissouriJudges.org to help educate voters.

Dodge

Dodge has been a trial lawyer with Hall Ansley, P.C. for over 32 years. A former member of The Missouri Bar Board of Governors, Dodge is past president of the Springfield Metropolitan Bar Association and is a founding member of the Southern Missouri Women Lawyers Association. She is the current chair of the Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee and was on the 31st Judicial Commission, which helps fill judicial vacancies under The Missouri Plan in Greene County.

“I am very honored to receive this award from our president, Athena Dickson,” Dodge said. “She has spent tireless hours traveling around the state sharing the important work of the Judicial Performance Review Committee and its role in the Non-Partisan Court Plan.”

Dodge said she was “especially honored” to receive the President’s Award alongside Tucker.

“He successfully directed the statewide evaluation of the JPR Committee and public dissemination processes for both the 2022 and 2024 terms,” she said. “He continues to educate us on the many positive benefits of The Missouri Plan.” 

Tucker

With over 44 years of practice, Tucker is of counsel at Armstrong Teasdale LLP, supporting its general counsel’s office with legal ethics, conflicts of interest, risk management, and continuing legal education. Before stepping into that role, Tucker was a litigation partner at Armstrong Teasdale.

A graduate of the Duke University School of Law, Tucker served on The Missouri Bar Board of Governors and was 1995-1996 Missouri Bar president. Tucker has served on the Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee and its predecessor, the Judicial Performance Evaluation Committee, since 2008. He was chair of the Judicial Performance Review Committee from 2022-2026.

Tucker said he was “proud of the work” of the Judicial Performance Review Committee.

“Each member has diligently undertaken the serious responsibility to objectively evaluate the performance of the judges up for retention election,” he said. “… The committee has worked collaboratively and efficiently to complete its tasks over each two-year election cycle. The voters of Missouri have benefited [from] the committee’s work.”

Tucker encouraged lawyers to get involved with The Missouri Bar as the work is “important and meaningful.”

“A long-term belief in the need to seek the improvement of the laws and the administration of justice for all persons in Missouri has been my inspiration for the work I have done,” he said. “Those principles have led me to work in a way which I hope has been useful, ethical and effective in both my private practice and in my public service.”

Dodge and Tucker will accept the President’s Award in Kansas City during the Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar and Judicial Conference, Sept. 16-18.

Click here to learn more about annual awards presented by The Missouri Bar, the Missouri Bar Foundation, and other entities. Read about other 2026 award winners here.