Scott E. Vincent is the founding member of Vincent Law, LLC in Kansas City.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit recently affirmed a 41-month prison sentence imposed on a dentist convicted of tax evasion. In U.S. v. Ulibarri,¹ the court rejected the dentist’s arguments that the sentence was not reasonable due to his reliance on a tax scheme promoter’s alternative tax mitigation strategy and business trust structure to eliminate federal taxes.

Ulibarri serves as a reminder to lawyers that the IRS pursues clients of tax scheme promoters, particularly when they significantly and repeatedly utilize the scheme.

Background

Ryan Ulibarri, a dentist licensed in Colorado, owned and operated Ulibarri Family Dentistry starting in 2014. After establishing the dental practice, Ulibarri attended a seminar led by associates of Larry Conner purporting to teach business owners how to eliminate federal income taxes on business income using Conner’s alternative tax-mitigation strategy, which was determined to be an abusive trust tax scheme. Against the advice of his lawyers and accountants, Ulibarri used Conner’s unlawful tax shelter for over seven years.

Using Conner’s strategy, Ulibarri funneled his business earnings through a series of “sham trusts.” To effectuate the scheme, Ulibarri assigned ownership of Ulibarri Family Dentistry to a business trust, which distributed income to a family trust, which then distributed income to a charitable trust. Ulibarri’s family spending was covered by funds held in the trust accounts, and Ulibarri then improperly claimed these personal expenses as deductions.

The trust tax returns reported distributions and deductions matching or exceeding the reported income, with the net positive income ultimately “donated” to a tax-exempt private family foundation. The foundation also loaned funds back to the sham trusts, allowing Ulibarri full control and beneficial use of the dental practice income without any tax liability.

From 2016-2023, the scheme enabled Ulibarri to avoid more than $1.6 million in taxes on $5.3 million in earnings from the dental practice.² During this time, Ulibarri concealed the scheme from his banks and the IRS by using nominal grantors to sign documents and providing misleading and deceptive information about his income, assets, and trusts. He continued using the scheme even after repeated warnings from lawyers, bookkeepers, and lenders, and even after his initial indictment.

In 2024, Ulibarri was indicted by a grand jury on six counts of tax evasion for his 2017-2022 tax years. He ultimately pled guilty. The district court determined Ulibarri’s offense level, made adjustments, and then sentenced Ulibarri to 41 months of imprisonment, three months supervised release, over $1.6 million in restitution, and a fine of $150,000. This was the maximum imprisonment under the range for the applicable guidelines.

Ulibarri appealed to challenge his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

10th Circuit analysis and decision

The 10th Circuit addressed both Ulibarri’s procedural and substantive unreasonableness claims but ultimately affirmed the district court’s ruling.

Procedural reasonableness

The 10th Circuit first reviewed Ulibarri’s procedural claim, noting that a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court incorrectly calculates the guidelines sentence, treats the guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider statutory sentencing factors, relies on clearly erroneous facts, or does not adequately explain the sentence.

In this case, Ulibarri contended that the district court abused its discretion in misapplying the sentencing guidelines by improperly including, and miscalculating, a 2023 tax loss. He also contended that the district court improperly assessed a two-level “sophisticated means” enhancement.

Ulibarri was not indicted for the 2023 tax period, but the district court had included the 2023 loss in his sentencing. Ulibarri argued that his 2023 tax loss was not related to the tax scheme conduct. The 10th Circuit reviewed IRS testimony and district court findings to the contrary, which indicated the 2023 tax loss resulted from continuing to implement the tax scheme by using the sham trusts.

The 10th Circuit found that the district court did not err in finding that the sham trust usage in 2023 was part of the same course of conduct and aggregating it with the other loss amounts for the years in question.

In calculating the 2023 tax loss, the IRS agent used a guidelines method for unfiled returns treating the tax loss as 20% of gross income, less tax withheld or paid. Ulibarri made several arguments about the practice gross receipts and cost of goods deductions calculations done by the IRS agent under this method. However, the 10th Circuit noted that the guidelines contemplate a reasonable estimate based on available facts and found that the district court’s calculation of the 2023 tax loss was a reasonable estimate under that standard.

Finally, the guidelines provide a two-level sentence enhancement for an offense involving “sophisticated means,” which is especially complex or intricate conduct in execution or concealment of an offense. Ulibarri argued the tax scheme was not “sophisticated” and did not involve elaborate planning or concealment on his part; he had merely purchased Conner’s tax shelter services and relied on financial advice as a client.

The 10th Circuit had no trouble finding that Ulibarri’s offenses involved sophisticated means, noting he misused multiple financial accounts, sham trusts, and grantors, and went to elaborate lengths to hide more than $5 million in business income from the IRS.

The 10th Circuit also rejected Ulibarri’s effort to shift blame to the tax shelter promoter, noting that he continued using the tax shelter scheme despite clear and repeated warnings from his lawyers and accountants that the conduct was unlawful.

Based on these findings, the 10th Circuit concluded that the district did not err in applying a sophisticated means sentencing enhancement.

Substantive reasonableness

The 10th Circuit next addressed whether the district court abused its discretion in applying the following U.S. Code § 3553(a) factors to impose an unduly long sentence:

• The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant
• The need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the crime, deter future criminal conduct, prevent the defendant from committing more crimes, and provide rehabilitation
• The sentences that are legally available
• The sentencing guidelines
• The Sentencing Commission’s policy statements
• The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
• The need for restitution

Ulibarri argued that the district court did not give adequate weight to certain factors, including the compromise to his personal and professional reputation, the conviction itself as general deterrence without a custodial sentence, unfair sentencing disparity relative to similarly situated defendants, and his inability to work while incarcerated which delayed restitution payment.

The 10th Circuit found that all of Ulibarri's factors were argued at length during the sentencing hearing and further found that “re-weighing” the § 3553(a) factors would be "beyond the ambit of our review."

The 10th Circuit concluded that the sentence imposed was within the guidelines range and presumptively reasonable, and the sentence, therefore, was not substantively unreasonable.

Conclusion

The 10th Circuit decision in Ulibarri shows the difficulty in challenging district court discretion in applying sentencing guidelines. The decision also rejects the idea that a taxpayer can simply rely on a tax shelter promoter or professional advisor in structuring and implementing a tax shelter scheme.

Endnotes
1 2026 PTC 130; 10th Cir. 2026.
2 Id.

Genna Tlustos is the assistant editor of the Journal of The Missouri Bar.

Living in a rural area has many benefits — avoiding traffic, the lower cost of living, having a close-knit community, and seeing the direct impacts of your work. 

But in Missouri, one major drawback may be finding access to legal services. And for the lawyers working in rural areas, the pressure to fill those gaps can be demanding and challenging. 

Assessing rural practice in Missouri

The Missouri Bar’s Special Committee on Rural Practice is researching the state of rural practice in Missouri, including examining barriers that may deter lawyers from practicing in rural areas, compounding potential access to legal services issues in those communities. 

The Missouri Bar has data regarding how many lawyers practice in each county. What this data doesn’t show, however, is the geographic scope of these lawyers’ practices, and whether they are still in active practice, are judges, or work in public service. 

The special committee will present its findings to The Missouri Bar Board of Governors, which will decide if the bar should take action and what those actions could be to help further improve the law, the profession, and the administration of justice in rural areas. 

It’s a concern Hon. Corey Moon, associate circuit judge for Lewis County and special committee co-chair, has been passionate about for years. 

“It’s an issue that I’ve had on my radar since I was a law student 15 years ago, and I knew that the problem was not going to get any better,” Moon said. 

Moon grew up in Canton and attended the University of Missouri School of Law. As a law student, he started a rural law association to help raise awareness of the issue. After graduation, he worked at a law firm in Kirksville. He then became Lewis County assistant prosecuting attorney, Knox County prosecuting attorney, and Macon County assistant prosecuting attorney, all while working as an associate attorney in private practice. He was then appointed Lewis County associate circuit judge in May 2021.

Moon, who serves on The Missouri Bar Board of Governors, pitched the idea of doing deeper research into rural practice in Missouri. Seeing Moon’s passion for the issue and having heard about similar concerns from other rural lawyers, Shelly Dreyer, 2024-2025 Missouri Bar president, was excited to start the special committee in 2025 and appointed Moon as chair. She is serving as co-chair. 

“We care about the issues facing Missouri lawyers,” Dreyer said. “And the bar is here to support lawyers and to improve their practices, and also to improve the law and access to justice.” 

Dreyer routinely travels to rural areas as part of her practice and visited rural communities as bar president. She said she often received “passionate responses” from Missouri lawyers and judges regarding challenges they faced while practicing in rural communities. 

Practicing in rural areas 

Dreyer grew up in a rural area north of Springfield. She didn’t know any lawyers or even many college-educated professionals other than her teachers. Her father, a union representative at the factory where he worked, encouraged her to become a lawyer. 

Dreyer started her career at a defense firm in St. Louis, then worked in plaintiff’s injury in St. Charles County for about 10 years. Then, 18 years ago, she and her husband moved back to southwest Missouri to start a family. 

The benefits of living in a smaller city far outweigh the limitations, Dreyer said. 

“Switching to practice law in a more rural setting was a big change, but I absolutely love it because you get to know your local attorneys better,” Dreyer said. “You get to know your local judges better. It’s just a much more tight-knit legal community.” 

Moon said he enjoys the camaraderie in the rural counties.

“I think that makes it a lot easier for you to understand attorneys and the unique issues that they’re dealing with,” Moon said. “And that makes it easier for you to work with their challenges in practicing law.” 

Maggie McConville, who practices at Chapman and Cowherd, P.C., grew up in the Chillicothe area and graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law in 2022. She said she moved back to Chillicothe because she saw that a firm was hiring, and she knew she would have mentorship, not only within her firm, but in the city as a whole.

“… [S]omething that’s really special about rural practice is that it does feel like its own little community and support,” McConville said. 

Nicholas Jain, Dunklin County prosecuting attorney, is from Kennett. After graduating from the University of Missouri School of Law, he practiced at the Greene County Prosecutor’s Office before running for prosecutor in his home county. 

One of the biggest differences between working in a metropolitan and rural area is the access to resources, particularly for individuals who need mental health services, drug rehab services, or domestic violence shelters, Jain said. 

While those limitations can make some aspects of the work difficult, the legal system can still help people, Jain said. 

Overall, he enjoys working in a rural area as he often knows the victims and defendants in cases, as well as most of the jury panel. Jain said he likes how fulfilling his work as a rural lawyer is, and he appreciates the collegial relationships he has developed with other lawyers. 

“Whenever you’re in your hometown, you kind of get to see the effects of what you do,” Jain said. “If someone is a victim of a robbery or stealing and you’re able to get some of those items back for them or get restitution, you just see the impact in a different, more immediate way.” 

Another unique aspect of rural practice is often the plethora of areas of law an office covers, McConville said. While a firm may have to refer individuals to other offices in specialized situations, they often cover a lot of practice areas. In her first year of practice, she worked on family law cases, civil suits, and estate planning. She even worked on an appeal within her first six months. 

Not only does her firm cover a variety of practice areas, it also covers a large geographic area — between 13-15 counties. 

“We do actually have a robust amount of attorneys in and around our area, but it’s still not enough,” McConville said. 

This can especially be an issue when several firms are conflicted out of a case, she said. Clients may have to be referred to lawyers in another city. 

Navigating vacancies across the state 

Moon said several prosecutor’s and public defender’s offices in his area have had at least one vacancy throughout the last several years. 

Jain said the local public defender’s office isn’t fully staffed and relies on contract counsel. Indigent people may be assigned lawyers with an office an hour away, sometimes even in Arkansas, making it difficult for them to meet with their lawyers, he added. 

In Linn County, there are no lawyers except for the judges and the prosecuting attorney, McConville said, so residents often must travel to Chillicothe or Macon for legal services. 

In the more rural areas, these vacancies make a big impact. Lawyers may work in four or five counties and become stretched thin, Moon said.

When clients must seek legal services from over an hour away, the cost of gas can be a hardship, Dreyer said. However, lawyers from cities who are willing to travel may charge more to cover travel time and expenses, which can create a financial hardship for clients, McConville said. 

Some individuals represent themselves in her area, McConville said, because they can’t afford legal services or can’t find a lawyer. Lawyers in the area may not be able to take an individual’s case due to conflicts or because of the specialized nature of the case. Pro se documents can cover the basic information needed, but it can leave gray areas that could create legal issues. Having a lawyer draft documents containing additional language can address these issues, McConville said.

Moon said several litigants have told him they can’t find lawyers in his county to represent them for traffic tickets. Sometimes the closest lawyer is in St. Louis. 

Finding a guardian ad litem is also a challenge, Moon said, as there are no lawyer residents of Lewis County who are certified as GALs. Instead, the court must find lawyers from Kirksville or Hannibal who are certified. 

McConville said there are only three GALs in Chillicothe, including herself. One is running for judge, the other stopped taking juvenile cases, and McConville has reached her case limit. In some situations, she said, all the local GALs are conflicted out of a case, meaning a GAL from a different area must be appointed. 

Most lawyers who work in rural practice care about access to legal services, McConville said, but their capacity to help may be limited as they are overworked and stretched thin. 

If more young lawyers don’t start practicing in the area, these rural practice issues will only get worse, McConville said. At age 33, she said she is one of the youngest lawyers in the area. 

“I think that if we don’t figure out some solution or encourage young people to come back, we’re very much looking at a situation where people don’t have legal access,” McConville said. 

Breaking down misconceptions 

McConville believes there are several reasons why lawyers may be uninterested in practicing in rural areas. One is the misconception that rural lawyers don’t make very much money. Since there are not a lot of lawyers to choose from in rural areas, she said, there is no shortage of work. In addition, as the rural lawyer obtains more experience, they can increase fees, attract more clients and work, and have a lower cost of living in a rural area than in a city. 

McConville also hears that there is nothing to do in small towns. In Chillicothe, at least, that’s not the case, she said. There is a vitalized downtown with restaurants, small businesses, festivals, and events. The surrounding towns also have breweries, shops, rivers, and lakes. 

Other often-cited concerns include finding housing or mentorship, McConville said. If there is not a firm hiring in a rural area, she said, there are often older lawyers preparing for retirement who may be willing to train a young lawyer, and there may be opportunities to buy a practice. 

“I think some of those misconceptions aren’t quite as daunting as people think,” McConville said. “I think a big thing is just wanting to actually live in the community.” 

Looking ahead

To better identify if rural communities are having issues accessing legal services, The Missouri Bar Special Committee on Rural Practice created three surveys: one for lawyers, one for judges, and one for the public. These surveys focus on the employment and housing choices of lawyers in non-metropolitan areas and the ability of Missouri residents to access legal services. 

The surveys are open to all Missourians, but the committee especially wants to hear from those in rural areas. The surveys will close toward the end of the year, and the special committee will evaluate the results throughout the first half of 2027. 

Lawyers are encouraged to take the survey at MoBar.org/MORuralLawyers. Judges can take the judicial survey at MoBar.org/MORuralJudges. 

Lawyers can also share the public survey with friends, family, neighbors, and groups they participate in. The public survey is available at MoBar.org/RuralLegalSurvey. 

In addition to the surveys, the special committee will host outreach opportunities throughout the state to have in-depth conversations with lawyers and the public. 

Beyond the special committee’s work, lawyers can speak to local schools, as Dreyer, Moon, McConville, and Jain have done. For example, McConville said she speaks at the Chillicothe High School for Constitution Day, not only on the Constitution but about practicing law. 

“Kids often want to do what they see, and if they’re not seeing attorneys in their local areas, it may not occur to them,” Dreyer added. “Talk to kids in your areas and encourage them to consider a career in law.” 

Encouraging students from rural areas to go into law is a great approach, Jain said, as lawyers from the area are more likely to move back and stay in their home region long term. Most of the lawyers and judges practicing in his area are from there, he added. 

Lawyers don’t have to limit their speaking to primary schools. McConville routinely speaks on a University of Missouri-Kansas City rural lawyer panel and has seen attendance grow over the last several years. But beyond talking about rural practice, she has helped connect students with opportunities to job shadow lawyers and judges in rural areas. 

“It’s one thing to talk on a panel,” McConville said. “It’s another thing to actually come live in the community and see, ‘Oh, this is what you were talking about.’” 

The issue of access to legal services is one that affects not only rural lawyers, but also lawyers in metropolitan areas. Moon said that part of a lawyer’s calling is to make sure the public is served. 

“[I]f there are areas in your state that you’re licensed in experiencing a shortage or hardship, and you know that there are people there who are struggling to have access to justice because they can’t find a lawyer, that should be important to you,” Moon said. “And I think you should want to try to find a solution so that you can increase those services and kind of bridge that gap.” 

For more information about the Special Committee on Rural Practice, contact The Missouri Bar at ruralpractice@mobar.org.

Paul Unger is a lawyer, speaker, and author in the field of legal technology. He has lectured in the United States, Canada, and Australia. Contact Unger at punger@affinityconsulting.com.

If you get 150 emails, 50 messages, 20 telephone calls, 15 walk-in interruptions, 25 social media notifications, and 50 email or internet curiosity breaks, that totals 310 digital interruptions. Divide that into 480 workday minutes and you have an interruption every 1.5 minutes! 

A 2025 Microsoft study indicated the average American worker is interrupted every two to three minutes — 275 times a day — by meetings, emails, or chats during core work hours.¹ Researchers in a 2007 Microsoft study concluded that it takes about 15 minutes to return back to work following an electronic-based interruption.² 

If lawyers are interrupted every two minutes, and it takes 15 minutes to return back to work they were performing, it can feel almost impossible to get anything done during the workday. This is why you may look at your timesheet some days at 5 p.m. and see only two hours of billable time, but feel like you put in a 14-hour day. 

The reality is we live in an age of information overload. We are constantly connected to the world, from smartphones, social media, 24-hour news networks, tablets, and computers. Unfortunately, this constant information overload may worsen our attention span. 

Between document filing deadlines, meetings with clients, case law research, and other tasks, an interruption every couple of minutes could greatly hinder a lawyer’s ability to effectively practice law and serve their clients. 

One way lawyers can help overcome the inability to focus is by learning attention management skills. Here are five attention management tips you can implement today that are easy, practical, and will make a big impact on your ability to focus and practice law. 

1. Turn off ALL notifications 

Why would you want to give the world a hotline to your brain? Turn all notifications off, and I mean all of them. 

In Microsoft Outlook, email notifications can be turned off by navigating to “File” > “Options” > “Mail” and deselecting the four different methods of notifications when a new message arrives. On an iPhone, go to Settings > Notifications and turn off notifications by app. As a recent Microsoft article notes: “The inbox may still be the front door to work, but too often it opens to a flood of unprioritized chaos.”³ 

You can also schedule “Do Not Disturb” times on your phone and computer to limit the texts, calls, and other notifications you receive. 

2. Practice single-tasking 

Clear your desk and your multiple monitors of information that is not directly relevant to the project you are executing. 

For example, email creates distraction explosions every 30 seconds to five minutes. How can lawyers possibly focus if they see those explosions hit in their inboxes? You should always minimize your email platform on your monitor unless you are batch processing emails or planning upcoming tasks.

Just because you have two or three monitors doesn’t mean you need to have something displayed on them, especially if the information displayed derails your ability to focus on the task in front of you. 

3. Use the Pomodoro method 

Pomodoro is a technique that utilizes a 25-minute timer. You work on a single task, preferably deep-thought work, for 25 minutes and then take a break and do whatever you want for five minutes. In other words, work in intervals. 

The human brain functions well when maintaining attention to a single task for 25 minutes. After 25 minutes, studies show workers begin to lose focus. By giving yourself a five-minute break, you can return to deep-thought legal work for another 25 minutes easily. 

Once you get a little momentum going and are immersed in the project, it becomes a lot easier to make progress on the task at hand. 

This technique can make a huge impact on productivity and help combat procrastination. 

4. Tackle deep-thought work early in the day 

Dive into deep-thought work, writing, or projects in the morning. Our brains function better following quiet time or sleep. In addition, this is theoretically the time before other tasks pop up throughout the day that could derail your attention. This can be one of the most productive times of the day since there could be far fewer interruptions. 

5. Create rituals 

Rituals are small checklists or short rigid schedules designed to execute the same desired tasks during a set period of time. Rituals can help form positive habits and prevent you from taking email or internet curiosity breaks. They also remind us to do things we frequently forget. 

By adding rituals and checklists, lawyers can greatly enhance their ability to focus and do those things that seem to always fall off their radars. 

By implementing these five attention management tips, lawyers can take back control of their workdays, make progress on their to-do lists, and continue to serve their clients in a timely and ethical manner.

Endnotes
1 MICROSOFT, 2025 WORK TREND INDEX ANNUAL REPORT: 2025: THE YEAR THE FRONTIER FIRM IS BORN (April 2025), https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/worklab/work-trend-index/2025-the-year-the-frontier-firm-is-born.
2 Steve Lohr, Slow down, brave multitasker, and don’t read this in traffic, N.Y. Times (March 25, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/business/25multi.html.
3 Breaking down the infinite workday, MICROSOFT (June 17, 2025), https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/worklab/work-trend-index/breaking-down-infinite-workday.

Weston Mills is a partner at Gilson Daub, a national law firm representing employers and insurers in workers’ compensation cases across 14 states. Mills is also the managing partner of the Gilson Daub Kansas City office and is licensed in Kansas and Missouri.

Hunter R. Martin is an associate attorney at Gilson Daub, focusing on workers’ compensation defense and serving clients in all venues across Missouri and Kansas.

In White v. Treasurer of the State, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, recently clarified the legal precedent handed down by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Treasurer of the State v. Penney, which established that occupational disease claims do not qualify as pre-existing disabilities for purposes of Second Injury Fund liability in Missouri workers’ compensation cases.¹ 

While White and Penney definitively limit the scope of SIF liability, these cases may also shift the burden onto employers in permanent total disability (PTD) cases involving occupational diseases. 

Second Injury Fund and legislative changes 

The SIF, managed by the State of Missouri, is most commonly involved in workers’ compensation cases that deal with PTD caused by a combination of a pre-existing disability and a new work-related disability.² For the fund to be liable for PTDs, multiple criteria must be met. For purposes of this analysis, the primary criterion is that a claimant must have suffered a compensable prior disability which meets or exceeds 50 weeks of permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation under the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Act to be a qualifying injury.³ 

There are two main types of cases in Missouri workers’ compensation practice: those involving PPD and those involving PTD. PPD is involved in cases where a worker is injured and can continue working. PPD is commonly referenced as the percentage of disability the injured worker suffered to the affected body part. PTD cases involve injuries that prevent a worker from returning to the labor force. The PTD test asks whether it would be reasonable to expect an employer to hire the injured worker in the open labor market given their permanent disabilities and condition.⁴ 

The SIF can be liable for PTD benefits in cases where the worker becomes permanently and totally disabled because of a combination of their most recent injury and another qualifying injury, as opposed to the most recent injury alone.⁵ 

The SIF is funded by the State via workers’ compensation insurance premiums and taxes paid by employers.⁶ Prior to 2005, a qualifying injury could include an occupational disease, which is “an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment” and does not include general diseases which the general public is exposed to without regard for employment.⁷ The current statutes specifically mention a number of occupational diseases, including hearing loss due to industrial exposure, lung or respiratory disease as a result of exposure to toxic fumes, repetitive motion diseases (e.g., carpal/cubital tunnel), and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (under certain circumstances).⁸ This is not an exhaustive list of occupational diseases commonly seen in practice but serves as an adequate representative list of the types of claims referenced by White and Penney. 

In 2005, the Missouri General Assembly enacted radical changes to the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Act to encourage business development throughout the state. In furtherance of this purpose, the State attempted to reduce the cost of workers’ compensation insurance and administration by capping the SIF’s surcharge on insurance premiums, requiring strict construction of the applicable workers’ compensation statutes for appeals, and excluding occupational diseases from the workers’ compensation system entirely.⁹ 

In 2013, the law was changed again due to two important events. First, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, in State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook¹⁰ found that because occupational diseases were now outside the scope of workers’ compensation, employers could be sued in tort for these diseases. This opened the floodgates of litigation over occupational diseases and caused significant expense to employers. Second, the SIF faced solvency issues following the surcharge cap that required statutory changes to preserve its ability to fulfill its legislatively mandated purpose.¹¹ 

In response to both these events, the Missouri General Assembly enacted a series of statutory changes to the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Act to keep the SIF solvent and address the increase in occupational disease litigation. The legislature created Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.067, which made occupational diseases again compensable for employers but did not specifically extend that compensability to the SIF. It is this backdrop that sets the stage for the disputes in both Penney and White. 

Penney v. Treasurer

To understand the legal landscape of White, it is important to first understand the Supreme Court of Missouri case that solidified the law applied by the White court. In Penney v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, the Court opined that occupational diseases were not compensable under § 287.220 and, therefore, not compensable against the SIF.¹² Under the strict construction mandated by the 2005 statutory changes, the Court stated it could not give a broader reading to the applicable law than its plain terms.¹³ Additionally, the Court highlighted that the legislature could have included occupational diseases to the applicable statutory section or referenced the SIF in § 287.067 and seemingly chose not to do so.¹⁴ Thus, the Court decided that occupational diseases were not compensable for purposes of SIF liability. 

While Penney was being decided and litigated, another case, White v. Treasurer,¹⁵ involving pre-existing occupational diseases, was also being brought through the appellate process. This case would end up being the clearest, most decisive confirmation hat occupational diseases were not compensable prior injuries to trigger SIF liability. 

White v. Treasurer 

Brian White worked as a distribution field worker for Missouri American Water from 2007-2020. In 2010, he suffered a work-related injury to his shoulders “which was deemed to be an occupational disease under … Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Act.”¹⁶ He filed a workers’ compensation claim and received a settlement from his employer equating to a total of 106.72 weeks of compensation. In 2020, White injured his chest at work and filed another workers’ compensation claim for this injury. He again settled the case with his employer, this time for 50 weeks of compensation.¹⁷

White then filed a claim for PTD benefits from the SIF, arguing that his prior shoulder injury and new chest injury together qualified him for compensation. The administrative law judge agreed and awarded benefits. The Missouri state treasurer, as custodian of the SIF, appealed, but the Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission affirmed the award. The Missouri state treasurer then appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, citing the Supreme Court of Missouri’s recent decision in Penney which established that occupational diseases were not qualifying disabilities sufficient to trigger SIF liability. 

The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the findings of the commission and the administrative law judge because it was clearly demonstrated in the record that White’s previous shoulder injuries were determined to be an occupational disease. The appellate court emphasized the Supreme Court of Missouri’s opinion that “the legislature clearly excluded occupational diseases from compensable injuries.”¹⁸ The White court concurred that those legislative reforms limited the SIF’s exposure by excluding occupational diseases from compensability for SIF liability. 

With the confirmation of the exclusion of occupational diseases from SIF liability, the question remains regarding how this limitation of liability will affect employers and insurers as the only entities who could now be responsible for PTD cases involving pre-existing occupational diseases. 

Indirect effects: What practitioners need to know 

While the courts in White and Penney clearly ruled out PTD claims based on pre-existing occupational diseases against the SIF, neither case addressed similar PTD claims against employers. In fact, the existence of § 287.067 directly allows for these types of cases to proceed against employers. Penney and White directly limited the SIF’s liability but may have indirectly increased liability for employers and insurers for claims involving occupational diseases by way of making claimants and lawyers more hesitant to settle PTD claims involving occupational diseases, even if only tangentially. 

Because of White and Penney, a risk now exists that the SIF will not be found liable for benefits due to the exclusion of occupational diseases. If a claimant settles a PTD claim with their employer with the intent to file a claim against the SIF, a pre-existing occupational disease may give the SIF the equivalent of a complete defense to the worker’s claim, leaving them with no further recourse for compensation or benefits. 

The potential hesitancy to settle PTD claims could lead to longer, more expensive litigation for employers and insurers, as well as increased liability in the form of higher settlements and more PTD awards. Claimants’ lawyers may be increasingly hesitant to settle PTD claims with employers due to fear of an award against the SIF being overturned on appeal. An environment may be forthcoming where PTD claims will require employers and insurers to provide more aggressive settlement offers to resolve cases involving occupational diseases, pre-existing or otherwise. There also may be an increased need to aggressively litigate and investigate PTD cases to determine whether occupational diseases are involved. Understanding this trend now can allow defense practitioners to prepare their clients for a more aggressive litigation landscape in PTD claims involving occupational diseases. 

Final thoughts 

This precedent is recent, and its full impact may be still to come. However, defense counsel should be prepared for more complex and expensive litigation in workers’ compensation cases involving occupational diseases. It may be likely that claimants and their lawyers will turn their attention toward employers any time there is an argument that occupational diseases are included in a PTD claim. 

Moving forward, it will be imperative to review and investigate pre-existing injuries and disabilities when administering and defending workers’ compensation cases to avoid potential surprises based on Penney and White. Clear documentation and early legal analysis may be the difference between routine claims handling and significant liability exposure.

Endnotes
1 White v. Treasurer of State As Custodian of the Second Inj. Fund, 717 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 2025). 
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.220. 
3 Id. 
4 Moss v. Treasurer of Mo. - Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, 570 S.W.3d 110, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018). 
5 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.220. 
6 Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 287.220 and 287.710. 
7 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.067. 
8 Id. 
9 David A. Lieb, Missouri Senate Backs Bill to Bolster Second Injury Fund, INSURANCE J. (May 17, 2023). 
10 State ex rel. KCP&L Greater Mo. Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 14, 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). 
11 David A. Lieb, Missouri Senate Backs Bill to Bolster Second Injury Fund, INSURANCE J. (May 17, 2023). 
12 White, 717 S.W.3d 835, 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 2025). 
13 Treasurer of State v. Penney, 710 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Mo. 2025). 
14 Id. 
15 White, 717 S.W.3d 835–839. 
16 Id. at 836. 
17 Id. at 836–837. 
18 Id. at 839.

Athena Dickson is 2025-2026 Missouri Bar president and a partner at Siro Smith Dickson PC.

Over the past several months, I have discussed in my “President’s Page” columns two closely related responsibilities that define our profession beyond the practice of law. First, I asked our members to help build a network of lawyer-leaders dedicated to civic education and public understanding of Missouri’s judicial retention system. I also discussed the importance of an independent judiciary and the constitutional principle that our courts are a co-equal branch of government, not a lesser one.

As my term as 2025-2026 Missouri Bar president draws to a close in September, I would be remiss if I did not reflect on how an informed electorate and an independent judiciary converge in my final “President’s Page” column.

As lawyers, we understand that judicial independence does not sustain itself. It depends upon public confidence. Public confidence depends upon public understanding. And public understanding requires education.

That work becomes especially important during judicial retention election years.

This November, voters will decide whether to retain 50 judges serving under Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan, also called The Missouri Plan. For many voters, however, the judicial retention process remains unfamiliar. They may not understand why Missouri adopted merit selection, how judicial performance evaluations work, or why retention elections were designed to promote judicial accountability while protecting courts from political pressures.

If we — Missouri lawyers — do not explain these principles, someone else will.

The need for public education is not unique to Missouri. Our neighbors in Kansas provide a timely example. In August, Kansas voters will consider a constitutional amendment that would fundamentally change how justices of the Kansas Supreme Court are selected. The proposal would replace Kansas’ long-standing merit-selection system with direct statewide elections for Supreme Court justices.

The steps taken in Kansas demonstrate an important reality: Systems that protect judicial independence cannot be taken for granted. They must be understood, explained, and defended.

The Missouri Plan has long been recognized nationally as a model for balancing accountability and independence. It helps establish a process to select judges on the Supreme Court of Missouri, on the Missouri Court of Appeals, in the City of St. Louis, and in Clay, Jackson, Platte, St. Louis, and Greene counties while preserving voter oversight through retention elections.

The Missouri Plan seeks to ensure that judges are selected based upon qualifications, integrity, temperament, and competence, not political popularity or campaign fundraising ability.

Yet even the strongest systems depend upon an informed public.

This is not about advocating for particular judges, nor is it about partisan politics. It is about helping Missourians understand the structure of our government, the role of the judiciary, and the safeguards that protect the rule of law.

It is about explaining why judges must be able to make decisions based upon facts and law, even when those decisions are unpopular. It is about ensuring voters have accurate information when they enter the voting booth.

And it is about preserving public trust in the institutions that resolve disputes peacefully and fairly.

As we move toward November, I encourage every Missouri lawyer to become an ambassador for civic education. That is why The Missouri Bar’s Education Outreach Network is so important. Across the state, lawyers serve on Rotary clubs, chambers of commerce, school boards, neighborhood associations, civic organizations, and nonprofit boards. Every one of those organizations represents an opportunity to help Missourians better understand how our courts function and why judicial independence matters.

Visit MoBar.org/EducationOutreach to sign up.

Help us educate — we cannot do this without everyone’s help. Engage in conversations about the role of the courts. Most importantly, help your fellow Missourians understand why an independent judiciary matters to everyone.

The rule of law is not self-executing. It depends upon institutions that are respected, courts that are independent, and Missourians who understand both.

Lawyers have always been teachers as well as advocates. This year, our state needs us to be both.

Together, we can ensure that Missouri voters enter the November election informed, engaged, and prepared to fulfill one of the most important civic responsibilities entrusted to them.

Thank you for helping advance this important work and for your support throughout my year as president. It has been a tremendous privilege to serve The Missouri Bar. I am proud to be a Missouri lawyer and grateful for the opportunity to work alongside so many dedicated professionals who care deeply about our profession, our justice system, and our communities.

I look forward to seeing you in Kansas City at The Missouri Bar’s Annual Meeting Sept. 16-18.

Hon. Alok Ahuja has served on the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, since 2008 and was the court’s chief judge from 2014-2016. Ahuja previously practiced for 15 years in Kansas City with Lathrop & Gage (now Lathrop GPM), where his practice focused on appeals in state and federal courts in a wide variety of substantive areas like commercial, employment, bankruptcy, and intellectual property. Ahuja received his Bachelor of Arts in philosophy from the University of Kansas and his Juris Doctor from the Yale Law School. He will be speaking at the Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar in September with Nina McDonnell during the CLE program, “From defective to reviewable: Points relied on under Rule 84.04(d).”

Why were you interested in becoming a judge? “I clerked for a federal appellate judge immediately after law school. I admired and respected him tremendously. I also loved the opportunity to participate in the process of deciding cases based on a disinterested view of the law and facts rather than advocating the interests of a particular client. It’s thrilling to be a (small) part of the process by which this community governs itself.”

What do you want members of the public to know about Missouri judges? “Missouri judges are hard working and are dedicated to applying the law in a fair and impartial manner. We continually strive to put aside our personal political and policy views and instead decide cases based on what the law requires. Missouri judges are dedicated to public service, and in many cases have given up more lucrative careers in the private sector to take on their judicial responsibilities.”

Your upcoming Annual Meeting CLE will focus on points relied on and give real-life examples from the courtroom. What key takeaways do you hope Missouri lawyers learn from the program? “… [T]he consequences of failing to draft proper points can be the dismissal of an appeal or the summary rejection of particular arguments. Our presentation at the Annual Meeting is intended to give lawyers practical advice on how to draft effective, rule-compliant points — beyond simply pointing to the fill-in-the-blank template contained in Rule 84.04(d).”

You’ve been involved in organizations focused on helping your community, including Lawyers Encouraging Academic Performance in Kansas City. How has giving back to your community impacted you professionally? “I consider community outreach and community service to be a critical part of my duties as a judge. I am also hopeful that my community service encourages other members of the legal community to do likewise. Working with groups like LEAP and Operation Breakthrough has been enormously fulfilling on a personal level — I’ve taken far more out of the experience than I’ve ever put in.”

If you could time travel, which period would you choose to visit first? “To England in May 1966 to see Bob Dylan and The Band on their legendary tour promoting Dylan’s ‘Blonde on Blonde’ album. I can’t imagine many things more exciting than seeing a future Nobel laureate performing the work which would one day win him the award, in front of sometimes hostile, jeering crowds.”

Answers have been edited for clarity, brevity, and style. Know a lawyer who you think should be featured in “Meet #MOLawyers”? Submit their name to journal@mobar.org.

To submit an obituary, please complete the form at MoBar.org/in-memoriam. We will not print a notice unless a copy of the death certificate or obituary is submitted.

Reza Azimi-Tabrizi, age 58, of Independence, on June 20, 2025. Azimi-Tabrizi graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2003. He practiced at Shook, Hardy & Bacon in Kansas City and later opened his own practice in Independence. 

Michael Barron, age 89, of St. Louis, on Dec. 28, 2025. Barron graduated from the University of Michigan School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1964. He worked for the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Michigan and in private practice in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He worked for several law firms in St. Louis, focusing on petroleum industry laws. He earned a Master of Laws in tax law from the Washington University School of Law and helped clients with elder law issues. 

Susan Traylor Bittick, age 71, of Dripping Springs, Texas, on Nov. 29, 2025. Bittick graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1995. She earned her Master of Laws from the University of Houston Law Center. Bittick worked at Ryan, LLC for 20 years, most recently as a principal in its U.S. advocacy practice. 

Steve Boyd, age 89, of Washington, D.C., on April 7, 2024. Boyd graduated from Harvard Law School and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1958. He served as a judge advocate in the U.S. Air Force in Japan and Taiwan. Boyd worked for the State Department in Washington, D.C., and New York and practiced international commercial litigation and business law for private firms in St. Louis, Paris, and Washington, D.C. He was an arbitrator and mediator for the American Arbitration Association. 

Robert “Bob” Brady, age 76, of Chesterfield, on March 9, 2023. Brady was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1973. He was a corporate lawyer in St. Louis and worked at Monsanto for over 30 years. He retired as director of the State and Local Tax Department. 

William B. Bundschu, age 94, of Lee’s Summit, on May 22, 2025. Bundschu graduated from the Duke University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1956. He received a Master of Laws from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. Bundschu practiced business law at the Popham, Conway, Sweeney, Fremont and Bundschu Law Firm. He served in the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve. 

Scarlet LeeAnn Butts, age 65, of Gladstone, on April 9, 2026. Butts graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1993. She worked in private practice and was a municipal prosecutor for Cameron. She was assistant prosecutor for Caldwell and DeKalb counties and was the child support prosecutor for the Hamilton Project, which served a fivecounty area. She was also a guardian ad litem. 

David Clayton Christian, age 77, of Kansas City, on March 20, 2026. Christian graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1972. He was a manager of governmental affairs at Kansas City Power & Light and Platte County assessor. Christian served in the Missouri House of Representatives and the U.S. Army. 

Edward Glion Curtis III, age 85, of Mission, Kansas, on March 11, 2026. Curtis graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1970. He was a senior executive for the Resolution Trust Corporation and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation before retiring as assistant general counsel for regional affairs for the FDIC. He served in the U.S. Army. 

Clifton “Clif ” Langsdale Elliott, age 86, of Kansas City, on May 12, 2025. He graduated from the Northwestern University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1963. He was a labor and employment lawyer. 

Angelo Joseph Falcone, age 92, of Kansas City, on Aug. 10, 2025. Falcone graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1956. Falcone practiced law for over 60 years. 

Thomas Earl Fitzgibbons, age 86, of St. Louis, on July 12, 2025. Fitzgibbons graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1968. He was a practicing lawyer until he retired. 

Martha Monique Gillespie-Stewart, age 39, of Bridgeton, on Sept. 14, 2024. Gillespie- Stewart graduated from the Southern University Law Center and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2014. She was a state attorney for Child Services in Jefferson City, then worked as a lawyer for the Tennessee Department of Child Services. 

William Glover, age 98, of Minnetonka, Minnesota, on Feb. 24, 2023. Glover graduated from the University of Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1952. He worked at International Multifoods for over 30 years, retiring as a corporate officer and senior vice president. Glover served in the U.S. Navy. 

William Leslie Hanks, age 83, of Waterloo, Illinois, on Sept. 12, 2025. Hanks graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1997. He was an assistant state’s attorney in St. Clair County, Illinois, before working for several law firms. 

Gay Harris, age 69, of Florissant, on April 10, 2025. Harris was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1994. 

James Alvin Hesse, age 83, of St. Louis, on June 1, 2025. Hesse graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1966. He was general counsel for the Missouri Pacific Railroad, Union Pacific, and Alton and Southern Railroad. 

Matthew Francis Howard, age 64, of Eldon, on March 30, 2026. Howard graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1985. He worked in private practice at Oswald & Seek and then started an independent practice. He was Miller County assistant prosecuting attorney, then Miller County prosecuting attorney. 

Thomas Charles Hullverson, age 89, of Scottsdale, Arizona, on Nov. 23, 2024. Hullverson graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1959. He joined the St. Louis trial law firm later known as The Hullverson Law Firm and practiced with his father and brother. He held leadership positions in various legal organizations, including The Missouri Bar. 

Dale L. Ingram, age 74, of Osage Beach, on Sept. 19, 2023. Ingram was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1989. He was a lawyer in Kansas City for 30 years and served in the U.S. Navy. 

Mark Joseph Ivandick, age 72, of Denver, Colorado, on Feb. 5, 2023. Ivandick graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1981. He was a judge advocate general in the U.S. Army before entering private practice in Clarksville, Tennessee. He worked as a lawyer and advocate for people with mental illness in Colorado. 

Tamma Elizabeth Keim, age 47, of Troy, on Nov. 12, 2025. Keim was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2010. She worked as an assistant prosecuting attorney at the Lincoln County Courthouse. 

Stephanie A. Kreis, age 82, of St. Louis, on July 21, 2024. Kreis graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1983. She worked at the Department of Defense Information Systems Agency, Office of General Counsel. 

Norman Walter Lampton, age 81, of Kansas City, on Dec. 21, 2025. Lampton graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1971. His practice area focused on bankruptcy law and creditors’ rights. He transitioned to the field of technology and worked as a data warehouse architect before returning to the practice of law. He served in the U.S. Navy. 

Joseph Lyons Leritz, age 97, of St. Louis, on Feb. 19, 2026. Leritz graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1952. He practiced law for 70 years. Leritz served in the U.S. Army. 

Samuel Markovits, age 72, of Middletown, New York, on Oct. 29, 2025. Markovits graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1978. He taught business law at SUNY Orange. 

DeLoss “Mac” McKnight, age 68, of Sandy, Utah, on March 25, 2026. McKnight graduated from the Duke University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1984. He was a lawyer and trust officer. 

Joseph Megerman, age 49, of Harrisonville, on June 3, 2026. Megerman graduated from the Cardozo School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2005. He served indigent clients in the Missouri State Public Defender’s Kansas City and Harrisonville offices. 

Hon. Kerry Lewis Montgomery, age 89, of Springfield, on March 12, 2026. He graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1965. He practiced law for 25 years in Springfield, then was appointed to the Missouri Court of Appeals. He served there for 13 years, including as chief justice. He served in the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. 

Joseph J. Mulvihill, age 79, of Phoenix, Arizona, on June 10, 2024. Mulvihill was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1969 and practiced law at Mulvihill & Hunter. He was a lawyer for the Jackson County Assessor and Collector and later was Kansas City assistant prosecutor. 

Jay Roger Robinson, age 93, of Charlotte, North Carolina, on Nov. 20, 2023. Robinson graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1959. He spent 19 years in personnel work and then went into private practice, focusing on labor law. He was an adjunct professor at the University of Mississippi and served in the U.S. Air Force. 

Barbeau Roy, age 86, of Napa, California, on Sept. 26, 2023. Roy graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1970. He taught philosophy at Saint Louis University. 

Robert Jules Schneider, age 96, of St. Charles, on Jan. 31, 2025. Schneider graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1952. He served with the Judge Advocate General’s Department in the U.S. Air Force. He did accounting and legal work for several companies in St. Louis, then worked for Wetterau Inc. for 24 years as general counsel, head of the legal department, secretary, and first vice president. 

Patricia Leigh Shostak, age 62, of St. Louis, on April 24, 2026. Shostak was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1991. 

J. Richard Skouby, age 94, of Vienna, on March 20, 2024. Skouby was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1956. He worked at Thomson Mitchell Law Firm and Mercantile Bank Corp. 

Henry Hirsh Stern Jr., age 88, of St. Louis, on April 25, 2026. He graduated from the University of Chicago Law School and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1963. He practiced law with his father, then founded Popkin & Stern law firm. He later was a partner at Lewis Rice. 

Greg Stites, age 71, of Bismarck, North Dakota, on May 25, 2022. He graduated from the University of North Dakota School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1996. He practiced law in Jamestown before joining Western Gear Corporation as a senior legal contracts administrator. He was general counsel at the North Dakota Insurance Department. He moved to Austin, Texas, and represented state insurance departments with insurance companies in receivership for the law firm of Rubenstein & Perry. He was senior counsel for the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and senior counsel and compliance officer at DXC Technology. 

Kevin R. Sweeney, age 68, of Kansas City, on Feb. 19, 2026. He graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1982. He worked for Shook, Hardy and Bacon; Sonnenschien, Nath, and Rosenthal; and Polsinelli PC. 

Hon. Franklin T. Thackery, age 97, of St. Joseph, on April 7, 2026. Thackery graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1957. He was a prosecuting attorney in Worth County and later entered private practice with Utz, Litvak, Thackery, Utz, and Taylor. He then became a circuit court judge. He served on The Missouri Bar Board of Governors and in the U.S. Navy. 

Joan Lee (Overman) Thompson, age 84, of Kingwood, Texas, on Nov. 3, 2025. Thompson attended the University of Kansas School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1989. She was a lawyer for Winston Properties. 

Florent William Wagner, age 87, of Leawood, Kansas, on March 21, 2025. Wagner graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1960. He was vice president of the Trust Department at Overland Park Bank for 20 years. 

John Wasserman, age 76, of Denver, Colorado, on Dec. 13, 2025. He graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1976. He worked in St. Louis as a corporate lawyer. 

Bryan C. West, age 67, of Chesterfield, on April 30, 2026. West graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1984. West was a partner at Paster West and Kraner in Clayton, which became Realty Law Partners. His practice focused on commercial real estate law. 

Irvin R. Zwibelman, age 91, of Chesterfield, on July 18, 2025. Zwibelman graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1958. He started his own law practice and served in the Missouri House of Representatives. He served in the U.S. Air Force Reserve Officers’ Training Corps.

Each year, Missouri lawyers from across the state come together to hear important case law updates, learn practical skills, and make new connections. This year’s Missouri Bar Annual Meeting returns to Kansas City Sept. 16-18 with networking opportunities, educational programs, and a chance to celebrate your fellow lawyers and judges. 

For those unable to attend in person, there will be a virtual “Lunch & Learn” option Oct. 5-9. View the schedule and register for the in-person or virtual Annual Meeting at MoBar.org/AM26.

Vote in elections for Missouri Bar Board of Governors and Young Lawyers’ Section Council 

From July 20-Aug. 15, Missouri lawyers can cast votes in The Missouri Bar Board of Governors and Missouri Bar Young Lawyers’ Section Council elections in their districts. The voting district is the county where the lawyer is employed or maintains their principal office. 

Missouri lawyers received an email from the Office of State Courts Administrator containing a link to the electronic ballot portal, where they can vote on contested Board of Governors seats in their districts. Lawyers eligible to vote in the YLS Council elections received an email from The Missouri Bar. 

There is one contested Board of Governors seat — District 12 (Kansas City within Jackson County). 

There are two contested YLS district council elections. District 8 (St. Louis County) has two open seats, and District 10 (Barry, Barton, Bates, Cedar, Dade, Henry, Jasper, Lawrence, McDonald, Newton, St. Clair, and Vernon counties) has one open seat. 

If there is not a contested Board of Governors or YLS Council seat in your district, you will not receive a ballot. 

Learn more at MoBar.org.

Gain knowledge at the 2026 Family Law Conference Aug. 20-22

Presented by MoBarCLE and The Missouri Bar Family Law Committee, the annual Family Law Conference is a great opportunity for family law practitioners to improve their skills, meet industry professionals, and interact with other lawyers in the family law practice. 

The conference returns Aug. 20-22 at the Chateau on the Lake Resort Spa & Convention Center in Branson and virtually. Register at MoBarCLE.org.

MoBar memory

The new Missouri Bar officers and their spouses were present at the 1976 Missouri Bar Annual Meeting in St. Louis. The meeting was bicentennial themed, featuring an Abe Lincoln look-alike and a presentation of “landmark” Missouri trials.

Missouri lawyers have access to vLex Fastcase at no cost 

As a member benefit, Missouri lawyers can access an extensive primary law collection through vLex Fastcase, including case law, statutes, regulations, and constitutions, searchable by citation, keyword, or natural language query. vLex Fastcase also provides search filters and an alert system. 

This Missouri Bar member benefit can save lawyers $1,140 per year.

Visit MoBar.org/Fastcase to access vLex Fastcase.

Tech tip 

Legal practice management vendors are constantly adding new features and efficiencies to their products that could save your firm valuable time and money and improve client interactions. It is good practice to re-evaluate your software and processes every few years for new features or services to ensure your firm is utilizing these improvements and aligning with evolving client expectations.

Save the date:

Missouri Bar Board of Governors meeting | Sept. 16 | Kansas City 
Fall Enrollment Ceremonies | Oct. 16 | Jefferson City 
National Celebration of Pro Bono | Oct. 25-31 | National 

For more information, visit MoBar.org.

The Missouri Bar wants to congratulate the 70 individuals who passed the February 2026 bar examination in Missouri and have completed all other requirements under Rule 8 for admission to The Missouri Bar. View the list of new lawyers here.

The legal profession’s fingerprints are all over the American founding. Of the declaration’s 56 signers, roughly 25 were lawyers or had legal training. In her latest column, Missouri Bar Executive Director Mischa Buford Epps writes about the upcoming 250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence and how lawyers can continue to uphold the rule of law.

The traditional law firm model is under pressure, but mid-tier and smaller firms have a distinct advantage if they can strategically adapt. In the latest issue of the Journal, Jeffrey Schoenberger breaks down steps small and mid-sized firms can take right now to protect their bottom line and thrive in an evolving legal market.

Missouri will be among 10 jurisdictions to administer the NextGen Uniform Bar Exam starting July 2026. Hon. Cynthia L. Martin explains how the NextGen UBE was developed, what skills and knowledge will be evaluated by the NextGen UBE, and how Missouri has stayed at the frontline of change in this article.

Download and read the full Journal issue here.

“Empathy is a vital yet underrated skill for lawyers. We must acknowledge out loud the emotional and financial strains of our clients. No client ever retains counsel because everything is going well. Attorneys create a trusted relationship when we exhibit understanding. Finally, the lawyer achieves greater job satisfaction when partnering with the client to find the best solution.”
-Kevin Checkett, attorney at law in Carthage

“Be humble. Projecting superiority in education, knowledge, and legal skills, (even when true) damages you in the eyes of clients, judges, opposing parties, and opposing attorneys.”
-Johnnie Burgess, attorney at law in Charleston, South Carolina

“Empathy and compassion. Also, selflessness. Lawyers … sometimes believe the cases revolve around them and not the client.”
-Lynne Jaben Bratcher, owner of Lynne Bratcher Law, LLC in Kansas City

“Communication. This is a skill which I have come to appreciate over time as one of the most important ones in life, especially as an attorney. Skillful lawyers know how to ‘say what they mean’ and ‘mean what they say.’ My work as an attorney continually improved as I learned how to articulate what I really meant/needed to communicate to the recipient of my message ... I have learned to keep the emotions out the communication. Keep the superlatives minimal and keep my words designed to be something the recipient understands and will be willing to read without perceiving antagonism or puffery … Before sending any message, especially an important one, I should read it over several times and examine it from differing viewpoints.”
-Roger Baron, Former city prosecutor of Osage Beach; professor emeritus, University of South Dakota School of Law in Vermillion, South Dakota

Answers have been edited for length, clarity, and style.

We were wondering ... What do you want your professional legacy to be? … Share your answer by emailing Journal@MoBar.org or filling out a form at MoBar.org/Closing-Statements.

Hon. Cynthia L. Martin was appointed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, in 2009. Prior to that, Martin was in private practice for 25 years as a commercial trial and transactional lawyer. She received B.A. degrees in Communication and Psychology from William Jewell College in 1981 and her J.D. degree from the University of Missouri- Kansas City School of Law in 1984. Martin served on the Missouri Board of Law Examiners from 2001-2011, including as its president when Missouri became the first state to adopt the Uniform Bar Examination in 2010. Martin was appointed to the Board of Trustees for the National Conference of Bar Examiners in 2011 and was chair of the board from 2019-2020. Martin was appointed chair of the NCBE’s Testing Task Force in 2018 and chair of the NCBE’s Implementation Steering Committee in 2021.

In July, Missouri will be one of 10 jurisdictions to first administer the NextGen Uniform Bar Exam. 

Developed by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, the NextGen UBE represents an exciting evolution from the Legacy UBE. The Legacy UBE uses three discrete item types to assess doctrinal knowledge in 12 areas, with a limited assessment of legal skills. In contrast, the NextGen UBE will objectively assess foundational lawyering skills and doctrinal knowledge using integrated multiple choice and constructive response items that better approximate the real-world practice of law. 

The NextGen UBE will be administered in person over the course of two days twice a year and will be fully computer-based, with the administration time shortened from 12 to nine hours. 

There will be a national rollout of the NextGen UBE, with the transition to be completed by July 2028. As of mid-May, 48 jurisdictions have agreed to administer the NextGen UBE by that time. 

Development of NextGen UBE 

NCBE’s commitment to the development of a new bar exam followed an intensive three-year research project undertaken by a Testing Task Force, which I had the pleasure of chairing from 2018-2021. 

The TTF engaged in a comprehensive and future-focused re-imagining of the bar exam’s content, design, and delivery method, driven by empirical input. The TTF recognized that whatever its recommendations, the bar examination would need to remain tethered to its purpose — to determine whether individuals seeking a general license to practice law have the minimum knowledge, skills, and abilities required to safely provide legal services to the public. 

The TTF conducted its research study in three successive phases and utilized independent research consulting firms. Throughout the three-year study, the TTF employed a dedicated website, blogs, published reports, webinars, and conference presentations to transparently describe the progress of its research. 

Phase one of the study was committed to listening sessions where the TTF could learn what stakeholders liked and disliked about the Legacy UBE, along with their aspirational goals for a new bar examination. 

Phase two involved a comprehensive and widely distributed practice analysis survey that was completed by over 45,000 demographically representative lawyers. The practice analysis identified the job activities of newly licensed lawyers and the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to perform those activities. 

Phase three engaged external focus groups to evaluate the data gathered from phases one and two and make recommendations about the content and design of a new bar examination, ever mindful that demonstrated minimum competence on the exam yields a general license to practice law. 

This ambitious three-year research study yielded TTF recommendations that were adopted by NCBE’s Board of Trustees in January 2021. The recommendations touched on every aspect of the bar examination, all while remaining committed to the essential principles of high-stakes licensure examinations — validity, reliability, and fairness. 

The TTF recommended: 

• The objective assessment of a narrower range of foundational doctrinal knowledge and a broader range of lawyering skills
• The use of integrated item types that cross-assess doctrinal knowledge and lawyering skills in a manner that approximates the “real world” practice of law
• Fully computer-based, in-person administration 

The TTF projected that implementation of its recommendations would take five to seven years and suggested the formation of the NCBE’s Implementation Steering Committee, which I am proud to chair. The committee worked with NCBE staff to develop NextGen UBE content and the complex infrastructure required to support computer-based administration. 

Skills and knowledge evaluated by NextGen UBE 

The NextGen UBE will assess foundational concepts and principles in nine doctrinal areas: civil procedure, contract law, evidence, torts, business associations, constitutional law, criminal law, real property, and family law (beginning in July 2028). These doctrinal areas largely transcend discrete practice areas and represent foundational knowledge that every lawyer with a general license to practice law should possess. 

In addition, the NextGen UBE will objectively assess foundational skills in seven areas: legal research, legal writing, issue spotting and analysis, investigation and evaluation, client counseling and advising, negotiation and dispute resolution, and client relationship and management. These skills represent the very essence of lawyering and must be drawn upon regardless of practice area. 

Content scope outlines for each of these areas have been meticulously curated based on the TTF’s practice analysis and input from content scope experts. The content scope outlines for foundational concepts and principles identify subtopics that are so fundamental they must be recalled without access to a legal library. Other subtopics are demarked to require knowledge sufficient to efficiently identify legal issues and to apply recalled and provided law to facts within the time constraints of a high-stakes licensure exam. 

The NextGen UBE features item types that integrate assessment across multiple knowledge and skills domains at the same time, much like the real-world practice of law where lawyers are rarely presented with a siloed legal question. 

Portability of official scores achieved on the NextGen UBE will remain a strongly encouraged practice, with many jurisdictions having already committed to the score portability compact that has been a hallmark of the Legacy UBE. 

By the time the NextGen UBE rolls out in July 2026, its content, item types, delivery platform, and every imaginable attribute implicated by migrating to a fully computer-based assessment will have been extensively field-tested, pilot-tested, prototype-tested, and beta-tested by more than 42,000 recent law school graduates. This includes hundreds of recent Missouri law school graduates. 

In addition, the unprecedented preparation for a smooth, operational rollout has included exhaustive psychometric evaluation of item and applicant performance, assisted by the facilitated input of practitioners and legal academics from across the country, including Missouri. 

As a result, NCBE projects that when administered to a demographically equivalent cohort, the recommended passing score range on the NextGen UBE will align with outcome analyses derived from passing score ranges on the Legacy UBE. 

In other words, though the NextGen UBE will be a very different exam from the Legacy UBE, it will not be any more or less rigorous to pass. At the same time, the NextGen UBE has been applauded by the thousands of recent law school graduates and other legal professionals who have already been exposed to its integrated content design and digital delivery platform, because both align with the real-world expectations of newly licensed lawyers. That is exactly what was intended. 

Missouri at the frontline of change

After years of scientific research and implementation, NCBE is now on the eve of the NextGen UBE launch in July 2026. During the seven-year period since the adoption of the TTF’s recommendations, NCBE staff and external vendors have worked tirelessly, efficiently, and passionately to develop the NextGen UBE. The work has been weighty, highly technical, and innovative, driven by an unwavering desire to ensure that the bar examination that jurisdictions elect to administer keeps pace with a changing profession and remains a valid, reliable, and fair assessment of minimum competence to secure a general license to practice law. 

Missouri has long been a leader in embracing forward-thinking enhancements in lawyer licensure that serve the dual interests of public protection and applicant fairness. As an example, Missouri was the first state to adopt the concept of a portable bar examination score with the Legacy UBE. That proud tradition continues with Missouri’s commitment to be among the first states to adopt and administer the NextGen UBE in July. Missouri’s decision reflects trust and confidence in the exhaustive research underlying the development of the NextGen UBE. 

Learn more about the NextGen UBE, including the research that led to its development and implementation, by visiting NextGenBarExam.ncbex.org.

Scott E. Vincent is the founding member of Vincent Law, LLC in Kansas City.

The 2nd Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals recently affirmed a U.S. Tax Court decision rejecting a taxpayer’s claim that she was no longer an S corporation shareholder following divorce and bankruptcy proceedings. This decision is a reminder to Missouri lawyers that it’s important to ensure clients clearly document ownership transitions in the context of divorce and bankruptcy to avoid liabilities. 

In Veeraswamy v. Commissioner,¹ the 2nd Circuit agreed with the tax court’s 2024 decision,² holding that the taxpayer was a shareholder for the year in question and was liable for income tax on her share of the S corporation’s capital gain and rental income. The 2nd Circuit also affirmed calculations of the taxpayer’s income and the imposition of penalties. 

Background 

The taxpayer, Karen Veeraswamy, and her husband Velappan Veeraswamy formed Ashand Enterprises, Inc. in 2000 and elected S corporation status for pass-through tax treatment to the shareholders. Upon formation, the Veeraswamys each owned 50% of Ashand per the articles of incorporation and initial board meeting. Ashand’s 2010 tax return similarly treated each of them as a 50% shareholder. 

Ashand was an investment enterprise, initially trading technology stocks and then, beginning in 2005, primarily owning and operating a multitenant building in the Bronx. Velappan Veeraswamy was Ashand’s president and ran the business. Karen Veeraswamy was listed as the secretary and treasurer of the business, and she opened bank accounts, worked in the office, and helped collect rent from tenants. 

The tax court described the marriage as beginning to fail as early as 2004 with an eventual divorce filing in 2011. During this time, Karen Veeraswamy continued to help with Ashand’s books, but Velappan Veeraswamy removed her from bank accounts and limited her access to the business office. During the divorce litigation, Velappan Veeraswamy argued that Karen Veeraswamy was no longer involved with the company, and she began filing her tax returns as married filing separately. 

All this turmoil ultimately led to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing for Ashand in 2013. Velappan Veeraswamy maintained in the bankruptcy that he was Ashand’s president and sole owner. Karen Veeraswamy made claims for child support and as a creditor of Ashand, but she did not claim to be a co-owner at that time. 

In 2014, a trustee sold the Bronx property for $7.6 million, leaving nearly $2 million in surplus after expenses which the bankruptcy court directed to escrow for resolution of the divorce proceedings. 

Velappan Veeraswamy then filed a personal Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 2018 which was converted to Chapter 7 liquidation later that year on Karen Veeraswamy’s motion. 

The IRS commissioner filed claims for Velappan Veeraswamy’s income tax liabilities for 2012-2015, and Karen Veeraswamy filed claims for unpaid domestic support. 

In February 2019, Velappan Veeraswamy had a heart attack and died, making the pending divorce case moot, and Karen Veeraswamy was appointed administrator of her late husband’s estate. As Karen Veeraswamy worked through Velappan Veeraswamy’s affairs, she discovered documents showing she had remained a 50% shareholder in Ashand despite Velappan Veeraswamy’s representations to courts and creditors to the contrary. 

Following Velappan Veeraswamy’s death, the bankruptcies of Ashand and Velappan Veeraswamy converged with the divorce proceedings. With the new ownership information, Karen Veeraswamy amended her claims to the Ashand surplus funds to claim an equity distribution as a 50% owner of Ashand. 

Over government objections, Karen Veeraswamy ultimately received priority payments of $486,038 on her equity claim and $480,000 in domestic support. Karen Veeraswamy did not report these items on her 2022 tax return, and she did not file a return for her 2014 tax year. The government received only a partial payment of its secured claims and nothing for its general unsecured claims. 

As this litigation was proceeding, the commissioner had also audited Ashand’s 2014 tax year, for which a return had not been filed. The commissioner reopened this audit in 2022 based on Karen Veeraswamy’s new claim that she owned 50% of Ashand. Based on information in the bankruptcy filings, the commissioner determined that Ashand realized a $1.9 million capital gain in 2014 from sale of the building, and half of the gain was attributed to Karen Veeraswamy. 

The commissioner then prepared a substitute return for Karen Veeraswamy for 2014 since she had not previously filed. This return was prepared with a bank deposit analysis and information from the bankruptcy proceedings as well as Karen Veeraswamy’s share of the 2014 Ashand capital gain. 

Karen Veeraswamy filed a petition in the U.S. Tax Court challenging the finding that she was a 50% shareholder of Ashand in 2014. 

2nd Circuit decision 

The main question addressed by the tax court and 2nd Circuit was whether Karen Veeraswamy was a 50% owner of Ashand in 2014. 

The 2nd Circuit reviewed the tax court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The 2nd Circuit found no error with the tax court determination that Karen Veeraswamy was a part owner of Ashand in 2014.³ The court noted the initial documentation of Karen Veeraswamy’s ownership in 2000, her testimony that she participated in the business even after the parties separated, and the 2010 Ashand tax return showing her as a 50% owner. 

The 2nd Circuit found that Karen Veeraswamy failed to demonstrate that she had abandoned her ownership interest prior to 2014, and the court noted her assertions in the bankruptcy proceedings that she was a 50% equity shareholder entitled to escrow funds.⁴ 

The court also rejected Karen Veeraswamy’s argument that some language in the bankruptcy confirmation plan referring to Velappan Veeraswamy as the owner of Ashand precluded the tax court and 2nd Circuit from reaching a contrary conclusion.⁵ On this point, the 2nd Circuit found that the bankruptcy proceedings did not litigate and reach a final judgment on the merits regarding Karen Veeraswamy’s ownership. Although the plan did refer to Velappan Veeraswamy as owner, the decree closing Ashand’s bankruptcy proceeding expressly disclaimed issues relating to payments between Ashand’s equity holders or parties in interest and referenced both Karen Veeraswamy and Velappan Veeraswamy. 

Based on these facts, the 2nd Circuit found that the tax court did not err in allowing the IRS to argue that Karen Veeraswamy was an owner of Ashand. 

Karen Veeraswamy also asserted that the tax court had inaccurately calculated her income, erred in the final computations, and improperly assessed penalties. The 2nd Circuit rejected these assertions, finding that the tax court properly accepted the commissioner’s calculation of income and properly computed her tax liability.⁶ The 2nd Circuit also found that the tax court did not err in finding that Karen Veeraswamy failed to establish reasonable cause to abate penalties. 

Conclusion

The U.S. Tax Court and 2nd Circuit Veeraswamy cases were admittedly pursued by a pro se taxpayer, but the decisions demonstrate the need for lawyers to ensure there is documentation regarding ownership transitions during divorces and bankruptcies. Absent clear documentation of abandonment or ownership transfer, the taxpayer in Veeraswamy was held liable for pass-through tax liabilities from an S corporation controlled by a separated spouse and business partner. 

Veeraswamy is also notable for the IRS strategy here; an audit was initiated to protect the government tax interests outside of the pending divorce and bankruptcy proceedings.

Endnotes 
1 2026 PTC 27 (2d Cir. 2026). 
2 Veeraswamy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2024-83 (2024). 
3 2026 PTC 27 (2d Cir. 2026). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id.

Mischa Buford Epps is executive director of The Missouri Bar.

Most days, you will find me at The Missouri Bar Center in Jefferson City. In the rhythm of daily work, it is easy to move through a city without pausing to consider whose name it carries. But, as July 4, 2026, approaches, marking 250 years since the signing of the Declaration of Independence, I’ve found myself thinking more deliberately about Thomas Jefferson, for whom this city is named.

Jefferson was 33 years old, a Virginia lawyer, when he took up his pen and drafted one of the most consequential pieces of political writing in history. The Declaration of Independence did not emerge from a military commander or a monarch. It came from a lawyer. It required a legal argument. And the argument he made, that all men are created equal and endowed with unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, has been echoing through courtrooms, legislatures, and the conscience of our nation ever since. 

The legal profession’s fingerprints are all over the American founding. Of the declaration’s 56 signers, roughly 25 were lawyers or had legal training. John Adams, the declaration’s most tireless advocate in the Second Continental Congress, built his reputation in courtrooms before he built it in crafting the new republic. James Wilson, one of only six men to sign both the declaration and the U.S. Constitution, was among the most sophisticated legal theorists of his generation. The founding generation from the bar understood that lasting liberty required not just revolution, but architecture: institutions, processes, and enforceable rules that would outlive any individual leader. They understood, in short, the rule of law. 

That principle — that no person stands above the law, that rights are not gifts from rulers but inherent in persons, that law should be consistently and fairly applied — is the connective tissue of everything that 250 years and the City of Jefferson followed. It is why we have an independent judiciary. It is why we have due process. It is why our U.S. Constitution, even with its imperfections, has endured. 

For those of us who have devoted our professional lives to the law, the rule of law is not an abstraction. It is the ground beneath everything we do. 

And yet Jefferson himself embodies one of the most searing paradoxes in American history. The man who wrote that all men are created equal enslaved hundreds of people over the course of his lifetime. The soaring ideals in the declaration coexisted with a lived reality he was never willing to fully surrender. 

Jefferson was not alone in this contradiction. The Constitution that followed protected slavery, counting enslaved persons as three-fifths of a human being for purposes of political representation. It said nothing of women’s rights. Indigenous people, whose nations and legal systems predated the arrival of colonists by centuries, were treated as obstacles rather than as rights-bearing persons. 

The founding vision was radical for its time but also grievously incomplete. 

This is not a reason to diminish the declaration’s 250th anniversary, but to understand it fully. The story of American law is the story of that original promise being slowly and imperfectly extended through constitutional amendments, civil rights legislation, landmark court decisions, and the lifelong labor of advocates who believed the words meant what they said.

We stand on the shoulders of lawyers who pushed our country toward its own ideals, understanding that the law is the arena where the distance between a nation’s promises and its practices gets contested and, sometimes, closed. That arena best functions when judges presiding over it are free to follow the law without being subject to undue political pressures, usurpation of authority, and diminishing rhetoric. 

As I drive through Jefferson City and pass the statue of that complicated, brilliant, contradictory man, I am reminded that the declaration was a beginning, not a conclusion. The ideals Jefferson articulated at 33 were larger than he was. 

As we mark 250 years, this anniversary calls us not to nostalgia, but to stewardship: stewardship of the rule of law, of the courts that uphold it, and of the ongoing work of helping our country fulfill its founding promise. That work has always belonged to lawyers. Let’s continue the work.

Athena Dickson is 2025-2026 Missouri Bar president and a partner at Siro Smith Dickson PC.

Last July, The Missouri Bar established the Special Committee on Rural Practice to conduct an extensive review of what residents in rural Missouri counties may be experiencing in accessing legal services. While there have been informal observations of potential lawyer shortages in certain rural areas, we need comprehensive, data-driven research to determine whether this is a widespread problem and, if so, to understand its true scope and underlying causes. 

The Missouri Bar tasked the special committee with researching and answering several critical questions: 

• Are rural Missouri counties experiencing a shortage of lawyers relative to the legal service needs of community residents?
• If shortages exist, which specific counties or regions are most affected?
• Are there specific practice areas that are most affected?
• How severe are these shortages, and are they getting worse over time?
• What is the current age distribution of rural lawyers, and what does this suggest about the future availability of legal services? 

To help answer these questions and provide a more comprehensive view of the legal landscape in rural Missouri counties, the special committee has launched surveys catered to the public, lawyers, and judges. 

If you are a Missouri lawyer or judge living in a non-metropolitan county, please complete one of the rural practice surveys to help The Missouri Bar better understand the current state of legal services in rural areas. 

Lawyers are encouraged to take the survey at SurveyMonkey.com/r/MoRuralLawyers.

Judges can take the judicial survey at SurveyMonkey.com/r/MoRuralJudges.

Please also share the public survey with friends, family, neighbors, and others living in rural communities. It’s available at SurveyMonkey.com/r/RuralLegalSurvey. 

Along with these surveys, the special committee will be meeting with lawyers and judges for in-person interviews throughout rural regions of Missouri. 

The feedback we collect will help us answer a critical question: Are rural Missouri residents able to obtain a lawyer when needed? 

The committee’s data collection efforts will be used to establish baseline facts about the current state of legal service accessibility in rural Missouri communities. This includes determining the number of practicing lawyers in each rural county, understanding the types of legal services currently available, and identifying any gaps between community legal needs and available services.

Equally important is understanding the barriers that may prevent lawyers from establishing or maintaining practices in rural areas. While various factors have been suggested — such as economic considerations, educational debt burdens, lifestyle preferences, or professional isolation — there has been no systematic study of what actually influences lawyers’ decisions about where to practice. The committee will investigate whether financial concerns are the primary deterrent or whether other factors, like technology infrastructure challenges or family considerations, play significant roles. 

The committee will conduct its data collection throughout this year. Through its comprehensive research, the committee will deliver timely results to The Missouri Bar Board of Governors next spring that can inform future policy and program recommendations. 

I am pleased to report that this special committee has hit the ground running and has taken quick steps to help determine the scope of these core concerns. But we need you — Missouri lawyers and judges — to help provide depth to this project. 

Thank you for taking the time to complete the survey and spread the word, and a special thank you to the committee for its work on this important issue.

Dr. Dwayne Smith is the founder of Workplace Law Solutions, a practice specializing in workplace investigations, conflict resolution, consulting, and collegiate athlete representation. He is also an adjunct professor at the Saint Louis University School of Education, where he teaches Advanced School Law. With more than 100 investigations completed for school districts and private businesses, Smith is a national speaker and the host of “Shifting the Power Balance,” a podcast focused on workplace conflict and resolution. He will be speaking at the

What is one thing lawyers could do to help create a healthier work environment? 

“Invest in truly knowing the people you lead and serve. Cultivate a culture where individuals feel valued, heard, and respected, and ensure that your firm’s mission and expectations actually reflect those values in practice, not just in writing. Perhaps most critically: Hold yourself to the same standard you ask of everyone else. Culture flows from the top. When leaders model accountability, it becomes part of the environment.” 

What do you wish more employers and law firms understood about addressing workplace concerns? 

“The single most important thing is having the courage to genuinely listen and then following through with a timely, impartial process. Concerns should never be dismissed simply because they are uncomfortable to address. Transparency and consistency throughout the investigation are not just best practices; they are essential to maintaining organizational trust and legal defensibility.” 

You will be speaking at MOSOLO about HR for small and solo law firms. Why should small firms prioritize building an HR playbook?

 “For small and solo firms in particular, investing in the HR function creates a foundation for accountability and risk reduction. It signals to everyone in the organization — from new associates to staff — that the firm is serious about its values and that people will have a genuine opportunity to succeed. That foundation ultimately strengthens the practice from the inside out.” 

What sparked your interest in Name, Image, and Likeness contract work? 

“Collegiate athletics has always been a passion of mine, and as the NIL landscape developed, it became clear that student-athletes needed ethical, legally trained advocates in their corner. A local financial planner first reached out asking me to review NIL agreements, and that initial work opened the door to a deeper engagement in this area.” 

What are you reading right now?

“I’m working through two books simultaneously: ‘Kenny Chesney: Heart, Life, Music’ and ‘Raised on Radio: The AOR Glory Years.’ I’m drawn to autobiographies, particularly from the music world, because they are honest accounts of grit, perseverance, and the life lessons people gather along the way. There is always something transferable to the practice of law and leadership.” 

Answers have been edited for clarity, brevity, and style. Know a lawyer who you think should be featured in “Meet #MOLawyers”? Submit their name to journal@mobar.org.

W. Dudley McCarter, a former president of The Missouri Bar, is a partner in the St. Louis law firm of Behr, McCarter, Neely & Gabris.

Amateur hockey player accepted risk of injury 

Becker v. Schenk, 716 S.W.3d 350 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025). 

Kyle Becker appealed the circuit court’s ruling on a claim of personal injury arising out of an ice hockey game. Becker argued the circuit court erred in finding he assumed the risk of breaking a bone while playing amateur ice hockey. The Missouri Court of Appeals- Eastern District affirmed the court’s judgment.¹ 

A plaintiff claiming personal injury must prove: 

1. the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff; 
2. the defendant failed to perform that duty; and 
3. the defendant’s breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.² 

In personal injury cases arising out of athletic competitions, the Supreme Court of Missouri heightens the plaintiff’s burden of proof from negligence to recklessness.³ To show recklessness, the plaintiff must prove the defendant “deliberately or willfully engaged in conduct that demonstrated a reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s safety.”⁴ “In amateur contact sports … [o]rdinary negligence principles are inapplicable in such cases because ‘conduct which might be “unreasonable” in everyday society is not actionable because it occurs on the athletic field.’”⁵ 

The risk agreement Becker signed “clearly and unambiguously” denoted the risk of “broken bones” as an injury resulting from “physical contact with other players … during the course of play[.]”⁶ By reading and signing the risk agreement, the Court of Appeals ruled, Becker “expressly assumed the risk of his precise injury.”⁷ “A broken bone is an inherent risk of ice hockey, a contact sport, Risk of injury, duty to third parties, and more known for rough play and for which injuries such as suffered by Plaintiff are reasonably anticipated,” the court noted. 

“In contact sports, physical contact and injuries among participants [are] inherent and unwarranted judicial intervention might inhibit the game’s vigor,” the court added.⁸

Expert testimony on risk factors does not establish causation

McCostlin v. Monsanto Co., 718 S.W.3d 435 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).

Mark McCostlin and his wife Karen McCostlin appealed the trial court’s ruling, arguing the court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of Monsanto Company because the expert witnesses’ testimony established a submissible case on causation, which is an issue for the jury. The Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District affirmed the trial court’s verdict in McCostlin v. Monsanto Co.⁹

The McCostlins had to show a causal connection between the defendant’s product, Roundup, and Mark McCostlin’s injury, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.¹⁰ 

There is no dispute that to establish causation, the McCostlins needed to establish both general and specific cau[s]ation in order to make a submissible case … An action regarding liability for exposure to a toxic substance typically requires a certain degree of scientific expertise and the causal relationship must be established by expert testimony.¹¹ 

The testimony of the McCostlins’ expert was that Mark McCostlin’s Roundup exposure was a “possible risk factor,” which is an “assurance of a possibility that is not sufficient to establish causation.”¹² The Court of Appeals added: 

[T]he trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict in favor of Monsanto because the McCostlins’ causation expert failed to demonstrate a causal connection between Monsanto’s products containing glyphosate (“Roundup”) and Mr. McCostlin’s non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma.¹³

Psychiatrist owed no duty to third parties injured by patient 

J.N. v. Anderson, ED113033 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025). 

Ryne Dobson killed his stepfather, Kevin Nentwig. Dobson’s half-brother J.N. and his mother Colleen Nentwig later sued Dobson’s treating psychiatrist Dr. Dale Anderson for wrongful death based on medical negligence. The appellants claimed Anderson knew or should have known that Dobson presented a serious danger of future harm to Kevin Nentwig and failed to notify Dobson’s family of that danger, ultimately causing Kevin Nentwig’s death. The jury returned, and the Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District affirmed, a verdict for Anderson.¹⁴ 

The appellants claimed the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on an alternative theory of negligence in which the healthcare providers owe a duty to third parties to not prescribe medication that affirmatively cause patients to harm third parties.¹⁵ The appellants claimed Anderson had a duty to Dobson’s family to not prescribe medications that cause or contribute to causing Anderson’s patient to harm third parties, like Dobson’s stepfather.¹⁶ 

In a negligence action, the plaintiff “must establish the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, and the defendant’s breach proximately caused the plaintiff injury.”¹⁷ The standard for the creation of a duty is foreseeability¹⁸ which, “for purpose of determining if a duty exists, is defined as the presence of some probability or likelihood of harm sufficiently serious that ordinary persons would take precautions to avoid it.”¹⁹ The possibility of harm is not sufficient enough to establish foreseeability.²⁰

Based on this, the Court of Appeals stated it was “not persuaded to recognize such a duty because the record here does not establish that Decedent’s death was reasonably foreseeable.” 

The health and safety of a foreseeable victim, such as an immediate family member the patient makes explicit threats about, is certainly an interest worthy of protection. But that must be balanced with the public’s interest in maintaining the physician-patient privilege.²¹

Admission of demonstrative evidence used by expert was not error

Richardson v. Hawes, 725 S.W.3d 301 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025). 

Julia Richardson filed a lawsuit against Dr. Arthur Hawes and Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Inc., alleging medical negligence in connection with a rhytidectomy and an abdominoplasty. A jury found in favor of the defendant, and on appeal, Richardson argued the trial court erred in admitting demonstrative exhibits during the defendants’ direct examination of their expert. The Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District affirmed the judgment.²² 

A trial court has broad discretion in admitting or excluding evidence.²³ “Even when an evidentiary ruling is in error, this Court will not set aside the jury’s verdict unless that error likely changed the outcome of the case.”²⁴ To demonstrate error in the admission of demonstrative evidence, an appellant must show an abuse of discretion by the trial court that results in prejudice to the appellant.²⁵ 

The Richardson trial court admitted the exhibits as demonstrative aids to help explain the testimony of the defendants’ expert. The appellate court found that despite Richardson’s hearsay objection, Richardson did not request a limiting instruction to the jury to ignore any hearsay in the exhibits.²⁶ 

The Court of Appeals further found that Richardson’s foundational contention on appeal challenging the defendants’ compliance with § 490.065, which states expert opinion must be based on information considered reasonably reliable in the subject field, was not raised at trial. 

Assuming arguendo that the trial court erred, our decision would not change because Richardson has failed to demonstrate how she was prejudiced … We fail to see how the outcome of the trial would have been different absent Defendants’ use of the subject exhibits, especially in light of the jury’s unanimous verdict in favor of Defendants.²⁷

Endnotes 
1 Becker v. Schenk, 716 S.W.3d 350 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025). 
2 State ex rel. Tyler Techs., Inc. v. Chamberlain, 679 S.W.3d 474, 477 (Mo. banc 2023) (internal quotation omitted). 
3 See Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 13-14 (Mo. banc 1982). 
4 Becker, 716 S.W.3d at 357 (citing McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club, L.P., 967 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998)). 
5 Elias v. Davis, 535 S.W.3d 737, 744-45 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) (quoting McKichan, 967 S.W.2d at 211-12). 
6 Becker, 716 S.W.3d at 360. 
7 Id. (citing Ferbet v. Hidden Valley Golf and Ski, Inc., 618 S.W.3d 596, 606 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020)). 
8 McKichan, 967 S.W.2d at 212. 
9 718 S.W.3d at 435 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025). 
10 Poage v. Crane Co., 523 S.W.3d 496, 508 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). 
11 McCostlin, 718 S.W.3d at 442. See also Brown for Est. of Kruse v. Seven Trails Invs., LLC, 456 S.W.3d 864, 869-70 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). 
12 Id. at 443; See also Linton by and through Linton v. Carter, 634 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Mo. banc 2021) (“[A] plaintiff bears the burden of proving causation, ‘[a]ssurance of possibility is not of itself … sufficient to make a submissible case.’”) 
13 Id. at 440. 
14 J.N. v. Anderson, ED113033 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Weiland v. Owner-Operator Servs., Inc., 540 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Mo. banc 2018). 
18 Id. 
19 Reddick v. Spring Lake Estates Homeowner’s Association, 648 S.W.3d 765, 781 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (internal citations omitted). 
20 Id. 
21 J.N., ED113033 at 8 (citing Virgin v. Hopewell Center, 66 S.W.3d 21, 27 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001)). 
22 Richardson v. Hawes, 725 S.W.3d 301 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025). 
23 Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Mo. banc 2011). 
24 Barkley v. McKeever Enters., Inc., 456 S.W.3d 829, 842 (Mo. banc 2015). 
25 Feiteira v. Clark Equip. Co., 236 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Mo. App. 2007). 
26 Richardson, 725 S.W.3d at 307. 
27 Id. at 308-309.

Jeff Schoenberger is a business coach for Lawyerist and a senior consultant for Affinity Consulting.

The world needs lawyers. People have disputes, contracts, estates, and regulatory puzzles that require the legal knowledge and services lawyers offer. But being needed does not necessarily mean being profitable. 

Even as the legal market posts solid gains, many firms, especially mid-tier and smaller firms, are feeling the squeeze. Rising costs, talent competition, and changing client expectations are pressing firms to rethink long-standing operational assumptions. 

See the big picture 

Contrary to some gloomy predictions of slow growth for law firms, recent years delivered strong results:

• Demand for legal services in 2024 grew approximately 2.6%, the strongest increase since before the 2008 financial crisis.1
• Billing rates have continued to climb, contributing to higher revenues across many firms.
• Among the Am Law 100, total gross revenue reached roughly $158 billion in 2025, representing about 13.3% year-over-year growth.2
• Profits per equity partner rose 12.3%.3

At the same time, the pace of demand growth decelerated late in 2024, with quarterly run rates settling around 3.3%.4 However, as 2025 unfolded, demand rebounded, with third-quarter law firm demand rising about 3.9% year-over-year, one of the strongest quarterly increases in recent history. This signaled sustained client activity and a continued opportunity for firms.5

Understand the new reality of expenses versus revenue 

Rising revenues are welcome, but costs are increasing right alongside them. Law firms continue to invest heavily in:

• AI, technology, and cybersecurity
• Talent acquisition and retention
• Practice management systems and business development

Operational costs have risen across the industry,6 and firms that treat these increases as unavoidable rather than strategic signals risk shrinking their margins and putting themselves at a competitive disadvantage. 

Combat rising expenses with efficiency 

Rethink client service touchpoints 

Not every client interaction needs to be in person or billed at premium rates. Routine communications can often be handled via phone, secure video (e.g., Webex, Zoom, Teams, or Google Meet), or client portals, a feature of many law practice management systems. This can reduce administrative friction while improving responsiveness. 

Invest in workflow and practice automation 

Modern intake, billing, and document workflows reduce repetitive work and improve consistency. The most successful firms adopt these tools deliberately, focusing on outcomes rather than novelty. 

Use metrics to guide decisions 

Tracking key performance indicators such as realization rates, cost per matter, and profitability by practice area enables smarter decisions. Across-the-board rate increases are rarely as effective as targeted, data-informed adjustments. 

Navigate the competitive talent frontier 

Recognize tight labor markets 

Competition for skilled lawyers remains intense. Corporations and in-house departments continue to draw talent away from firms, often offering competitive compensation and benefits packages.7 

Prioritize work-life balance 

Younger lawyers increasingly expect flexibility and balance. Firms clinging to rigid, hours-driven models may find themselves losing capable lawyers to alternative practice models. 

Focus on succession and mentorship 

As senior lawyers retire, firms without strong mentoring and succession plans risk losing both clients and institutional knowledge. Rebuilding those assets is far more expensive than maintaining them. 

Adapt to protect your firm’s bottom line 

The traditional law firm model is under pressure. That does not mean it is obsolete, but it does mean firms must adapt. 

Mid-tier and smaller firms should focus on:

1. Reducing unnecessary expenses without diminishing client value.
2. Managing revenue intentionally through pricing strategy and service design.
3. Treating talent strategy as a core business function, not an afterthought. 

Put simply, profitability is no longer a byproduct of good lawyering alone. Profitability in 2026 will belong to firms that align people, processes, and technology with clear business goals.

Endnotes 
1 State of the Legal Market 2025, THOMSON REUTERS INSTITUTE (Jan. 7, 2025), https://www. thomsonreuters.com/en-us/posts/legal/state-of-the-us-legal-market-2025/. 
2 The 2025 Am Law 100 by the Numbers, LEGAL. IO (April 15, 2025), https://www.legal.io/articles/5609720/The-2025-Am-Law-100-By-the-Numbers. 
3 Id. 
4 State of the Legal Market 2025, THOMSON REUTERS INSTITUTE (Jan. 7, 2025), https://www. thomsonreuters.com/en-us/posts/legal/state-of-the-us-legal-market-2025/. 
5 Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Firms See ‘Sharp Spike’ in Demand in Third Quarter, Report Says, ABA J. (Nov. 13, 2025), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/law-firms-see-sharp-spike-in-demand-in-third-quarter-report-says. 
6 2025 Predictions: Driving Profitability for Law Firms, SUREPOINT TECHNOLOGIES, https://surepoint.com/resources/blog/2025-predictions-driving-profitability-for-law-firms-and-optimizing-operations/ (last visited April 14, 2026). 
7 Frederick J. Esposito Jr, Law Firm Finance Trends and Predictions for 2025, ABA (Jan. 1, 2025), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_practice/resources/law-practice-magazine/2025/january-february-2025/law-firm-finance-trends-and-predictions-for-2025/.

William C. Martucci, who holds an LL.M. from Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., practices nationally in business and employment litigation. He focuses on complex class litigation, including wage and hour litigation, in California, Massachusetts, and New York, as well as business-to-business litigation, executive compensation disputes, business torts, and unfair competition. A nationally regarded trial lawyer, Martucci is often sought out for high-stakes jury work. His jury work has been featured in The National Law Journal.

Burcu Erbaz defends clients in business and employment litigation matters. She graduated first in her class at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, where she was on the editorial board of the UMKC Law Review. Erbaz also served as a judicial intern for Hon. Stephen R. Bough in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, conducting legal research and drafting memoranda.

Minha Jutt represents clients in business litigation matters, including complex commercial disputes, restrictive covenants and trade secrets, and design and construction. Her experience extends to all stages of litigation, ranging from initial client counseling and fact investigation to dispositive motion practice to preparation for appeal. An honors graduate of the University of Kansas School of Law, where she served as the executive comments editor of the Kansas Law Review, Jutt clerked for Hon. Julie A. Robinson, U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas.

The integration of artificial intelligence into the legal profession has rapidly shifted from an experimental novelty to a foundational technological trend, representing in many respects a transformational shift comparable to earlier technological revolutions in the law practice. 

AI systems — especially generative AI tools such as large language models — are being adopted across law firms and courts to support key functions like legal research, drafting, document review, and administrative workflow automation. These technologies can process vast amounts of information and surface relevant statutes, precedents, and legal arguments more quickly than traditional manual methods, ultimately increasing efficiency and enabling legal professionals to prioritize strategic thinking over routine tasks. 

Missouri lawyers now routinely encounter AI in research platforms, document drafting tools, litigation analytics, and client-facing technologies. Used properly, these tools offer meaningful efficiencies, including faster access to information, assistance with initial drafting, and improved access to justice for self-represented litigants. Used improperly, however, generative AI poses serious ethical and professional risks. 

What distinguishes generative AI from earlier tools is not merely speed or convenience, but autonomy. Generative AI systems do not solely retrieve information; they generate content. That distinction is ethically significant. AI-generated outputs are statistical in nature and can produce inaccurate or misleading information, often referred to as “hallucinations.” These hallucinations are not rare anomalies; they are a known limitation of large language models.¹ 

These issues have already drawn judicial ire. As courts across the country have now documented, generative AI can fabricate case law, misstate holdings, and present false information in a manner that appears authoritative.² Several U.S. courts recently sanctioned lawyers for submitting briefs containing fabricated citations derived from unchecked AI output.³ 

Missouri’s ethical legal framework does not prohibit the use of AI. To the contrary, Missouri has long recognized that lawyers must adapt to technological change.⁴ Rule 4-1.1 of the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct requires competent representation, and Comment [6] expressly includes a duty to stay abreast of “the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”⁵ Missouri Informal Opinion 2024-11, issued by the Office of Legal Ethics Counsel, confirms that generative AI is simply the latest technology subject to this longstanding principle.⁶ 

For Missouri lawyers, the ethical issue is not whether AI may be used, but how it may be used consistent with duties of competence, candor, confidentiality, and supervision.⁷ Missouri Informal Opinion 2024-11 properly frames generative AI as analogous to a nonlawyer assistant or external service provider: It’s a tool that may assist the lawyer, but it can never replace the lawyer’s independent judgment or responsibility for accuracy.⁸ 

Using AI in legal practice 

In various practices, perhaps one of the most widely advertised uses of AI is performing traditionally labor-intensive tasks in initial discovery, such as document review and e-discovery. Proponents of AI contend that AI-assisted tools can expedite labor-intensive tasks such as locating key documents, identifying key custodians, and summarizing documents. When performed accurately and thoroughly, these functions can streamline lawyers’ processes and save client expenditures on discovery — ultimately permitting lawyers to expend more time and client funds on more strategic and substantive phases of legal practice. 

Proponents of AI also contend that AI-assisted tools have the potential to streamline legal research by assisting lawyers in quickly locating on-point statutes and case law amidst vast databases. While the accuracy of these tools remains largely untested, they may develop into beneficial aids moving forward. 

AI platforms also have predictive analytic capabilities based on historical data. These capabilities can assess potential case outcomes and settlement ranges, as well as the possibility of the success of a motion based on district and judge-specific data. 

On the transactional side, AI-assisted tools can analyze dense legal terminology to spot inconsistencies, vague or unclear language, and potential risks and unfavorable terms. 

Ultimately, while these developing technologies may streamline and enhance the efficiency of various legal tasks, lawyers remain responsible for ensuring their use of AI complies with their professional obligations. 

Developing guidelines and case law: Missouri ethics and national enforcement trends 

Missouri’s ethics-first approach 

Missouri has addressed the use of AI primarily through ethical interpretation rather than prescriptive court rules. Informal Opinion 2024-11 provides a comprehensive road map for Missouri lawyers considering the use of generative AI.⁹ The opinion emphasizes several core principles:

• Competence (Rule 4-1.1): Lawyers must understand how generative AI works, what it can and cannot reliably do, and the risks associated with its use.¹⁰
• Confidentiality (Rule 4-1.6): Lawyers must evaluate whether AI platforms store, reuse, or expose client data and must make reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized disclosure.¹¹
• Candor to the tribunal (Rule 4- 3.3): Lawyers may not submit false statements of fact or law, including fabricated citations or mischaracterized authority.¹²
• Supervision (Rules 4-5.1 and 4-5.3): AI output must be supervised just as work performed by nonlawyer assistants, vendors, or junior lawyers is supervised.¹³

The opinion is explicit that lawyers may not rely blindly on AI-generated content. Any work product generated with AI assistance must be independently reviewed and verified by the lawyer before it is used in representation.¹⁴ 

In parallel with these ethical guidelines, Missouri legislators have also proposed statutory guidance over the last couple of years, including in 2025 through HB 1462, the AI Non-Sentience and Responsibility Act.¹⁵ This bill, which did not pass the Missouri Legislature, attempted to codify key principles regarding the legal status and responsibilities associated with AI systems, including:

• Nonsentience: AI systems would have been declared nonsentient and could not hold legal personhood, personal relationships, or corporate roles.
• Human accountability: Owners, developers, and manufacturers would have remained legally responsible for AI outputs, including harm caused through intended or unintended use. Misuse by users would not transfer liability to the AI itself.
• Oversight and safety: Owners would have been required to maintain proper supervision and risk controls over AI systems, with liability for negligence or foreseeable harm. Developers and manufacturers would have to prioritize safety mechanisms and assess risks proactively.
• Piercing corporate veils: The statute made clear that corporate structures could not shield human actors from liability if AI-caused harm resulted from recklessness, negligence, or deceptive practices.

Together, the informal opinion and the proposed legislation reflect a dual approach in Missouri: The ethical guidance ensures lawyers remain competent and responsible in practice, while legislation could establish a clear legal framework assigning human responsibility and preventing AI from being treated as a legal actor. Both underscore that reliance on AI does not absolve lawyers or organizations from accountability. 

Missouri case law: Kruse v. Karlen 

Missouri courts have already enforced these principles. In Kruse v. Karlen, the Missouri Court of Appeals sanctioned a litigant for submitting an appellate brief containing fictitious AI-generated case citations.¹⁶ The court dismissed the appeal and imposed damages, emphasizing that citing nonexistent authority violates fundamental appellate obligations regardless of whether the error arose from AI use.¹⁷ 

Kruse is significant because it demonstrates that Missouri courts do not view AI misuse as a technical lapse, but as a serious breach of professional responsibility.¹⁸ The decision aligns squarely with Informal Opinion 2024-11’s insistence on verification and supervision.¹⁹ 

The federal approach and the push for certification 

Federal courts have likewise responded forcefully to AI-related misconduct. 

Missouri federal courts 

Some judges in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri have individualized standing orders emphasizing the proper use of AI. As an example, Rule 18 of U.S. District Judge Joshua M. Divine’s requirements provides: 

Mandatory Certification Regarding Generative Artificial Intelligence: All attorneys and pro se litigants appearing before the Court must file a certificate on the docket, together with their notice of appearance, attesting either that no portion of any filing will be drafted by generative artificial intelligence (such as ChatGPT, Harvey. AI, or Google Bard) or that any language drafted by generative artificial intelligence will be fully checked for accuracy by a human being, using print reporters or traditional legal databases.²⁰

In addition, the Eastern District of Missouri has issued guidance for self-represented litigants that prohibits filings drafted by any form of AI and emphasizes that litigants — including lawyers — are responsible for the contents of their filings, including portions generated with AI, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.²¹ 

Kansas federal courts 

Newly promulgated Standing Order 26-01 guides the use of artificial intelligence in preparing court filings in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas.²² The order cautions that AI tools may generate false statements of fact or law, including fabricated citations, and reminds litigants that they remain fully responsible for the accuracy of all filings submitted to the court. 

Lawyers and parties must review and verify any AI-assisted content — including legal authority, quotations, factual assertions, and legal analysis — before filing. The order further warns that failure to verify AI-generated material may result in sanctions, including the striking of filings, monetary penalties, referral to disciplinary authorities, disqualification of counsel, filing restrictions, or dismissal of claims. In addition, the court retains discretion to require parties to disclose the use of AI in filings and to certify that any AI-generated material has been personally reviewed and verified for accuracy. 

In a decision on Feb. 2, 2026, District Judge Julie A. Robinson sanctioned multiple lawyers for their improper use of generative AI without independently verifying the legal authority cited in their filings.²³ The court imposed monetary sanctions of $1,000-$5,000 after five lawyers signed briefs containing fabricated and misrepresented case law generated by an AI tool.²⁴ The court emphasized that the use of generative AI in legal practice is not inherently improper; rather, the violation arose from the lawyers’ failure to verify that the cited authorities actually existed and supported the propositions for which they were cited.²⁵ 

As the court explained, the duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law is nondelegable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and lawyers who sign filings certify that the legal authorities contained therein have been reviewed and verified through human judgment.²⁶ Robinson further stressed that reasonably competent lawyers should be aware of the well-publicized risks associated with unverified generative AI research, including the potential for hallucinated legal authority, and that reliance on such tools without verification falls short of the objective standard required by Rule 11.²⁷ 

In Moore v. City of Del City,²⁸ the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal as a sanction after a pro se litigant cited numerous fabricated cases that the court determined were generated by AI.²⁹ The court emphasized that failure to verify citations wastes judicial resources and undermines confidence in the legal system.³⁰ Importantly, the 10th Circuit imposed a prospective certification requirement, ordering the litigant to disclose future AI use and verify citation accuracy under penalty of perjury.³¹

While Missouri has not adopted a formal certification rule, a functional equivalent already exists. Every Missouri lawyer who signs a pleading or brief certifies — by signature — that the authority cited exists and supports the propositions asserted.³² The use of AI does not alter that obligation. 

National cases 

In Mata v. Avianca, Inc., lawyers relied on ChatGPT to draft a motion that cited six nonexistent judicial decisions.³³ The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found that counsel failed to verify the AI-generated authorities before filing and imposed $5,000 in sanctions, while also ordering the lawyers to notify the judges whose names had been falsely attributed to fabricated opinions.³⁴ Widely regarded as the first major sanctions decision addressing generative AI in federal litigation, Mata established the now-frequently cited principle that the use of AI does not excuse violations of Rule 11.³⁵ 

More recently, in February 2026, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed that traditional sanction rules adequately govern AI-related misconduct. In Fletcher v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., the court observed that although generative AI represents a new technology, existing procedural rules already provide sufficient mechanisms to address inaccurate or fabricated legal citations.³⁶ The court emphasized that the same professional and procedural obligations apply regardless of whether legal research is performed by traditional means or assisted by AI.³⁷ 

Similarly, in Lifetime Well LLC v. Ibspot.com, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania highlighted the supervisory responsibilities of lawyers when AI tools are used in preparing filings.³⁸ The court warned that a lack of diligence and supervision — particularly where less experienced lawyers rely on generative AI without adequate review — may lead to both monetary and nonmonetary sanctions when filings contain false or fabricated legal authority.³⁹ 

Together, these cases reinforce a consistent judicial message: While AI may assist with legal research and drafting, the responsibility for verifying legal authority and ensuring the accuracy of court filings remains squarely with the lawyer. 

The American Bar Association 

The American Bar Association issued formal ethical guidance on lawyers’ use of AI in ABA Formal Opinion 512 and through interpretations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. These authorities do not prohibit the use of AI in legal practice but instead require that lawyers employ such tools in a manner consistent with their professional obligations. 

Formal Opinion 512 explains that existing ethical rules fully apply when lawyers use AI-assisted tools.⁴⁰ The duties of competence, confidentiality, supervision, candor to the tribunal, and reasonable fee practices remain the responsibility of the lawyer.⁴¹ Lawyers must independently review and verify AI-generated outputs before relying on them in legal work and must take care to avoid entering confidential client information into publicly accessible AI systems.⁴² 

The opinion further encourages law firms to implement internal policies and supervisory measures governing the use of AI.⁴³ In addition, lawyers must ensure that court filings contain verified legal authority and may need to disclose the use of AI to clients when it materially affects legal strategy, confidentiality, or costs.⁴⁴ 

In essence, once again, the responsibility for the final legal work product rests with the lawyer — not with the AI system — and lawyers remain accountable for verifying the accuracy and integrity of any AI-assisted work.

Judicial AI misuse 

A recent Bloomberg Law article reported that two federal judges issued erroneous rulings after chambers staff used generative AI tools without adequate review.⁴⁵ While these incidents sparked concern about judicial oversight, their relevance to Missouri lawyers lies elsewhere: They reinforce that accountability follows authority.⁴⁶ Just as judges remain responsible for opinions issued under their names, Missouri lawyers remain responsible for filings submitted under theirs. 

Considering AI in practice 

Proper training 

While AI-assisted tools continue to be developed, they are not infallible. Law firms should provide training to their lawyer and nonlawyer employees about the ethical and practical considerations to be made regarding the use of AI. Law firms should also establish clear policies regarding permissible uses of AI. 

Lawyers must familiarize themselves with the extent of the capabilities and limits of the AI-assisted tools. Just as law students and lawyers traditionally underwent training for Westlaw and LexisNexis, they should similarly undergo training for each AI-assisted tool they intend to deploy. A lawyer should be able to understand and articulate the mechanism an AI tool uses in its analysis, especially when that analysis influences an important strategic decision. 

Beyond attending vendor-led trainings, lawyers should independently explore and test AI-assisted tools to ensure they can fulfill their intended purposes. For example, a lawyer may ask an AI-assisted tool to review and summarize an email or contract the lawyer has already reviewed before deploying the tool more widely. 

Confidentiality

Lawyers must ensure that AI-assisted tools preserve the confidentiality of the information — both client confidentiality and any information marked as confidential through a protective order or similar mechanism. Under Missouri law, lawyers must make reasonable efforts to protect client information. In the context of AI, law firms and lawyers should ensure all AI systems used are “closed,” meaning the systems store information in protected databases. Law firms should consult with IT or cybersecurity professionals to assess risks associated with security, data privacy, and unauthorized data retention. Lawyers should review applicable terms of use for each platform to assess the risk of unauthorized disclosure. 

Lawyers should further advise their clients regarding the use, risks, and benefits of AI before obtaining informed consent from the client if necessary. 

Supervision 

All work products generated with AI assistance should be independently reviewed and verified by a lawyer before the work product is used in client matters. As numerous case law and anecdotal examples demonstrate, AI is not infallible. Lawyers should scrutinize all AI-generated work product for accuracy, bias, and thoroughness and correct any deficiencies. 

Over-reliance 

Lawyers should not over-rely on AI-assisted tools for tasks such as legal research, contract analysis, or predictive capabilities. Instead, lawyers should assess case needs, client goals, varying strategies, possible outcomes, and risks to make an informed decision regarding the best use of AI to supplement the lawyer’s own analysis rather than replace it. 

Looking ahead: Practical and ethical implications for Missouri lawyers 

Missouri is entering a phase of normalization of AI usage coupled with heightened accountability. AI will remain embedded in legal practice, but tolerance for careless or unsupervised use is rapidly disappearing. For Missouri practitioners, the road map is clear. 

First, courts are increasingly unwilling to accept ignorance, delegation, or automation as excuses for inaccurate filings. Therefore, verification must become routine. Missouri lawyers should assume courts will expect every citation, quotation, and legal proposition — whether AI-assisted or not — to be independently confirmed. This expectation is not merely aspirational, it is increasingly being enforced, and the risk of sanctions is real. As Kruse and Moore demonstrate, courts are expanding sanctions beyond monetary penalties and are willing to dismiss cases, strike filings, and impose prospective restrictions when AI misuse results in false authority or misrepresentations of the law. 

Second, law firms must address supervision explicitly. Verification obligations apply regardless of who uses the AI — lawyer, intern, nonlawyer assistant, or law clerk. Informal Opinion 2024-11 makes clear that partners and managers bear responsibility for ensuring that lawyers and nonlawyers understand appropriate AI use. 

Third, confidentiality analysis is essential. Missouri lawyers must scrutinize AI platform terms of service and data-handling practices, particularly where client information is involved. 

Finally, Missouri lawyers should resist the false choice between innovation and ethics. Banning AI outright is neither realistic nor desirable. The ethical path forward is informed, careful, and accountable use. 

Looking forward, Missouri courts may consider whether to formalize AI practices through standing orders, appellate rules, or administrative guidance, particularly as federal courts experiment with disclosure and certification requirements. Even absent such rules, Missouri’s existing Rules of Professional Conduct and Missouri Informal Opinion 2024-11 already supply a workable ethical framework: Educate yourself on the technology, safeguard confidentiality, supervise its use, verify its output, and never abdicate professional judgment. 

Generative AI does not change the lawyer’s role as gatekeeper, advocate, and officer of the court. It amplifies that role. It is a powerful tool that magnifies both competence and carelessness. For Missouri lawyers, the ethical question is not whether AI will be used, but whether it will be used in a way that preserves the competence, candor, and integrity of the profession.⁴⁷

Endnotes 
1 What are AI Hallucinations?, Google Cloud, https://cloud.google.com/discover/what-are-ai-hallucinations (last visited Dec. 30, 2025). 
2 Moore v. City of Del City, No. 25-6002, 2025 WL 3471341, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025); see also Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc., 348 F.R.D. 489, 497 (D. Wyo. 2025) (“It is ... well-known in the legal community that AI resources generate fake cases.”). 
3 Daniel Wu, Lawyers Using AI Keep Citing Fake Cases in Court. Judges Aren’t Happy, WASH. POST (June 3, 2025), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2025/06/03/attorneys-court-ai-hallucinations-judges/. 
4 MO. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 4-1.1 cmt. [6] (2025). 
5 Id.
6 MO. INFORMAL OP. 2024-11. 
7 MO. INFORMAL OP. 2024-11, supra note 4. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id.; MO. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 4-1.1. 
11 Id.; MO. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 4-1.6. 
12 Id.; MO. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 4-3.3. 
13 Id.; MO. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 4-5.1 and 4-5.3. 
14 MO. INFORMAL OP. 2024-11, supra note 4. 
15 AI Non-Sentience and Responsibility Act, H.B. 1462, 101st Gen. Assemb., Mo. (2025), available at https://legiscan.com/MO/text/HB1462/id/3141592 (last visited Mar. 16, 2026). 
16 Kruse v. Karlen, 692 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024), reh’g and/or transfer denied (Apr. 9, 2024). 
17 Id. at 53–54. 
18 Id.
19 MO. INFORMAL OP. 2024-11, supra note 4.
20 Requirements, Hon. Joshua M. Divine, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E.D. Mo. (revised August 2025), available at https://www.moep.uscourts.gov/judge/joshua-m-divine. 
21 See Guidance for Self-Represented Litigants on the Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence (United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri), available at https://www. moed.uscourts.gov/self-represented-litigants-srl. 
22 U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Kan., Standing Order No. 26-01 (2026), available at https://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/news/notice-proposed-amendment-local-rules-issuance-so-26-01-and-changes-form-protective-order (last visited Mar. 16, 2026). 
23 Doc. 218, Memorandum and Order, at 1, Overstock.com, Inc. v. Lexos Media IP, LLC, No. 2:22-cv-02324-JAR-ADM (D. Kan. Feb. 2, 2026).
24 Id. at 35–36. 
25 Id. at 20–21. 
26 Id. at 19–21. 
27 Id. at 26–28.
28 25-6002 (10th Cir. Dec. 03, 2025).
29 Moore, 2025 WL 3471341, at *3, supra note 5. 
30 Id. at *2.
31 Id. at *3.
32 MO. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT R. 4-3.1.
33 Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 Fed. Supp. 3d 443, 451–52, 465–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 461–62 (explaining that fabricated authorities generated by AI cannot constitute "existing law” for purposes of Rule 11); see also Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc., 348 F.R.D. 489, 493 (D. Wyo. 2025) (sanctioning attorneys under Rule 11 for filing a motion that cited multiple nonexistent cases generated by AI). 
36 Fletcher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 25-20086, 2026 WL 456842, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 2026). 
37 Id. at *5–6. 
38 Lifetime Well, LLC v. Ibspot.com, Inc., No. 23-cv-02203, 2026 WL 195644, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2026). 
39 Id. at *4–5. 
40 See ABA Formal Op. 512 (2024). 
41 Id. at 2–4, 7–10 (2024). 
42 Id. at 5–6. 
43 Id. at 10. 
44 Id. at 7–9. 
45 Justin Henry, Judges Admit to Using AI After MadeUp Rulings Called Out, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 23, 2025), https://news.bloomberglaw. com/business-and-practice/judges-called-out-for-nonfactual-rulings-admit-to-use-of-ai.
46 Stephen Gillers (Prof., NYU Law), quoted in Judges Admit to Using AI After MadeUp Rulings Called Out, BLOOMBERG LAW, supra note 47 (discussing the need for judges and lawyers to verify AI-generated citations); For additional insights regarding AI in this context of judicial engagement, see generally Anika Jaitley, Daniel W. Linna Jr., Hon. Xavier Rodriguez, V.S. Subrahmanian & Siyu Tao, Artificial Intelligence in Federal Courts: A Random-Sample Survey of Judges, 27 SEDONA CONF. J. __ (forthcoming 2026). 
47 See generally New York State Bar Association, Report and Recommendations of the New York State Bar Association Task Force on Artificial Intelligence (April 2024). “Among the many comments and insights offered in connection with the New York State Bar Association Task Force on Artificial Intelligence, the conclusion is instructive in the insights provided. This report offers no “conclusions.” As AI continues to evolve, so will the work of NYSBA and the groups tasked with ongoing monitoring. As a profession, lawyers and judges must continue to refine the initial guidelines suggested in this report and audit the efficacy of proposed rules and regulations. Legal professionals are encouraged to liken this journey to the mindset of ancient explorers: Be cautious, be curious, be vigilant, and be brave.”

Genna Tlustos is the assistant editor of the Journal of The Missouri Bar.

For 30 years, The Missouri Bar Solo & Small Firm Conference has brought together lawyers from across the state to learn new skills, make connections, and receive important legal updates. 

After the second MOSOLO Small Firm Conference, an article from the July 1997 “Missouri Bar Bulletin” stated that there was “anticipation in the air on June 5, 6, and 7 at the Lodge of the Four Seasons at the Lake of the Ozarks. Was it really possible to duplicate the success of last year’s Missouri Bar Solo and Small Firm Conference?” 

The answer that year, and every year since, has been a resounding “yes.” Each summer, hundreds of Missouri lawyers have returned or come for the first time to experience what MOSOLO has to offer. 

This year’s MOSOLO Small Firm Conference is June 11-13 at Margaritaville Lake Resort in Osage Beach, and a virtual option will be held June 24-26. At just one conference, Missouri lawyers can fulfill all 15 MCLE hours for the reporting year. This year, attendees are participating in a workshop that will enhance their observation, perception, and communication skills, along with sessions about expungement, preservation, voir dire, and more. 

“Most CLEs for this many hours are far more expensive, and they don’t include networking, mentorship, or the opportunity to attend classes in shorts,” said Cassie Bugalski, chair of the Solo and Small Firm Committee. 

The 30th anniversary and the number of attendees each year show how important solo and small firms are to the legal profession, said Bugalski, managing member at Gump, Faiella & Bugalski, LLC in Moberly and Columbia. In rural areas, solo and small firms are essential in providing communities with legal services.

Some lawyers have come since MOSOLO’s inception in 1996 and are now bringing their associates, children, and other young lawyers, she said. 

“The legacy of mentorship created by this conference has proven to be invaluable,” Bugalski said. 

David Macoubrie, a Chillicothe lawyer with Cleaveland, Macoubrie and Cox, LLC, said he was on the planning committee of the first MOSOLO Conference in 1996. He enjoys the camaraderie of Missouri Bar conferences and said that getting involved in the bar helps you become a better lawyer and positively influence others. 

“I think we owe it to ourselves and to other lawyers to get involved, and you’ll be surprised, you might be able to contribute something,” Macoubrie said. “… Everywhere I go, I learn something. And also, I probably teach something at the same time.” 

These conferences can help lawyers discover that they are not the first to have experienced a particular situation or issue. They can discuss how they approached those problems with other lawyers, he said.

For Bugalski, networking at MOSOLO has bettered her and her law firm. 

“Being able to tell a client that you don’t practice in an area when they need help can be frustrating, but because of (MOSOLO), I can say, ‘But I know someone who will take care of you. Let’s give them a call,’” said Bugalski, who has attended the conference for eight years. “To see their faces soften and their load lighten because you’re able to continue to take care of them with referrals to good people with the same client care is pretty powerful.” 

Bugalski said she comes back to MOSOLO each year to continue interacting with lawyers who have the common goal of treating clients with the utmost dignity and respect while making their businesses the best they can be, in the good times and the tough times. 

This year, Bugalski said she hopes participants see the value of personal interactions and connections, expanding their knowledge together while having some relaxation and fun. 

Register for the in-person or virtual MOSOLO Small Firm Conference at MoBarCLE.org. 

Scroll through the carousel at the top of this page to view MOSOLO photos from the last 30 years!

Want to help Missourians better understand how our courts work, what The Missouri Plan is, and how the judicial retention process works? Join The Missouri Bar’s Education Outreach Network and serve as a leader by helping to inform your community. Learn more at MoBar.org/EducationOutreach.

Tell us: What do new lawyers need to thrive?

The 2025-2026 Missouri Bar Leadership Academy class is inviting lawyers who have been practicing for 10 years or less to take a brief survey (10 minutes or less) that dives into their needs, wants, and perceptions of The Missouri Bar. 

Your perspective will help guide the class as it creates recommendations for how The Missouri Bar can even better support lawyers now and moving forward in a relevant, timely, and impactful way. 
Take the survey at MoBar.org/Shape-Missouri-Bar. The survey will remain open until July 13.

Learn from nationally recognized speakers at Missouri’s premier DWI seminar 

From the essentials new lawyers need to know to navigate their first DWI cases to advanced techniques and case law updates for veteran practitioners, the Bernard Edelman DWI Law & Science Seminar will help Missouri lawyers sharpen their skills. 

The conference will be July 23-24 in Lake Ozark. Register at MoBarCLE.org by June 24 to save $55 on registration.

MoBar memory 

Law school graduates were sworn in and received their law licenses in ceremonies before the Supreme Court of Missouri on Oct. 18, 1987.

The Missouri Bar is here to help protect your law practice during disasters 

If disaster struck tomorrow, would your firm be prepared? Find checklists to help you stay vigilant against fires, floods, and other events in the bar’s Law Practice Management Center. Visit MoBar.org/LPM for more resources.

Tech tip: end-of-day wind-down ritual 

The American Bar Association estimates that lawyers receive an average of 120 emails per day. With such a large volume of emails to sift through, organization becomes critical. In addition to moving emails into designated folders, Google’s Gmail and Microsoft’s Outlook offer ways to color-code emails by applying multiple “categories” or “labels” to them. This allows you to organize using the best of both methods, helping you respond to emails from clients, colleagues, and opposing counsel in a timely manner.

Save the date

MCLE deadlines: Complete hours by June 30 and file by June 31 | MoBar.org/MCLE
The Missouri Bar Board of Governors meeting: July 17 | Camdenton 
Family Law Conference: Aug. 20-22 | Branson 
Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar: Sept. 16-18 | Kansas City
For more information, visit MoBar.org.

To submit an obituary, please complete the form at MoBar.org/in-memoriam. We will not print a notice unless a copy of the death certificate or obituary is submitted.

John Henry Altergott Jr., age 86, of Kansas City, on Oct. 10, 2024. Altergott graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1961. He was a litigator and legal mediator. He served in the U.S. Army Reserves. 

James T. Ausmus Sr., age 88, of Centralia, on March 9, 2026. Ausmus graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1962. He practiced in Centralia for over 60 years and was general counsel for the A.B. Chance Company. He was the city attorney for Centralia and Sturgeon and maintained a private practice. Ausmus served in the U.S. Army. 

Hon. Rollie Richard Baldwin, age 94, of Kansas City, on Feb. 10, 2026. Baldwin graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1959. Baldwin was elected Clay County probate judge and served more than 25 years in the Clay County Circuit Court. He served in the U.S. Army. 

David Lee Blunt, age 73, of Edwardsville, Illinois, on Feb. 1, 2026. Blunt was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1984. He founded his own law firm in Edwardsville and represented thousands of railroad workers and their families. 

Frank Dean Colaw, age 69, of Chesterfield, on Jan. 7, 2024. Colaw graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1981. He worked for McDonnell Douglas Aerospace as a corporate lawyer in Missouri until he was transferred to its California location. He worked as a corporate lawyer and director of finance for the Boeing Company. 

Hon. William M. Corrigan, age 93, of Ballwin, on Dec. 5, 2025. Corrigan graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1955. Corrigan was a circuit judge in St. Louis County, a United States bankruptcy judge, a partner in a law firm specializing in plaintiff litigation, and a member of a firm specializing in defense litigation. He was vice president of the Bar Association of Metropolitan St. Louis. He served in the U.S. Army.

John David “Dave” Croessmann, age 75, of Battlefield, on March 29, 2024. Croessmann graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1977. He practiced business law in Springfield. 

Kaitlynn Marie Donnelly, age 37, of Platte City, on Feb. 17, 2026. Donnelly graduated from the University of Toledo Law School and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2014. She worked as an assistant public defender for the Missouri State Public Defender’s Office in Kirksville. In 2016, she began working as an assistant prosecuting attorney with the Platte County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office. In 2025, she received The Missouri Bar Foundation’s Lon O. Hocker Award for outstanding trial work. 

Robert “Bob” Nicoll Feldmann, age 79, of St. Louis, on April 15, 2026. Feldmann was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1974. 

Arthur Edward Fillmore II, age 79, of Kansas City, on Feb. 22, 2026. He graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1975. He practiced law for 50 years in Kansas City. Fillmore served in the U.S. Army. 

Arthur Friedman, age 90, of St. Louis, on Nov. 22, 2025. Friedman was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1961. 

Margaret Ellen Gangle-Casinger, age 74, of St. Clair, on Oct. 21, 2024. Gangle-Casinger was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1983 and worked in the St. Louis City Juvenile Court for over 20 years. 

Charles “Charlie” Curtis Hatley, age 95, of Cape Girardeau, on Feb. 13, 2026. Hatley graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1958. He practiced law in New Madrid for almost 63 years. He spent most of those years in general practice and was a Missouri assistant attorney general. Hatley served in the U.S. Marine Corps. 

John Michael Herries, age 38, of Springfield, on Sept. 14, 2025. Herries was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2014. 

William Keller “Bill” Hoskins, age 89, of Natick, Massachusetts, on Feb. 5, 2025. Hoskins graduated from Harvard Law School and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1983. He moved to Cincinnati, Ohio, and joined the Frost and Jacobs Law Firm. He was general counsel for the Drackett Company, then associate general counsel of Bristol-Meyers. Hoskins then was general counsel for Marion Laboratories in Kansas City. In 2001, he formed Resolution Strategies. Hoskins served in the U.S. Navy. 

George Winton Huston, age 88, of Kansas City, on Oct. 14, 2025. Huston graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1972. He was a corporate lawyer for General Motors, then opened his own law practice. Huston served in the U.S. Army and U.S. Army Reserves. 

William Bruce Kopper, age 91, of Colorado Springs, Colorado, on Nov. 13, 2025. Kopper graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1959. He joined the legal department of the Frisco Railroad, then became legal counsel for Golden Cycle Corp. in Colorado Springs. He returned to general practice for a decade, then expanded his practice to include Kopper Investment Management. 

Robert Royden Laing Jr., age 67, of Bonner Springs, Kansas, on March 9, 2026. Laing graduated from the Washburn University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1984. He earned a masters in tax law from the Southern Methodist University School of Law. He practiced law in a range of areas, including family law, business and corporate law, and more. 

Tracy Mathis, age 72, of St. Louis, on March 6, 2026. Mathis was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1982. She was a lawyer at Lewis Rice and practiced in health law. She was a founding director of the St. Louis Area Health Lawyers Association and she was a director and legal counsel for Youth In Need. 

Susanna Renee McCrimmons, age 45, of Springfield, on Feb. 15, 2026. McCrimmons graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2008. McCrimmons began her career in the Attorney General’s Office, then worked for the Greene County Public Administrator’s Office. She worked for Smith-Montgomery Law, Springfield Law Group, and Ozarks Family Law before starting her own practice. 

Hon. B.L. Paul McGhee, age 100, of Dexter, on Feb. 25, 2026. McGhee graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1949. He was a Missouri assistant attorney general, a Stoddard County Probate Court judge, Stoddard County prosecuting attorney, Dexter city attorney, Circuit Court of Stoddard County associate judge, senior circuit judge of Missouri, and president of the Missouri Association of Prosecuting Attorneys. He also had a private practice in Stoddard County. McGhee served in the U.S. Navy. 

Mark D. Mittleman, age 78, of St. Louis, on Dec. 16, 2024. Mittleman graduated from the University of Virginia School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1972. He worked for the Missouri Attorney General’s Office, then joined a St. Louis law firm. He formed his own legal practice in Clayton. 

Stephen Joseph Nangle, age 76, of St. Louis, on March 3, 2026. Nangle graduated from the University of Denver College of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1974. His legal career spanned five decades. 

John S. “Jack” Pletz, age 81, of Jefferson City, on April 17, 2025. Pletz graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1976. Pletz was legal counsel and executive director for the Missouri Elections Commission. He also was deputy secretary of state for Missouri. He transitioned to private practice with Bartlett, Venters, Pletz and Toppins, P.C., then co-founded what would become Pletz and Reed, P.C. He was also legal counsel to the Jefferson City Housing Authority. He served in the U.S. Air Force. 

Robert Lee Proost, age 88, of St. Louis, on March 3, 2026. Proost was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1962. 

Peter Jerome Salm, age 91, of Sarasota, Florida, on April 7, 2025. He graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1974. He worked as a trial lawyer, then supervising trial lawyer, for the National Labor Relations Board. In 1979, he transferred to the NLRB’s Tampa, Florida, office. Salm served in the U.S. Army. 

Larry Gordon Shockley, age 82, of Lorton, Virginia, on Jan. 29, 2026. Shockley graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1967. He served in the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General’s Corps. He worked in legislative affairs for the U.S. Air Force and was vice president for government relations at the Parsons Corporation. 

Sally Irene Slipian, age 70, of St. Louis, on March 25, 2026. Slipian was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1980. 

Donald Lee Slyter, age 93, of Kansas City, on April 15, 2025. Slyter was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1962. 

Harry Leitch Strachan III, age 84, of Chesterfield, on April 27, 2025. Strachan graduated from Rutgers University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1974. He served in the U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps. He worked in St. Louis for the Federal Strike Force. Strachan then worked in corporate law at 7UP and Energizer. 

Leonard Swade, age 94, of Windsor, Connecticut, on Dec. 13, 2025. Swade graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1956. He was a lawyer with Tidewater Oil, then Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance. Swade served in the U.S. Army. 

Hon. Theodore M. Tahan Sr., age 95, of St. Louis, on Feb. 10, 2026. Tahan graduated from the Boston University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1968. Tahan worked in Washington, D.C. before moving to St. Louis. He served as a federal administrative law judge and was a corporate executive before starting a law practice. He served in the U.S. military. 

Eugene “Gene” Barry Weisman, age 91, of St. Louis, on March 7, 2026. Weisman was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1960 and had a decades-long career as a lawyer. He served in the U.S. Army. 

John Masters Williams, age 78, of Farmington, on March 8, 2026. He graduated from the Samford University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1974. He practiced for 51 years. 

Hubert Bernard Willman, age 92, of Spring, Texas, on Feb. 2, 2026. Willman graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1962. He also studied tax law at New York University School of Law. He served in executive roles at North American Rockwell, Commercial Credit, 7UP, and Genstar Corporation. He became vice president, general counsel, and secretary at ComputerLand Corp. He helped launch Martin Wolf Securities, where he was vice president and chief financial officer. Willman served in the U.S. Navy.

Editor's note, 7/1/2026: Sally Slipian's tribute in “In Memoriam” has been updated due to discrepancies.

Editor’s note: The applicants who passed the bar examination but had not yet completed all other requirements for admission are not included in this list, which the Missouri Board of Law Examiners originally published on April 8, 2026. Read more about the admission requirements under Rule 8 at MBLE.org.

Courtney Alesia Adkins 
Kimberly Dyane Alexis 
Mohammad Haitham Alkhatib 
Marian Amlalo 
Anika Karina Andersen 
Andrew Lee Apple 
Emily Clark Arauz 
Tiara Delane Arties 
Andrea Baca 
Gerren Keith Banks 
Bridget L. Beran-Netemeyer 
Jason Brent Boyd 
Shayna Leann Brazeal 
Jacob Bryan 
Charlene Roxanne Burton 
Hannah McClaigh Byassee 
Allison Rose Cichocki 
Klara Marie Cockrell 
Isabella Maclyn Crutchfield 
Kyle DiBernardo 
Andrew Michael Dincher 
Sarah Kay Dowler
Derricka Deshawn Drake 
Justin Thomas Dussold 
Jessica Ventura Esguerra 
Taylor Marie Flemons 
Bret A. Hart 
Gabriel Hawi 
John Daniel Herrman 
Teneisha Herron 
Annaleigh Thiessen Hobbs 
Andrew Hodges 
Alison Carrol Huff 
William N. Hurt 
Tara Ilges 
Latorrie Johnson 
Courtney Maurice Jordan 
Zoya Khan
Rene Lelesi Kina 
Clayton T. Larue 
Lauren Catherine Laughlin 
Jennifer Beatty Long 
Maria Manikatos 
Elizabeth McDowell Carpinone 
William Robert McIntyre 
Taylor Johna Bryana Meador 
Julie Von Meglan 
Chaz Michael Mercer 
Corey Ray Myers
Evelyn Nelson 
Kendal Margaret Nilges 
Winifred Nwaokolo 
Sarah Oldfather 
Allison Anne Paglisotti 
Deyanira Parra Lugo 
Faith Suzanne Pelton 
Vincent Anthony Pistone 
Amanda Poe 
Christine Rubai Sagwa 
Tyler Harris Syed Shah 
Alex Neil Smoller 
Clayton Williams Speidel 
Alexander True 
Lizeth Anahy Vargas 
Isabella Marie Villegas 
Katelyn Madison Wall 
Victoria Ann Weitkamp 
Adeli Maria Bonita Wickham 
Fletcher Wilson 
Thomas Andrew Wolff

In contemporary legal practice, Missouri lawyers across a wide range of disciplines increasingly encounter transactions, planning matters, and disputes that implicate § 1031 deferral rules and Delaware Statutory Trust investment structures. In the latest Journal, author Benjamin Newhouse explains the basics of § 1031 exchanges, the structure and advantages of DSTs, important legal considerations, and best practices for advising clients.

For the last 85 years, Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan has continued its tradition of attracting high-quality judges in the least political way, ultimately giving the people the final say. Commonly known as The Missouri Plan, it aims to select judges based on merit, not politics or popularity, and keep the selection process transparent and open to the public. Learn more about the plan's history, how it works, and why it continues to be right for Missouri in this article.

AI is powerful, but it is not magical. Like any other tool in your firm, AI can help or hurt depending on how — and where — Missouri lawyers use it. Learn how you can leverage AI effectively in certain situations, with minimal risks and maximum results, so you can even better serve your clients.

A quick, specific “thank you” can do more than brighten someone’s day. It can strengthen Missouri lawyers’ sense of purpose and motivate them to continue practicing at their best. Read more about the power of gratitude in the legal profession and download a gratitude gram .

Download and read the full Journal here.

"If a task will take you five minutes or less, do it right away. Even if it is something small, like scheduling a doctor’s appointment, etc., not having it on your mind or to-do list will free up energy that you can dedicate to something more substantial.”
- Vanessa Starke, owner/attorney at Starke Law Offices, LLC in Blue Springs

“Be early for every single court date or deposition, etc. Being on time is being late. I learned it in the military.”
- Mark Rudder, member at Law Office of Mark Rudder in St. Louis

“On the first day of orientation at Saint Louis University School of Law, a professor told us that our legal careers had already begun. She asked us to look at the people sitting on either side of us and reminded us that they would one day be our colleagues. She also shared a piece of advice I’ve carried with me ever since: It takes years to build a reputation for integrity, and only one poor decision to damage it. That perspective shaped how I approach every professional interaction. It instilled in me the habit of pausing to consider the long-term impact of my words and actions — and to consistently choose integrity, even when no one is watching.”
- Joy Holley, director of legal operations at Ameren Services Company in St. Louis

“Return all calls within 24 hours.”
- Jeanne Foster, Jeanne Foster LLC in Independence

“Return phone calls from clients and opposing counsel the same day, if possible. For clients, it builds good relations and customer satisfaction (an important factor in client word-of-mouth referrals). For counsel, it expedites progress on case management and makes counsel feel that you are taking the interaction seriously and not being disrespectful.”
- Kathleen Bird, retired lawyer in Smithville

“Never put off till tomorrow what you can do today for tomorrow will bring its own deluge of things to be handled. A corollary, big projects need to be timely calendared/scheduled for specific dates and times and then removed from your desk so that they do not act like weights dragging you under.”
- Hurley D. Mahan, lawyer at The Hurley D. Mahan Law Office, LLC in Clinton

We were wondering ... What’s an underrated skill in the legal profession, and why? … Share your answer by emailing Journal@MoBar.org or filling out a form at MoBar.org/Closing-Statements.

W. Dudley McCarter, a former president of The Missouri Bar, is a partner in the St. Louis law firm of Behr, McCarter, Neely & Gabris.

Court did not err in partitioning property among siblings 

Blaylock v. Blaylock, 715 S.W.3d 206 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). 

Plaintiffs Thomas and Martha Blaylock appealed the circuit court’s judgment partitioning in-kind real property that Thomas Blaylock and his three siblings, the defendants, inherited from their mother’s estate. The Blaylocks argued that dividing the property in kind instead of ordering that all the property be sold and the proceeds be distributed resulted in “great prejudice to them.”¹ The Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District affirmed the circuit court’s judgment.² 

Under Supreme Court of Missouri Rule 96.08, it is up to the court to determine the parties’ interests and order partition in kind or by sale of the land. Courts generally favor a partition in kind over partition by sale “unless it would result in great prejudice to the owners.”³ To decide whether a great prejudice would exist, the courts must determine “whether or not the value of the share of each, after partition, would be materially less than the share of the money equivalent that each could probably obtain from the whole.”⁴

The Court of Appeals ruled:

The evidence shows the court carefully considered the physical characteristics of the property and the differences in value in determining that partition in kind, with an owelty awarded to Plaintiffs, was appropriate and would not result in great prejudice to the parties.⁵

Evidence of cocaine use was not abuse of discretion 

Midwest Tr. Co. v. United Parcel Serv., Nos. WD86697, WD87624 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). 

Following a jury trial, the United Parcel Service, Inc. appealed a judgment awarding compensatory damages on a negligence claim for in utero injuries to K.P., who sustained fetal brain damage in a car wreck involving a UPS delivery truck driven by Steven Miller.⁶ K.P. was born with severe neurological impairments seven months after the wreck.⁷ UPS argued the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of Miller’s history of cocaine use. The Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District affirmed the judgment.⁸ 

UPS accepted responsibility for Miller causing the car wreck while driving a company vehicle.⁹ At trial, UPS objected to evidence of Miller’s history of cocaine use as “irrelevant and highly prejudicial” because (1) UPS had admitted responsibility for Miller’s conduct, and (2) there was no “credible evidence” that he was under the influence of drugs at the time of the wreck.¹⁰ 

Under the general rule of McHaffie v. Bunch,¹¹ UPS argued that once it accepted respondeat superior liability, Midwest Trust Co., the conservator and next of friend of K.P., could not pursue any other claims of imputed negligence for Miller’s conduct. However, McHaffie recognized an exception to the general rule in cases where the employer may be liable for punitive damages that would not be assessed against the employee.¹² 

Midwest asserted claims for punitive damages that fell within that exception, and therefore the circuit court allowed submission of the additional claim for negligent entrustment of the UPS vehicle and evidence that would support a punitive damages award based on Miller’s drug use.¹³

The jury found that drug use was not a factor in the wreck and denied relief for alleged misconduct under the negligent entrustment and punitive damages claims.¹⁴ The Court of Appeals later ruled, “The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence as it was logically and legally relevant to the negligent entrustment and punitive damage claims, regardless of the jury’s ultimate decision.”¹⁵ 

Trial court did not err in applying multiplier to attorneys’ fees 

Petifurd v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., No. WD87416 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). 

The Missouri Department of Corrections appealed the judgment in favor of former employee Danny Petifurd on his claim of retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act. The DOC argued the trial court erred by applying a 1.5 multiplier to calculate attorneys’ fees awarded to Petifurd. The Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District affirmed the ruling.¹⁶ 

The DOC claimed the trial court erred by applying a 1.5 multiplier because the court considered the contingent nature of the case when determining the lodestar amount and again when evaluating the necessity of applying a multiplier. 

The trial court has discretion to award reasonable attorneys’ fees, but there are factors that it may consider to determine the amount, including:

1) the rates customarily charged by the attorneys involved in the case and by other attorneys in the community for similar services; 2) the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation; 3) the nature and character of the services rendered; 4) the degree of professional ability required; 5) the nature and importance of the subject matter; 6) the amount involved or the result obtained; and 7) the vigor of the opposition.¹⁷

The Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District ruled:

Even if the trial court did duplicate its consideration of the contingent nature of the representation, we decline to find that the court abused its discretion in applying a 1.5 multiplier to the lodestar amount where other non-duplicative factors supported use of the multiplier.¹⁸

Expert testimony unnecessary in private nuisance action 

Neighborhood Legal Support of Kansas City v. Ontman, 717 S.W.3d 600 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). 

Robert Ontman appealed the judgment in favor of Neighborhood Legal Support of Kansas City’s claim requiring Ontman to take actions to abate a nuisance. Otman claimed (1) NLS lacked standing to bring its nuisance suit and (2) nonexpert opinion testimony should not have been allowed in the case.¹⁹ 

Under § 82.1025.2, RSMo, any person or entity who owns property within 1,200 feet of the alleged nuisance property can file a civil nuisance action. The trial court found that since NLS owns property within 1,200 feet of Ontman’s property, it had standing to bring the suit.²⁰ 

Ontman also argued the trial court erroneously allowed nonexpert opinion testimony regarding the property’s nuisance conditions, asserting that only an expert’s testimony can establish a nuisance condition. The Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District disagreed, stating the code violations documented in NLS’ photographs are “so glaring and obvious that a person without any specialized training can readily identify them by looking at the photos, rendering expert testimony unnecessary in this particular case.”²¹ 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, noting:

The trial court did not err in allowing lay witnesses to testify regarding the clear and unmistakable code violations depicted by the photographs, which constituted sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the property qualified as the sort of nuisance contemplated by section 82.1025.

Endnotes
1 Blaylock v. Blaylock, 715 S.W.3d 206, 1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).
2 Id.
3 Von Behren v. Oberg, 902 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. App. 1995).
4 Id.
5 Blaylock, 715 S.W.3d at 11-12.
6 Midwest Tr. Co. v. United Parcel Serv., Nos. WD86697, WD87624 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 3.
11 891 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Mo. banc 1995).
12 Id. at 826.
13 Midwest, Nos. WD86697, WD87624 at 7. See also Wilson v. Image Flooring, LLC, 400 S.W.3d 386, 393 (Mo. App. 2013).
14 Midwest, Nos. WD86697, WD87624 at 9. 
15 Id. 
16 Petifurd v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., No WD87416 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). 
17 Berry v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., 397 S.W.3d 425, 431 (Mo. banc 2013). 
18 Petifurd, No. WD87416 at 19. 
19 Neighborhood Legal Support of Kansas City v. Ontman, 717 S.W.3d 600 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). 
20 Id. 
21 Id.; See also Stone v. Mo. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 350 S.W.3d 14, 22 (Mo. banc 2011) (“If the fact at issue is ‘open to the senses,’ the option of [a] lay witness is admissible.” (quoting Beuttenmuller v. Vess Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 447 S.W.2d 519, 526 (Mo. 1969))).

Scott E. Vincent is the founding member of Vincent Law, LLC in Kansas City.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland recently found that a lawyer acting as director, president, and treasurer of a client’s investment corporation was personally liable for the corporation’s tax liabilities,¹ showcasing the significant risk lawyers should consider when acting as a director and officer of a client business entity. 

Background 

Isaac Neuberger was a principal in a Baltimore law firm and represented Michael Konig and other Konig family members for many years. In 2001, Neuberger formed Lehcim Holdings, Inc. for the family to utilize as an investment company. Neuberger was Lehcim’s sole director, president, and treasurer. 

Lehcim engaged in a variety of lending transactions with other Konig family business entities, including a series of loans of more than $8 million from Nightingale Ventures, Ltd. Neuberger was also the director of Nightingale from 2002-2009. Lehcim claimed substantial tax deductions for 2010-2020 for interest accruing on these loans from Nightingale. 

The IRS determined on audit that the Nightingale loans were not bona fide debt and disallowed the Lehcim interest expense deductions. In 2019, the IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency for more than $1.4 million in unpaid taxes and penalties, and it followed in November 2020 with the issuance of a Final Notice of Intent to Levy for more than $2 million. 

Neuberger and his firm outlined a complex plan for collection of Lehcim receivables and repayment of the Nightingale loans that was to involve money transfers among multiple companies. Konig was tasked with implementing the plan. This plan was completed in 2019 and 2020, resulting in more than $8.8 million in payments from Lehcim to Nightingale. 

In 2020, Neuberger, as Lehcim’s president, submitted a Form 433-B, Collection Information Statement for Businesses, to the IRS for Lehcim, showing assets substantially less than its liabilities. The IRS pursued collection efforts against Lehcim and issued Notices of Levy to Neuberger’s firm and related Konig entities, but the IRS did not receive funds from those sources. 

In 2022, the United States sued Neuberger under the Federal Priority Statute,² seeking a judgment that Neuberger was personally liable for Lehcim’s tax liabilities. An IRS expert determined that Lehcim was insolvent at the time each of the payments in question was made from Lehcim to Nightingale. 

District court decisions 

The district court issued decisions in 2025 and 2026 in this case. In the 2025 decision, the court addressed the elements for applicability of the Federal Priority Statute: (1) a debt due the United States, (2) the debtor’s insolvency, and (3) a triggering event under the statute such as a bankruptcy or assignment for the benefit of creditors. The court also addressed Neuberger’s representative liability.

First the court cited prior authority for the conclusion that a federal tax debt is clearly a claim of the United States under the statute. The court agreed with the IRS expert that Lehcim was insolvent before each of the transfers to Nightingale. The court rejected Neuberger's argument that the government could not take the position that the Nightingale loans were not bona fide liabilities for tax assessment purposes, but alternatively treat the loans as liabilities for purposes of Lehcim’s solvency. The court noted that IRS disallowance of the Nightingale loan interest deductions was not the applicable test for whether to include this debt for insolvency purposes. 

The court then found that the transfers of more than $8.8 million by Nightingale, regardless of character, were preferential transfers akin to bankruptcy and were made when Lehcim was insolvent, satisfying the triggering event requirement for purposes of the Federal Priority Statute. 

The district court then turned to Neuberger’s potential representative liability. Under 31 U.S.C. § 3713(b) a “representative … paying any part of a debt … before paying a claim of the Government is liable to the extent of the payment for unpaid claims of the Government.” In this context, the court found that Neuberger was Lehcim’s representative who had knowledge of the government’s claim at the time of the transfers to Nightingale. 

Noting that Neuberger was Lehcim’s sole director, president, and treasurer, the court found that Neuberger had authority to act on behalf of Lehcim and was integral in the development and execution of the plan to pay Nightingale before paying the tax liabilities — even though Lehcim’s owner, Konig, was ultimately responsible for implementing the plan. Based on these determinations, the court held that Neuberger was responsible for asset transfers under the Federal Priority Statute. 

Following the court’s 2025 decision, the parties further disputed damages. The government argued that Neuberger was responsible for all Lehcim’s tax liabilities, including continuing accruals of penalties and interest under the Internal Revenue Code, for a total of more than $3.3 million by the end of October 2025. The court found no support for tax law computations under the Federal Priority Statute. Instead, the court found that damages under the Federal Priority Statute should be determined based on the amount of the government claim for which Neuberger had notice, and not the ongoing accruals of penalties and interest.

Therefore, the court held that Neuberger was liable for approximately $1.88 million of taxes, penalties, and interest identified in the IRS’ 30-day letter issued in 2019. 

Conclusion 

The Neuberger case demonstrates the significant risk for a lawyer acting as a director and officer of a client business entity. The lawyer in this case appears to have outlined a plan for repayment of loans and possible resolution of tax liabilities as counsel, but when the client did not follow through and pay the business entity tax liabilities, the lawyer was left with substantial financial exposure.

Endnotes 
1 U.S. v. Neuberger, 2025 PTC 358 (D. Md. 2025); 2026 PTC 24 (D. Md. 2026). 
2 31 U.S.C. Section 3713.

Mischa Buford Epps is Missouri Bar executive director.

The law has never stood still. Today’s pace of change confronting practitioners eclipses that seen by prior generations of lawyers. New legislation and administrative actions at the federal and state level reshape practice areas at blistering speed. Courts issue rulings that redefine long-settled principles. Technology tools are transforming legal research, drafting, and client communications. 

Against this backdrop, one truth remains clear: Mastery is not a destination but a discipline. Competence is not a credential earned once and stored on a shelf. It is a living, breathing standard that must be actively maintained and continuously built upon. 

This is precisely why lawyer education and professional development are essential to The Missouri Bar’s mission. We exist not only to help regulate the profession, but to elevate it, helping Missouri lawyers even better serve their clients and communities. 

Over the years, this commitment to lawyer education has manifested itself in numerous ways. From lecture courses for lawyer veterans returning from World War II, to the 1980’s and 1990’s traveling circuit of videotaped replays of CLE presentations across the state, to 2020’s pivot to online CLEs via Zoom and WebEx in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, The Missouri Bar has adapted and expanded its CLE programs and offerings to assist Missouri lawyers in staying abreast of the changes reshaping their fields of practice. 

Education at the bar extends beyond formal CLE programming. We provide members a comprehensive suite of member benefits and resources designed to support every stage of your legal career. Be sure to explore our member library of practice guides, model forms, research tools and other member benefits programs that you can draw on anytime you need them at MoBar.org/LPM. 

Last year, the bar helped administer the minimum continuing legal education (MCLE) requirements under Supreme Court of Missouri Rule 15 for more than 24,940 Missouri lawyers subject to the MCLE requirements. The Missouri Bar is here to help lawyers achieve their yearly MCLE requirement by offering hundreds of timely and relevant CLEs in person and online at MoBarCLE.org, delivering real, actionable insights that lawyers can put to work immediately. 

The intensified demands of practice place new pressure on lawyer well-being, mental health, and sustainable careers. The bar also offers programs to address these realities and more. Whether you are a solo practitioner looking to sharpen your understanding of family law changes, a law firm partner exploring how to responsibly integrate AI into your practice, or a prosecutor or public defender seeking better strategies for managing stress and avoiding burnout, there is something for every lawyer. 

Many lawyers often choose to earn all their MCLE hours by attending the bar’s conferences. In 2025, there were more than 2,650 registrants for the bar’s multi-day conferences, bringing together Missouri lawyers across practice areas, settings, and career stages, creating opportunities for new connections, mentorship, and peer learning that is hard to replicate. Remember to mark your calendars for these upcoming conferences:

• 30th anniversary of the MOSOLO Small Firm Conference, June 11-13 in Osage Beach
• Bernard Edelman DWI Law & Science Seminar, July 23-24 in Lake Ozark
• Family Law Conference, Aug. 20-22 in Branson
• Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar, Sept. 16-18 in Kansas City
• Estate, Trust & Elder Law Institute, Nov. 5-6 in St. Louis

Lawyers can also find unique opportunities to earn CLE credit at no cost through Spring and Fall Committee Meetings. Last year’s Spring and Fall Committee Meetings saw more than 12,700 attendees. This year, members can look forward to the virtual Spring Committee Meetings April 27-30, providing an opportunity to collaborate with other lawyers in your practice area and learn the latest updates in your field. 

Whether you choose to earn your CLE in person, remotely, or doing self-study, you are carrying on an important legacy of life-long learning that comes with being a lawyer. The Missouri Bar is here with programs, resources, and an unwavering commitment to helping you better serve your clients and communities. I hope to see you at a future program soon!

Jeff Benoist became administrator/counsel for the Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline on April 1, 2025. Prior to that, Benoist spent 25 years handling insurance litigation while successfully trying over 50 jury trials and 75 bench trials in every corner of Missouri. He has practiced in front of hundreds of judges in more than half of the counties in Missouri. He graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law in 2000.

The Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline ensures Missouri’s judiciary remains fair, impartial, and accountable to the public by investigating complaints against judges and enforcing disciplinary actions when necessary. The commission’s function is vital in upholding public trust in the judicial system, reinforcing the idea that no judge is above the law.¹ 

What is the CRRD? 

The CRRD was established in 1972 when Missouri voters approved § 24 of Article 5 of the Missouri Constitution to oversee the ethical conduct and fitness of judges.² It serves as a check and safeguard against judicial misconduct and incompetence. 

The CRRD consists of six volunteer members who serve six-year, staggered terms. The CRRD includes two members of the public appointed by the governor who are not members of The Missouri Bar; two members of The Missouri Bar selected by the bar’s Board of Governors; one judge of the Missouri Court of Appeals selected by a majority of the appellate judges (rotates from the Eastern to Western to Southern District); and one circuit judge selected by a majority of the Missouri circuit judges. 

The CRRD investigates complaints against judges of the Supreme Court of Missouri, Missouri Court of Appeals, circuit and associate circuit courts, and municipal courts, as well as members of the judicial nominating commissions that fill vacancies in accordance with Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan.³ 

The CRRD also oversees judicial retirement and removal. Missouri’s judges are subject to mandatory retirement at the age of 70. 

Additionally, judges can be removed from office if they are found unfit due to incompetence or inability to perform their responsibilities. 

Supreme Court of Missouri Rule 12.21(A) requires the CRRD to keep all proceedings confidential until the CRRD files a recommendation with the Court that the judge or member of a judicial commission be retired, removed, or disciplined. Rule 12.21(B) details exceptions to the rule of confidentiality. Further, a complainant may choose to waive confidentiality and request that the complaint be sent to the judge. 

How does the CRRD disciplinary process work? 

Members of the public, lawyers, and judges can submit complaints about judges to the CRRD by mail or by emailing CRRD@courts.mo.gov. Rule 4-8.3(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct requires a lawyer to inform the appropriate authority (CRRD) if they know that a judge has committed a violation of Rule 2 (Code of Judicial Conduct) that raises a substantial question as to the judge’s fitness for office. Rule 2-2.15 requires a judge who has knowledge that another judge committed a violation of Rule 2 to inform the appropriate disciplinary authority (CRRD). 

In 2024, the CRRD investigated 303 complaints, and that number rose to 405 complaints in 2025. Each year, approximately 45% of judges receive a complaint.

The CRRD follows a structured process when handling cases of judicial discipline. If a complaint is found to have merit, the CRRD writes a request to the judge for a response regarding the allegations. The CRRD may then recommend an informal disposition, such as a meeting with the judge or an informal reprimand by the commission, or it may proceed to a formal hearing pursuant to Rule 12. 

At a formal hearing, a judge is allowed to be represented by counsel, may call witnesses, and may introduce evidence. 

Upon completion of the hearing, the CRRD can recommend disciplinary actions such as formal reprimands, suspensions, or even removal from office. If formal proceedings are initiated and at least four members of the CRRD find that the judge should be disciplined in some manner, the CRRD then publicly files its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations with the Supreme Court of Missouri. 

The Court has the final authority to determine and impose disciplinary measures. This system creates a balanced approach where oversight is exercised while still allowing due process for judges accused of misconduct. 

Conclusion 

The CRRD helps foster transparency and accountability within the judiciary.

By providing a formal avenue for complaints and ensuring judges adhere to ethical guidelines, the CRRD enhances the legitimacy of Missouri's courts. 

For more information about the CRRD, including a link to a complaint form, visit the Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline's webpage at Courts.mo.gov.

Endnotes 
1 Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline, Mo. Ct., https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=230 (Feb. 19, 2026). 
2 Id. 
3 Id.

Athena Dickson is 2025-2026 Missouri Bar president and a partner at Siro Smith Dickson PC.

The principle that our government is governed by laws, not by individuals, is not abstract. It is not partisan. And it is not optional. It is the shared civic agreement that no one stands above the law, and that our system of government functions only when each branch respects the constitutional role of the others. 

That is why the recent decision not to hold Missouri’s State of the Judiciary on Jan. 28 gives pause. The State of the Judiciary has long served as a moment of institutional respect — an opportunity for the judicial branch to speak openly about the administration of justice, challenges facing our courts, and the needs of the citizens it serves. When that tradition is disrupted and the judiciary is publicly characterized as the “lesser” branch of government, it raises serious concerns that transcend any single bill or political disagreement. 

The Missouri Constitution does not recognize “greater” or “lesser” branches. It establishes co-equal branches — legislative, executive, and judicial, each with distinct responsibilities and each essential to preserving liberty. Our courts, led by the Supreme Court of Missouri, exist to interpret and apply the law impartially, safeguard individual rights, and ensure that the rule of law prevails. 

Disagreement with court decisions or judicial administration is not only permissible; it is inevitable in a healthy democracy. But respect for the judicial branch as an institution is non-negotiable. When rhetoric diminishes the courts or seeks to pressure them through political means, public confidence in the justice system erodes. And when confidence in the courts erodes, so too does the rule of law. 

As lawyers, we occupy a unique position at this moment. We are officers of the court. We are sworn not merely to advocate for clients, but to uphold the Constitution and the legal system itself. That obligation requires us to speak clearly when foundational principles are threatened. 

This is not about taking sides in a policy dispute. It is about defending the structure that allows disputes to be resolved lawfully, peacefully, and fairly. The rule of law depends on independent courts, mutual respect among the branches, and a shared commitment to constitutional governance. Let us be clear, consistent, and courageous in saying so. 

The Missouri Bar’s Board of Governors issued this statement related to the events on Jan. 28, and so many of you have reached out in support. I encourage you to continue standing up for an independent judiciary. 

One essential way to support an independent judiciary is to participate in the judicial performance review process. The judicial performance review process in Missouri plays a vital role in strengthening public confidence in our courts and ensuring those who serve on the bench meet high standards of fairness, integrity, and competence. It is an essential component of our justice system and one that depends on your engagement, especially through lawyer surveys.

You will soon receive an email asking for your feedback on the judges standing for retention this year. I strongly encourage you to complete that survey. Your perspective matters. 

By participating in the judicial performance review process, you are not only serving your profession, but also reinforcing the foundational principles of justice and helping maintain Missourians’ faith in our system of government.

What is something you wish more Missouri lawyers understood about the legal field or profession?

 “We are more than a profession. We are a key part of the system of checks and balances. That is a duty we should take more seriously.” 

How do you think lawyers can play an impactful role in educating the public (specifically students) about civic education and governmental processes?

“I think it is important to say ‘yes’ to opportunities to speak to groups of young people. We should also be informally mentoring and nurturing people who are interested in the process.” 

Why do you think mentorship is important within the legal profession? 

“There are so many parts of this profession that cannot be learned in a classroom or from books. You have to walk through it and have someone leading the way.” 

Who is your legal mentor? 

“I am blessed to have worked for the Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys for many years and had many of their members encouraging me along the way. It was Ken Vuylsteke and Tim Dollar who pushed me to go back to school and get my (law) degree. Sly James and John Boyd Sr. gave me the confidence to speak up and find my way through novel legal issues and policy puzzles. Even now, I find myself leaning on colleagues like Nimrod Chapel Jr. as I continue to expand my skills as a lawyer.” 

What tips would you give to lawyers on effective ways they can “translate” complex legal or legislative jargon into information that their non-lawyer clients can use? 

“Don’t assume your audience has a knowledge base. It is usually better to over-explain and be clear than to under-explain and try to clean up misunderstandings later. That said, you need to be sure you are not condescending, but just providing clear information and direction.” 

If you could be in a TV show, which one would you choose and why? 

“‘Stargate SG1.’ I love the idea of exploring new worlds.” 

Answers have been edited for clarity, brevity, and style. Know a lawyer who you think should be featured in “Meet #MOLawyers”? Submit their name to Journal@MoBar.org.

Bethany Allen is a compliance lawyer at Norton Rose Fulbright, where she focuses on conflicts, professional responsibility, and ethical risk within large law firm environments. She is also an adjunct professor at Avila University, teaching peace studies and mediation. Allen serves on The Missouri Bar’s Standing Committee on Well-Being in the Profession and was a member of The Missouri Bar Leadership Academy 2024-2025 class.

A quick, specific “thank you” can do more than brighten someone’s day. It can strengthen Missouri lawyers’ sense of purpose and motivate them to continue practicing at their best. 

The legal profession is a helping profession with demanding and emotionally complex situations. Over time, these situations can lead to high levels of stress, depression, anxiety, and burnout, making it difficult for lawyers to practice law and serve clients.1 When lawyers are supported, connected, and mentally healthy, they can even better serve their clients and communities. 

Well-being is not extra. It is foundational to the quality of our legal work. 

One way to increase lawyer well-being is to focus on gratitude. When we practice gratitude, our brain releases dopamine and serotonin, two neurotransmitters that are responsible for our emotions.² Regularly practicing gratitude can have lasting effects and improve psychological conditions like stress, anxiety, and depression by turning your thoughts toward good things.³ 

Additionally, research in organizational psychology consistently shows that expressions of specific appreciation increase workplace engagement, strengthen team cohesion, and reduce stress.4 Studies have also linked gratitude practices to improved resilience⁵ and lower symptoms of burnout.⁶ The American Bar Association’s 2024 well-being report continues to highlight connection and supportive professional culture as key protective factors against chronic stress and isolation.⁷ 

Done well, gratitude is not vague praise, but rather specific recognition that reinforces what is working, who we can rely on, and why our work matters. This combination of purpose and connection is powerful in demanding environments like those in the legal profession. 

That is why The Missouri Bar Standing Committee on Well-Being in the Profession is excited to offer tear-out gratitude grams that lawyers can use to express their appreciation to their colleagues, judges, opposing counsel, and clients. 

This downloadable gratitude gram serves as an invitation to build momentum for Well-Being Week in Law, May 4-8, before the week officially arrives. Well-Being Week in Law is a national initiative from the Institute for Well-Being in Law that seeks to raise awareness about lawyer well-being and encourage action across the legal profession year-round. 

Tear out this gratitude gram and write a note that is concrete and specific to someone you appreciate. Thank a mentor who made time for you, a colleague who went above and beyond, a staff member who kept tasks or a project moving forward, or even opposing counsel who helped keep a matter professional. Then, pass the gratitude gram along — hand it over, mail it, or leave it where that individual will find it. 

Small acknowledgments build professional culture. Culture shapes experience. Experience shapes well-being. 

A simple note may feel small, but it contributes to something larger. Gratitude strengthens connection, reinforces purpose, and reminds us that none of us practice alone. 

Together, those small motions matter.

Endnotes 
1 Bloomberg Law Attorney Workload and Hours Survey, BLOOMBERG LAW (2024).
2 Roland Zahn, et al, The Neural Basis of Human Social Values: Evidence from Functional MRI, 19 CEREB CORTEX 276 (2008).
3 Id. 
4 Vartika Kashyap, Top 7 ways to show gratitude in the workplace, MEDIUM, (June 12, 2025).
5 Does Gratitude Rewire Your Brain?, AMERICAN BRAIN FOUNDATION (Nov. 26, 2025).
6 Salena Tully, et al, Gratitude Practice to Decrease Stress and Burnout in Acute-Care Health Professionals, 28 THE ONLINE J. OF ISSUES IN NURSING 3, (Sept. 24, 2023).
7 Monique White, Attorney Well-Being: A Pressing Concern for the Legal Profession, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Nov. 20, 2024).

Hon. Zel Fischer is a judge on the Supreme Court of Missouri.

Andrea K. Spillars is chief disciplinary counsel at the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.

On Feb. 24, 2026, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued new rules restructuring the disciplinary system in Missouri. These new rules, effective Jan. 1, 2027, consolidate all complaint investigations within the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. Full-time staff employed by OCDC will be responsible for investigating complaints in a timely and efficient manner under the supervision of the chief disciplinary counsel. 

The process for adjudicating cases based on complaint investigations will otherwise remain unchanged. Lawyer and non-lawyer volunteers appointed by the Court will continue to serve as disciplinary hearing officers,¹ conducting proceedings and recommending appropriate sanctions for misconduct. The Advisory Committee,² also comprised of both lawyer and non-lawyer volunteers appointed by the Court, will continue to serve its important role as an administrative and advisory body within the disciplinary system. Ultimately, final orders of discipline remain within the purview of the Court.³ 

The new rules eliminate the bifurcated system that has existed for disciplinary investigations since 1991. That system originated in 1934 when the Court created Circuit Bar Committees comprised of volunteers to conduct investigations, make probable cause determinations, and prosecute alleged misconduct before the Court. Amendments in 1991 created OCDC under the Court’s direct supervision and authorized that office to investigate professional misconduct or assign the matter to one of the committees to investigate. 

After 1991, Circuit Bar Committees (later renamed Regional Disciplinary Committees) continued to operate in some, but not all, geographic areas. Thus, since 1991, complaints against lawyers domiciled in Kansas City, St. Louis, and Springfield have been investigated by volunteers serving on Regional Disciplinary Committees located in those jurisdictions. Full-time OCDC staff handle investigations for the remaining complaints, which represent slightly less than half the total number of complaint investigations opened per year. 

Initiating disciplinary action is a serious matter and necessarily requires a thorough investigative effort to determine whether a complaint is supported by evidence demonstrating a rule violation. A disciplinary system that centralizes oversight of those investigative efforts is important to promote the fair and consistent application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Resourcing those efforts with full-time staff is similarly important to facilitate timely and efficient resolution of complaint investigations. 

Currently, both complainants and lawyer respondents may have different experiences during the investigative process, dependent upon the entity responsible for the complaint investigation. However, consistent statewide enforcement of the Rules of Professional Conduct is foundational to the goal of protecting the public and the integrity of the profession. To that end, the new rules promote consistency in both process and outcomes. 

With these changes, it is important to recognize the individuals who have offered their time, expertise, and ethics as members of the Regional Disciplinary Committees. Volunteerism is a hallmark of the legal profession, and those individuals serve as exemplars of the Missouri legal profession. Current committee members will be particularly instrumental to ensuring a smooth transition during 2026 and will hopefully offer their expertise in other capacities. To all those who volunteer in the disciplinary system, including those contemplating that path, your service is greatly appreciated.

Lawyers practicing in Missouri enjoy a profession that is largely selfgoverning, and with that privilege comes special responsibility. Ensuring the standards are consistently enforced for the benefit of the public and the integrity of the profession is the most fundamental duty. To fulfill that duty requires continually re-examining existing structures. It also requires instituting reforms when necessary. The changes implemented by the Court will serve that purpose by fostering consistency in how investigations are conducted and the Rules of Professional Conduct are applied. 

Read the full order about the new rules at Courts.mo.gov.

Endnotes 
1 Rule 5.04. 
2 Rule 5.01. 
3 Rule 5.17.

Jeffrey Schoenberger is a senior consultant at Affinity Consulting Group LLC.

Artificial intelligence is everywhere. According to a Forbes Advisor survey, 97% of business owners believe tools like ChatGPT will help their businesses.¹ At the American Bar Association’s TECHSHOW in March, there were more than 15 sessions about AI.² And yet, lawyers continue to make headlines for citing cases that never existed — because an AI platform confidently made them up. 

That contrast tells us something important. AI is powerful, but it is not magical. Like any other tool in your firm, AI can help or hurt depending on how — and where — you use it.

The goal is not simply to “use AI,” but instead to leverage AI effectively in certain situations, with minimal risks and maximum results. 

Start with the right model 

Different AI tools generally serve different purposes, and many can outperform traditional search engines when you want an answer that synthesizes several sources. Below are five “general-purpose” AIs and how they may help your firm — without using them for legal research or analysis. 

• ChatGPT has become a household name and excels at more general inquiries like brainstorming, outlining, and producing first drafts.
• Claude tends to be more cautious, more structured, and better with long inputs. It is less “salesy” and more deliberate.
• Google Gemini has the advantage of access to Google’s ecosystem and your stored data.
• Microsoft Copilot shines inside Microsoft 365 — summarizing email threads, manipulating Excel data, and helping draft responses in Outlook or Word.
• Perplexity combines AI summaries with citations, which is helpful for market research, tech evaluations, and comparisons. 

These tools are not designed to do legal research or final-form legal writing. Treating AI platforms as substitutes for legal judgment is how lawyers could end up embarrassing themselves — and worse, explaining themselves to disciplinary authorities. 

The safest and most effective approach is simple: 

• Use AI for administrative work or for early drafts in areas where you are already knowledgeable.
• If you can confidently spot errors, omissions, or bad advice, you are in the right territory. 

Example 1: marketing 

Many lawyers know what they want to say but dread sitting down to write it. Marketing content, such as blog posts, newsletters, and social media, often stalls out at the blank page stage. 

That is where AI earns its keep. 

In this example, start by asking ChatGPT for ideas. The quality of the results depends on the prompt.

An OK prompt: “Give me ideas for social media posts for an estate planning firm.” 

A better prompt: “I am the owner of a solo estate planning firm. I primarily work with single mothers, and I am a single mother myself. I need ideas for blog posts aimed at single mothers who do not yet have an estate plan.” 

Specific context produces better output. Once you find an idea you like, ask ChatGPT for a draft. If the draft misses the mark, tell it why and ask for a rewrite. 

You will still need to edit and factcheck. But if writer’s block is your bottleneck, AI can get you moving. 

Rule of thumb: If something feels wrong, fix it. If you are unsure, verify it or remove it. 

Example 2: writing email responses 

Not every email requires legal analysis. Many require clarity, tone control, or a nudge toward action. 

For example, Copilot can help by drafting a response based on your instructions: “I need to follow up politely but firmly and ask the client to respond.” 

That differs from asking for legal advice. Used this way, Copilot may save time and reduce friction. 

This can work particularly well for re-engaging clients who have gone silent for months. Sometimes the hardest part is figuring out what to say and how to say it. AI can help you get over that hump. 

Example 3: drafting firm policies 

Policies are another area where AI can provide leverage without undue risk. 

For example, suppose you want to formalize a work-from-home policy. You already know the rules: 

• Two days remote per week
• Three days in the office, and
• Two weeks’ advance notice for planned remote days. 

Feed that information into ChatGPT and ask it to draft the policy. You will likely receive a surprisingly thorough draft covering objectives, eligibility, approval processes, communication expectations, equipment, security, and acknowledgments. 

Will it make assumptions? Yes. 

Will it include things you do not want? Probably. 

But reviewing and refining a draft is far easier than starting from scratch. It may also surface issues you had not considered. 

A critical rule: Always start fresh 

One final operational note that matters more than people realize: When you switch topics, start a new chat in the AI platform. 

Reusing an existing conversation confuses the model and degrades output quality. Treat each task as a clean slate. You will get better results faster and with less frustration. 

The takeaway 

AI is neither a silver bullet nor a ticking time bomb. It is a productivity tool — one that rewards clear thinking, good judgment, and appropriate boundaries. 

Start by using it where the stakes are low and your expertise is high. That is how you can transform your legal practice using AI without becoming an example in an ethics presentation.

Endnotes 
1 Katherine Haan and Rob Watts, How Businesses Are Using Artificial Intelligence, FORBES (April 24, 2023), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/business/ software/ai-in-business. 
2 American Bar Association, TECHSHOW, Chicago, Ill. (March 25-28, 2026), https://www. techshow.com.

Hannah Kiddoo Frevert is communications director at The Missouri Bar.

For the last 85 years, Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan has continued its tradition of attracting high-quality judges in the least political way, ultimately giving the people the final say. 

Commonly known as The Missouri Plan, it aims to select judges based on merit, not politics or popularity, and keep the selection process transparent and open to the public. 

To better understand why the plan works and why it continues to be right for Missouri, it’s important to know why it was adopted in the first place. 

Political influence before The Missouri Plan 

Prior to The Missouri Plan’s adoption, Missouri judges were selected in the same fashion as those in other states, by general election. 

In the 1930s, Missourians became increasingly frustrated by the excessive role of political influence and monetary leverage in judicial elections and decision-making. Judges were removed from the bench with great frequency as voters were swayed by national politics. Political machines like that of “Boss” Tom Pendergast would buy votes, packing the Supreme Court of Missouri, along with other state and local offices, with appointees of his own political persuasion.

In 1937, a bipartisan group of more than 80 people met and formed the Missouri Institute for the Administration of Justice. Their proposal? A new way to select Missouri judges, based not on popularity or influence, but on merit. 

When the proposal landed on the 1940 Missouri ballot, it passed by a majority of 90,000 votes. Skeptics were quick to suggest that voters simply didn’t understand the law, and they pushed for it to return to the ballot in 1942. That time, it was retained by a majority of about 180,000 votes and was adopted into the Missouri Constitution.

This novel nonpartisan way of selecting judges quickly proved to be a success. In 1948, Supreme Court of Missouri Judge Laurance M. Hyde, a key player in the plan’s adoption, noted that the nonpartisan system “combines the best features of both the appointive and elective systems but provides safeguards lacking in either.”¹ 

Following the plan’s adoption, the Supreme Court of Missouri got its docket on a current basis for the first time in 50 years, an achievement that Hyde credited to judges having more time to focus on the cases before them rather than spending months campaigning. 

The plan’s inner workings 

Today, The Missouri Plan governs the selection and retention of all appellate court judges in the state, as well as trial judges in the City of St. Louis and Jackson, Clay, Platte, St. Louis, and Greene counties. 

Significantly, The Missouri Plan has proven to be a model for the nation as more than 30 states have used it to create a similar structure for their own judicial selections. 

The Missouri Plan’s approach to judicial selection is especially unique in that all Missouri residents can be involved in the process. When a vacancy arises in a court that uses The Missouri Plan, eligible individuals are encouraged to apply and be interviewed by a nominating commission.

The Appellate Judicial Commission, which selects nominees to fill Supreme Court of Missouri or Missouri Court of Appeals openings, consists of a judge of the Supreme Court of Missouri, three lawyers, and three non-lawyer members. The circuit judicial commissions, which select nominees for openings on a circuit court that uses The Missouri Plan, includes the chief judge of the Court of Appeals district in which the vacancy occurs, two lawyers, and two non-lawyer members. In both types of commissions, the lawyers are elected by bar members and the non-lawyers are appointed by the governor.

Members of the public are invited to attend these interviews, where the candidates are evaluated based on the character and experience they bring to the bench, as well as their professional strengths and legal analysis skills. The commission selects the top three candidates for the open judgeship and passes along its recommendations to the governor, who appoints one of those candidates to the role. 

During the general election following their first 12 months on the bench and at the end of each term, judges stand before the voters in a retention election. 

Voter education efforts 

Before voters are asked to decide whether a judge should or should not be retained, they are encouraged to consider the findings of Missouri’s Judicial Performance Review Committee. The committee is composed of lawyers, retired judges, and residents of Missouri. 

In its first iteration, the committee surveyed Missouri lawyers, asking if they felt specific judges should or should not be retained. This information was then conveyed to voters. 

To even better inform Missourians, there have been modifications to the review process in subsequent years, in line with best practices outlined by the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System. Today, the committee completes an anonymous evaluation of each judge up for retention, reviewing written opinions and surveys completed by lawyers and jurors who, when applicable, have worked with the judge.

Lawyers play an essential role in the judicial reviews of judges up for retention in Missouri. In advance of each review cycle, lawyers who have practiced in front of the judge are asked to share their experiences, noting the judge’s preparedness, efficiency, professionalism, impartiality, and other factors. 

Jurors, similarly, can share about their judicial interactions. At the conclusion of a trial, jurors are invited to provide feedback about a judge’s patience, ability to make the legal issues easy to understand, and equal treatment of all parties, among other considerations. 

Based on all these materials, the Judicial Performance Review Committee then recommends whether a judge should or should not be retained, and its findings are publicly available through YourMissouriJudges.org. 

Empowerment through civic education 

Now, 85 years in, The Missouri Plan continues its tradition of attracting high-quality judges in the least political way and ultimately giving the people the final say. 

As the 2026 judicial retention elections draw near, lawyers are invited to present to community groups, classrooms, local bar organizations, and other institutions to help voters better understand the role of The Missouri Plan in our appellate and metro court systems. 

To help coordinate these efforts, The Missouri Bar is creating a network of lawyer-leaders embedded in their communities who are willing to help educate residents about The Missouri Plan and the judicial retention process. Lawyers interested in volunteering and presenting can complete a form at MoBar.org/lawyer-leader. 

Community groups or classroom teachers interested in having a lawyer present about the judicial selection process can fill out a form at MissouriLawyersHelp.org/Request-a-speaker. 

Learn more about The Missouri Plan at YourMissouriJudges.org.

Following the adoption of Missouri's Non-Partisan Court Plan, the Missouri Bar Journal published several pieces, such as the one above from 1940, regarding the importance of The Missouri Plan. 

Endnotes 
1 Laurance M. Hyde, The Missouri Plan for Selection and Tenure of Judges, 39 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, 3 (Sept.-Oct. 1948).

MCLE deadline approaching

Mark your calendar — the 2025-2026 minimum continuing legal education compliance period will end June 30. Lawyers must earn 15 MCLE hours by June 30 and file their MCLE annual reports by July 31. To learn more about MCLE requirements and file your hours, visit MoBar.org/MCLE.

Express your gratitude 

Working in the legal profession can feel overwhelming and difficult. Download the gratitude gram at MoBar.org/Journal to encourage a colleague, opposing counsel, or judge and tell them why you are thankful for them. 

There’s no place like MOSOLO! 

Come celebrate the 30th anniversary of the MOSOLO Small Firm Conference June 11-13. Follow the yellow brick road to Margaritaville in Osage Beach for the opportunity to fulfill all your MCLE hours and network with other solo and small firm practitioners. Register by May 12 to save $50 on registration.

Get the latest updates and connect with other lawyers during Spring Committee Meetings 

Missouri Bar open enrollment committees will meet virtually April 27-30, providing an opportunity to collaborate with other lawyers in your practice area and learn the latest updates in your field at no cost. The bar has nearly 40 open enrollment committees with relevant focus areas for every lawyer. You do not have to be a member of a committee to attend the meetings and CLEs, but committee members are the first to know about upcoming events. Join one or multiple committees at no cost at MoBar.org/Committees-Sections.

MoBar memory 

Comedian Buzz Sutherland causes roaring laughter during the Saturday morning plenary session at MOSOLO June 12-14, 2003. 

Stay informed with weekly Legislative Updates 

Throughout the 2026 legislative session, The Missouri Bar government relations department creates weekly Legislative Updates for Missouri lawyers so they can stay up to date on legislation that may impact their practices or clients. Find the updates at News.MoBar.org.

Tech tip: end-of-day wind-down ritual 

It’s easy to place simple tasks at the bottom of the priority list, but that can lead to stalled workflows and a growing, overwhelming to-do list, impacting your practice and clients. Instead, end your workday with a tech “wind-down” ritual. Set aside five to 30 minutes to do tasks like clear your email inbox, complete approvals, sign documents, and respond to client questions. This will allow you to come back to the office the next day refreshed and with a clean slate.

Save the date:

Real Estate Institute | April 9 | Virtual 
AAML Advanced Family Law Symposium | April 10 | St. Louis 
Workers’ Compensation Institute | April 17 | Jefferson City 
Spring Enrollment Ceremonies | April 24 | Jefferson City 
Well-Being Week in Law | May 4-8 | Nationwide 
Board of Governors meeting | May 15 | Jefferson City 
For more information, visit MoBar.org.

Benjamin Newhouse is the founder of Vineyard Asset Management, LLC, a boutique wealth management firm. Through years of experience and his current affiliations, Newhouse focuses on applying the use and benefits of various DSTs and private placement investments for clients. He graduated from the University of Tulsa College of Law in 2000. In addition to holding numerous financial securities licenses, Newhouse is also a member of The Missouri Bar and a certified public accountant licensed with the Missouri State Board of Accountancy. He holds the personal financial specialist credential available to CPAs who acquire additional specialized training within various financial management bodies of knowledge. He teaches business law as an adjunct professor at Mission University in Springfield. He can be contacted at

Internal Revenue Code § 1031 offers one of the most powerful strategies available to business owners and real estate investors to continue deferring potential capital gains liabilities that would otherwise become due upon the sale of an appreciated asset.¹ 

While many lawyers who specialize in tax or real estate law are familiar with the requirements involved in conducting a § 1031 exchange, it generally appears that very few such specialized lawyers and certified public accountants are aware of how Delaware Statutory Trusts can be effectively leveraged to facilitate a fully qualified tax-deferred exchange transaction under § 1031. 

Typically, clients engaging in a § 1031 exchange transaction simply elect to “swap” one directly owned investment property for another. However, just as the real estate market has evolved, the Internal Revenue Service, via private letter ruling,² has also evolved by recognizing and blessing the use of properly structured DSTs to also qualify to receive § 1031 taxdeferred exchange treatment.

While § 1031 exchanges and DSTs are most frequently discussed in the context of tax and real estate practice, their implications extend well beyond those specialties. In contemporary legal practice, lawyers across a wide range of disciplines increasingly encounter transactions, planning matters, and disputes that implicate § 1031 deferral rules and DST investment structures. 

Business and corporate lawyers advising closely held companies, professional practices, and family-owned enterprises often confront situations in which the operating business and the underlying real estate are economically distinct assets. DSTs offer a mechanism for reinvestment that permits continued tax deferral without requiring ongoing operational control, an outcome frequently aligned with succession or exit planning objectives. 

Estate planning and trust lawyers likewise encounter DST-related issues when advising clients whose wealth is concentrated in illiquid real property. The ability to fractionalize ownership interests through DSTs can facilitate equitable distribution among beneficiaries, mitigate forced sales, and preserve eligibility for a step-up in basis at death. 

Family law practitioners may also confront DST considerations in the division or disposition of income-producing property incident to divorce. Because the tax consequences of real estate liquidation can significantly affect the net marital estate, awareness of § 1031-compatible structures may influence settlement strategy and valuation analyses. 

Finally, litigators and general practitioners increasingly encounter DSTs in disputes involving fiduciary duties, securities law disclosures, suitability determinations, and professional negligence claims. A working understanding of DST mechanics and limitations enhances issuespotting and enables more effective collaboration with tax and financial professionals, thereby advancing competent client representation. 

This article explores the basics of § 1031 exchanges, the structure and advantages of DSTs, important legal considerations, and best practices for advising clients when considering use of this modernized vehicle to conduct an exchange transaction. 

Legal framework of § 1031 exchanges 
Like-kind property 

Real property held for investment or business use can be exchanged for like-kind property.³ When properly exchanged, the transaction is essentially a swap for new property, which will not trigger a taxable event when a capital gain might ordinarily have otherwise become recognized. However, § 1031 merely defers recognition of potential taxes due; it does not forgive them. 

Exchanges using § 1031 must adhere to very strict rules and time horizons. One of the first obstacles to satisfy is to ensure the new investment (or business-use property) meets the IRS’ definition of like-kind property.⁴ Section 1031 does not fully define this “likekind” term, but it does specifically prohibit the definition from being attached to non-real property such as corporate equities, bonds, real estate investment trusts, etc.⁵ Like-kind real property is defined for § 1031 purposes to be of the same nature or character to the property being exchanged. It is not a reference to its quality or grade.⁶ The property must also be located within the United States.⁷ 

For example, if Taxpayer A owns a commercial warehouse building and receives rental income from its tenants, the real estate is clearly being held as an investment asset. However, if Taxpayer A were to then exchange it for a parcel of subdivided vacant land marketed for immediate resale as residential or commercial lots, then the IRS may treat the transaction as a taxable sale rather than a like-kind exchange.⁸ Even though both the relinquished and exchanged assets are real property as required by § 1031, since the vacant land is held primarily for sale, it may not meet the definition of like-kind property because the latter asset is not held for investment or business use.⁹ 

Conversely, if Taxpayer B owns an apartment building from which she also collects rental income and then uses § 1031 to exchange it for multiple acres of raw, unimproved land with the intent to hold it for long-term appreciation and eventual resale, the exchange should be deemed like-kind because she is exchanging one real estate investment property for another, despite the significant differences between the quality or grade of the real estate. 

Time limits 

Exchanges under § 1031 must also meet strict time limits. The IRS will never extend additional time for any reason to a party seeking § 1031 tax-deferral benefits if these prescribed limits are exceeded. There is a hard cap on the time the IRS allows a taxpayer to perform the various steps necessary to complete a qualifying § 1031 exchange transaction. 

In this regard, the first time hurdle is the 45-Day Rule.¹⁰ The exchanging party must formally and specifically “identify” the potential replacement property (or properties) to be acquired within 45 days of the closing date for the sale of the relinquished property.¹¹ Using the example above, Taxpayer B who sold her apartment building would need to declare and identify that she was going to use the proceeds from her sale to purchase the specifically described vacant land within this time window. 

To satisfy § 1031’s identification requirement, the exchanging party must satisfy one of the following three rules: 

1. The Three-Property Rule allows the exchanging party to identify a maximum of three potential replacement properties to be used, regardless of their aggregate fair market value.¹² 

Here, Taxpayer B sells her apartment building for $13 million. Within 45 days, she can identify, for example: 

•  vacant land valued at $9 million,
• an industrial warehouse building valued at $8 million, and
• a rental house valued at $450,000.

She can then acquire any, all, or a combination of these properties, provided the aggregate or combined values at least meet or exceed the $13 million sales price of her apartment building. 

2. The 200% Rule only denies the exchanging party satisfaction of replacement property identification if the aggregate fair market value exceeds 200% of the relinquished property’s sale price.¹³ 

When Taxpayer B sells her apartment building for $13 million, she can identify any number of properties up to $26 million ($13 million multiplied by 200%) in replacement property value. Thus, Taxpayer B can identify additional properties for potential or back-up use beyond just the three properties illustrated in the previous rule, as their aggregate value was only $17.45 million, still short of the $26 million value permitted under this exception. 

3. The 95% Rule: If the exchanging party violates the two previous rules, the replacement property identification can still be deemed satisfactory, but only if the taxpayer actually, and timely, acquires 95% or more of the total fair market value of all identified properties.¹⁴ 

If Taxpayer B identifies 10 like-kind real properties with an aggregate fair market value of $32 million (thus violating both the three-property and 200% rules), she can still satisfy the identification requirement if she actually acquires at least $30.4 million worth (95% of $32 million) of all the formally identified assets. If she fails to obtain that high threshold, then her entire attempted exchange becomes taxable. 

The second non-negotiable time hurdle is the 180-Day Rule.¹⁵ Under this time requirement, the exchanging party must acquire the replacement property or properties within 180 days of closing on the sale of the relinquished property or the due date of the exchanging party’s tax return, including extensions, for the year of transfer of the relinquished property, whichever occurs first.¹⁶ 

So, even if Taxpayer B properly and timely identified the replacement property within the 45 days allotted, she still must close on the identified property before the 180 days expire. Abandoned or delayed closings are not an unusual occurrence. If the purchase/sale negotiations go sideways after the 45-day identification period expires and Taxpayer B does not have a sufficient remaining amount of aggregate fair market value identified, she cannot possibly proceed to complete the exchange under § 1031 as there are no extensions of time. 

Thus, parties seeking to conduct a § 1031 exchange are always at risk for noncompliance when the replacement property identified is a traditional real property asset. However, identifying a DST for potential use during the initial 45-day time requirement can significantly reduce this risk. 

Reinvestment and debt replacement 

If both the like-kind and time elements are satisfied, the exchanging party must still meet three further requirements to receive the full § 1031 tax deferral. 

1. Reinvest all net exchange proceeds from the sale of the relinquished property.¹⁷ 

If Taxpayer B keeps any cash proceeds from the sale, that amount is treated as “boot” and is a recognized capital gain.¹⁸ 

2. Replace the debt of the relinquished property with equal or greater debt.¹⁹ 

Assume Taxpayer B’s relinquished property (the apartment building) had $600,000 in debt. If the replacement property had only $425,000 in debt, she would need to contribute $175,000 ($600,000 minus $425,000) in new cash to avoid incurring taxable boot.²⁰ 

However, if she obtained net cash proceeds (equity) of $12.4 million (the $13 million sales price minus the $600,000 property debt), and then decided to withhold $400,000 in cash and only invest $12 million and then takes on additional $575,000 in debt for the replacement property (the $13 million purchase price minus the $425,000 embedded debt of replacement property equals the $12.575 million taxpayer’s required equity contribution), she would raise her replacement property embedded debt from $425,000 to $1 million via the additional $575,000 debt. 

By withholding the $400,000 equity and replacing it with financing, Taxpayer B would receive taxable boot of $400,000. Thus, equity may replace debt, but debt cannot replace equity without suffering a taxable event.²¹ 

3. The purchase price of the replacement property must be equal to or greater than the sales price of the relinquished property. Note: Closing costs are prohibited from being part of this equation.²² 

Assume Taxpayer B sells her apartment building for $13 million. The new replacement property or properties must at least aggregately cost $13 million. If she were to purchase a set of properties for $12 million, she would realize a taxable gain of $1 million ($13 million minus $12 million) unless she reinvested this amount via additional cash or qualifying improvements for the replacement properties.²³

Use of a qualified intermediary 

Though not explicit within § 1031, the exchanging party cannot take actual or constructive receipt of the exchange proceeds upon closing on the sale of the property being relinquished; doing so would violate IRC § 1001 and thus immediately disqualify the exchange from obtaining tax deferral.²⁴ 

To avoid this fate, the exchanging party uses a qualified intermediary to take actual or constructive receipt of the exchange proceeds on their behalf.²⁵ Thus, it’s important to enlist and coordinate the services of a QI before proceeding to close on the sale of the relinquished property. 

Entity consistency requirement 

Finally, for the § 1031 exchange to be successful, both the relinquished and replacement properties must be held by the same taxpayer/entity.²⁶ Other than this requirement, any tax-paying entity — corporations, partnerships,²⁷ individuals, limited liability companies, trusts, etc. — is entitled to the benefits of § 1031.²⁸ Even non-U.S. citizens who own property in the U.S. can use § 1031.²⁹ 

Summary for § 1031: five pitfalls to avoid 

The exchanging party needs to avoid the following to receive the full tax deferral benefits available under § 1031: 

1. Control of proceeds. Solution: Use a QI to take actual or constructive receipt of sales proceeds. 

2. Failure to trade up or trade even. Solution: Apply all cash/ equity received from the sale and replace all the debt retired when acquiring the replacement property. 

3. Violation of time frames. Solution: Understand the 45-day and 180-day rules; use a QI to manage. 

4. Misidentification. Solution: Use identification rules and unambiguous descriptions in writing provided to the QI. 

5. Change of entity. Solution: Acquire replacement property in same entity registration format as the relinquished property was titled. 

Delaware Statutory Trusts 

Legal structure and IRS acceptance 

Governed by the Delaware Statutory Trust Act, DSTs are trust entities that allow numerous investors to possess fractional shares in real property through beneficial ownership of the title-holding trust.³⁰ Investors in a DST are not direct owners of the real estate, but instead own an undivided beneficial interest in the assets held by the trust, while the DST holds title to the property for the benefit of its many investors. 

In 2004, the IRS recognized DSTs’ beneficial interest as qualified/likekind replacement property for real property relinquished within § 1031 exchanges.³¹ Via Rev. Rul. 2004-86, the IRS importantly distinguished DSTs from limited partnership interests for the purpose of § 1031 transactions. The IRS further specified that beneficial interests are synonymous with direct ownership interests under § 1031, that debt must be allocated pro rata for exchange purposes, and that active management must be conducted by the DST and not by its beneficial interest holders.³²

Consequently, this revenue ruling effectively made it possible for taxpayers to conduct a qualifying § 1031 exchange transaction in a manner that incorporates passive management strategies of the replacement property. In other words, the taxpayer is no longer relegated to being actively involved in the continual management of their replacement property, as was customary practice with most § 1031 exchanges, should the taxpayer instead prefer to take a more passive role while still retaining the tax benefits of owning such directly held real estate interests. 

“Seven deadly sins”: IRS DST structural requirements 

While Rev. Rul. 2004-86 effectively opened the § 1031 door to DSTs, the IRS tempered its acceptance of using such structured vehicles within the private letter ruling by requiring DSTs be limited in the actions they may take. As such, DSTs may not:

• obtain additional capital.
• acquire additional debt or refinance current debt.
• reinvest any subsequent sale proceeds.
• make capital expenditures; they are limited to making normal repair and maintenance expenses.
• enter into new leases or renegotiate existing leases.³³
• invest cash between distribution dates to the beneficial owners in anything other than short-term securities. 

DSTs must also distribute all cash (other than necessary reserves) on a current consistent basis. 

To deal with these limitations, DSTs tend to contain provisions for springing into a limited liability company taxed as a partnership (commonly known as a “springing LLC”) if action prohibited by the IRS within the DST format is needed. While this action is normally not taxable, it does run the risk of limiting future § 1031 exit options. 

Tenants, toilets, and trash: DSTs and passive management 

Among seasoned real estate investors, the burdens of active property management are often summarized — somewhat tongue-in-cheek — by “tenants, toilets, and trash.” This trinity of persistent frustrations often cause once-eager real estate investors to begin searching for viable exit ramps as they face the day-to-day oversight of active property operations and management. The operational realities of being a landlord often detract from the financial rewards, particularly as investors age or desire a more hands-off approach. 

The first of these challenges, tenants, require continuous attention: screening applicants; collecting rent; supervising the property to prevent or mitigate misuse, neglect, or damage; or engaging in the eviction process. 

“Toilets,” a stand-in for the broader category of property maintenance issues, is the ever-constant reminder that physical structures require upkeep. Unfortunately, that sometimes means plumbing issues arising at 3 a.m. requiring immediate attention, which threaten not only the profitability of the investment, but also the ability to preserve the value of the investment itself. 

“Trash” refers to the physical deterioration and cleanup that often follows tenant turnover. Whether that’s fumigating a rental house, removing abandoned property, or repairing damages and repainting walls, the task of keeping the property marketable for future tenants can quickly erode both the net income and patience of the real estate investor. 

DSTs enable real estate investors to move from active management to passive management. Because the DST is a passive real estate investment vehicle, the purchase, financing, management, and eventual sale of the property is the responsibility of the DST sponsor to perform — not the investor. Thus, the investor can continue to enjoy the benefits of owning real property without the hassle of day-to-day management. 

… And the other “T”: taxes 

Given these cumulative challenges, many long-term real estate investors eventually desire an exit ramp that might enable them to reallocate the value of their investment into other areas, provided such can be accomplished in a tax-efficient or tax-neutral manner.

However, they are often quickly disabused of that notion by their lawyers and CPAs, who proclaim that a non-strategic exit from this real estate arena will likely trigger material tax consequences. If the advisor explains the § 1031 exchange process but neglects to include the DST option for consideration, then the investor can be left with the false impression that they are relegated to a lateral investment move, and maybe further additional capital outlay, via exchanging the currently owned property for another physical like-kind property. Thus, the investor risks wrongfully concluding their only effective option is to “trade one problem for another.” Conversely, DSTs can provide the client with an option that may materially change their current investment situation, while doing so in a tax-neutral manner. 

Those clients who entirely disregard the § 1031 option run the risk of not only having their transaction be subject to federal and state taxes for capital gains, but also two additional taxes: Depreciation Recapture Tax (DRT)³⁴ and the Net Investment Income Tax (NIIT) of the Affordable Care Act.³⁵ Consequently, it is not uncommon for a client-investor to be forced to cede the majority of their sales proceeds to paying various tax liabilities if a transaction is not properly structured to incorporate the tax benefits of § 1031. 

DRT is perhaps the most often overlooked and financially significant component in the sale of real estate. Real estate investors typically depreciate the structure, but not the land, of rental income-producing property over a 27.5-year or 39-year schedule.³⁶ When the real property is sold, the IRS “recaptures” that depreciated amount via a flat 25% tax rate. 

A lesser-known but increasingly relevant component of the overall tax burden is the 3.8% NIIT imposed by the Affordable Care Act. This surtax applies to net investment income, including capital gains, for taxpayers whose modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) exceeds certain thresholds — $250,000 for married couples filing jointly and $200,000 for single filers. The 3.8% tax is applied to the lesser of the taxpayer’s net investment income or the amount by which their MAGI exceeds the threshold.³⁷ 

Suppose a married couple filing jointly has $450,000 in MAGI and $700,000 in capital gains from selling three rental properties. Since their MAGI exceeds $250,000 by $200,000 ($450,000 minus $250,000) and their net investment income from the sale of the houses is $700,000, the 3.8% NIIT is assessed against the lower value ($200,000). This NIIT causes an additional $7,600 in federal tax liability incurred by the couple. 

Using a DST via a § 1031 exchange can defer not only federal and state capital gains taxes but also DRT and NIIT. Moreover, the investor can keep deferring this total tax liability into future DSTs, or return to direct ownership, until they pass away. At death, the investor’s beneficiary is still entitled to receive a step-up in the cost basis of the investment, thereby significantly mitigating, if not entirely eliminating, this overall deferred tax liability, while still permitting the client-investor to enjoy the tax benefits of real estate investment during their lifetime. 

Additional advantages of using DSTs in § 1031 exchanges 

For real estate investors desiring to transition away from active management, better diversify their real estate holdings, or streamline their estate and tax planning, DSTs can offer unique strategic advantages over the options typically used for real property replacement. DSTs offer the following potential advantages: 

• Access to institutional-quality real estate. The multi-trillion-dollar U.S. commercial property market may be a challenge to navigate for individual investors. Partnering with a respected DST sponsor with local market knowledge, who has access to institutional-quality properties coupled with expertise in management and financing, can help real estate investors expand their options when looking for replacement property. Using this strategy, for example, an investor could potentially exchange their apartment complex interest into a DST that owns a $70-million distribution center. On their own, the investor would likely never be able to afford or manage such an asset.
• Diversification. Financial advisors typically advocate their clients to obtain exposure to various asset classes to reduce overall portfolio risk. DSTs can aid in accomplishing the diversification and risk management objectives by exchanging one type of real property into several different types of real estate classifications. DSTs usually have flexible minimum investment amounts enabling investors to exchange into multiple offerings. DST investments can offer multiple property portfolios across a variety of property types (commercial, industrial, multi-family, etc.), as well as broad geographic locations. For example, a real estate investor could exchange their eight rental properties, all held in Columbia and classified as residential real property, for a DST that holds real property assets in industrial (Garland, Texas), commercial (Miami, Florida), and residential (Nashville, Tennessee), thereby accessing multiple sectors and different geographic locations.
• Nonrecourse debt.³⁸ When an individual owns a building, they are responsible for repayment of debt if a default occurs. DSTs, however, typically use nonrecourse financing. The sponsor of the program (i.e., trustee) takes on the liability and is responsible for any debt repayment on the property. While there is always risk involved with owning real estate, nonrecourse financing limits the liability for DST investors.³⁹ For investors approaching retirement and considering selling property to simplify their lives, a DST also helps solve the dilemma of trying to secure a mortgage on a replacement property at a time when the investor’s earned income may become reduced due to retirement, which might make qualifying to obtain future financing more of a challenge.
• Simplified tax reporting (grantor letter). Tax lawyers and CPAs typically dread the Schedule K-1 form. Not only do they tend to be issued late in the tax season, they’re also complex and require significant skill and time to process. Most real estate holdings, including securitized real estate, cannot avoid K-1 reporting. However, DSTs can bypass Schedule K-1 and issue a grantor trust letter that exhibits the DSTs’ allocable income and expenses. The grantor trust letter streamlines the tax filing process as compared to the K-1 form.
• Closing efficiency. Investor and DST sponsor transaction costs may be lower because of less lender paperwork. In addition, the DST sponsor arranges financing and manages all due diligence efforts. Often in a § 1031 exchange where a lender is involved, the lender requires a Special Purpose Entity to isolate financial risk on the specific real property. Not only does the Special Purpose Entity creation add more time and start eating away at the 180-Day Rule, but the creation tends to generate more expenses, such as legal fees, for the investor.
• Relief from underperforming real estate. After factoring in the true costs of real estate ownership, many investors find they own property that provides little or no net income, but they are still hesitant to sell and be forced to recognize capital gains taxes along with DRT and NIIT. A § 1031 exchange using a DST may provide a solution to increase cash flow while deferring any taxable event by replacing the property not generating sufficient cash flow for a DST designed to do such.
• Estate planning. Some investors prefer being active real estate owners, while their heirs may wish to be passive owners. A DST can be a powerful estate planning tool. DST interests can be divided amongst beneficiaries, leaving each to decide what to do with their own portion, while the basis on the property steps up to fair market value upon the original owner’s death.⁴⁰ This strategy is effective for many owners of family farms. Family farm owners are often asset-rich and cashpoor; they understand the tax liability in selling the farm, and often, they have children who either do not want to take over the farm or cannot get the financing to purchase the farm from the parent that would enable the parent to retire. The § 1031-to-DST strategy solves the exit and retirement problem, and it can solve the estate distribution problem as well.
• Return to active management. If the investor longs for the days of “tenants, toilets, and trash” and wishes to return to actively managing investment real estate, the investor always retains that option. Once the DST liquidates, they can simply use the standard § 1031 exchange via like-kind property swap and exit out of the passive management scenario without incurring capital gain or triggering NIIT or DRT and instruct the QI to acquire a directly owned real estate interest of their choosing.
• Eminent domain, destroyed property, and § 1033 exchanges. Investment properties that have been subject to eminent domain or destruction (fire, flood, etc.) may be eligible for a § 1033 exchange. A § 1033 exchange applies when a property is lost through casualty, theft, or condemnation, and incurs capital gains from the proceeds received to pay for the loss.⁴¹ As in § 1031 exchanges, a DST may be a replacement solution for these types of exchanges, too.⁴² Similar to a § 1031 exchange, if reinvested proceeds meet the requirements for the exchange, then capital gains may be deferred. However, unlike § 1031, a § 1033 exchange can be utilized by the investor even if the event took place in the past two or three years and if the investor already took receipt of the proceeds. 

Disadvantages of using DSTs in § 1031 exchanges 

While the advantages of DSTs are compelling, there are several disadvantages that can make the § 1031-to-DST exchange an inappropriate investment. These include, but are not limited to: 

• Illiquidity. Upon acquisition of a beneficial interest in a DST, an investor generally lacks the ability to sell, assign, or redeem that interest at will. Instead, recovery of principal is typically possible only upon the occurrence of a liquidity event — a sponsor-initiated transaction that converts the underlying real estate asset into cash or a cash-equivalent interest. 

  Liquidity events most commonly arise through: (1) the sale of the DST-owned real property; (2) a DST-level § 1031 exchange into replacement real estate; or (3) a contribution of the DST property to a real estate investment trust operating partnership pursuant to IRC § 721, commonly referred to as an UPREIT transaction. Less commonly, a liquidity event may occur following the conversion of the DST into a partnership structure — often termed a “springing LLC” — to address operational exigencies, though such conversion may restrict future § 1031 exchange eligibility. 

  For example, assume an investor completes a § 1031 exchange into a DST that owns a $50 million multi-tenant industrial property. The offering documents project a seven-year holding period. During that time, the investor receives periodic income distributions derived from rental operations but has no contractual right to liquidate their beneficial interest. At the conclusion of year seven, the DST sponsor determines that market conditions are favorable and sells the property. After satisfaction of outstanding debt and transaction expenses, the net proceeds are distributed to the beneficial owners. This sale constitutes the liquidity event. At that juncture, the investor must elect whether to reinvest the proceeds through another § 1031 exchange or recognize the previously deferred capital gains, DRT, and NIIT surtaxes. 

  This framework underscores that liquidity in a DST is event-driven, sponsor-controlled, and time-uncertain. Accordingly, lawyers advising clients considering DST investments should emphasize the necessity of aligning the investment horizon, cash flow needs, and risk tolerance with the structural limitations inherent in DST ownership. 

• Complete absence of public secondary markets for DST interests. Since DST shares are illiquid, a public secondary market does not exist for investors or others to buy and sell their shares. However, there is a silver lining associated with this aspect: Since there is no public secondary market, the DST shares are marginally correlated to equity markets. Thus, their value tends to remain constant while traditional shares in equities see greater volatility as they are traded. Investors holding securitized real estate, such as a DST, generally must demonstrate that they have a low need for liquidity. Unfortunately, circumstances sometimes arise that change that dynamic, and when they do, investors in DSTs and other illiquid assets will receive unsolicited deeply discounted third-party offers for their interests.
• Long-term time horizons and holding periods. Typically, DSTs tend to exist between five and seven years before the sponsor will consider initiating any type of liquidation process. During that time, if the DST is successful, it will pay its beneficial owners a distribution of the income derived from the underlying property, generally on a monthly basis. So, an investment property holder using DSTs as replacement properties to execute a § 1031 exchange strategy is at the mercy of the DST sponsor as to when they can exit the investment. Conversely, if the investor holds on to their physical property, the investor retains the freedom to sell it at any time they deem beneficial.
• Lack of investor control. As stated above, the investor loses decision control when entering the DST. The decision of when to sell the DST is determined by the sponsor. Unlike traditional stocks, there are no voting rights associated with an investor’s beneficial ownership interest. When a DST is sold, the investor can rollover sales proceeds into another DST (e.g., keep kicking the proverbial tax can down the road until death when beneficiaries can receive a step-up in cost basis), exchange the sales proceeds into a new directly held property, or cash out and pay taxes.
• Fees and costs. DST investments tend to be more expensive than other traditional investments. They also incur relatively high management fees to pay for the professional team operating them, which eat into the investor’s yield, unless significant tax savings from deferral can be obtained.
• Inflexibility of structure. As previously mentioned, DSTs are prohibited from refinancing, making capital improvements, or amending/altering the lease terms. Properties held in a DST could fall into dereliction if not properly managed or if minor repairs would be futile. Thus, it is imperative to evaluate the operational results and reputation of each DST sponsor to mitigate this risk.
• General real estate risks. Just as in holding any physical real property, DST beneficial owners assume the same general and market-related risks of changes in cap rates, variations in occupancy, loss of tenants, loss of principal, rising interest rates, limited liquidity, and inflation.
• Accredited investor status. Like most private placement and securitized real estate investments of an illiquid nature, DSTs can only accept accredited investors as defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission.⁴³ To meet the definition, an investor must have a net worth, excluding primary residence and personal property, that is $1 million or more. Trusts not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities being offered must have total assets greater than $5 million, but this high threshold can be waived for grantor trusts where each trustee meets the individual criteria for being an accredited investor. If the investor fails that net worth test, then the investor can qualify by providing the past two years of their tax returns showing at least $200,000 of individual income or $300,000 in joint spousal income. Many investors who possess lower-valued real property, such as rental houses for college students, might find the accredited investor status requirement barring their use of a DST.
• Tax law changes. While the § 1031 exchange has existed since 1921,⁴⁴ it tends to be a candidate for elimination (or is often used as a negotiation tool) during tax policy discussions on Capitol Hill. Even though it is unlikely to be eliminated, it is not immune from substantial changes, such as when the sale of personal property became ineligible for § 1031 exchange benefits in 2017.⁴⁵ The most recent major legislation, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act,⁴⁶ resulted in no changes to § 1031, DSTs, or the likekind definition. Further, OBBBA placed no new limitations, caps, or phase-outs on § 1031 transactions.⁴⁷ Again, while the sun still shines on § 1031 exchanges, new legislation can always bring about a sunset. 

One last § 1031 wrinkle: Section 721 UPREIT Exchange 

The intersection of DST investments, § 1031 like-kind exchanges, and so-called “UPREIT” transactions presents one of the more sophisticated and consequential tax planning crossroads in modern real estate practice. 

The ultimate moment of decision arrives when DST sponsors offer investors the opportunity to convert their fractional real estate beneficial interests into Operating Partnership units (OP units) through a § 721 contribution to a Real Estate Investment Trust’s (REIT) umbrella partnership.⁴⁸ The choice to accept such units carries significant implications for future tax deferral strategies, including the ability — or inability — to execute subsequent § 1031 exchanges. 

What lawyers, CPAs, and other advisors need to know about the § 721 UPREIT process is that, while there is a proper time and place for it, when their client enters the UPREIT, they are now in a § 1031 dead end. That client can no longer conduct a subsequent § 1031 exchange using those particular proceeds. This distinction creates what tax practitioners often describe as a “one-way election.”

Further, when an investor selects the UPREIT option, the OP units become commingled with other REIT properties in the sponsor’s portfolio. While that can positively improve the investor’s diversification, the investor is now forced to invest in other properties they did not select, while also having no ability to decide whether future properties being added to the REIT portfolio are desirable for their situation. 

In addition, when the investor converts their DST beneficial ownership interests to OP units, that conversion is not a taxable event. However, when the REIT sells the OP units at its liquidation event, or when the investor decides to liquidate a portion of their REIT interest, an unavoidable taxable event occurs. The investor must now recognize tax liability on the deferred capital gains, DRT, and NIIT. 

One of the advantages often expressed in advising a client to accept the § 721 UPREIT option is the limited liquidity feature of the REIT in comparison to the essentially non-existent liquidity aspect inherent with DSTs. Like DSTs, REITs generally are not publicly traded, so they do not offer a secondary market sale option. Instead, the REIT sponsor tends to offer a Share Repurchase Program where the sponsor offers shareholders a stated share price for a limited number of shares to be redeemed. However, this particular liquidity provision is almost always limited and never guaranteed — and it is not uncommon for the REIT sponsor to suspend or terminate the program. 

Lawyers, CPAs, and other advisors should remain cautious that converting DST interests into OP units effectively closes the door to conducting future § 1031 exchanges for that real estate asset. That does not mean such transactions should be dismissed out of hand. For some investors, the opportunity to more broadly diversify their holdings, gain some measure of liquidity, and shift the management of their real estate assets to professional institutions can outweigh the disadvantages. 

Conclusion 

Using DSTs as replacement properties to execute a § 1031 exchange strategy is not appropriate for all real estate investment holders. However, when properly structured, the DST option provides significant tax and utility advantages for investors and retiring business owners to consider. It can enable such people to exit the active management duties and accompanying liabilities intrinsically attached to holding physical real property, while also providing the benefit of a consistent income stream that is marginally correlated to the performance of equity markets.

Although gaining in popularity, this viable strategy continues to be significantly underutilized today due to lack of option awareness by lawyers, CPAs, and other financial professionals. Thus, acquiring a competent understanding of the strategy’s availability, along with its advantages and drawbacks, will empower lawyers to better advance their clients’ interests in securing appropriate tax deferrals, improving asset diversification, and accomplishing valuable estate planning objectives.

This article is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation of an offer to buy any security which can only be made by prospectus. Investing in real estate and § 1031 exchange replacement properties may not be in the best interest of all investors and may involve significant risks. Investors should understand all fees associated with a particular investment and how those fees could affect overall performance. Neither Diversify, DFPG or its representatives provide tax or legal advice, as such advice can only be provided by a qualified tax or legal professional, who all investors should consult prior to making any investment decision. Wealth management services through various unaffiliated companies including advisory services offered by Diversify Wealth Management, LLC (“Diversify”) and Integrated Advisory Services, LLC (“IAN”) SEC registered investment advisers. Additional investment services and securities through DFPG Investments, LLC., a broker/dealer, member FINRA/SIPC, and an affiliate of Diversify. IAN is not affiliated with Diversify or DFPG.

Endnotes 
1 J. Max Nowakowski, The Basics of a 1031 Like-kind Exchange, 95 OKLA. B.J. 42 (June 2024). 
2 Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191. 
3 I.R.C. §1031(a)(1) (2025). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Treas. Reg. §1.1031(a)-1(b) (as amended in 1991). 
7 I.R.C. §1031(h) (2025). 
8 I.R.C. §1031(a)(2) (2025). 
9 Sparks v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 603 (W.D. Ark. 1956). 
10 I.R.C. §1031(a)(3)(A) (2025). 
11 Treas. Reg. §1.1031(k)-1(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 1991). 
12 Treas. Reg. §1.1031(k)-1(c)(4)(i)(A) (as amended in 1991). 
13 Treas. Reg. §1.1031(k)-1(c)(4)(i)(B) (as amended in 1991). 
14 Treas. Reg. §1.1031(k)-1(c)(4)(iii) (as amended in 1991). 
15 I.R.C. §1031(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2018). 
16 Treas. Reg. §1.1031(k)-1(b)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1991). 
17 I.R.C. §1031(h) (2025). 
18 Treas. Reg. §1.1031(b)-1(a) (as amended in 1991); Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963). 
19 Treas. Reg. §1.1031(b)-1(c) (as amended in 1991). 
20 Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 105 (2009). 
21 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200251008 (Sept. 11, 2002).
22 I.R.C. §1031(a)(1) (2025). 
23 Treas. Reg. §1.1031(k)-1(g)(7) (as amended in 1991). 
24 I.R.C. §1001(a) (2025). 
25 Treas. Reg. §1.1031(k)-1(g)(4)(i) (as amended in 1991). 
26 Maloney v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-34; Treas. Reg. §1.1031(a)-1(b) (as amended in 1991). 
27 Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975-2 C.B. 333. 
28 I.R.C. §1031(a)(1) (2025); Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(a) (as amended in 1991). 
29 I.R.C. §1031(a)(1) (2025); I.R.C. §§ 871–882 (2025); I.R.C. §897 (2025); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9853024 (Oct. 1, 1998). 
30 Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 3801 et seq. (2023). 
31 Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191. “Holdings: (1) The Delaware Statutory Trust is an investment trust, under §301.7701-4(c), that will be classified as a trust for federal tax purposes. (2) A taxpayer may exchange real property for an interest in the 
Delaware Statutory Trust without recognition of gain or loss under §1031, if the other requirements of §1031 are satisfied.” 
32 Id. “… interests in the trust may be qualifying property in a tax-deferred, like-kind exchange if the other requirements for such treatment are satisfied.” 
33 Id. Except in the event of an original tenant bankruptcy or insolvency. 
34 26 U.S.C. §1250(a); IRS Pub. 544, Sales and Other Dispositions of Assets (2023). 
35 26 U.S.C. §1411 (2025). 
36 IRS Publication 527, Residential Rental Property § 2 (2024); IRS Publication 946, How to Depreciate Property § 4 “Recovery Periods Under GDS” (2024).
37 Net Investment Income Tax, Topic No. 559, Internal Revenue Service; Instructions for Form 8960, 2024; 26 U.S.C. § 1411 (Net Investment Income Tax). 
38 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200521002 (May 27, 2005). 
39 Delaware Statutory Trust Act, 12 Del. C. § 3801 et seq.; Rev. Rul. 2004-86; Instructions for Form 6198 (2024), At-Risk Rules (Treas. Reg. § 1.465-27); 26 C.F.R. § 1.465-27 (Qualified Nonrecourse Financing). 
40 I.R.C. §1014(a) (2025). 
41 I.R.C. §1033 (2025). 
42 Private Letter Ruling (PLR) 200644019 (Nov. 3, 2006). Although not precedent, this PLR allowed a taxpayer to use DST interests as replacement property in a §1033 exchange after a condemnation. 
43 17 C.F.R. §230.501(a) (2025). 
44 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §202(c), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (1921). 
45 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §13303, 131 Stat. 2054, 2124 (2017). 
46 Public Law 119-21, An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to title II of H. Con. Res. 14, 139 Stat. 72 (July 4, 2025). 
47 Evan Liddiard, “Big Beautiful” Tax Bill Now Law: In-Depth Analysis, Nat’l Ass’n of REALTORS, (Jul. 14, 2025), Big Beautiful Tax Bill Now Law: In-Depth Analysis, NAR, nar.realtor/washington-report/big-beautiful-tax-bill-now-law-in-depth-analysis. 
48 26 U.S.C. § 721(a): “No gain or loss shall be recognized to a partnership or to any of its partners in the case of a contribution of property to the partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership.”; Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(a): confirms that the contributor receives a partnership interest in exchange for the contributed property.

To submit an obituary, please complete the form at MoBar.org/in-memoriam. We will not print a notice unless a copy of the death certificate or obituary is submitted.

Hon. David Arand, age 69, of Union, on Sept. 20, 2024. Arand graduated from the Washburn University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1980. Arand joined the law firm of Briegel & Baylard in Union. His practice focused on estate planning and family law. He was a lawyer in the juvenile court system and a municipal judge for Union and St. Clair. 

Hollye Stolz Atwood, age 79, of St. Louis, on July 17, 2025. Atwood graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1973. She was the first female partner at Bryan Cave, where she spent her legal career of more than 50 years. Atwood served on the board of the St. Louis Bar Foundation. 

Alan J. Baker, age 83, of St. Louis, on Dec. 21, 2025. Baker graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1971. He practiced law for 55 years. Baker served in the U.S. military. 

Hon. Charles “Charlie” Wayne Baker, age 83, of Little Rock, Arkansas, on Dec. 21, 2023. Baker graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1965. Baker joined a private law firm in Kansas City. He moved to Little Rock, where he was a federal bankruptcy judge and joined the Rose Law Firm. Baker also worked on several political campaigns. 

Richard Beaver Sr., age 79, of Jefferson City, on Aug. 7, 2024. Beaver was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1987. He was a lawyer for more than 37 years. 

Angela M. Bennett, age 73, of Kansas City, on Dec. 2, 2025. Bennett graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1977. She was a lawyer for the Missouri Attorney General’s Office, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the law firm Lathrop & Gage. She was a regional director of the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights. She was a member of The Missouri Bar Board of Governors, a delegate to the American Bar Association, and chair of the ABA’s Professionalism Committee. 

Christopher Michael Blanton, age 78, of St. Louis, on Jan. 9, 2026. Blanton graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1975. He was a senior partner at The Stolar Partnership LLP, where he worked for the entirety of his legal career. Blanton served in the U.S. Army. 

James Virgil Bliss, age 94, of Ballwin, on Feb. 17, 2025. Bliss graduated from the Southern Methodist University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1965. 

Richard Brownlee, age 79, of Jefferson City, on Dec. 30, 2025. Brownlee graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1972. He represented major industries before the Missouri General Assembly for more than 40 years and advised large companies on state contracting, procurement, and technologyrelated initiatives. 

David Roger Cerchie, age 79, of Vero Beach, Florida, on Sept. 8, 2025. Cerchie graduated from the University of Tulsa College of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1994. He began practicing in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and later co-founded VersaFlex. 

Charles Edward Clark, age 85, of Lenexa, Kansas, on Dec. 20, 2025. Clark graduated from the University of Michigan School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1965. He joined the law firm of Dietrich, Tyler, Davis, Burrell and Dicus. He joined List and Clark Construction Company as of counsel and later as president. Clark served in the U.S. Army Reserve Judge Advocate General’s Corps. 

Thomas Clough, age 88, of Grover Beach, California, on May 21, 2025. Clough was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1966. 

Joan Z. Cohen, age 83, of St. Louis, on Feb. 24, 2025. Cohen graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1983. She joined Armstrong Teasdale, where she became partner and specialized in human relations and employment law. 

Hal Coleman, age 100, of Osage Beach, on April 27, 2025. Coleman graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1949. He practiced law for 43 years. Coleman served in the U.S. Navy. 

Susan Tarkow Cooper, age 74, of St. Louis, on July 13, 2023. Cooper was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1978. 

Jack Craft, age 87, of Kansas City, on Dec. 2, 2025. Craft graduated from Northwestern University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1965. He practiced with Lathrop, Righter, Gordon, and Parker in Kansas City and later founded Craft, Fridkin & Rhyne. Craft also assisted with several political campaigns. 

Paul A. Craig, age 73, of St. Ann, on Nov. 23, 2025. He was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1988. 

Heywood Hodder Davis, age 93, of Prairie Village, Kansas, on Dec. 7, 2024. He graduated from the University of Kansas School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1958. Davis was an associate, then partner with the law firm Dietrich, Tyler, Davis, Burrell & Dicus. He and his colleagues formed Davis, Sands & Collins P.C. firm, and he was a founding trustee of what is now Legal Aid of Western Missouri. Davis served in the U.S. Navy. 

Francis X. Duda, age 83, of St. Louis, on Jan. 24, 2026. Duda graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1967. He worked at Bryan, Cave, McPheeters & McRoberts, then Keefe, Schlafly, Griesedieck & Ferrell, where he became partner. He joined Armstrong, Teasdale, Kramer, Vaughan & Schlafly as partner until he joined Anderson & Gilbert. He received The Missouri Bar Foundation Spurgeon Smithson Award. Duda served in the U.S. Army and was a captain in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps. 

Hon. Theodore “Ted” Stephen Elo, age 65, of St. Joseph, on March 30, 2025. Elo graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1987. He practiced law in the private sector for nearly 20 years before becoming assistant city attorney for St. Joseph. He was elected municipal judge for St. Joseph in 2022. 

Jay W. Endress, age 65, of Peru, Illinois, on Sept. 13, 2025. Endress graduated from the Marquette University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1985. He practiced law for nine years in Kansas City. He worked at the Cantlin Law Firm in Ottawa, Illinois, and was a legislative aide. He was a co-owner of Saint Bede Abbey Press and of four newspapers. 

David Edgar Everson Jr., age 81, of St. Louis, on Nov. 19, 2025. Everson was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1978. He was a civil rights defender and antitrust litigator. 

Mary Lindeman Fournie, age 71, of St. Louis, on Dec. 2, 2025. Fournie graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1979. She practiced with Bryan, Cave, McPheters & McRoberts. 

Steven N. Frank, age 76, of St. Louis, on Sept. 8, 2024. Frank graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1973. He worked in private practice for 25 years with Peper, Martin, Jensen, Maichel & Hetlage, then Shiffrin & Treimann. He was corporate counsel with Ralston Purina and McDonnell Douglas. He participated in the merger of McDonnell Douglas with Boeing, co-founded ZeaVision, and became partner at Plancorp. 

Norman Fretwell, age 80, of Kansas City, on Feb. 25, 2025. Fretwell graduated from the University of Michigan Law School and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1973. He became partner at law firms in Kansas City, most recently Spencer Fane. Fretwell served in the U.S. military. 

Wayne Daniel Gifford, age 70, of Waynesville, on Sept. 30, 2025. Gifford was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1978 and started his own law practice. He was also elected prosecuting attorney. Gifford served in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves. 

Jay T. Grodsky, age 78, of Raymore, on Nov. 30, 2025. Grodsky graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1978. He practiced bankruptcy and family law, then worked for the Missouri Department of Health and Human Services. Grodsky served in the U.S. Air Force. 

Lloyd Barry Gubin, age 74, of St. Louis, on Jan. 26, 2026. Gubin graduated from the St. Mary’s University School of Law in San Antonio, Texas, and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1982. He was in-house counsel for Deaconess Hospital and was an adjunct professor at Webster University. Gubin started a civil law practice specializing in bankruptcy. Gubin served in the U.S. Army Reserves. 

Paula Kay Harms, age 51, of Kansas City, on Sept. 22, 2025. Harms graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2000. She worked for more than 20 years as an assistant federal public defender for the Capital Habeas Unit. 

Robert Lewis Hawkins, age 74, of Biloxi, Mississippi, on Nov. 30, 2025. Hawkins graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1979. He practiced law with his father, then at his own firm before serving as the director of historic sites in Biloxi and Redlands, California. He worked for the Social Security Administration in Tennessee until he retired. 

H. Max Hilfiker, age 81, of Malden, on Sept. 8, 2025. Hilfiker graduated from the South Texas College of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1974. He established the Hilfiker Law Firm in Malden, where he worked until he retired. Hilfiker served in the U.S. Army. 

Hon. Robert “Bob” Harlan House, age 76, of Joplin, on June 13, 2025. House graduated from the Duke University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1974. He was appointed a circuit judge of the 44th Judicial Circuit. House was an assistant attorney general, Douglas County prosecuting attorney, Mansfield city attorney, and Ava municipal judge. He was also a chief administrative law judge for the Missouri Division of Workers’ Compensation. 

Tristram Willoughby Hunt, age 59, of Kansas City, Kansas, on June 5, 2024. Hunt graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1999. He worked as an assistant district attorney for the Wyandotte County District Attorney’s Office. He worked for the U.S. Department of Justice as an assistant U.S. attorney until he retired. 

Craig Jacobs, age 65, of Jefferson City, on Oct. 10, 2025. Jacobs was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1997 and was a lawyer for the State of Missouri. 

Hon. Peter Roman Jarosewycz, age 75, of Kansas City, on Jan. 4, 2024. Jarosewycz graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1976. He was an administrative law judge for the Missouri Department of Employment. 

Ken Johnson, age 80, of Springfield, on Feb. 14, 2026. Johnson graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1970. He worked at Bussell, Hough & Greene, then Johnson & Sweeney. He practiced with Twibell Johnson for decades. 

Eugene Kastanek, age 80, of Midlothian, Texas, on Aug. 28, 2025. Kastanek was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1976. He was an attorney-at-law at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for 41 years. 

Velma Lucinda Lambert, age 78, of St. Louis, on March 12, 2025. Lambert was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2003. 

Carl Armand Leibner, age 91, of O’Fallon, on July 19, 2025. Leibner was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1969. He worked with the Farm Credit Bureau and later the State of Missouri. Leibner served in the U.S. military. 

Lauren Leigh Butler Mann, age 41, of Kansas City, on Aug. 19, 2025. Butler Mann graduated from the Oklahoma City University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2011. She worked with Martin, Leigh, Laws, and Fritzlen, P.C. and Millsap and Singer, LLC. She then worked at Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City.

Betty Masters, age 84, of Jefferson City, on April 23, 2025. Masters graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1991. She worked for the State of Missouri for 35 years, including in the Missouri Personnel Division, the Department of Welfare, the Division of Employment Security, the Missouri House of Representatives, and Gov. Joseph Teasdale’s office. She was also a lawyer and chief bill drafter for the Joint Committee on Legislative Research. 

James McHugh, age 92, of St. Charles, on Nov. 26, 2024. McHugh graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1966. He was president of the International Division at Pet, Inc. McHugh served in the U.S. Air Force. 

Hon. Roger W. McLean, age 70, of Kansas City, Kansas, on March 22, 2025. McLean graduated from the University of Kansas School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1991. He worked at Barnett & Lerner, then formed McLean & McLean with his brother. He was appointed judge of the Wyandotte County District Court and later returned to private practice.

James Scott Merritt Jr., age 85, Manhattan, Kansas, on Feb. 26, 2025. Merritt graduated from the University of Virginia School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1964. He joined the Kansas City law firm of Stinson Mag and practiced there for two decades. He later opened his own private practice. 

Donald Rae Moore, age 75, of Blue Springs, on Nov. 11, 2025. He graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1987. He was partner at Cochran Oswald before leaving the firm. He then represented clients and businesses in Blue Springs and eastern Jackson County for more than 40 years. Moore served in the U.S. Navy. He joined the U.S. Army Reserve JAG Detachment in Independence and retired after more than 20 years of service. 

Janet Elise Oliver, age 75, of Overland Park, Kansas, on Oct. 18, 2025. Oliver graduated from the University of Missouri- Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1997. She practiced law in the Kansas City area. 

Sam Scott Phillips, age 70, of Columbia, on Dec. 16, 2025. Phillips graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1983. He was executive trust officer and vice president of Exchange Bank in Jefferson City, chief assistant prosecuting attorney for Greene County, and deputy chief disciplinary counsel for the Supreme Court of Missouri. He was also chair of The Missouri Bar Law Practice Management Committee and served on the board of directors for the National Organization of Bar Counsel. 

Tommy Daniels Pisciotta, age 31, of Clayton, on Jan. 5, 2026. He graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2022. 

Michael J. Plambeck, age 60, of Bellevue, Nebraska, on July 19, 2025. Plambeck graduated from Creighton University Law School and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1990. Plambeck practiced in Kansas City, then opened Binning & Plambeck in Bellevue. 

Andrew Bentley Protzman, age 54, of Leawood, Kansas, on Aug. 12, 2025. Protzman graduated from the University of Missouri- Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1996. He started practicing at Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice, then started his own practice, Protzman Law Firm. 

Clyde James Rayburn Jr., age 92, of Lee’s Summit, on Oct. 1, 2024. Rayburn graduated from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1954. He evaluated policies at Dodson Insurance for 20 years. 

John Emerson Russell, age 83, of St. Louis, on March 20, 2025. Russell graduated from the Vanderbilt University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1969. He worked in the trust department at a bank in Nashville, Tennessee. He was a lawyer for the IRS in Washington D.C., then started his own practice in St. Louis. Russell served in the U.S. Marine Corps. 

Clyde Holcomb Sellers, age 78, of Freeport, Florida, on May 6, 2024. Sellers graduated from the Washington University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1973. He worked for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineering as a lawyer and chief of real estate for 33 years. 

George F. Smith, age 79, of St. Louis, on March 24, 2025. Smith graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1971. Smith worked for St. Louis County, was a partner at Lashly & Baer, and spent 26 years at UniGroup. He served in the U.S. Army Reserves. 

Sandy Smith, age 74, of Kansas City, on Aug. 31, 2025. Smith graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1989. She practiced at various hospitals and law firms in the Kansas City area. 

Michael A. “Terk” Suire, age 67, of Fenton, on Sept. 22, 2025. He was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1992. Suire served in the U.S. Coast Guard. 

John Francis Sutherland IV, age 80, of St. Louis, on Dec. 24, 2024. Sutherland graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1969. He spent most of his career working in the banking industry. He served in the U.S. Army. 

William Earl “Bill” Taylor, age 87, of St. Louis, on Nov. 10, 2025. Taylor graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1963. He practiced tax law for 41 years at Monsanto, Ralston Purina, and Ralcorp. 

John Mark Thomas, age 73, of Ann Arbor, Michigan, on Dec. 4, 2025. Thomas graduated from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2011. Thomas was an in-house attorney with Ford Motor Company before joining Bryan Cave law firm and later Dykema Gossett. 

Michael Towerman, age 66, of Glencoe, on Sept. 5, 2024. Towerman was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1983. 

Hon. Gerald “Jerry” Arthur Wacknov, age 86, of Foster City, California, on Oct. 10, 2025. Wacknov graduated from Columbia Law School and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1964. He worked as a lawyer for the National Labor Relations Board until he was appointed as an administrative law judge and moved to the San Francisco Bay area. Wacknov retired after a 50-year career with the NLRB. 

Richard “Rick” Clark Wallace, age 78, of Lenexa, Kansas, on June 26, 2025. Wallace graduated from the University of Kansas School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1990. He worked at Wyandotte County Legal Aid and later helped found Kansas Legal Services in Topeka. He then joined the Evans & Mullinix Law Firm. 

William C. Wefel, age 80, of St. Louis, on March 20, 2025. Wefel graduated from the Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1968. Wefel practiced as a lawyer until he bought a motorcycle business, Bob Schultz Motors. 

Hon. William J. Wegge Jr., age 83, of Festus, on Dec. 23, 2025. Wegge graduated from Saint Louis University School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1980. He practiced law in De Soto and Hillsboro and served as a municipal judge in De Soto. He was elected associate circuit judge in 1991. After retiring, he continued to practice law on a part-time basis. 

Michael Yates, age 79, of Joplin, on Nov. 19, 2024. Yates graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 1980. He was a professor of paralegal studies and political science at Missouri Southern State University. He later served as an adjunct professor at MSSU and Crowder College. He was a regional reporter with the Education Law Association.

Have you ever heard a colleague say something is required, or not required, by the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct and wondered, “Is that right?” Melinda J. Bentley, legal ethics counsel for the Office of Legal Ethics Counsel, breaks down 10 scenarios to help Missouri lawyers separate fact from fiction when complying with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Quiz your knowledge here.

In December, the Supreme Court of Missouri updated redaction requirements. As lawyers review their redaction process, they can follow this step-by-step guide for redacting easily in Adobe Acrobat Pro to continue protecting clients' sensitive information.

In her column, Missouri Bar President Athena Dickson asks Missouri lawyers to consider joining The Missouri Bar's network of lawyer-leaders. This network is made up of individuals willing to help educate Missouri residents about The Missouri Plan and the judicial retention process. Learn more and sign up.

In the latest issue of the Journal, Nicholas Jain, 2025-2026 Chair of the Young Lawyers’ Section, reflects on the evolution of the YLS and the impact it has had on both Missouri lawyers and local communities. Read his thoughts here.

“Other attorneys! Our jobs can be isolating, lonely, and depressing. Finding others who are willing (and want to) listen to you and talk with you is key. Not only does it sometimes result in good ideas and resolutions, it reminds you that you are not alone. Perspective can be very helpful. I find that people who are not ‘in the trenches’ do not understand the burden we shoulder each day, and that can make me feel further adrift. Other lawyers, particularly those who have been in the same trenches, can create a sense of comradery.”
 – Tory Bernsen, CJA lawyer and St. Louis County Traffic Court commissioner in St. Louis

“When I am feeling burnout or discouragement, I try to remember why I became a lawyer. I wanted to make the world better and help people, simple as that. So, I try to see the difference I have made and continue to make for my clients. Reminding myself of my purpose and having perspective of the bigger picture gives me the reason I need to keep going and the motivation to work hard. People need us as lawyers, and we have a privilege, and in my opinion, duty, to go out and serve them. I always remind myself of that and I keep going, with a renewed sense of purpose.”
– Kennedy Womack, associate attorney at Stange Law Firm, PC, in Columbia

We were wondering … What is one habit you developed early in your career that has proven to be valuable over time? Share your answer by emailing Journal@MoBar.org or completing a form or visiting MoBar.Wufoo.com/forms/closing-statements.

W. Dudley McCarter, a former president of The Missouri Bar, is a partner in the St. Louis law firm of Behr, McCarter, Neely & Gabris.

Continuing care exception did not extend two-year statute of limitations for medical negligence suit 
Wolfe v. Walker, 713 S.W.3d 536 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). 

Frank and Karen Wolfe appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents Dr. Courtnye Allyson Walker and SSM Regional Health Services. The ruling held that the Wolfes’ claims of medical negligence were barred by the two-year statute of limitations and that the statute of limitations was not tolled by the continuing care exception. The Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District affirmed.¹ 

Section 516.105 states that all actions against physicians, hospitals, and entities providing health care services for damages for malpractice, negligence, errors, or mistakes related to health care shall be brought within two years from the date of occurrence of the negligent act.² 

Wolfe’s petition was filed more than two years after he was released from Walker’s care. Wolfe relied on a nonstatutory exception to the two-year statute of limitations known as the “continuing care” exception. The exception operates to temporarily pause the commencement of the statute of limitations as long as a physician’s “treatment is continuing and of such a nature as to charge the medical man with the duty of continuing care and treatment which is essential to recovery.”³ 

‘“[C]ontinuing care’ only exists if a patient is actually receiving continuing treatment from the health-care provider for the condition on which the claim of negligence is based.”⁴ Continuing care is not established when the patient requires treatment later for complications arising from the health care provider’s negligence, or because the provider “knew or should have known of the patient’s need for further treatment.”⁵ 

In Newton v. Mercy Clinic East Communities,⁶ the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the continuing care exception does not apply to the continued physician-patient relationship to include care for later discovered complications. In Wolfe, “the trial court properly recognized that the uncontroverted facts Wolfe relies on fell into the category of care for later discovered complications and does not qualify as ‘continuing care’ for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations.”⁷

Inverse condemnation, not nuisance, is proper cause of action against municipality 
Ferguson v. City of Sunrise Beach, 710 S.W.3d 620 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025). 

The City of Sunrise Beach appealed, claiming the trial court erred in denying the motion on the plaintiffs’ nuisance claim for property damage because the plaintiffs’ claims for loss of use and enjoyment of real property must be asserted through an action for inverse condemnation.⁸ The Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District reversed and remanded the judgment.⁹ 

The respondents alleged the city released improperly treated wastewater from the treatment plant that migrated to the creek near the respondents’ properties, which negatively impacted their properties and their “use and enjoyment” of them.¹⁰ 

“Inverse condemnation is the exclusive and proper remedy for an alleged nuisance or other damage caused to private property by an entity having the power of eminent domain.”¹¹ “[N]o cause of action for nuisance exists against municipalities with condemning authority.”¹² 

The Missouri Court of Appeals stated the respondents and trial court “misconceived the law” regarding the respondents’ claims.¹³

 [W]here a plaintiff has from the outset misconceived the law and has chosen a mistaken legal theory to submit to the jury for redress, we may reverse the judgment … and remand the cause to allow the plaintiff to plead and to submit another theory.¹⁴ 

The court remanded the case to allow the respondents to amend their petition to assert claims for inverse condemnation. The court noted: 

Provided the amended petition states causes of action for inverse condemnation, the case shall be allowed to proceed. If the amended petition does not state such claims for inverse condemnation, the trial court shall dismiss the claim with prejudice.¹⁵

Timely filed application for change of judge must be granted 
State ex rel. Tapia v. Ankrom, 713 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).

Rudy Tapia and Douglas Rogers were involved in a lawsuit,¹⁶ and the case was transferred to a new venue, where Hon. Derek Ankrom was assigned as the new judge. After Ankrom denied Tapia and Rogers’ application for a change of judge, Tapia and Rogers filed a writ of prohibition asking that Ankrom be prohibited from taking any further action in the case, except to order a change of judge. The Missouri Court of Appeals- Western District made the preliminary writ of prohibition permanent.¹⁷ 

Ankrom was designated the trial judge on Aug. 28, 2024, and the application from Tapia and Rogers for a change of judge was filed Sept. 17, 2024, within 30 days of Ankrom’s designation.¹⁸ Since the application was served on all counsel of record, the application for a change of judge was timely.¹⁹ 

Rule 51.05(e) notes the judge must promptly sustain a timely application for a change of judge once presented. “Rule 51.05 grants a party the absolute right to disqualify a judge once without cause or any showing of prejudice.”²⁰

Evidence that supports MHRA claim may support punitive damages 
D.W. by and through L.W., v. Hogan Preparatory Academy, Inc., 713 S.W.3d 654 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). 

Hogan Preparatory Academy, Inc. and Douglas Bliss, a former teacher, appealed from a judgment in favor of D.W., a former student, for compensatory and punitive damages on her claim against Hogan for sex discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act and her claim against Bliss for battery. The Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District affirmed the judgment.²¹ 

A case for punitive damages requires clear and convincing proof the defendant intentionally acted by wanton, willful, or outrageous act, or by reckless disregard for an act’s consequences from which evil motive is inferred.²² “The defendant must have intentionally committed a wrongful act without just cause or excuse.”²³ 

Hogan claimed D.W. failed to make a submissible case for punitive damages because there was no clear and convincing evidence of Hogan’s evil motive, outrageous conduct, or reckless indifference to D.W.’s rights. However a plaintiff may show discriminatory conduct supporting punitive damages by circumstantial evidence.²⁴ D.W.’s “evidence in support of her MHRA claim may also meet her burden for submitting punitive damages to the jury.”²⁵ 

The rationale for allowing the jury to make reasonable inferences in determining liability for punitive damages is the same as that for the substantive claim: [defendants] may act to prevent the development of direct evidence and a clear evidentiary trail of discriminatory intent is rare.²⁶ 

Hogan noted the jury did not award punitive damages against Bliss as reflecting on the sufficiency of the evidence. The court rejected Hogan’s “novel argument that a jury’s verdict as to the employee on a punitive damages claim controls the issue of submissibility of a punitive damages claim against the employer.”²⁷

The court found that the jury could have declined to award punitive damages for a variety of reasons. “We decline to find that the trial court erred in submitting the issue of punitive damages against Hogan to the jury simply because the jury did not award punitive damages against Bliss.”²⁸ 

From the evidence adduced at trial and the reasonable inferences therefrom, a jury could have inferred that Hogan engaged in outrageous conduct either through intentional wrongful acts or through the reckless disregard of D.W.’s rights. Because this is not a case involving the “complete absence of probative facts to support the jury’s conclusion” as to punitive damages, we decline to reverse the jury’s verdict.²⁹

Endnotes 
1 Wolfe v. Walker, 713 S.W.3d 536 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). 
2 RSMo § 516.105.1. 
3 Thatcher v. De Tar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1943). 
4 Tiemann v. SSM Regional Health Services, 632 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Wolfe, 713 S.W.3d at 546. 
8 Ferguson v. City of Sunrise Beach, 710 S.W.3d 620 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 622. 
11 Id. at 625, quoting Basham v. City of Cuba, 257 S.W.3d at 650, 653 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008) (holding “[i]nverse condemnation is the exclusive remedy when private property is damaged by a nuisance operated an entity having the power of eminent domain”). 
12 George Ward Builders, Inc. v. City of Lee’s Summit, 157 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004). 
13 Ferguson, 710 S.W.3d at 629. 
14 George Ward Builders, Inc., 157 S.W.3d at 651 (quoting Blaine v. J.E. Jones Constr. Co., 841 S.W.2d 703, 710 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992)). 
15 Ferguson, 710 S.W.3d at 630. 
16 State ex rel. Tapia v. Ankrom, 713 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). 
17 Id. 
18 Tapia, 713 S.W.3d at 640. 
19 Id. 
20 State ex rel. Manion v. Elliot, 305 S.W.3d 462, 464 (Mo. banc 2010); see also State ex rel. Hutchinson v. Manansala, 674 S.W.3d 811, 813 (Mo. App. 2023); Worth v. Roden, 646 S.W.3d 308, 310 (Mo. App. 2022).
21 D.W. v. Hogan Preparatory Academy, Inc., 713 S.W.3d 654 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). 
22 Brovont v. KS-1 Med. Servs., P.A., 622 S.W.3d 671, 699 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). 
23 Id. 
24 Holmes v. Kansas City Mo. Bd. Of Police Comm’rs ex rel. Its Members, 364 S.W.3d 615, 629 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012). 
25 Id.; see also Baldridge v. Kansas City Pub. Schs., 552 S.W.3d 699, 712-13 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (evidence used to support a claim of harassment can be considered in connection with a claim of punitive damages). 
26 Holmes, 364 S.W.3d at 629. 
27 Hogan, 713 S.W.3d at 665. 
28 D.W., 713 S.W.3d at 666. 
29 Id. at 667, citing Anslinger v. Christian Hosp. NENW, 687 S.W.3d 180, 183 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024).

Scott E. Vincent is the founding member of Vincent Law, LLC in Kansas City.

The U.S. Tax Court recently held that taxpayers had taxable income resulting from termination of whole life insurance policies, a consideration that tax lawyers should keep in mind when serving their clients.

In Fugler v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,¹ the tax court found that when a couple terminated whole life insurance policies with outstanding loans, they received constructive distributions from the policies that were includible in their gross income.

Background 

In 1987, David and Cindy Fugler purchased whole life insurance policies from Mass Mutual insuring their two children. The Fuglers were the owners and beneficiaries of the policies, which required annual premiums of $150 per year until each child’s 65th birthday or their death, whichever occurred first. The policies also allowed borrowing against cash surrender value. 

From 1988-2006, the Fuglers paid the annual premiums. In 2006, they borrowed $10,500 from one policy and $11,000 from the other policy. From 2007-2016, the Fuglers borrowed from the policies to cover the annual premiums. Interest on these loans also was added to the loan balances on each policy. By 2018, the policies had loan balances of $19,845 and $20,699. 

The policies also had cash surrender values which increased over time from accumulated dividends but were reduced by the outstanding policy debts. In 2018, the Fuglers notified Mass Mutual of their intent to terminate the policies. Mass Mutual provided surrender forms and advised them that surrender could result in taxable income. The Fuglers submitted the surrender forms and received checks for $3,033 and $2,729 with respect to the policies.

Mass Mutual reported the distributions to the Fuglers on Form 1099-R, indicating taxable income with respect to each policy, calculated as the gross distribution, including the checks distributed and the outstanding loan balance, reduced by insurance premiums paid. For one policy, this resulted in a $16,028 taxable amount. For the other policy, it was a $16,578 taxable amount. The Fuglers did not report income from Mass Mutual on their 2018 tax return.

The IRS proposed an increase to the Fuglers’ income for the taxable amounts on the Mass Mutual Form 1099-R, and the Fuglers pursued relief in tax court. The issues in the case were: 

(1) whether the policy distributions were includible in the Fuglers’ 2018 taxable income, 
(2) whether the Fuglers were entitled to a deduction for interest paid on the policy loans, and 
(3) whether the Fuglers were entitled to innocent spouse relief under Internal Revenue Code § 6015.²

Statutory background and tax court analysis 

Code § 61 defines “gross income” as income from any source including “income from life insurance and endowment contracts.” Code § 72 further provides that amounts received under annuity, endowment, or life insurance contracts are included income, and amounts received from nonannuity life insurance contracts are income to the extent they exceed investment in the contract. 

The tax court also cited prior cases for the concept that loans against life insurance policy cash value are loans from the insurance company to the policyholder, and these loans are not taxable distributions when received. However, the tax court stated that a taxpayer constructively receives proceeds from a terminated life insurance policy to the extent that existing policy loans are satisfied from the policy’s cash value, citing Mallory v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.³ 

In Fugler, the tax court, therefore, found that the taxpayers constructively received proceeds in the amount of the outstanding loan balances that were satisfied upon termination of the policies. The tax court held that the Fuglers’ taxable income for 2018 included these constructively received policy loan balances in addition to the checks received for the remaining cash value of each policy.

The tax court next addressed the Fuglers’ claim for interest expense deductions. The Fuglers claimed the proceeds of the policy loans were used in connection with their mining and logging business. The commissioner stated the interest was nondeductible personal interest. Section 163(h) disallows a deduction for personal interest, unless the interest is identified in §163(h)(2), which includes categories such as interest relating to a trade or business, investment, qualified residence, etc. However, the tax court found the Fuglers offered no evidence to show they were engaged in a mining and logging trade or business and no evidence that the loan proceeds were used for that purpose. As a result, the tax court held that the interest paid on the policies was nondeductible personal interest.

Finally, the tax court recognized that the IRS had conceded Cindy Fugler was entitled to innocent spouse relief. The tax court also confirmed that innocent spouse relief is only available to one spouse in response to David Fugler raising a similar claim.

Conclusion 

Fugler demonstrates why lawyers should remind their clients to carefully consider the tax implications in terminating insurance policies with outstanding policy loans. In some cases, it may make more economic sense to maintain the policies until death of the insured so that nontaxable death benefit proceeds repay the loans. 

Fugler also reminds taxpayers that interest deductions are only available for specific categories, like a trade or business, and that taxpayers must be able to demonstrate use of loan proceeds relating to the category in question for deductibility.

Endnotes 
1 Fugler v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Summ.Op. 2025-10 (U.S. Tax Ct., 2025). 
2 § 6015. Relief from joint and several liability on joint return, 26 USCA § 6015. 
3 Mallory v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo. 2016-110 (U.S. Tax Ct., 2016).

Nicholas Jain is Dunklin County prosecuting attorney and 2025-2026 Young Lawyers’ Section Council chair.

Note from Missouri Bar Executive Director Mischa Buford Epps: The mission of the Young Lawyers’ Section is to enhance the professional growth and public service of new and recently admitted Missouri lawyers. No matter where you are in your career, it is important to encourage and support others. With this in mind, I have invited YLS Council Chair Nicholas Jain to share about YLS and its latest initiatives. 

I’m proud to serve as chair of YLS Council and carry on the legacy of young lawyers before me. YLS is a community within The Missouri Bar comprised of lawyers who are 36 years old or younger, or who have been admitted to any state bar for 10 years or less.

My time on YLS began in 2016 while working as a prosecutor in southwest Missouri just a year out of law school. While I was surrounded by a strong network of lawyers there, YLS gave me an additional community of fellow young lawyers to learn from and grow with. I quickly learned that even though Missouri lawyers have a worldwide reach, being a Missouri lawyer and YLS member is a small group. 

During last year’s Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar, I sat next to David Macoubrie, a lawyer from Chillicothe, at the Opening Lunch and Chief Justice’s Address. I learned that Macoubrie was on the inaugural YLS Council in 1967. 

Another member of the inaugural YLS Council was the late Maurice “Marcy” Graham, whom I was fortunate enough to meet when I was a law student with very little clue of what my future practice would look like. Simply based on the virtue of me wanting to be a lawyer and him being one, Graham generously shared his time to help me decide what type of lawyer I wanted to be. Graham’s legacy of guiding young lawyers continues to this day.

Knowing these inaugural members sparked an interest in learning more about the history of the YLS Council’s founding and its connection to today. 

YLS was created to solve what the bar identified at the time as its greatest challenge: obtaining “more and better participation by the lawyer in Bar activities,” according to a 1967 article in the Journal of The Missouri Bar.¹ Bar leaders recognized that educating new lawyers about the bar’s responsibilities early on would promote continued service throughout the lawyers’ careers. 

At its first meeting, the YLS Council adopted the following projects for its first year of creation: 

– Welcome new lawyers at the bar admission ceremonies 
– Educate students of the future dangers of a felony conviction 
– Undertake a study to locate areas in the state that had the largest need for lawyers 
– Share with high school and college students about the practice of law 
– Recognize outstanding contributions to the overall field of law²

Now, nearly 60 years later, I can report that YLS continues to carry that mission and passion. YLS members welcome new lawyers at enrollment ceremonies every year. YLS Council members continue to present to students about civic education throughout the year and even saw a massive success for last year’s Constitution Day when lawyers spoke to more than 2,000 students at more than 60 schools.³ The council continues to partner with law schools around the state to connect students to The Missouri Bar and YLS. The YLS Council also highlights lawyers and non-lawyers who are making a difference in their communities by presenting the annual Liberty Bell Award and Tom Cochran Community Service Award. 

YLS has expanded its mission greatly since its founding in 1967. YLS organizes and provides continuing legal education programs both around the state and virtually. YLS Council educates the public through ShowMeRights.org and publications about the courts. We help our communities through service projects and by answering Missouri residents’ questions on Missouri.FreeLegalAnswers.org. 

I am proud of the work The Missouri Bar Young Lawyers’ Section does for lawyers of all ages and for the individual communities we serve. I am certain YLS will continue to serve Missourians long into the future.

Endnotes 
1 Thomas D. Cochran, “Missouri Young Lawyers Section,” 23 J. MoBar 528 (1967). 
2 Id. at 529-31. 
3 “Former Missouri chief justice, 2025-26 Missouri Bar vice president present to students,” The Missouri Bar (2025), https://news.mobar.org/former-missouri-chief-justice-2025-26-missouri-bar-vice-president-present-to-students.

Athena Dickson, 2025-2026 Missouri Bar president

One of the most important roles of the legal profession is public education — particularly when it comes to the third branch and our judicial system. Nowhere is that responsibility more evident than during judicial retention election years, when citizens are asked to vote on whether judges should remain in their positions, often with limited understanding of how the retention process works or why it exists. 

Lawyers are uniquely positioned to help bridge that gap. Many of you already do so — not just through your professional work, but through leadership roles in civic and community organizations across the state. Members of this bar serve in organizations such as the Optimist Club, Rotary, Eagles, Lions, chambers of commerce, neighborhood associations, and other civic groups that regularly host speakers and educational programs. 

The Missouri Bar is building a database of civic education resources — a network of lawyer-leaders embedded in their communities who are willing to help educate Missouri residents about the Missouri Plan and the judicial retention process. The goal is to inform the public about the structure, purpose, and safeguards of retention elections, and to underscore the importance of an informed electorate.

To accomplish this, I am asking our members to take a moment to share with us the civic and community leadership positions you currently hold. This includes officer roles, board service, committee leadership, or active participation in organizations that engage the public. By identifying where our members are already involved, The Missouri Bar can more effectively and responsibly deploy resources about our courts, judicial selection, and Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan. 

Having this network will allow The Missouri Bar to more thoughtfully share judicial performance review results to ensure all Missourians have access to ongoing civics education. When civic groups request speakers or information, the bar can connect them with trusted local lawyers who understand the legal system and the communities they serve. 

Judicial independence depends, in part, on public understanding. By helping citizens understand the benefits of merit selection and the retention process, lawyers help preserve confidence in the courts and the rule of law. This effort reflects the best traditions of our profession — service, education, and leadership. 

Please visit MoBar.org/lawyer-leader and submit your civic involvement. Your willingness to serve, and to be counted as a resource, strengthens both our communities and our justice system. Please also reach out to MoPlan@MoBar.org if you are willing to volunteer to help educate about the importance of the judiciary and champion Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan.¹ 

Thank you for your continued commitment to the profession and to public service.

Endnotes 
1 Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan, commonly known as The Missouri Plan, governs selection and retention of judges on the Supreme Court of Missouri, the Missouri Court of Appeals, and six circuit courts (Clay, Jackson and Platte counties in the Kansas City area; both the county and City of St. Louis; and Greene County in the Springfield area). Learn more at YourMissouriJudges.org.

Brittany Chapman is the managing attorney for the Administrative Hearings Section with the Missouri Department of Social Services - Division of Legal Services, where she oversees administrative hearing operations and supports hearing officers in adjudicating public benefit cases. She was a member of the 2024-2025 Missouri Bar Leadership Academy class and is currently a mentor advisor for the 2025-2026 class. Chapman graduated from the University of Missouri School of Law and was admitted to The Missouri Bar in 2014. 

Why did you want to be a lawyer? 

“What really made everything click were personal experiences where I saw people I love being treated unfairly. Seeing injustice up close helped me realize that I wanted to be in a position where I could help make sure things were done the right way. Being a lawyer doesn’t mean you always get the outcome you want, but it does mean you can help ensure the process is fair. For me, that mattered — and still matters — a lot.” 

What are some lessons you learned from being in Leadership Academy? 

“One of the biggest lessons I took from Leadership Academy was how much growth can happen when you’re in a space with other thoughtful, motivated leaders who are all willing to show up fully. Being able to learn from how my peers led, communicated, and approached problems pushed me to expand my own leadership style and perspective. 

“It was also a powerful reminder that even strong, capable leaders experience doubt and stress — and what matters is choosing to move forward anyway. The experience reinforced, for me, that with the right mindset and a supportive group, you can do hard things, execute well, and walk away feeling more confident in your abilities to tackle any challenges that come your way.” 

Why were you interested in being a mentor for Leadership Academy? 

“Mentorship fills my cup. While I’m not naturally the most social person, I genuinely enjoy pouring into others, sharing what I’ve learned, and helping make the path a little clearer. Leadership Academy felt like the perfect space to do that — to support individuals who are already leading, but who are still growing and stretching themselves. Being able to offer perspective, encouragement, and practical insight is what drew me to mentoring and continues to motivate me to give back.” 

What advice would you give to new/young lawyers? 

“Hold on to who you are while you’re growing into the lawyer you’re becoming. This does not mean refuse to adapt and evolve. It means you bring a voice and a set of experiences that the legal field needs. While you might not fully understand yet what makes your contribution unique, know that you will discover it over time. Trust that you chose this path for a reason and remember that no one else can bring what you bring to the table.” 

If you could pick one word that you hope describes your 2026, what would it be and why? 

“The word I’m leaning most into is ‘activate.’ It’s about taking the opportunities that are in front of me and moving some of the things I’ve envisioned from idea to reality — to do the thing, figure it out as I go, (and) just run with it. For me, 2026 feels like the year to flip the switch and go!” 

Answers have been edited for clarity, brevity, and style. Know a lawyer who you think should be featured in “Meet #MOLawyers”? Email the Journal team at Journal@MoBar.org.

Melinda J. Bentley is legal ethics counsel for the Office of Legal Ethics Counsel and Advisory Committee of the Supreme Court of Missouri.

Correction: This article was updated on March 9, 2026, to correct the statement: “Second, funds subject to this exception are only advance paid fees, and advanced paid expenses must still be held in a client trust account.”

Have you ever heard a colleague say something is required, or not required, by the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct and wondered, “Is that right?” This article examines 10 scenarios to help you separate fact from fiction when complying with the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct. 

Scenario 1: The Supreme Court of Missouri does not require lawyers to have a statement as to confidentiality in the footer of emails. Fact or fiction? 

Answer: Fact. 

The rules do not require that a lawyer place a statement as to confidentiality in the footer of emails, although such a statement may be a best practice.¹ While there can be practical reasons for including such a statement, or disclosures required by other law, statements that start with “The Supreme Court of Missouri requires,” “The Missouri Bar requires,” “The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel requires,” or “The Legal Ethics Counsel requires” are not accurate. 

Confidentiality is the key ethical consideration for lawyers in determining if email is an appropriate means for communicating matters with clients, and a lawyer should discuss such concerns with the client prior to using email.² Rule 4-1.6(c) states that “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of the client.” Comment [15] to Rule 4-1.6 provides guidance regarding reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized access or inadvertent disclosure. Factors lawyers should consider include, but are not limited to:

the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use).

Further, Comment [16] to Rule 4-1.6 provides guidance regarding reasonable precautions to prevent client information from reaching unintended recipients. Lawyers should consider factors including “the reasonableness of the lawyer’s expectation of confidentiality … the sensitivity of the information and the extent to which the privacy of the communication is protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement.” 

In applying these considerations, lawyers should discuss with clients as to whether emails should be used to communicate about the representation. They should also consider the nature and sensitivity of the information that may be exchanged, what protective measures can be utilized to preserve confidentiality, and how the client may be accessing email and who else might also have access to that email (i.e. the client’s employer or family members).³

Scenario 2: A lawyer must withdraw immediately from representing a client and not contact them if the client files a complaint with the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel or a fee dispute resolution program. Fact or fiction? 

Answer: Fiction. 

Just because a client files a complaint with the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel or seeks assistance from a fee dispute resolution program does not mean the lawyer is prohibited from contacting the client unless the client is represented by counsel in that matter.⁴ Neither the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel nor the fee dispute resolution program would be representing a client such that contact would be prohibited pursuant to Rule 4-4.2. 

A conflict of interest is not always present just because a complaint is filed. Sometimes the filing of such a complaint stems from a simple lack of communication or miscommunication. The lawyer should consider whether the lawyer’s personal interest materially limits their ability to represent the client’s interests.⁵ Specifically, consideration should be given to “if there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s other responsibilities or interests,”⁶ or “if the probity of a lawyer’s own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice.”⁷ 

Additionally, such circumstances do not automatically require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation. In this scenario, Rule 4-1.16 would only require withdrawal if the client discharges the services of the lawyer,⁸ or if continuing the representation would cause the lawyer to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.⁹ The lawyer may be permitted to withdraw if the criteria of Rule 4-1.16(b) are met. 

Whether the lawyer is required or permitted to withdraw, they still must provide notice to or seek the permission of the tribunal and continue with the representation when ordered to do so, notwithstanding other good cause for terminating the representation.¹⁰ If the representation is terminated, to the extent reasonably practicable, the lawyer is required to take steps to protect the client’s interests.¹¹ 

Scenario 3: A lawyer moving from Law Firm A may be screened from any conflicts of interest when joining Law Firm B. Fact or fiction?

Answer: Fiction.

Missouri does not recognize screening when it comes to conflicts related to Rule 4-1.10, addressing imputed disqualification of law firms; and Rule 4-1.9, addressing former clients and lawyers moving between law firms.¹² While screening may be helpful in persuading a client to waive a conflict, such conflicts must be addressed pursuant to those specific rules.¹³ 

Instead, “screened” is a defined term pursuant Rule 4-1.0(k):

[T]he isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other law.

Screening is only permitted in appropriate circumstances pursuant to Rule 4-1.11, 4-1.12, 4-1.18, and 4-6.5. 

Scenario 4: Flat fees must always go into the client trust account. Fact or fiction?

Answer: Fiction.

Pursuant to Rule 4-1.15(c), which requires a lawyer to deposit legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance into a client trust account, there is an exception that if the advanced paid flat fee does not exceed $2,000, it may be deposited into another account. 

There are a few important notes about this exception. First, although it is permissive for the lawyer to choose to keep advance paid fees that do not exceed $2,000 in another account, it is not required.¹⁴ Second, funds subject to this exception are only advance paid fees, and advanced paid expenses must still be held in a client trust account.¹⁵ Finally, this exception applies only to advance paid fees that do not exceed $2,000, not installment payments for a larger sum.¹⁶ 

Scenario 5: A lawyer may respond to negative online reviews posted by clients, because clients waived confidentiality by posting information regarding the representation. Fact or fiction?

Answer: Fiction.

Rule 4-1.6(b)(3) only permits a lawyer to make a limited disclosure of confidential information “to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client …” An online review does not constitute a controversy between the lawyer and the client, so the lawyer may not respond and disclose confidential information in that public forum.¹⁷ 

Scenario 6: A lawyer may not withhold a client’s file for nonpayment of legal fees. Fact or fiction? 

Answer: Fact. 

Missouri Advisory Committee Formal Opinion 115 provides that a lawyer may not withhold a client’s file for nonpayment of legal fees. Instead, the client owns the file “from cover to cover, except for those items contained within the file for which the attorney has borne out-of-pocket expenses such as, but not limited to, transcripts.”¹⁸ It is important to note that there may be some limited exceptions to the content of materials to be provided to the client as part of the file, such as information subject to a protective order or settlement agreement,¹⁹ or information subject to a discovery agreement.²⁰ 

Lawyers should consider Rule 4-1.22, Missouri Advisory Committee Formal Opinion 115, substantive law, and other Missouri informal opinions when determining the contents of the client file.²¹ 

Scenario 7: Lawyer A may not pay a referral fee to Lawyer B for sending a new client to Lawyer A. Fact or fiction? 

Answer: Fact.²² 

Rule 4-7.2(c) prohibits a lawyer from giving “anything of value to a person for recommending a lawyer’s services.” That includes a “referral fee” from one lawyer to another. However, Rule 4-1.5(e) permits lawyers who are not in the same firm to divide fees so long as certain conditions are satisfied:

(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; (2) the client agrees to the association and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and (3) the total fee is reasonable.²³

Scenario 8: Lawyer A prepared a will and deeds for a client who is now deceased. The personal representative’s lawyer, Lawyer B, requested that Lawyer A turn over a copy of the client’s file. Lawyer A may not disclose information, other than the actual will the lawyer considers still valid, or a deed that has been recorded, without a court order, unless the client gave express consent to permit disclosure. Fact or fiction?

Answer: Fact.²⁴

Rule 4-1.6 provides that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by Rule 4-1.6(b).” In this scenario, it is impliedly authorized that Lawyer A may provide Lawyer B with the client’s will so the client’s estate planning wishes may be followed. However, the entire file may not be provided absent informed consent of the client prior to the client’s death, consistent with Rule 4-1.6(a) and 4-1.0(e); or a limited disclosure to comply with other law or a court order, consistent with Rule 4-1.6(b)(4).²⁵ 

Scenario 9: A lawyer may disclose information contained in public court records the lawyer filed on behalf of the client without the client’s consent. Fact or fiction?

Answer: Fiction.²⁶

Rule 4-1.6 prohibits disclosure of confidential client information unless a valid exception is met, and Rule 4-1.9(c) does likewise for confidential information of a former client. Even though information may be contained in a public record or available on Case.net, it is still confidential as to the lawyer. Comment [3] to Rule 4-1.6 notes that confidentiality

… not only applies to matters communicated in confidence by the client, but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

Further, Comment [4] explains that confidential information includes protected information that could reasonably lead to the discovery of such information by a third party. This would include information that could lead to the discovery of the client’s identity or of the situation involved.

Scenario 10: Lawyer A has been contacted by the surviving spouse of Lawyer B, a solo practitioner, who recently passed away. Lawyer A may not review the files of Lawyer B at the request of surviving spouse. Fact or fiction? 

Answer: Fact.²⁷ 

Unless Lawyer B obtained the informed consent of clients for another lawyer outside the firm to access the clients’ confidential information in the event of Lawyer B’s death or incapacitation, Lawyer A may not review the client files of Lawyer B absent appointment as a trustee pursuant to Rule 5.26. 

Conclusion 

If lawyers have questions about the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct in their practice, they can contact the Office of Legal Ethics Counsel via MO-Legal-Ethics.org to seek an informal advisory opinion about their prospective conduct.²⁸

Endnotes
1 See Mo. Informal Opinion 2012-01.
2 See Melinda J. Bentley, “The Ethical Implications of Technology in Your Law Practice: Understanding the Rules of Professional Conduct Can Prevent Potential Problems,” 76 J. Mo. B. 20, at 22 (2020) (discussing application of the Rules of Professional Conduct to email and other electronic communications with clients). 
3 Id.
4 See Mo. Informal Opinions 2022-05 and 20050059.
5 Rule 4-1.7(a)(2).
6 Rule 4-1.7, Comment [8].
7 Rule 4-1.7, Comment [10].
8 Rule 4-1.16(a)(3).
9 Rule 4-1.16(a)(1).
10 Rule 4-1.16(c).
11 Rule 4-1.16(d).
12 See Mo. Informal Opinion 2017-07.
13 See Mo. Informal Opinions 20060003, 20050030, and 20030007.
14 Rule 4-1.15(c).
15 See Mo. Informal Opinion 2018-15.
16 Id.
17 See Mo. Informal Opinion 2018-08.
18 Mo. Formal Opinion 115; See also In the Matter of Cupples, 952 S.W.2d 226, 234 (Mo. banc 1997); McVeigh v. Fleming, 410 S.W.3d 287, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2013).
19 See Mo. Informal Opinion 2020-07. 
20 See Mo. Informal Opinion 2020-08.
21 See also Missouri Office of Legal Ethics Counsel and Advisory Committee of the Supreme Court of Missouri Resource Page: File Retention Resources, https://mo-legal-ethics.org/for-lawyers/resources/file-retention-resources/. 
22 See Missouri Informal Opinion 2018-05. 
23 See also Rule 4-1.5, Comments [7] and [8] (providing further guidance on division of fees). 
24 See Missouri Informal Opinion 20040004. 
25 See also Rule 4-1.6, Comments [10]-[13]; Missouri Informal Opinions 2017-04, 2015-02, 20070016, 20060004, 20010154; 20000165; 990146; 990118; 980080; 970100; 960130; 950264; 950018. 
26 See Missouri Informal Opinion 2015-02. 
27 See Missouri Informal Opinion 2018-11. 
28 See Rule 5.30(c).