Administrative

No error preserved
Appellate courts reviewed agency decisions, not intervening circuit court judgments. On the exclusion of evidence, an offer of proof was necessary to preserve error, and the offer of proof had to be sufficiently specific for a reviewing court to identify the disputed evidence and the foundation for its admissibility. On the admission of evidence, a contemporaneous objection was necessary to preserve error. The agency disciplined the appellant’s license, the circuit court affirmed that decision, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
David E. Smock v. Missouri State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88558

ADR

Federal Arbitration Act was the parties’ choice of law
"Missouri courts generally enforce choice-of-law provisions.” The parties’ multiple agreements, including separate arbitration agreements, all included choice of law provisions naming the Federal Arbitration Act. No waiver of that provision occurred when an initial motion to compel arbitration did not cite the Federal Arbitration Act but a promptly filed amended motion did. That choice of law nullified a notice requirement in the Missouri Uniform Arbitration Act. The circuit court erred when it denied the appellants’ motion to compel arbitration for failure to comply with the Missouri notice requirement. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed that ruling, remanded the action, and ordered the circuit court to compel arbitration.
(Overview summary)
Jeannie Ashelin and Corey Scheideman, Plaintiffs/Respondents, v. Ed Napleton St. Louis Imports, Inc., d/b/a Off Lease by Napleton, et al., Defendants/Appellants
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114278

Appellate

Appellant’s brief required dismissal
Appellate courts did not convict circuit courts of error on arguments not made in circuit court, and the appellant did not show what arguments the appellant made in circuit court. Failure to comply with rules of appellate procedure jeopardized the appellate courts’ neutrality, preserved nothing for review, and constituted grounds for dismissal. The appellants had to file the record on appeal, including the legal file, including all documents necessary to rule, but the appellant omitted the decree of dissolution that was the source of the parties’ dispute. In the appellant’s brief, statements of fact had to favor the judgment, points relied on had to set forth a theory for reversal, arguments had to show the interaction of law and fact raised in — and only in — the points relied on. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Diane K. Wilson, nka Diane K. Almstedt, Appellant, v. Stephen D. Wilson, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114135

No participation, no preservation
Appellate courts seldom found errors in rulings as to which the appellants never objected, or failed to file after-trial motions, because circuit courts were due a chance to correct errors themselves. The day before trial, the appellant filed a notice. The notice waived all participation in the trial but purported to preserve any error at trial. And the appellant did not appear for trial, so whether the appellant’s appearance at trial would have required the appellant to assert the Fifth Amendment was mere conjecture. Cumulative plain error review required a showing of errors, and those errors had to be obvious, but no such error appeared in the “well-considered, detailed judgment [.]” If the judgment omitted required findings of fact, the remedy was a motion to amend. The appellant did not file any after-trial motions. The appellant preserved nothing for appeal, so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Heather Lynn Ruel, Respondent, v. Adam Roland Ruel, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113943

Business

No submissible case on breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent misrepresentation
After the discovery deadline, the plaintiff changed its theory of damages through supplemented responses to discovery. A motion in limine was not sufficient to preserve an objection to a late-disclosed witness; the objection had to be renewed at trial when the testimony was offered. The previous theory became obsolete, so no prejudice to the defendant resulted when the circuit court quashed a notice of deposition on the obsolete theory. And the defendant had remedies available that it did not seek, so that ruling was no abuse of discretion. Continuing objections could preserve error without further objecting but, otherwise, affirmative statements of “no objection” to documents offered at trial under the new theory of damages waived all appellate review. Instructions, approved or not, had to submit ultimate facts for the jury’s determination; otherwise, they constituted roving commissions. That described the defendants’ proffered instructions on the affirmative defenses of waiver and estoppel because they merely recited principles of law, so the circuit court did not err in rejecting them. The merger doctrine limited damages to one award per wrong. Lack of a timely objection to an instruction on that basis waived all but plain error review. Plain error review was discretionary. The elements of plain error review included manifest injustice. No injustice occurred, as shown by awards of damages less than the evidence could have supported, so the Missouri Court of Appeals exercised its discretion against conducting plain error review of the instruction. And besides, the jury did not make three awards on one theory, it made three awards on three theories, one per theory. But two of those theories should not have gone to the jury because the plaintiff failed to support the elements of those two claims. The elements of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty included the existence of a fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary relationship existed when a “subservient party voluntarily cedes control to and places confidence in the dominant party with the reasonable expectation that the dominant party will act for the benefit of the subservient party.” That did not describe the relationship between the parties, an automotive dealer and an automotive auction house, because no evidence showed that the plaintiff ceded decision-making to the defendants. The elements of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation included reliance on a representation that was false when made. No evidence showed that the defendants made any false representation. Specifically, membership in a professional organization did not communicate adherence to that organization’s standards. And an insignificant percentage of failure to perform a promised service could have shown a breach of contract but did not show an intent not to perform when the defendant made the promise. On those claims, the circuit court erred in denying the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, so the Court of Appeals reversed the plaintiffs’ verdicts for breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals otherwise affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
J. Nuckolls, Inc. d/b/a Fenton Auto Sales, Respondent, v. America's Auto Auction St. Louis, Inc., et al., Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113904

Criminal

Disqualification of prosecuting attorney’s office discussed
“[O]nly in rare circumstances should a circuit court interfere with the democratic process and override the voters’ choice as to who is best suited to represent the interests of the people as prosecuting attorney, even with respect to a single case.” Appellate courts did not review rulings never sought. The appellant did not ask the circuit court to rescind its vacatur as to a specific assistant prosecutor, and for argument on the motion but not an evidentiary hearing, so the appellant preserved no error as to those matters. The appellant asked to disqualify a prosecuting attorney’s entire office, and the circuit court granted that relief, but then vacated that order. The appellant asked the circuit court to change its vacatur as to the entire office based on one assistant prosecutor’s former representation of the appellant in another action. The appellant did not show any conflict of interests and, even if the appellant had shown a conflict of interests, the appellant could not impute that conflict to the prosecuting attorney’s office. Also, the appellant showed no appearance of impropriety once the assistant prosecutor withdrew, never having used any protected information, and after only de minimis participation. Criminal defendants’ right to present a complete defense included a presumption that the exclusion of the defendant’s evidence was prejudicial but the State showed that the disputed evidence was cumulative and not probative of the relevant time frame. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri v. Francis Henry Kempker
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87593

Accomplice liability shown
Accomplice liability rendered co-defendants equally liable if one so much as encouraged the other. The record included evidence that the defendant helped steal goods and tried to sell some of them. That evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant of stealing more than $750. The elements of plain error included manifest injustice, meaning outcome-determinative. The circuit court included “physical interference” in an instruction on resisting appellant’s arrest. That language was not outcome-determinative, because the appellant did not deny using physical force, so the Missouri Court of Appeals denied plain error review. Circuit courts’ authority over their records continued after authority over judgments ended, so circuit courts could amend their judgments nunc pro tunc any time. The circuit court corrected the appellant’s sentence nunc pro tunc, mooting that point on appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. JUSTIN LEVI WATERDOWN, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39176

Child victim’s testimony discussed
The elements of plain error review included an obvious error. No obvious error occurred when a fact witness testified about questioning techniques without commenting on anyone’s veracity. The Missouri Court of Appeals declined plain error review. The elements of child molestation in the second degree as charged included contact with the victim’s anus, for which the State offered evidence that the defendant only made contact with the victim’s buttocks. That evidence did not support that element so the circuit court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for acquittal on that count. “Regardless of a child witness’s limitations, prosecution of criminal cases is not undertaken by children, but by adults who have been educated in the criminal law, criminal proceedings, and evidence. A child witness’s limitations do not lower the State’s evidentiary bar for a criminal conviction.” The Court of Appeals reversed that conviction, remanded the action for a judgment of acquittal on that count, and affirmed the remaining convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. RICKY LEE THURMAN, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38739

For unlawful use, the State need not prove that defendant pointed the weapon at victim
The elements of unlawful use of a weapon as charged included exhibiting the weapon in an angry or threatening manner. “[A] defendant need not actually point the gun at a victim to satisfy the element of acting in an angry or threatening manner[,]” And the evidence supported a finding that defendant did point a firearm at victim. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. CAMEO LORENZO GILMORE, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39181

Orders of protection

Distance not shown
Appellate review of criminal convictions viewed all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict but did not employ unreasonable, speculative, or forced inferences. The elements of violating a full order of protection included “entrance upon the premises of the petitioner’s dwelling unit … or being within a certain distance of the petitioner[.]” The full order of protection against defendant required the defendant to stay a certain distance from victim petitioner. The State’s evidence showed that the defendant was less than that distance from petitioner’s dwelling unit but was silent as to whether defendant was in the dwelling unit at the time. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. MEGAN A. HAAG, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39203

Personal Injury

Appellant’s summary judgment was not inextricably entwined with respondent’s motion
On motions for summary judgment, parties prevailed when “the motion, the response, the reply and the sur-reply show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Defending parties could do so by showing that claimant parties could not support any element of the target claim. A statute waived political subdivisions’ sovereign immunity for property in a dangerous condition. Sovereign immunity was not a defense, it was part of the plaintiff’s case to plead and prove. The plaintiff alleged that her injury resulted from someone impelling her into the defendant school district’s gymnasium wall during a race. Those allegations did not describe a dangerous condition of property, and the plaintiff offered no additional undisputed facts, so the summary judgment record on the defendant’s motion showed no dangerous condition. On that record, the law entitled the defendant to a favorable judgment. The plaintiff alleged that the wall was defectively designed in her own motion, but denial of her summary judgment motion was interlocutory and not subject to appeal. And the plaintiff’s motion offered different facts and theories so it was not inextricably intertwined with the defendant’s motion. Therefore, the denial of the plaintiff’s motion was not subject to review. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for the defendant.
HAILEY J. UNRUH, Plaintiff-Appellant v. WILLOW SPRINGS R-IV SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39136

Post-conviction

No appointment, no abandonment, no third-party interference, no final judgment
Appeal was possible only from a final judgment. A final judgment was a ruling that disposed of all claims, whether in the initial motion or a superseding amended motion. The amended motion stated “differing, and additional,” claims from the initial motion but was not timely. For either motion, timely filing was an element, without which circuit courts had no authority, subject to court-made exceptions. Exceptions included third-party interference but that exception applied only to initial motions and did not apply to amended motions. Exceptions for amended motions included abandonment, meaning no timely filing by counsel. But abandonment was limited “consistently, repeatedly, and emphatically” to appointed counsel. When counsel voluntarily entered an appearance without appointment, no appointment was necessary, and abandonment did not apply. Therefore, the amended motion was outside the circuit court’s authority. Nevertheless, the circuit court issued judgment on the amended motion only, and not the initial motion, so that judgment was not final. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and remanded the action to the circuit court.
(Overview summary)
Donald E. Nussbaum v. State of Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87727

No objection, no deficient performance
The elements of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel included deficient performance, against which the law presumed, and which the State could negate with evidence of a reasonable trial strategy. Reasonable trial strategy presumptively included choosing against making an objection to the State’s questioning even when plainly subject to objection. “[The] decision not to object was to avoid attracting additional attention to the improper questions and corresponding responses. This is a commonly recognized and accepted trial strategy.” Evidence to the contrary did not enter into appellate review. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
NICHOLAS J. BEROS, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39203

Probate

Standing to challenge trust administration shown
The appellants abandoned challenges, and the grounds for challenges, to rulings not cited in a point relied on. Anyone bringing any action had to show standing, meaning a sufficient interest in the subject matter. For parties bringing an action related to the administration of a trust, standing generally depended on the action and the terms of the trust. For reformation or other modification, only trustees and beneficiaries had standing. The plaintiff brought an action related to a trust that specifically excluded the plaintiff from any benefit. Whether success in an action could create such an interest was irrelevant. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiff’s petition to intervene in the administration, and for breach, of trust; and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling. The absence of an adequate remedy in probate, which the plaintiff could show by pursuit or futility of a remedy in probate division, was an element of tortious interference with an inheritance. Other elements included underlying tortious conduct that caused the interference, which the plaintiff adequately pleaded. The circuit court dismissed that claim, so the Court of Appeals reversed that ruling and remanded the action.
(Overview summary)
Ronald Jennings v. Debra J. Miner, et al.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88464

Utilities

Easement enforced, damages reversed
Rule and statute extended the circuit court’s authority over its judgment within which to issue an amended judgment, which it did within that time, vacating the original judgment and determining the matters subject to appeal. Appeal did not have to await resolution of attorney fees. Respondent property owners acquired land subject to appellant gas utility’s recorded easement for a pipeline, the terms of which included a tap and residential gas service to owners’ predecessors. The conveyance’s plain terms showed that the easement was real, meaning applicable to the land, rather than personal, meaning applicable only to parties to the conveyance. Therefore, the obligations of the conveyance bound successors to the original parties, replacement of the residence notwithstanding. On motions for summary judgment, citing stipulated facts, the circuit court found in the owners’ favor. But the only support for breach of contract damages was an exhibit attached to the owners’ proposed judgment, not in the stipulated facts. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the damages award and otherwise affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
Paul and Erin Tharp v. Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88122

Below are the Missouri lawyers who achieved the milestone in 2026. 

Richard Arthur Abrams 

Theodore D. Agniel 

Lawrence J. Altman 

John W. Amberg 

Donald Kenneth Anderson Jr. 

Jay B. Angoff 

Michael D. Arnold 

J. Nick Badgerow 

Jack T. Bangert 

Vito Charles Barbieri 

Richard Andrew Barry III 

John Francis Barry 

George A. Barton 

Kris R. Baumgartner 

Debra E. Behrendt 

James Harvey Bernard Jr. 

Paul F. Black 

Ira Leonard Blank 

Denise Helene Bloch 

Kevin Lawrence Bloomfield 

Gary Richard Bradley 

Louis R. Branz 

Bryan Craig Breckenridge 

Lance Christian Bretsnyder 

Charles E. Bridges 

Ronald S. Bronstein 

Hon. James Michael Brown 

Charles Ray Brown 

Daniel Robert Brown 

Donald E. Bucher 

Steve Dulle Burmeister 

Dennis Lee Callahan 

Michael R. Cannon 

Frank Kimberly Carlson 

Frank Chadwick Carnahan 

Lynn Chipperfield 

James B. Christensen 

Daniel Elliot Claggett 

Nicholas W. Clark 

Betsy Clarke 

Don Cary Collins 

Nathan F. Conley 

Daniel Joseph Conway 

James Christopher Cook 

Joan Amendola Coulter 

Joseph P. Cowin 

John Lester Crowe 

Hon. Charles D. Curless 

David N. Damick 

Hon. Michael Paul David 

Gilbert Richardson Dean III 

Johnnye L. Dennis 

Alan Harvey Deright 

R. Lawrence Dessem 

Sharon Ann Gerber Dickinson 

Gerard Thomas Diekman 

Dan Dildine 

Lynn W. Dippold 

John E. Dooling Jr. 

Sandra J. Doreson 

Hon. Robert G. Dowd Jr. 

Brian Harold Dunn 

Dennis E.  Egan 

Steven E. Emke 

Gayle Stutzman Evans 

James Eugene Ewan 

Steven E. Faber 

William David Farrar 

John Weldon Fay 

Hon. Arthur B. Federman 

Donna Kay Feinberg 

Hon. Kenneth Frank Feretti 

Brian J. Finucane 

James Michael Fischer 

Hon. Hannelore Depenthal Fischer 

Frank Bernerd Flink Jr. 

Robert Michael Fowler 

Carol Frenick Fowler 

Robert Edward Fox Jr. 

Maureen McCarthy Franz 

Ty Steven Gaither 

James Michael Gallen 

John C. Garavaglia 

James Dennis Gassen 

Judy Ann Gibbs 

Maurice Michael Gill 

Suzanne Rae Gladney 

A. Fuller Glaser Jr. 

James Glover III 

David Eckstein Goldman 

Terrance J. Good 

Hon. Jon Reginald Gray 

Hon. Stephen K. Griffin 

Gregory Ottis Grounds 

Nancy Hynson Grove 

Carolyn Ann Haimann 

Steven Milton Hamburg 

David T. Hamilton 

Judith L. Hancock 

Kenneth E. Hand 

Nathan C. Harbur 

Eric C. "Ric" Harris 

Paul J. Harris 

Hon. Mark Jay Harris 

Michael David Hart 

Charles Andrew Harter 

Hon. Randall Louis Head 

Elizabeth Healey 

Lewis Arthur Heaven Jr. 

Richard Helfand 

Hon. Robert M. Heller 

John Morgan Henderson Jr. 

Christopher Hoberock 

D. Warren Hoff Jr. 

Hon. Victor C. Howard 

Jonathan William Igoe 

Frank A. Isler 

Sylvester James Jr. 

Steven George Janik 

Thomas R. Jayne 

Frank William Jenny II 

Al W. Johnson 

Hon. James Kelso Journey 

Peter A. Joy 

Hon. James Kingdon Justus 

Michael Edward Kaemmerer 

Robert Nathan Kahn 

Patricia Aylward Kalb 

Hon. Elliot M. Kaplan 

Richard A. Kaufman 

John Thomas Kay 

John Mark Kell 

Mark Thomas Kempton 

James Jay Knappenberger 

Thomas Winsor Koelling 

David Jay Krauss 

David O. Kreuter 

Sanford Krigel 

Erlene Wienstock Krigel 

Steven C. Krueger 

John Wilson Kuebler 

Steven Paul Kuenzel 

Louis N. Laderman 

Hon. Isidore Ireland Lamke 

John H. Lamming 

Marsha Kay Duncan Laner 

Robert Charles Latz 

Timothy Gale Lee 

Douglas L. Levine 

Jay Lewis Levitch 

Mark S. Levitt 

Steven A. Levy 

Terry W. Liberman 

Richard Brent Lindenberger 

Bradley Harold Lockenvitz 

Leo L. Logan III 

Gary R. Long 

Michael Alan Love Sr. 

Carolyn Suzanne Love 

Theodore Joseph MacDonald Jr. 

Michael W. Manners 

Col. Gary Michael Manuele 

Michael Allen Markenson 

William Nassau Marshall III 

Hon. Michael Robert McAdam 

Newton G. McCoy 

Robert Paul McCulloch 

Donald F. McDonald Jr. 

Bernard Peter McDonnell Jr. 

Janet Goldberg McEnery 

John E. McKay 

Patrick Conlon McKenna 

Nancy Weeden McKimmy 

Hon. Maura Bridget McShane 

Lewis Eugene Melahn 

Daniel G. Menzie 

Keith C. Miller 

Christopher J. Miller 

Marilyn Grace Miller 

Max E. Mitchell 

L. Russell Mitten II 

Kim Roger Moore 

Philip Edward Morgan Jr. 

John Boyd Morthland 

Robert Spencer Moss 

Richard A. Mueller 

Thomas Hugh Mug 

Linda Marie Mustoe 

Robert Dale Nienhuis 

Gerard T. Noce 

Timothy F. Noelker 

Mary Kathleen O’Blennis 

Mary Anne O’Connell 

John Patrick O’Connor 

Robert G. Olson 

William D. O’Neill 

Mark Cannon Owens 

Virginia Gaddy Pasewark 

Charles Pauly Jr. 

James Michael Payne 

Hon. Jack N. Peace 

Bob L. Perica 

C. Edward Peterson 

Roger A. Potter 

Michalene Susan Powers 

Richard Louis Prebil 

George Edwin Proctor Jr. 

William Michael Quitmeier 

Dwight Emery Rahmeyer 

Hon. Nancy Steffen Rahmeyer 

Daniel A. Raniere 

Paul L. Redfearn III 

Shari R. Rhode 

Andrew A. Rimmel 

Edward A. Rose Jr. 

Terry Robert Rottler 

Mark Sableman 

Patrick Michael Sanders 

John David Schaperkotter 

Laurence Gavin Schmidt 

Hon. Mary Bruntrager Schroeder 

Daniel J. Schwartz 

Richard J. Schwartze 

Michele Kaido Schwent 

James J. Scott 

Maureen Scully 

Kenneth A. Seufert 

Michael Lawrence Sexton 

Judith A. Sharp 

Hon. Booker Thomas Shaw 

John William Shaw 

Michael P. Shea 

Bobette Shipman 

Nancy Lee Sido 

Douglas Ealey Sittler 

Kenneth Aubrey Slavens 

James Michael Smith 

James M. Smith 

Phillip Sanford Smith 

Hon. Edwin H. Smith 

Donald Williamson Smith 

Andrea Loring Smith 

Gary Edward Snodgrass 

David Alan Sosne 

Daniel Edward Speir 

Steven E. Spoeneman 

George Lee Stafford 

Eugene Girard Steinmann 

Paul R. Sterrett 

Bradford Lee Stevens 

V. Raymond Stranghoener 

Mark W. Suardi 

David F. Sullivan 

Mike Svetlic 

Robert M. Sweere 

Robert Jefferson Swift Jr. 

Dennis Herbert Tesreau 

Hon. Kenneth Foster Thompson 

Rodney William Thompson 

Judy R. Ullmann 

Hon. James Walter Van Amburg 

Thomas Kent Vandiver 

Elgene C. Ver Dught 

John A. Vering III 

Daniel L. Viets 

Steven Dee Waldman 

Hon. Barbara Wendy Wallace 

E. Waide Warner Jr. 

Roger W. Warren 

Russell F. Watters 

Richard Donald Watters 

Thomas Blumeyer Weaver 

Charles Edward Weedman Jr. 

John C. Weller 

Dorothy L. White-Coleman 

Steven Kent Wickersham 

Hon. Terry W. Wiese 

Les D. Wight II 

Michael E. Wilson 

Steven Douglas Wolcott 

Branson L. Wood III 

Randell Keith Wood 

Marie Spencer Woodbury 

William Lee Yocum 

Valarie Standefer Zeeck 

Candace Margaret Zierdt 

Nick Alexander Zotos 

Appellate

Wrong reason, right result
An appellate court “will affirm the circuit court’s judgment ‘if it is correct on any ground supported by the record regardless of whether the circuit court relied upon it.’” The petitioner sought an exemption from registration as a sex offender, and the circuit court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. That reasoning was erroneous because the constitution gave circuit courts jurisdiction over all matters civil and criminal. But the result was correct because statutes provided the conditions for that relief and the appellant did not meet those conditions. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
(Overview summary)
Sherma Johnson, Appellant, v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, et al., Respondents
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113828

Judgment was not final without resolving all claims
Appellate jurisdiction was a matter of statute and rule, not “waiver, acquiescence, or even express consent[.]” For the parties’ action, a final judgment was necessary before appellate jurisdiction was possible. The judgment was not final because it failed to address all the petition’s claims. Nevertheless, the Missouri Court of Appeals issued an opinion on the judgment in an earlier appeal. The law of the case doctrine was discretionary when an earlier opinion “arose from mistake or resulted in a manifest injustice” to the defendant. “Under these exceptional circumstances, we exercise our discretion not to apply the law of the case doctrine.” The Court of Appeals recalled its mandate and withdrew its opinion in the earlier appeal, which reversed the judgment issued pursuant to that earlier appeal and mooted the remaining matters on appeal, and it remanded the action for a final judgment.
(Overview summary)
Matthew Valdivia v. Missouri Department of Corrections
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88465

ADR

No contract, no arbitration agreement
Arbitration was a matter of contract. Contracts existed only when essential terms were agreed. Negotiations over contract terms did not constitute a contract. The parties agreed to arbitrate disputes arising from a prospective employment contract. “The only legally enforceable promise created out of at-will employment is the employer’s promise to pay the employee for the work he or she performs.” Therefore, essential terms of a contract for at-will employment included the start date. No start date was ever agreed, and the employer withdrew its offer of employment before employment started. Without a contract of employment, there was no arbitration agreement. The circuit court denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
(Overview summary)
Jeremy Bredwell v. Snap-On Incorporated, et al.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88325

Criminal

Self-defense theories had to be in disjunctive
Counsel affirmatively stating “no objection” to the State’s proffered instruction did not waive plain error review. Self-defense was a special negative defense, meaning that the defendant had to raise it and the State had to disprove it, like an extra element of the offense. The defendant raised general self-defense and castle doctrine self-defense, so the State had to disprove both. But the instructions allowed conviction if the State negated either general self-defense “or” castle doctrine self-defense. That lowered the State’s burden of proof and constituted plain error. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded the action for a new trial.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri v. Robert E. Matlock, Jr.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87929

Post-conviction

Findings of fact and conclusions of law required on timeliness.
Circuit courts had to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the timeliness of initial motions, and a motion to amend was not necessary to preserve that matter. Failure to make those findings and conclusions made no record for appellate review and therefore required a remand. The movant’s motion arrived late, but the movant alleged timely filing and alternatives to that requirement. The circuit court made no findings of fact on the matter of timeliness, so the Missouri Court of Appeals remanded the action to the circuit court.
(Overview summary)
Joshua C. Proffer, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114132

Probate

Non-probate transfer was non-recoverable
When a decedent’s liabilities were greater than the decedent’s estate, an action for accounting could re-capture “recoverable transfers,” meaning decedent property that a creditor could have seized and attached for the decedent’s debts. That did not describe a decedent’s individual retirement account because all amounts disbursed from such accounts to the account holder or a beneficiary were exempt from attachment and execution. A beneficiary of the decedent’s individual retirement account received their benefit and the estate’s personal representative brought an action for accounting to recover that transfer. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
In the Estate of: Dennis Hicks
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114395

Approval of final settlement affirmed
In an earlier appeal, the appellant challenged the circuit court’s order approving the sale of assets. The protectee’s death ended the respondent conservator’s authority over the protectee's assets except for winding up and making a final settlement. Final settlements did not dispose of all assets; they accounted for all assets. That accounting did not have to disclose that the former conservator participated in the auction. The only person who had standing to raise a conflict of interest objection was the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. The appellant did not show that any assets were sold at less than fair market value so the circuit court approved the settlement. When the appellant appealed, law of the case barred the appellant from raising an argument that the appellant could have raised in the earlier appeal. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the order approving the final settlement.
IN THE MATTER OF KYONG SPRUILL, INCAPACITATED AND DISABLED. J-PIA SPRUILL, Respondent v. ARTHUR J. SPRUILL, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39185

Appellate

Special orders after judgment explained
Appeals were possible from special orders after judgment. Special orders after judgment related to the accomplishing or preventing enforcement of a judgment. Special orders after judgment did not include a ruling on the appellant’s declaratory judgment action. That action sought clarification of an underlying circuit court action’s status but did not seek relief related to enforcement of the judgment in that underlying action. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
City of Richmond Heights, Missouri, Respondent, v. Clinton L. Watson, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114255

Appellant’s briefing deficiencies barred review
The appellants had the burden of showing that the circuit court committed reversible error by filing an appellant’s brief. Appellants’ briefs were subject to rules that protected the courts’ impartiality by requiring appellants to set forth their challenges in a specified format. That format included a statement of facts, with references to the record and without argument, relevant to the judgment. It also required points relied on that, in a specified template, alleged circuit court error and a theory for reversal. Each theory required support with an argument in a respective prescribed analysis. When the appellant charged reversible error in any ruling, the appellants had to state how they preserved that error for review and the standard of review for the ruling. The appellant’s brief failed to conform to those requirements, requiring an appellate to construct an argument for the appellant, which courts would not do. The Missouri Court of Appeals granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Steven M. Young, et al., Respondents v. William H. Young, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113691

Attorneys

Use of AI’s fictitious citations merited sanctions
Every filing in every tribunal constituted a certification that the allegations and arguments had a basis in law and fact, which required some pre-filing inquiry. Counsel violated both the inquiry and certification requirements when counsel cited fabricated authorities for fictitious legal propositions hallucinated by generative artificial intelligence results. “Improper or careless use of generative AI” might also have violated “multiple rules of professional conduct.” Failure to check AI results was objectively unreasonable and supported a monetary sanction against counsel. The Missouri Court of Appeals denied the petition and ordered petitioner’s counsel to pay an amount for the adverse parties’ reasonable attorney fees.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri ex rel. Steven Schnell, Relator, v. Honorable Rebecca Richardson, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114731

Criminal

Revocation of parole prohibited
Writs of prohibition issued “to avert the usurpation of power when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction[.]” Sentencing defendants to the custody of the Department of Corrections ended the authority of the circuit court and started the authority of the Department, including as to parole. The respondent circuit judge nevertheless issued a summons and a warrant on the State’s motion to revoke the parole of the relator. The Missouri Court of Appeals made permanent its writ of prohibition against the respondent circuit judge to bar any further action in the relator’s criminal action.
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. SARAH M. PRETTYMAN, Relator v. THE HONORABLE LYNETTE VEENSTRA, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39402

Revocation of parole prohibited, related jail board bill unauthorized
Writs of prohibition issued “to avert the usurpation of power when a lower court lacks authority or jurisdiction[.]” Sentencing defendants to the custody of the Department of Corrections ended the authority of the circuit court and started the exclusive authority of the Department as to parole. The respondent circuit judge nevertheless issued a summons and a warrant, and confined the relator to jail. The Missouri Court of Appeals made permanent its writ of prohibition against the respondent circuit judge to bar any further action in the relator’s criminal action, except to tear up jail board bill for the relator’s unauthorized confinement.
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. BRANDON LEE RUTZ, Relator v. THE HONORABLE R. CRAIG CARTER, CIRCUIT JUDGE, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39403

Elections

Secretary of State held in, then purged of, contempt
Civil contempt’s purpose was to encourage compliance with court orders by fine or commitment to jail. The elements of contempt included a court-ordered obligation and a breach of that obligation. In an action to determine which congressional redistricting map to use at the general election, old or new, the Supreme Court of Missouri required the use of the old map and barred the Missouri Secretary of State from “mandating the use of the” new map. The secretary emailed election authorities to mandate the use of a map three times: first, the old map; second, the new map; third, the old map. The second email put the secretary in contempt of court. A U.S. district court’s temporary restraining order did not change that result because that temporary restraining order did not require the second email and, even if it did, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the temporary restraining order. The third email purged the secretary of contempt. Because the Missouri Secretary of State purged himself of contempt, the Supreme Court of Missouri did not order any commitment or fine.
Richard von Glahn, Appellant, v. Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity, et al., Respondents
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101805

Family

Circuit court correctly characterized and awarded a non-existent asset
In actions for dissolution of marriage, circuit courts had to characterize and divide the parties’ assets. The source of funds determined whether assets, and increases in value, were subject to characterization as marital or separate assets. Assets subject to division were those existing on the date of trial, except that assets not existing on that date were also subject to division if secreted or squandered. Appellate courts could determine that circuit courts implicitly made findings of fact as to squandering and secreting assets from the circuit courts’ dispositions of assets. The record supported an implicit finding that the appellant tried to conceal an asset — by selling and deferring receipt of payment — in anticipation of dissolving the marriage, so the circuit court could characterize and divide that asset. And the appellant asked the circuit court to award an asset to a non-party so, if awarding that asset to the appellant was an error, the appellant invited that error. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
In RE The Marriage of: Andrew John Rottinghaus v. Kelly Ann Rottinghaus
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88229

Workers’ compensation

Additional significant evidence doctrine was stricken under strict construction
Workers’ compensation statutes were subject to strict construction. Strict construction barred judicially created doctrines. Temporary awards were subject to modification pending final awards. Final awards were subject to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s review. That review was de novo, so the judicially created requirement of “additional significant evidence” was not the standard for temporary or final awards. Final awards of the Commission only, not and ruling of an administrative law judge, were subject to judicial review. Judicial review included deference to findings of fact that had support in substantial and competent evidence on the whole record. The claimant had earlier work-related injuries for which the claimant received settlements and treatments. The claimant had a later injury that resulted in permanent partial disability and a temporary award. For the later injury, an administrative law judge’s award included amounts for a total knee replacement and future medical treatment. On review, the Commission denied those amounts in its award, finding less disability attributable to the later injury than the administrative law judge had. “The Commission is not bound by the experts' exact percentages of disability and is free to find a disability rating higher or lower than that expressed in medical testimony . . . because a claimant's degree of disability is not solely a medical question [, and] is a finding of fact within the special province of the commission.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s award.
(Overview summary)
Gabriel Gilbert v. City of Grandview, MO
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88375

MOLAP will have in-person and virtual office hours for law students on the following days during the fall 2026 semester unless otherwise indicated.

University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law

Sept. 23, 9 a.m.-2 p.m., Room 222 (Law Library)

Oct. 14, 9 a.m.-2 p.m., Room 208

Nov. 12, 9 a.m.-2 p.m., Room 222 (Law Library)

University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law

Sept. 23, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., virtual 

Oct. 21, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., virtual 

Nov. 18, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., virtual 

Dec. 2, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., virtual

Saint Louis University School of Law

Sept. 14, 10 a.m.-2 p.m., Room 1005D

Oct. 26, 10 a.m.-2 p.m., Room 1005D

Nov. 16, 10 a.m.-2 p.m., Room 1005D

Dec. 7, 10 a.m.-2 p.m., virtual

Washington University School of Law

Sept. 9, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., Anheuser-Busch Hall Office of Student Life, Suite 210

Oct. 21, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., Anheuser-Busch Hall Office of Student Life, Suite 210

Nov. 11, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., Anheuser-Busch Hall Office of Student Life, Suite 210

Dec. 2, 10 a.m.-3 p.m., virtual

Come in during MOLAP’s office hours, schedule an appointment, or access services outside the scheduled office hours by calling 1-800-688-7859 or emailing molap@mobar.org.

Appellate

Time for appeal from special order after judgment explained
Appellate courts had authority only as statutes and rules provided. All judgments were orders, but not all orders were judgments. Special orders after judgment were not judgments so the time to appeal judgments did not generally apply to special orders after judgment. Specifically, judgments were effective after entry and special orders after judgment were effective immediately on entry. Special orders after judgment included any order on enforcement of, or collateral attack on, any judgment. That described the appellant’s motion for satisfaction of judgment. The appellant did not file the notice of appeal in time so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Kenneth Chailland, II, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Speed and Specialties Autobody, LLC, Defendant, and Jesse Woodrow Long, Defendant/Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114213

Theory not raised in circuit court barred in appellate court
“A defending party is entitled to a summary judgment if it demonstrates: … that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of the facts necessary to support movant’s properly pleaded affirmative defense.” Affirmative defenses were also subject to affirmative defenses, also called affirmative avoidance, and all had to be pleaded or were waived. That applied to estoppel. In its amended answer and motion for summary judgment, the defendants cited statutes of limitation and alleged facts relevant to those statutes. The plaintiff did not file a reply mentioning estoppel and so waived that theory. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred because estoppel prevented the defendants from raising statutes of limitations. The circuit “court never ruled on that issue and it has been waived.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
CLINT A. WILKERSON, in his capacity as SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE OF THE MIKE ALAN WILKERSON TRUST DATED 8/9/1995, and in his individual capacity, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SCOTT L. WILKERSON and KIMBERLY D. WILKERSON, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39231

Fictitious citations resulted in dismissal
Appellate rules protected the appellate courts’ neutrality. Those rules included a duty of candor. Filing an appellate brief constituted a certification that all theories were not frivolous. The appellant’s brief violated multiple rules, including citation to inapplicable authorities. “Most notably, three cases in [appellant]’s brief are completely fictitious.” Unable to conduct any meaningful review, the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Willie C. Fortune v. CTA Certified Transmission
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88370

Civil

Class action certification denied over predominance
The elements of class action certification included predominance of common questions of law and issues of fact over individual matters among the class. “[A]n extensive analysis of state law variances” was necessary “to demonstrate class certification did not present insuperable obstacles.” Separate arbitration agreements and divergent statutes applicable to members of a proposed nationwide class showed the opposite. The circuit court denied certification and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Crown Asset Management, LLC, Respondent, v. Lisa Lawson, Appellant, v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114220

No meritorious defense stated
The elements of an action to set aside a default judgment included a meritorious defense. A meritorious defense meant “an arguable theory” of defense to the plaintiff’s claim as described in allegations of fact with supporting evidence. A verified answer merely setting forth denials of the plaintiff’s allegations was insufficient. The circuit court erred in setting aside the default judgment so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and ordered the circuit court to reinstate the default judgment.
(Overview summary)
Gregory Ernst, et al., Appellant, v. Tainter Landscape, LLC, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114018

Good cause to set aside default not shown
Parties could set aside a default judgment on showing a meritorious defense to the claim and good cause for the default. Good cause included negligence but not recklessness. Recklessness included “a deliberate choice to risk the possibility of a default judgment” like ignoring litigation, especially at upper management levels. The defendant had notice of the subject matter, and the action, and that neither the defendant’s insurer nor the defendant’s own lawyer would defend the action. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
HARRY MENKE, Plaintiff-Respondent v. JAI GANESH LAXMI LLC, d/b/a LIBERTY LODGE, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39201

Criminal

Accomplice liability shown for attempted offense
An attempted offense meant a substantial step showing a firm purpose to complete the offense. The State carried its burden on that element with evidence that the defendant drove the vehicle that circled the crime scene where the victim was killed by the defendant’s associate. No plain error occurred when the circuit court admitted a surveillance video that was “highly probative and otherwise displayed . . . strong indicia of reliability.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. James C. Armstrong, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113515

Recklessness shown
The elements of involuntary manslaughter included criminal recklessness, meaning to consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk. On that element, the State carried its burden of proof with evidence that the defendant passed six miles of lighted signage toward slowed and stopped traffic at 50 or 60 miles per hour without trying “to slow, stop, or swerve his vehicle [.]” The State showed that the defendant was the driver with a judicial admission that the defendant caused the wreck and evidence that the defendant matched the description of the only person in the vehicle. “An in-court identification . . . is not always required.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. ADMIR KULOVAC, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39130

CDL did not bar expungement
Unambiguous statutes required no construction. Holders of a commercial driver’s license were ineligible for expungement of driving-related offenses. When the driver committed a driving-related offense, the driver did not hold a commercial driver’s license. Therefore, the driver was not barred from expungement. Neither the appellant’s later receipt of a commercial driver’s license, nor other standards for expunging other offenses, nor statutes preserving records of offenses, altered that result. The circuit court expunged the driver’s record and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
D.P.U. v. Director of Revenue, State of Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88190

Elections

Certification of insufficiency for initiative and referendum proposals was insufficient
The only possible pre-election challenges to an initiative petition before a vote were those related to form like the one-article limit, and single-subject limit for new articles, for constitutional amendments. On receipt of proposed initiative petition forms, the Missouri Secretary of State must certify ballot titles and summaries within “a strict statutory deadline.” On receipt of an initiative petition with signatures, the Secretary of State must examine the petition and signatures and certify sufficiency or insufficiency of compliance with the Missouri Constitution and statutes. A certificate of insufficiency required “a certificate stating the reason for the insufficiency.” On an initiative petition with signatures, the Secretary of State issued a certificate of insufficiency. The certificate did not set forth reasons for insufficiency. Failure to set forth reasons preserved no challenge to the initiative petition for judicial review. The face of the petition showed compliance with the one-article and single-subject limits, and it was too late to change the ballot title and summary already certified. The Supreme Court of Missouri ordered the initiative petition certified and placed on the ballot with the title and summary as already certified.
(Overview summary)
Claire Harris, et al., Appellants, vs. Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity as the Missouri Secretary of State, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101806

Legislative re-districting map was subject to referendum
“[T]he United States Constitution permits a state to authorize a referendum as to legislation drawing new congressional districts,” and the Missouri Constitution allowed the voters to subject any legislation to referendum with limited exceptions. An exception for re-districting applied only to state re-districting, which was a separate process. An exception for “the immediate preservation of the public peace” required an emergency clause, which the legislation did not have. An exception “for the maintenance of state institutions” applied only to appropriations. Therefore, the General Assembly’s congressional re-districting legislation was subject to a referendum. Pending that referendum, the legislation did not take effect and only “shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.” The circuit court declared otherwise, so the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed. The Court ordered the initiative petition certified and placed on the ballot and barred the use of the legislation unless approved by the voters.
(Overview summary)
Richard von Glahn, Appellant, vs. Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity, et al., Respondents.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101805

Certification mooted declaratory judgment action
Courts did not rule on actions that were moot, meaning that no live dispute or effective relief remained. In an action for declaratory judgment, the parties litigated whether certain signatures counted toward the number required for an initiative petition to reach the ballot. The Missouri Secretary of State’s certification stated that the number of signatures was sufficient even without the disputed signatures. That certification mooted the litigation, but the circuit court issued judgment. The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated that judgment and entered judgment of dismissal.
(Overview summary)
People Not Politicians, et al., Appellants, vs. Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins, et al., Respondents.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101801

Employment

Substantial identity of interest forgave misidentification of employer
Summary judgment was available only to parties who showed the right to a favorable ruling on undisputed material facts. In actions under the Human Rights Act, attorney fee awards to employers were possible in actions brought “without foundation,” meaning on frivolous claims. That did not describe the state of the summary judgment record as to confusion over employer’s identity, especially when the parties genuinely disputed whether that identity was reasonably ascertainable, and an initially named defendant and the eventually named employer shared a substantial identity of interest. The claimant’s substitution of parties was timely and related back to the initial filing. The circuit court entered summary judgments against the claimant, and the Missouri Court of Appeals vacated those judgments and remanded the action to the circuit court.
LOGAN NUMBERS, Appellant v. 76 MALL INN, INC., and GRAND COUNTRY FUN SPOT, LLC, Respondents
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39172

Evidence

No prejudice shown
Appellate courts reviewed not merely for error but also for prejudice. Prejudice in the admission of evidence meant a reasonable likelihood of acquittal without the disputed evidence. That did not describe sympathetic background testimony, even if not relevant logically or legally; as shown by jury deadlock on one of the charges. It also did not describe a surveillance video, even if not subjected to a sufficient foundation, that the defense cited in evidence and argument. Accomplice liability for an offense required the State to show participation in the offense, which the State did with evidence of where and when defendant and victim were together. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Antonio Steed, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113711

Juvenile

Due process was satisfied
In actions for protective custody, parents had the right to receive certain documents in discovery and present evidence at hearings. But the juvenile officer did not offer any documents, and the circuit court excluded no evidence relevant to the judgment, at any hearing so no due process violation occurred. The circuit court encouraged circuit courts to be accessible to pro se litigants, abjured the Division of Children’s Services to participate in appellate proceedings, and affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
In the interest of: E.S.W.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113858

Orders of protection

Domestic abuse not shown
In an action for a full order of protection, the plaintiff argued that the defendant committed domestic abuse by battery, which required proof of physical harm. “Neither party testified that [plaintiff] suffered pain, bruising, soreness, injury, visible marks, or impairment of bodily function, or required medical treatment.” And the plaintiff also argued that the defendant committed domestic abuse by assault, which required evidence that the plaintiff feared for her physical safety. “[T]here was no evidence [plaintiff] received threats of physical harm or actions of physical violence.” The plaintiff also argued that the defendant committed domestic abuse by harassment, which required evidence of substantial emotional distress. The evidence showed that the defendant was “‘annoying and boorish,' [but] his conduct would not cause ‘substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person.’” The record also showed that the circuit court issued the full order to separate the parties before their conflict escalated further. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the action with instructions to dismiss.
E.M., Petitioner-Respondent v. H.M.M., Respondent-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39109

Personal injury

Pleading of punitive damages against SLEF prohibited
Writs of prohibition were discretionary remedies for actions in excess of authority. The State Legal Expense Fund covered the defense of State employees, and was an exclusive remedy, in actions for money damages based on official activities. Relators were a judge and another State employee, both defendants in an underlying action seeking money damages for conspiracy and abuse of process, so relators were within the Fund’s scope. In an earlier action, the relator could not get a writ barring such action but no opinion accompanied the denial, so it did not address the merits. Governing statutes expressly barred punitive damages against the Fund, which also barred prayers for relief in the form of punitive damages. The respondent circuit judge in the underlying action nevertheless ordered that the plaintiff in the underlying action could amend the petition to seek punitive damages. The Missouri Court of Appeals made permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition barring the circuit court from enforcing that order.
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. JUDGE STEVEN A. PRIVETTE, and ALICE BELL, Relators v. THE HONORABLE JAMES K. JUSTUS, SENIOR JUDGE, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38977

Post-conviction

No extra time for newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence
Time limits for filing were mandatory and failure to comply waived all relief with few exceptions. Those exceptions did not include newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence. Newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence were not grounds for post-conviction relief though they might support a writ of habeas corpus or a pardon. The circuit court dismissed the motion and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Mark David Adams, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113896

Workers’ compensation

Reduction in disability rating affirmed
On the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s administrative review of administrative law judge rulings, no deference was due. The Commission’s findings of fact were subject to deference on judicial review. Expert testimony was not necessary to sustain such findings and lay testimony could suffice. The record showed that the Commission did not exceed its authority by relying on one source of proof to the exclusion of all others. The record supported a finding that part of the claimant’s continuing disability was due to the claimant’s failure to perform rehabilitative exercises, rather than the claimant’s job-related injury, even crediting the claimant’s testimony. Clarification could occur before the Commission, not in the Missouri Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision.
(Overview summary)
Bradley Barnett v. Kawasaki Motors MFG Corp USA and Sentry Casualty Company
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88459

• District 3 (Jackson County)
• District 4 (Cass, Clay, Johnson, Lafayette, Platte and Ray Counties)
• District 9 (City of St. Louis)
• District 14 (Butler, Carter, Dent, Dunklin, Iron, Madison, Mississippi, New Madrid, Oregon, Pemiscot, Reynolds, Ripley, Scott, Shannon, Stoddard and Wayne Counties)
• Eastern Appellate District (all counties encompassed by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District).

The YLS Council will fill these vacancies by majority vote. The terms for these council seats will begin September 2026 and will end September 2028.

The council requests that those interested in serving complete the nominating petition and file it with Brett Rolwes, The Missouri Bar YLS liaison, by Sept. 28.

The council invites those who file to include a resume and brief statement explaining their interest in serving on the YLS Council. Nominations for the Eastern Appellate District seat also require the submission of a statement describing the nominee's unique experience, knowledge, and qualifications to represent diverse elements of The Missouri Bar to accompany their nominating petition.

All eligible petitions received will be submitted to the YLS Council for consideration.

What is the YLS Council?

The YLS Council is the governing body for the Young Lawyers’ Section of The Missouri Bar. It is composed of approximately 35 young or new lawyers elected to serve two-year terms from districts across the state. Officers and executive committee members are elected from within the ranks of the council’s membership.

What does YLS do?

YLS sponsors, in full or in part, a variety of public service projects, continuing legal education programs, and social networking events across Missouri that are geared toward young and recently admitted lawyers. The section collaborates with several affiliate organizations that also have great opportunities to help new and young lawyers integrate in the profession and serve their communities.

Visit News.MoBar.org to learn more about what YLS and the council have been doing recently.

The Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee — comprised of lawyers, retired judges, and Missouri residents — completes an anonymous evaluation of each judge up for retention under Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan, also known as The Missouri Plan, to ensure they are meeting the judicial performance standards. The committee reviews written opinions and surveys completed by lawyers and jurors who, when applicable, have worked with the judge. The committee then recommends whether a judge should or should not be retained, and its findings are publicly available through YourMissouriJudges.org to help educate voters.

Dodge

Dodge has been a trial lawyer with Hall Ansley, P.C. for over 32 years. A former member of The Missouri Bar Board of Governors, Dodge is past president of the Springfield Metropolitan Bar Association and is a founding member of the Southern Missouri Women Lawyers Association. She is the current chair of the Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee and was on the 31st Judicial Commission, which helps fill judicial vacancies under The Missouri Plan in Greene County.

“I am very honored to receive this award from our president, Athena Dickson,” Dodge said. “She has spent tireless hours traveling around the state sharing the important work of the Judicial Performance Review Committee and its role in the Non-Partisan Court Plan.”

Dodge said she was “especially honored” to receive the President’s Award alongside Tucker.

“He successfully directed the statewide evaluation of the JPR Committee and public dissemination processes for both the 2022 and 2024 terms,” she said. “He continues to educate us on the many positive benefits of The Missouri Plan.” 

Tucker

With over 44 years of practice, Tucker is of counsel at Armstrong Teasdale LLP, supporting its general counsel’s office with legal ethics, conflicts of interest, risk management, and continuing legal education. Before stepping into that role, Tucker was a litigation partner at Armstrong Teasdale.

A graduate of the Duke University School of Law, Tucker served on The Missouri Bar Board of Governors and was 1995-1996 Missouri Bar president. Tucker has served on the Missouri Judicial Performance Review Committee and its predecessor, the Judicial Performance Evaluation Committee, since 2008. He was chair of the Judicial Performance Review Committee from 2022-2026.

Tucker said he was “proud of the work” of the Judicial Performance Review Committee.

“Each member has diligently undertaken the serious responsibility to objectively evaluate the performance of the judges up for retention election,” he said. “… The committee has worked collaboratively and efficiently to complete its tasks over each two-year election cycle. The voters of Missouri have benefited [from] the committee’s work.”

Tucker encouraged lawyers to get involved with The Missouri Bar as the work is “important and meaningful.”

“A long-term belief in the need to seek the improvement of the laws and the administration of justice for all persons in Missouri has been my inspiration for the work I have done,” he said. “Those principles have led me to work in a way which I hope has been useful, ethical and effective in both my private practice and in my public service.”

Dodge and Tucker will accept the President’s Award in Kansas City during the Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar and Judicial Conference, Sept. 16-18.

Click here to learn more about annual awards presented by The Missouri Bar, the Missouri Bar Foundation, and other entities. Read about other 2026 award winners here.

Appellate

No review of unpreserved matters without asking for plain error review
In any jury trial, to preserve error, parties must raise the matter contemporaneously and raise the matter again in a motion for new trial. Preservation also required citing the matter in a point relied on that was compliant with appellate rules. Appellate courts could not correct the appellant’s brief and rule on the appeal from there because those activities would constitute advocacy for the appellant. The appellants further had to file all portions of the record referenced in their briefs. The appellant claimed that the circuit court erred by overruling its objection to the defendant’s closing argument and sought a mistrial. The appellant’s motion for new trial cited the ruling on mistrial, which did not preserve error in ruling on the objection. The burdens of proof and standards of review for the rulings were different, and the appellant cited the wrong one for the objection. A point relied on citing awards for both future lost wages and future medical expenses was multifarious and preserved error in neither award. The appellant also cited differing standards of review in its point relied on associated argument. The appellant further failed to file transcripts to which it referred. The appellant preserved no error for review and appellate courts “will not sua sponte review for plain error [.]” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
Tara Straussner, Respondent, v. City of St. Louis, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114085

Judgment too vague for appellate review
Appeals were possible from final judgments. Judgments granting permanent injunctions were final only when, among other things, their provisions were “clear, precise, and definite” as to what was barred, and for how long, without reference to any other document. In an action to enforce a covenant not to compete, the plaintiff sought to bar the defendants from selling at retail online and from any brick-and-mortar location. The circuit court barred the opening of “a retail store” without stating whether that included online and for how long. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Pretzel Boys Licensing, LLC, Respondent, v. Pretzel Pretzel-Telegraph, LLC, Amber Scurlock, and Anthony Simmons, Appellants.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113968

Wrong reason, right result
An appellate court “will affirm the circuit court’s judgment ‘if it is correct on any ground supported by the record regardless of whether the circuit court relied upon it.’” The petitioner sought an exemption from registration as a sex offender and the circuit court dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. That reasoning was erroneous because the constitution gave circuit courts jurisdiction over all matters civil and criminal. But the result was correct because statutes provided the conditions for that relief and the appellant did not meet those conditions. Couching the action as an action for declaratory judgment did not alter that result. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
(Overview summary)
Sherma Johnson, Appellant, v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, et al., Respondents.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113828

Deficient briefing required dismissal
Rules of appellate procedure preserved the appellate courts’ impartiality by avoiding speculation on the appellants’ theories. Non-compliant statement of facts, points relied on, and argument were so incoherent that they either failed to preserve or abandoned the appellant’s claims of circuit court error. After notice and opportunity to cure, the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Tower Loan of Missouri, LLC, v. Michael Session
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88455

Civil

Voiding of judgment reversed
Circuit courts could grant relief from judgments, including default judgments, void for lack of due process. Due process included personal jurisdiction, which included notice and an opportunity to be heard, which occurred by service of process. Service of process on a person living outside of United States was possible under Missouri law but was also possible under the Hague Convention, which the plaintiff satisfied by delivery to the defendant through Scotland’s central authority. The central authority’s return of service constituted prima facie evidence of due process that the defendant failed to refute. A spelling error in the defendant’s name was a mere misnomer, not a misidentification, that the circuit court could correct at any time. “When summons is actually served on the correct party but by the wrong name, the error becomes immaterial because the correct party has notice of the suit." Once the party served defaulted, the circuit court could enter default, including an award of damages. “Defendant’s contention regarding the lack of probative evidence to support the award is a merit defense disguised as a due process argument.” The plaintiff’s affidavit supported the amount of damages awarded and, even if it didn’t, that would have been a mere error of law and not a jurisdictional error.
(Overview summary)
Mindy Reaves, Appellant, v. P. Harvey's Mold Lady and Construction Services, LLC, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114152

Statutes determined standing
The plaintiffs had the burden to establish standing, meaning the legally protected interest necessary to file an action for relief. Missouri statutes determined standing for Missouri statutory actions, not United States caselaw, so that interest need not be in monetary damages. Statutes created a cause for action for a borrower whose lender did not timely file a release of lien. The plaintiff alleged that the plaintiff’s lender did not timely release the lender’s lien. That pleading alleged standing, so the circuit court erred in dismissing the action. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of reversal and remanded the action to the circuit court.
(Overview summary)
Robert J. Gallagher, Appellant, v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113806

Amended schedule did not extend time for response to summary judgment
On a motion for summary judgment, any numbered paragraph in the statement of undisputed facts that the responding party failed to deny constituted an admission. Circuit courts generally had authority to extend deadlines; and the rule governing summary judgment specifically contemplated discovery pending, and extensions of time for discovery for responding to, motions for summary judgment. None of those things happened in the parties’ action. The circuit court issued an amended schedule that extended the deadline for discovery and continued the trial date, but that order did not void the pending summary judgment motion, nor extend the time to respond to the motion. The appellant did not file a response to the motion, the circuit court deemed the movant’s allegations admitted and granted the motion, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgement.
(Overview summary)
Wendy Anderson v. Truman Medical Center, Inc. D/B/A University Health
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88285

Criminal

Reference to questions unanswered by the defense was okay
The elements of plain error review included an obvious error. An indirect reference to the defendant’s failure to testify could support reversal when the record showed a calculated intent to highlight the matter. But the State did not reference the defendant or failure to testify, only “unanswered questions” that the State attributed to the defense. The circuit court did not plainly err in refraining from intervening sua sponte so the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Joseph O. Fuller, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113750

Trespass conviction affirmed
The elements of trespass in the first degree as charged included remaining on real property unlawfully. Unlawful presence did not require evidence of the title to real property, nor of the property’s metes and bounds. Evidence that another person had the right to use, possession, or occupancy was sufficient. Such evidence came from the occupant’s general manager and was sufficient to support the element of remaining unlawfully. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri v. Samuel David Todd Cornell
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88419

Circumstances implied knowledge
The elements of class E felony leaving the scene of an accident included knowledge that property damage had occurred. The State supported that element with evidence of a collision between the defendant’s vehicle and the victim’s vehicle, extensive damage to the victim’s vehicle, and the defendant’s flight from the collision. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri v. Jerry Cook
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88131

Appeal violated plea bargain
Plea bargains were contracts, in which “both parties relinquished rights and received benefits [,]” subject to equitable principles. Sentencing was a material provision. The appellant agreed to enhanced sentencing for some charges in exchange for dismissal of other charges including resisting arrest. The defendant’s post-judgment motion challenging the enhanced sentencing, though successful on appeal, constituted a breach of the agreement great enough to support rescission, so the circuit court did not err in denying enforcement of the dismissal. When the State re-filed the charge of resisting arrest, the State showed flight with arresting officer testimony, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri v. Christopher Lynn Baker
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88023

No right to inform jury of consecutive sentence mandate
When considering their recommended sentences, juries cannot consider whether sentences could be concurrent or consecutive because that was a collateral matter for the judge alone. The sentences for the defendant’s offenses had to be consecutive, the circuit court barred the defense from mentioning that law during argument on sentencing, and that ruling was no abuse of discretion. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri v. Kam Deih Kap
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87925

Employment security

No good cause to backdate benefits
Benefits began in the month of the filing of a claim unless the claimant showed good cause for starting them earlier. Good cause meant “beyond the reasonable control of the claimant and then only if the claimant acts as soon as practical.” That did not describe the claimant’s ignorance of the law allowing a claim while working part-time. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that decision.
(Overview summary)
Sharonda White, Appellant, v. Division of Employment Security, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114000

Appellant must appeal the Commission’s dismissal, not the ALJ’s decision
An administrative law judge decided the claimant’s claim on the merits, the claimant filed a petition for review with the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, and the Commission dismissed petition for review for failure to appear. The Missouri Court of Appeals had authority only to review the Commission’s rulings. The claimant’s notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals challenged the ruling on the merits of the claim, not the Commission’s dismissal. Because the Commission never ruled on the merits of the claim and only dismissed the petition for review, the Court of Appeals had no authority over the merits of the claim. The Court of Appeals dismissed the notice of appeal.
(Overview summary)
Torie Nave v. Barnes-Jewish Hospital, Employer, and Division of Employment Security
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88602

Family

No new grounds alleged in motion to modify
Appellate courts affirmed dismissal on any ground charged in a motion to dismiss even if the circuit court did not rely on it. To support a motion to modify child custody, the movant had to show facts unknown at, or that arose since, the earlier custody order. The movant alleged a breakdown in communication and cooperation between the parties, but that was nothing new. “These parents have engaged in protracted and hostile litigation since 2018 when their child was less than a year old. Even accepting Father’s multiple averments in his motion as true, his allegations regarding Mother are hardly a surprise.” The circuit court dismissed the motion for failure to state a claim and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
(Overview summary)
James Bryan Steele, Jr., Appellant, v. Amanda Marie Perkins, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114077

No Form 14, no appeal
Except when the appellants sought plain error review, appellate courts reviewed only preserved errors. To preserve error in awards of child support, parties had to file a Form 14 in circuit court. The appellant challenged the award of child support on appeal but did not file a Form 14 in circuit court and so failed to preserve the matter. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the award.
(Overview summary)
M.F., Appellant, v. S.B., Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113585

Juvenile

No colloquy was necessary to accept an admission of guilt
Plain error review was within appellate courts’ discretion for obvious errors that “seriously” undermined circuit court judgments by their effect on substantial rights. The rights of a juvenile in an adjudication hearing included the essentials of due process in a criminal action. The appellant juvenile did not show that those essentials included the colloquy due in circuit court to determine whether an admission was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. And the record showed that the appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made the admissions. No plain error occurred when the circuit court accepted the guilty plea so the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of commitment.
(Overview summary)
In the Interest of B.L., a Minor v. Juvenile Officer
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88431

Post-conviction

Overwhelming evidence of guilt negated prejudice
The movant had to show that counsel performed below professional standards. The movant cited the advice not to testify and failure to call the movant to testify. But the circuit court’s colloquy showed that the movant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to testify and that the waiver was strategic. The record showed that such strategy was sound because it avoided damaging cross-examination. Dealing with the State’s closing arguments in the defense’s closing argument, rather than objecting contemporaneously, was reasonable trial strategy. One point relied on alleging deficient performance by the appellate counsel as to three convictions was multifarious and preserved no errors. Also, no prejudice resulted from counsel’s alleged deficiencies because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Kevin M. Fields, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113721

Post-conviction relief

Refraining from an objection was sound strategy
Judgments on post-conviction relief motions were subject to reversal only when the whole record left appellate courts with a definite and firm impression that the circuit court had made a mistake. On a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the elements included deficient performance, which a reasonable trial strategy negated. When the claimed deficiency was the absence of an objection to evidence, trial counsel presumptively had a strategic reason for not objecting, even when trial counsel offered none. Trial counsel chose not to object to a witness’s testimony because it was likely to appear not credible and trial counsel was then able to further undermine the witness’s testimony on cross-examination. And, even if trial counsel’s performance were deficient, there was no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
ANDREW LUKE LEMASTERS, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39108

Witness would not have been helpful
Reasonable trial strategy negated claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Claims for ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on failure to call a witness required the movant to show that the witness was available and would have helped the movant “unqualifiedly.” As to both, the record supported a finding to the contrary and the circuit court found that the witness’s testimony in favor of the movant was not credible. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Sadiq J. Moore v. State of Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88073

Real estate

Road remedy was an easement, not a transfer of ownership
Circuit courts could establish private roads when strictly necessary for access, but only with the least “damage or injury and . . . inconvenience as practicable to the owner or owners of the real property over which the private road shall pass.” Specifically, the road had to be a permanent easement appurtenant. The circuit court granted the private road in fee simple absolute, so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, and remanded the action.
CLINT BOWEN, and MOGAN BOWEN, Respondents v. DYLAN ROEDER, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39014

Meet Aleigh Flournoy, a member of the 2025-2026 Missouri Bar Leadership Academy class! A graduate of the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, Flournoy is associate general counsel for North Kansas City Health. She previously was a judicial extern to Hon. Brian C. Wimes and Hon. Jill A. Morris.

Every year, The Missouri Bar brings together a select group of new and young lawyers to serve on the Leadership Academy. Each class completes a service project, engages in leadership workshops, networks with leaders in Missouri’s legal profession, and attends bar meetings. Following graduation, members continue to serve The Missouri Bar in an active capacity for two years. 

Flournoy recently chatted with The Missouri Bar about her unique path to becoming a lawyer, her favorite parts of Leadership Academy, her advice to new lawyers, and more.

What has been your favorite part about being on Leadership Academy so far?

“My favorite part of Leadership Academy has been everything I never saw coming. While the formal programming has been outstanding, some of the most meaningful growth has come from the relationships formed along the way … It is the phone calls, text messages, and emails that continue long after a meeting ends. It is the willingness to ask, ‘Have you dealt with this before?’ ‘What do you think about this situation?’ or, in those inevitable rookie-attorney moments, ‘Did I completely screw this up?’ Those conversations have reminded me that good lawyers seek answers, but great lawyers are not afraid to ask for help finding them.”

Why did you decide to apply for Leadership Academy?

“The reason I applied for Leadership Academy can be summed up in four words from my nominator and lifelong mentor: “You're ready. Apply.” … I am grateful not only for Rita Luukkonen’s confidence in me, but also for her willingness to give me the push I needed. Her faith in me gave me the confidence to act on that nomination, and applying for Leadership Academy has been one of the most rewarding professional decisions I have made.”

What do you value most about The Missouri Bar and its mission?

“What I value most about The Missouri Bar is its recognition that the legal profession exists to serve something greater than itself. Its mission is ‘to improve the legal profession, the administration of justice, and the law on behalf of the public.’ Those goals are inseparable. Stronger lawyers strengthen the profession, and a stronger profession strengthens public trust in our legal system.

“… The Missouri Bar reminds us that being a lawyer is about more than practicing law. It is about being a steward of the profession, a champion for the rule of law, and a servant to our communities. That commitment to both professional excellence and public service is what makes The Missouri Bar such an important institution.”

This year's class service project centers around learning about new lawyers’ needs, wants, and perceptions of The Missouri Bar. How do you see this work shaping the bar’s overall ability to continue helping lawyers even better serve their clients?

“By intentionally seeking input from newer attorneys, The Missouri Bar is … investing in the future of the profession. Understanding what new lawyers need to succeed helps the bar develop programs and resources that are relevant, practical, and impactful. When attorneys have access to meaningful … opportunities to build professional relationships, they are better equipped to navigate challenges, exercise sound judgment, and serve their clients effectively.”

Why should new/young lawyers consider applying for Leadership Academy?

“Leadership Academy goes beyond teaching traditional leadership skills; it is grounded in real-life leadership. There is something powerful about hearing Supreme Court of Missouri and Court of Appeals judges, along with some of the state’s most respected attorneys, speak candidly about the challenges they have faced … If a lawyer is unsure whether the program is worth it, my answer is simple: Apply … The relationships, perspectives, and lessons you gain will stay with you long after the program ends.”

Why did you want to become a lawyer?

“My first job was dusting those massive print law books and the tall shelves that held them in a Kansas City law firm’s library … There was something remarkable about holding those books and knowing that the words bound between those leather covers had the power to change, well, the world. I wanted to be part of that, but my path to the law was not direct. I earned degrees in journalism and business and built a career outside the practice of law. Then, in 2016, I became a mother and it changed my perspective …

“I became a lawyer because I wanted to help people, because I had witnessed the difference lawyers can make in people’s lives, and because I have always been drawn to stories and their impact. Somewhere between dusting those law books and reading them, albeit online by that point, I realized the law gave me a way to do both.”

What advice would you give to new/young lawyers?

“Winning is gratifying and losing is painful, but neither is as important as what you learn from the experience. Success can create the illusion that there is nothing left to learn; humility reminds us there always is … The best lawyers are not those who always have the answers. They are the ones willing to keep searching until they find them.”

Editor’s note: These answers have been edited for clarity and conciseness. Learn more about Leadership Academy here. 

Constitutional

No concealed carry permits for felons 
The United States Constitution’s Second Amendment protected the right of law-abiding citizens to “keep and bear Arms [.]” Restrictions on felons bearing arms were constitutional because felons were not law-abiding citizens and such restrictions had a long history in “our Nation’s tradition of firearm regulation.” Grounds to deny a concealed carry permit included felony convictions and guilty pleas. Substantial evidence of those convictions included the applicant’s testimony and other undisputed evidence. The circuit court affirmed the denial and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary)
Anthony Hayes, Appellant, v. Saint Louis County Police Department, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113903

Criminal

Trespasser had no standing to challenge search 
Appellate courts reviewed the record from the pretrial hearings and at trial. Guests of a tenant had standing to challenge searches of tenants’ premises, but the record supported a finding that the defendant was a trespasser and not a guest. The elements of possessing contraband included control of the contraband and knowledge of the contraband’s nature. Actual possession of contraband supported an inference that the defendant knew what the contraband was. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ritchie A. Jones, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113690

No plain error in multiple sentences for one incident
Defendant had to raise constitutional issues at the first opportunity, except double jeopardy, because double jeopardy went “to the very power of the State to bring the defendant in the court [.]” Unpreserved double jeopardy claims were within the courts’ discretionary plain error review. Plain error review required the defendant to show that an obvious error affected a fundamental right and caused a manifest injustice. Double jeopardy barred conviction for an offense under both a general description and a specific instance. One course of conduct could constitute multiple offenses if the statutes setting forth those offenses had differing elements. First-degree assault required the State to show that the defendant caused serious physical injury, while unlawful use of weapon by shooting at a motor vehicle did not. Unlawful use of weapon by shooting at a motor vehicle required the State to show that the defendant used a firearm, while first-degree assault did not. Each armed criminal action conviction required the State to show a separate underlying offense. Therefore, no error occurred when the circuit court imposed multiple sentences for those multiple offenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. BRYAN W. GRISSOM, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD

Family

Findings were sufficient 
When substantial admissible evidence in the record [supported a] judgment [,]” reversible error in the admission of evidence was “practically impossible” to show. The appellant challenged the admission of financial records authenticated by deposition but showed no prejudice from that evidence because other, undisputed evidence supported the judgment. In actions to modify child custody, statutory factors guided circuit courts’ determination of the children’s best interest. Conclusory recitations of which factor favored which party were insufficient because they did not allow meaningful appellate review. Circuit courts had to support their application of those factors made relevant by the allegations and evidence with findings of fact. The circuit court met that standard with “numerous factual findings corresponding to several statutory best-interest considerations” that “extensively considered allegations” and relevant evidence. “[T]he findings are relevant to the requests of the parties, easy for this Court to ascertain, and clearly attributable to [applicable] factors [.]” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 
COLBY L. DAVISON, Appellant v. BOBBIE S. FOLEY f/k/a DAVISON, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD39296

Insurance

Insurers need not cover sales tax for replacement vehicle when vehicle not replaced
Judgment on the pleadings was due when the petition alleged facts on which no relief was due under any theory. An earlier appellate ruling on a motion to dismiss held that relief was due if the insured’s reading of a policy was correct but did not decide that the insured’s reading of the policy was correct. The parties’ automobile policy’s collision coverage gave the insurer the option of repair or replacement. Replacement was at comparable value. Comparable value included any tax that the insured had to incur to “acquire ownership” of a replacement vehicle. Insured’s vehicle suffered a collision, the insured did not acquire ownership of a replacement vehicle, the insurer paid replacement value that did not include an amount for sales tax. In an action for breach of contract, the insured sought an amount for sales tax, but no relief was due because the insured never incurred sales tax. The circuit court granted the insured’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary)
Yolanda Bell v. Shelter General Insurance Company
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88275

Post-conviction

Abandonment inquiry required 
With exceptions inapplicable to the movant’s action, timely filing was mandatory. Among those exceptions was abandonment by appointed counsel. When appointed counsel filed amended motions out of time, circuit courts had to conduct an inquiry into whether the appointed counsel had abandoned the movant because abandonment excused untimely filing. The circuit court failed to conduct that inquiry. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the action to the circuit court for an inquiry into abandonment. 
TERRANCE LAMONTE JOHNSON, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD39268

“To have made an impact in someone’s life so their view of the legal system isn’t always negative.”
-Lillian Mehler, staff attorney with Legal Aid of Western Missouri in Kansas City

"To leave the world in better shape than I found it in.”
-Emily K. Price, Assistant circuit attorney at the St. Louis Circuit Attorney’s Office in St. Louis

Answers have been edited for length, clarity, and style.

We were wondering ... How has your legal career surprised you? Share your answer by emailing Journal@MoBar.org or filling out a form at MoBar.org/Closing-Statements.

W. Dudley McCarter, a former president of The Missouri Bar, is of counsel with the firm of McCarthy, Leonard, Kaemmerer and Miller.

For personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the defendant’s conduct must fall within Missouri’s long-arm statute

Cox v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon, WD87512 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).

Jeffrey Cox, one of the representatives of a class action lawsuit (collectively, the borrowers), appealed the circuit court’s order and judgment granting The Bank of New York Mellon’s motion for summary judgment, arguing the exercise of personal jurisdiction over BNYM would not comply with due process. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, affirmed the judgment.¹

“The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient when personal jurisdiction is contested.”² To assess personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, Missouri courts use a two-prong test:³ (1) the defendant’s conduct must fall within Missouri’s long-arm statute under § 506.500, and (2) the defendant “must have sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to satisfy due process.”⁴

The appellate court noted that the borrowers “have not set forth any disputed material facts to establish that BNYM transacted business in Missouri or used or possessed Missouri real estate that would subject it to specific jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.”⁵ BNYM does not have any “officers, directors, employees, or offices in Missouri, it did not sell any products or services in Missouri, and it did not loan money to Missouri consumers.”⁶

… [T]here is no genuine issue as to the material facts that BNYM, neither individually or through an agent, engaged in at least one of the acts enumerated in the long-arm statute subjecting it to personal jurisdiction in Missouri.

Private membership club is exempt from the Missouri Human Rights Act

Littlefield v. Norman Rigdon Post No. 5896, 723 S.W.3d 874 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).

Rayne Littlefield appealed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Norman Rigdon Post No. 5896 for Veterans of Foreign Wars, claiming the court erred in finding the VFW exempt from the definition of employment discrimination claims. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed the judgment.⁷

Littlefield argued that the VFW is not a “bona fide private membership club” that is exempt from the Missouri Human Rights Act’s definition of “employer” solely because it holds public events advertised on its website.⁸

Missouri courts have not yet defined “bona fide private membership club” under the MHRA, “making this a matter of first impression.”⁹ Thus, the court “must construe exemptions to remedial statutes like the MHRA narrowly.”¹⁰

Federal courts have considered many factors to determine whether a group is a bona fide private membership club, including:

(1) the genuine selectivity of the group, (2) the membership’s control over operations of the establishment, (3) the history of the organization, (4) the club’s purposes, (5) the use of facilities by nonmembers, and (6) whether the club advertises to the public to solicit members or promote the public’s use of its facilities.¹¹

“Courts consider an organization’s membership selection process as the most important factor in finding a club is a bona fide private membership club.”¹² To become a VFW post member, the applicant must have honorably served in a foreign war, insurrection, or expedition.¹³ “These criteria demonstrate the exceedingly selective nature of VFW membership,” the court noted.¹⁴

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Littlefield, VFW remains a bona fide private membership club in spite of its public events and advertising. Four of the six factors [considered by the federal courts] support the finding that VFW is a bona fide private membership club. Additionally, the most important factor — selectivity of the membership — leads one to the same conclusion.¹⁵

Requirements for registering a foreign judgment are mandatory

Sophia Chu v. Nanna, ED113487 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).

William Nanna appealed the circuit court’s order denying Nanna’s motion to dismiss Sophia Chu’s motion to register a foreign judgment. Because Chu failed to comply with the statutory requirements for filing a verified petition, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, reversed the circuit court’s judgment.¹⁶

The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Law, under § 511.760 and Rule 74.14, governs the registration of foreign judgments in Missouri. Section 511.760 states “any judgment, decree or order of a court of the United States or of any state or territory which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state” qualifies as a “foreign judgment” under the UEFJL.¹⁷ Registration of a foreign judgment happens when an authenticated copy of the judgment is filed in the circuit clerk’s office.¹⁸ “Compliance with the statutory procedure has been regarded as being mandatory.”¹⁹ Section 511.760.3 adds:

A verified petition for registration shall set forth a copy of the judgment to be registered, the date of its entry and the record of any subsequent entries affecting it, all authenticated in the manner authorized by the laws of the United States or of this state, and a prayer that the judgment be registered.

The Court of Appeals found that the circuit court erred in denying Nanna’s motion to dismiss Chu’s motion to register the foreign judgment because Chu failed to comply with the statutory requirements for filing a verified petition.²⁰

Inverse condemnation is sole avenue for recovery from a city for property damage

State ex rel. City of Osage Beach v. Koeppen, SD38855 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).

The Grand Harbour Condominium Owners Association, Inc. filed a lawsuit against the City of Osage Beach alleging two counts of negligence, a claim of nuisance, a claim of trespass, and a claim for ejectment.²¹ The city sought a writ of prohibition to order Hon. Aaron G. Koeppen to not proceed further other than to grant the city’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, held that Grand Harbour’s sole avenue of recovery was through an inverse condemnation action.²²

Article I, § 26 of the Missouri Constitution mandates that “private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”²³ The Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in Ferguson v. City of Sunrise Beach²⁴ and reaffirmed that “[i]nverse condemnation is the exclusive and proper remedy for an alleged nuisance or other damage caused to private property by an entity having the power of eminent domain.”²⁵ “The fact that the nuisance is alleged to have been caused by the public entity’s negligence is immaterial.”²⁶

Endnotes
1 Cox v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon, WD87512 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).
2 Id. at 10 (citing Bryant v. Smith Interior Design Grp., Inc., 310 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Mo. banc 2010); Ingram v. Johnson & Johnson, 608 S.W.3d 663, 687 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020)).
3 Andra v. Left Gate Prop. Holding, Inc., 453 S.W.3d 216, 225 (Mo. banc 2015); Noble v. Shawnee Gun Shop, Inc., 316 S.W.3d 364, 370 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).
4 Andra, 453 S.W.3d at 225.
5 Cox, WD87512 at 17-18.
6 Id. at 19.
7 Littlefield v. Norman Rigdon Post No. 5896, 723 S.W.3d 874 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).
8 Id. at 879.
9 Id. at 880.
10 Id.; See also Lampley v. Missouri Comm’n on Human Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Mo. banc 2019)
(internal quotation omitted) (“Remedial statutes should be construed liberally to include those which are within the spirit of the law and all reasonable doubts should be construed in favor of applicability to the case.”)
11 Id. at 881 (citing Quijano v. Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1980); Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1276 (7th Cir. 1993)).
12 Id. at 882 (citing Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1276).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 883; See also Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1276.
16 Sophia Chu v. Nanna, ED113487 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).
17 MO. REV. STAT. § 511.760.1(1).
18 Berman, Deleve, Kuchan & Chapman, LLC v. 417 Rentals, LLC, 598 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020).
19 HBE Leasing Corp. v. Eckilson, 769 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Mo. App. S.D. 1989).
20 Chu, ED113487. See also Am. Indus. Res., Inc. v. T.S.E. Supply Co., 708 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986) (“… strict adherence to the statutory requirements has great importance where one attempts to enforce the liability imposed by another jurisdiction on a citizen of Missouri through registration of a foreign judgment. This court is reluctant to uphold the dismissal of what may be a valid judgment; the requirement of verification, however, is sound practice and should be enforced.”).
21 State ex rel. City of Osage Beach v. Koeppen, SD38855 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).
22 Id.
23 Ferguson v. City of Sunrise Beach, 710 S.W.3d 620, 625 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
26 Heins Implement Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 693-94 (Mo. banc 1993).

Presented by The Missouri Bar Family Law Committee, the Roger P. Krumm Family Law Award honors a family law lawyer who has demonstrated an exceptional degree of competence, skill, integrity, commitment, and dedication toward the improvement and advancement of the practice of family law and the parties involved in family law matters.

Glesner Fines is the Rubey M. Hulen professor of law and dean emerita of the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. A graduate of the University of Wisconsin at Madison School of Law and Yale Law School, she has taught various law courses and co-founded the law school’s family law emphasis program, which includes multiple clinics and international and interdisciplinary coursework. 

“I have the awesome privilege of teaching students and attorneys how to do that work professionally, compassionately, and effectively,” Glesner Fines said.

Glesner Fines founded and directs the UMKC Self Help Clinic in a partnership with Legal Aid of Western Missouri, supervising students and helping as a volunteer lawyer counseling clients in family law matters and other civil issues.

She was the reporter on the revision of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers “Bounds of Advocacy,” the ethical standards for the organization’s fellows. She also wrote numerous articles and is a frequent presenter at conferences on ethics and family law topics.   

She was the chair of the American Association of Law Schools Section on Professional Responsibility, is a member of the executive committee of the AALS Section on Family Law, is a member of the American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility, and is on the editorial board of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts’ Family Court Review.

Glesner Fines said she is “incredibly honored” to receive this year’s Roger P. Krumm Family Law Award. She emphasized that family law is fundamental to the legal profession and society.

“Families are the foundation of society, and family law attorneys have impact far beyond their client's cases,” she said. “… Family matters are often an individual's first exposure to the law, lawyers, and the courts. If I have done my job well, the attorneys I have taught become professionals who enhance the public's trust in the rule of law.”

Click here to learn more about annual awards presented by The Missouri Bar, the Missouri Bar Foundation, and other entities. Read about other 2026 award winners here. 

Natalie Spangler is deputy chief disciplinary counsel at the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.

Although an admonition is not considered discipline under the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.12 authorizes the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel to issue an admonition when it determines there is “sufficient probable cause to believe that [a lawyer] under investigation is guilty of professional misconduct.”¹ An admonition is appropriate when “the professional misconduct is of such nature that further proceedings are not warranted.”² 

If the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel issues a letter of admonition, the lawyer has 15 days to either accept or reject it.³ If accepted, the admonition becomes a matter of public record and may be considered by the Supreme Court of Missouri in determining any future discipline.⁴ If rejected, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel must file an information and proceed through the formal disciplinary process.⁵ In other words, rejection of an admonition requires the matter to move forward as a disciplinary case.

While admonitions are public records, they are not routinely published. To determine whether a lawyer has received an admonition, an individual must request the lawyer’s public disciplinary records from the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.⁶ 

In 2025, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel issued 54 admonitions. Below are 10 examples of misconduct that resulted in an admonition and the corresponding rule violations.

1. Improper deposit of an advanced flat fee

A client paid a $5,000 flat fee in two installments of $2,500. Before performing any work, the lawyer deposited both payments directly into the operating account rather than the client trust account. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rule 4-1.15(a).⁷ Advanced fees generally must be held in trust until earned. Although Rule 4-1.15(c)⁸ permits certain flat fees to be deposited directly into an operating account, the exception applies only when the total flat fee is less than $2,000. Dividing a larger flat fee into installments under $2,000 does not bring the fee within the exception.

2. Lack of diligence resulting in litigation sanctions

The lawyer failed to appear for two court hearings and failed to provide court-ordered discovery responses. As a result, the court sustained a motion for sanctions and struck the client’s pleadings. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rule 4-1.3.⁹ This matter illustrates how missed deadlines, ignored court orders, and a lack of diligence can materially prejudice a client’s interests and expose the client to severe litigation consequences.

3. Failure to adequately communicate the basis of the fee

A criminal defense lawyer’s fee agreement provided that representation through investigation and resolution of the matter would cost $7,500 but stated that additional fees for trial, hearings, or certain motions would be negotiated later. The agreement did not explain the basis for those additional fees or when they would become due. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rule 4-1.5(b).¹⁰ Lawyers must adequately communicate the basis or rate of their fees and expenses. Leaving substantial portions of a fee arrangement to future negotiation may create uncertainty and fail to satisfy the rule’s disclosure requirements.

4. Failure to supervise a subordinate lawyer

A client delivered a $5,000 fee payment to a law office. A subordinate lawyer was expected to deposit the funds and handle the matter but failed to do so. The supervising lawyer was the signatory on the trust account and remained responsible for ensuring proper handling of client funds. 

The supervising lawyer in this case received an admonition for violating Rules 4-1.15(a) and 4-5.1(b).¹¹ The matter serves as a reminder that supervisory lawyers must implement reasonable measures to ensure subordinate lawyers comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct and properly safeguard client property.

5. Failure to communicate and improper withdrawal

An expungement client was unable to communicate with counsel for approximately six weeks. The lawyer later explained that illness prevented communication but had no procedures in place to ensure client matters were addressed during the absence. The lawyer subsequently attempted to withdraw from the representation by notifying the court clerk rather than complying with the procedures required for withdrawal. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rules 4-1.4¹² and 4-1.16(c).¹³ Even during extended absences, lawyers remain responsible for maintaining reasonable communication with clients and ensuring that any withdrawal from representation complies with applicable court rules and procedures.

6. Failure to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation 

Following the filing of a disciplinary complaint, the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel opened an investigation and requested information from the lawyer. The lawyer failed to respond to multiple requests. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rule 4-8.1(c).¹⁴ Lawyers have an independent obligation to cooperate with disciplinary investigations and respond to lawful requests for information from disciplinary authorities.

7. Unauthorized use of another lawyer’s signature and failure to redact

A lawyer filed court documents using another lawyer’s signature block without authorization. The filing also failed to properly redact information relating to a minor child as required by court rules. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rules 4-1.1,¹⁵ 4-3.4,¹⁶ and 4-8.4(c).¹⁷ Competent representation requires careful review of court filings and compliance with procedural rules, including redaction requirements. The unauthorized use of another lawyer’s signature also constitutes a misrepresentation concerning the identity of the filing lawyer.

8. Inadvertent disclosure of confidential information

A lawyer received a subpoena duces tecum seeking records relating to a former representation. Unable to reach the client, the lawyer responded to the subpoena by email and attached confidential documents. Several third parties copied on the email received the documents, resulting in an unauthorized disclosure. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rule 4-1.6.¹⁸ Even when responding to legal process, lawyers must exercise caution before disclosing client information and ensure that confidential materials are provided only to authorized recipients.

9. Failure to perform services and promptly refund unearned fees

A client retained a lawyer to prepare estate-planning documents, signed a fee agreement, and paid the agreed flat fee. The lawyer then failed to perform the work or communicate with the client for approximately five months. After the client terminated the representation and requested a refund, the lawyer delayed an additional five months before returning the unearned fee. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4. Lawyers must pursue client matters with reasonable diligence, maintain adequate communication, and promptly address requests relating to unearned fees when a representation ends. 

10. Sale of a law practice and failure to preserve records 

A lawyer sold a law practice and subsequently joined another private practice in the same geographic area and practice area. In addition, the lawyer discontinued payment for an electronic file-management system and lost access to client files and records maintained through that system. 

The lawyer received an admonition for violating Rules 4-1.17(a)¹⁹ and 4-1.15(f).²⁰ A lawyer who sells a law practice must satisfy the conditions governing such sales, including ceasing private practice in the relevant geographic and practice area. The matter also serves as a reminder that lawyers retain continuing obligations to preserve trust account and client records, even after closing or selling a practice. 

Staying up to date on the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct can help you avoid admonitions like the ones outlined above. For more information or questions, contact the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel at MoChiefCounsel.org.

Endnotes 
1 Rule 5.12(b). 
2 Rule 5.12(b)(1). 
3 Rule 5.12(b)(4). 
4 Id.
5 Rule 5.12(b)(5). 
6 Rule 5.31(b)(3). 
7 Rule 4-1.15(a) states, in pertinent part: “A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. Client or third-party funds shall be kept in a separate account designated as a ‘Client Trust Account[.]’” 
8 Rule 4-1.15(c) states: “A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred, except that an advanced flat fee which does not exceed $2,000 is exempted from this requirement and may be deposited into another account.”
9 Rule 4-1.3 requires a lawyer to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Comment [3] talks about how procrastination can lead to a violation of Rule 4-1.3, in that “a client’s interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or change in conditions[.]” 
10 Rule 4-1.5(b) provides “the basis and rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client[.]” 
11 Rule 4-5.1(b) requires that that “[a] lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.” 
12 Rule 4-1.4 requires that a lawyer “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter[,]” “promptly comply with reasonable requests for information[,]” and the lawyer 
“shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” 
13 Rule 4-1.16(c) requires a lawyer to “comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating representation[.]” 
14 Rule 4-8.1(c) states, in pertinent part, that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority[.]” 
15 Rule 4-1.1 states “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”
16 Rule 4-3.4(c) states that it is professional misconduct to “knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of the tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists[.]” 
17 Rule 4-8.4(c) states, in pertinent part, that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” 
18 Rule 4-1.6 explains “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of the client unless the client gives informed consent” or that the disclosure is authorized by court rule. 
19 Rule 4-1.17 states that there are three conditions that must be met in order to sell one’s law firm, with the first being: “(a) The seller ceases to engage in the private practice of law, or in the area of practice that has been sold, in the geographic area in which the practice has been conducted, as defined by the agreement between the parties to the sale.” 
20 Rule 4-1.15(f) states, in pertinent part, “[c]omplete records of client trust accounts shall be maintained and preserved for a period of at least six years after the later of: (1) termination of the representation, or (2) the date of the last disbursement of funds.”

Mischa Buford Epps is executive director of The Missouri Bar.

Did World Cup fever hit your household?

Whether or not soccer is your sport of choice, there’s something special about seeing so many countries come together and vie for one of sport’s most significant recognitions, especially with some of the tournament happening so close to home.

Watching the games unfold is also a fascinating study of teamwork, leadership, and character. In a competition packed with star power, each individual’s talent matters, but it takes a united team to win.

The same is true of our profession.

As lawyers, we come from different backgrounds and paths to the profession, creating different perspectives and priorities. When we come together to improve the legal profession, the administration of justice, and the law on behalf of the public, all of Missouri benefits.

I’ve seen this unity — and its impact — firsthand in many ways. Over the summer months:

• Lawyers and judges have continued to volunteer to present about Missouri’s Non-Partisan Court Plan to students and community groups, helping them better understand what judges do, how judicial retention elections work, and why they matter.
• Dozens of lawyers shared their time to serve as leaders and speakers at the Missouri Boys and Girls State legal practice track, introducing the next generation to the legal profession and its vital role in our communities.
• More than 470 attendees gathered at the Lake of the Ozarks for the Solo & Small Firm Conference. It was the 30th anniversary of the event, with seasoned, mid-career, and novice lawyers meeting to exchange ideas, build relationships, and learn from one another so they can even better serve their clients.
• Hundreds of lawyers and judges have participated in recent surveys, providing valuable insight into the realities of rural practice in our state and helping shape how The Missouri Bar can continue to best support new and young lawyers.

These are only a few examples of the many wins we can accomplish when we work together.

I encourage you to join the action this September when we gather in Kansas City for the 2026 Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar and Judicial Conference. In addition to timely plenary sessions, CLE programs, and the opportunity to connect with colleagues, we’ll usher in a new bar year and celebrate all we’ve accomplished — together — over the past 12 months.

Of course, we can’t miss the opportunity to incorporate soccer into the mix. Our Best of Missouri Reception will take place at CPKC Stadium, home of the Kansas City Current and the first stadium in the world purpose-built for a women’s professional sports team.

As a unified bar, we bring together lawyers from different practice areas, communities, and perspectives to strengthen the profession and serve the public. Thank you for being part of the team.

Hon.

The annual Diversity Champion Award recognizes a lawyer who demonstrates a true commitment to an inclusive legal profession which reflects the diverse constituencies that Missouri lawyers serve, and achieves gains toward increasing retention, advancement, and promotion of lawyers across multiple dimensions of diversity.

A graduate of the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, Peterson serves as a municipal court judge for Kansas City, currently presiding over the Kansas City Municipal Court Community Court and the Community Assistance Recovery and Empowerment (CARE) Court. Prior to serving as municipal judge, she was a family court commissioner and an assistant public defender.

Peterson said receiving this year’s Diversity Champion Award was “very special.”

“[I]t means that some of the efforts that I have initiated to increase the stability of people [in] our community, increase attorney community engagement, and increase minority participation in the legal profession and legal activities are … valued, appreciated, and encouraged,” she said.

While presiding over the Kansas City Municipal Court Mental Health Court, Peterson said she saw firsthand how warrants impact individuals, from limiting their access to treatment and transitional living programs to hindering their applications for drivers’ licenses and employment.

These revolving issues inspired her to restructure the municipal court’s Community Engagement Initiatives Program into a four-pronged approach:

1. Municipal court judges and staff began attending community programs and activities to provide warrant relief, case resolution, and information about court processes, specialty courts, and the court’s warrant relief dockets.
    

2. Peterson helped develop, and now presides over, the Community Court at the Kansas City Municipal Court to provide warrant relief, legal aid for case resolution, food baskets, a clothing closet, and utility assistance. Several treatment providers also attend to assist individuals with referrals for drug treatment, housing, and mental health assistance.  
    

3. Peterson helped establish the CARE Court, which she now presides over, to offer those experiencing homelessness a pathway to stability. The CARE Court works directly with treatment providers by receiving requests to set aside warrants and dismissing cases once individuals begin consistently working with treatment providers.
    

4. Peterson helped the Kansas City Municipal Court coordinate its first Law Day event in 2025, which had more than 500 participants, 50-plus volunteer lawyers, dozens of resource fair agencies, and more. During the event, pro bono lawyers with diverse backgrounds and from various bar associations and legal entities helped indigent individuals resolve cases. The court offered a free CLE to lawyer volunteers, and it held a Treatment Provider Fair during the event to assist with referrals for mental health, physical health, substance misuse, housing, employment, and other community services.

“Our Community Engagement Initiatives Program not only helps reduce the significant impact the justice system has on marginalized communities, (but) it also impacts the defendant’s stability and trust in the justice system, collaboration in the legal profession, and collaboration between the legal profession and the treatment profession,” Peterson said.

Peterson encouraged new lawyers to “look outside of the box” and “follow your heart.”

“We get so caught up in the court process, procedures, and expectations that we sometimes fail to see the human factor of what we are doing and how the system can impact individuals, and indirectly, their families,” she said. “Sometimes creative ideas are met with apprehension ... Don’t be afraid to shine and shoot for the stars.”

Peterson will accept the Diversity Champion Award in Kansas City during the Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar and Judicial Conference, Sept. 16-18.

Click here to learn more about annual awards presented by The Missouri Bar, the Missouri Bar Foundation, and other entities. Read about other 2026 award winners here. 

Appellate

Payment mooted appeal
Motions for sanctions and post-judgment clarifications did not constitute claims, so ruling on such motions could not constitute judgments, and were not subject to appeal. And any appeal that could result in no meaningful relief on any existing controversy was moot. The appellant sought review of a ruling assessing monetary sanctions and denying clarification. Then the appellant paid the sanction without seeking a stay or posting a supersedeas bond. Compliance with that ruling mooted the appeal from the ruling. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
MARK CHRISTOPHER DARNELL, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SUZANNE KAY REMETIO, and DANIEL ZACEK SMITH, Defendants-Respondents
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39425

Criminal

No plain error review on enhanced sentence
The elements of plain error included an obvious error resulting in manifest injustice, meaning that the error was outcome-determinative, which often depended on the strength of the evidence. And courts seldom found plain error when the defendant made no objection. Any fact that increased a sentence had to be submitted to a jury, like the facts that showed prior and persistent offender status, but the circuit court failed to do so. Instead, the circuit court took notice of the facts supporting prior and persistent offender status, and concluded that the appellant was a prior and persistent offender. But both occurred without objection or with a statement of no objection. And the appellant did not show that a jury could reasonably have found that the defendant was not a prior and persistent offender. Also, the sentence was in the unenhanced range of punishment so the defendant could not even show prejudice. The Missouri Court of Appeals declined plain error review and affirmed the conviction.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. DERICK JAY COOK, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD38766

Error unpreserved
Preserving a constitutional right to present excluded evidence required the defendants to raise the challenge at the first opportunity. Preserving any argument against excluding evidence required the defendants to make an offer of proof. The defendant failed to do both and the record did not afford a complete understanding of what the evidence was excluded. Failing to preserve error left review only for plain error, on which courts rarely granted relief when the defendants did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. The Missouri Court of Appeals declined plain error review and affirmed the convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. MARVIN EUGENE GUERIN, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD39150

Employment

Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act applied
The federal government’s Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act barred the compulsory arbitration of disputes over sexual assaults and harassment, including enforcement of any pre-dispute arbitration agreement. The employee reported sexual assault and harassment by a supervisor, was terminated, and was re-hired without the supervisory relationship. The employee and employer then entered into an arbitration agreement and the employer tried to compel resumption of the supervisory relationship. The plaintiff employee brought several claims alleging that the employer retaliated against the employee for refusing to accept sexual assault and harassment. But the claims were not for sexual assault and harassment, so the circuit court granted the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration under the agreement. That ruling was error because the agreement was pre-dispute, in that the dispute was resolved when the parties made the agreement; and the Act applied to all disputes, not just claims; and the Act covered the entire action of which that dispute was a part. The Missouri Court of Appeals made permanent its writ of mandamus requiring the circuit court to deny the motion to compel arbitration.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri Ex Rel., Alan Waddell v. The Honorable Cory Lee Atkins, Circuit Court Judge, Division 17 of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD89050

Family

Child support modified on testimony alone
Appellate courts could not advocate for either party, including on whether the appellant preserved an issue, so an inadequate preservation statement was grounds for dismissal of a point relied on. To modify an award of child support required evidence “of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable.” That included evidence of increased costs of living and expenses that increased with the child’s age. The movant carried that burden with “detailed” testimony of the children’s increased costs, the movant’s decreased income, and the appellant’s increased income even without supporting documents. Circuit courts had to draft a Form 14 for each combination of children at issue and the circuit court did so by drafting one for two children and another for one child. The circuit court correctly applied a credit for overnight visits exercised and not merely awarded. How circuit courts calculated the presumed child support amount and how circuit courts determined whether that amount was rebutted were separate rulings requiring separate points relied on; combining those challenges into one point made that point multifarious. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
Brandi M. Bizzell, Appellant, v. Thomas E. Bernatow, Respondent.
(Overview summary)
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113839

Credit was due for amounts paid pendente lite
Whether a ruling was unsupported by substantial evidence or against the weight of the evidence were two different theories, requiring separate points relied on, and combining them rendered a point relied on multifarious and subject to dismissal. Joint custody of a child was preferred but the appellant’s disinterest in parenting supported an award of sole custody in respondent. Courts could impute counsel’s conduct to the client, including an award of attorney fees for late arrival on the day of trial and declining plain error review for failure to file a post-trial motion. “[A] party ordered to pay retroactive support is generally entitled to receive a credit for voluntary child support [.]” When the circuit court failed to apply that credit, the Missouri Court of Appeals entered the judgment that the circuit court should have entered.
(Overview summary)
Andrew R. Vollmer, Appellant, v. Kathy D. Vollmer, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113666

Personal injury

New trial was due when the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
Appellate courts favored the grant of a new trial over the denial of a new trial. If a motion for new trial set forth any basis for granting the motion, and the circuit court granted the motion on such basis, appellate courts affirmed the ruling. The circuit court recited the standard incorrectly but applied the correct standard. The circuit court set forth its basis clearly, rather than simply referencing paragraphs of the motion, and no detailed analysis was necessary. In a challenge to the granting of a new trial, matters related to the grant of partial summary judgment were irrelevant. Appellate courts viewed the record in a light favorable to the circuit court’s ruling so whether the jury favored the defendant appellant, or could have, was irrelevant. A submissible case of failure to warn included causation. The plaintiff satisfied that element with the presumption that, if the defendant had given a warning, the plaintiff would have followed the warning. In context and on the record, the plaintiff did not challenge a defective design in all products in the entire industry.
(Overview summary)
K.W., et al., Respondents, v. Saint Louis Children's Hospital, et al., Appellants.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113441

Post-conviction

Third party interference not shown
Untimely filing waived all relief with limited exceptions. The exceptions included third-party interference, which required the movants to do everything necessary to file timely, and to show that a third party thwarted timely filing. That required detailed pleading and proof as to how the third party prevented timely filing. The movant alleged that he was jailed in Kansas without his “legal work” but did not allege that Kansas deprived him of access to a law library or any other facts that described third-party interference. The circuit court denied relief without a hearing and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
ROY L. BLACKSURE, Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39358

Gregory M. Goodwin, T.J. Matthes, and Tracy Spradlin will receive this year’s Lon O. Hocker Awards for their commendable work as trial lawyers. 

The Missouri Bar Foundation awards the Lon O. Hocker Award to three trial lawyers under the age of 40 who demonstrate zealousness, honor, strength, courtesy, confidence, and respect. Established in 1954, the award is named after Lon O. Hocker, a lawyer who practiced in St. Louis for more than 50 years and was a well-respected trial lawyer.  

Goodwin

A graduate of the University of Missouri School of Law, Goodwin is chief counsel of the Public Protection Section at the Missouri Attorney General's Office, trying criminal, sexually violent predator civil commitment, and public corruption cases. In addition to trial work, Goodwin has handled appeals in state and federal court.

As a first-generation lawyer, Goodwin said it is an “honor” to be recognized as an exemplary trial lawyer and to be entrusted to try serious cases.

“Trials are often referred to as a search for the truth, and in many of my cases, trials have aided public understanding of the important issues,” he said. “It is a privilege to work towards those goals every day, and I am so grateful to be recognized for that work.”

Goodwin said his passion for law is driven by his duty to seek justice in every case.

“Every case that goes to trial represents one of the worst days in the lives of the victim or the victim's surviving family,” he said. “It is my privilege to ask a jury for justice in their expression of the community’s condemnation of wrongdoing.”

Matthes

Matthes is a partner with Rosenblum, Schwartz, Fry & Johnson, PC, where he has worked as a criminal defense lawyer since graduating from Saint Louis University School of Law.

Matthes said his favorite part of being a lawyer is representing individuals. Criminal defense work has introduced him to a wide range of individuals from across the country who have unique stories.

“The human element and connection with those individuals keep the work meaningful,” he said. “I am always intrigued walking into meeting with a client for the first time about who I am going to meet, how they ended up in the situation they are in, and how I can best advocate for them.”

Matthes said he was “truly humbled” to receive the Lon O. Hocker Award, as many of the past recipients are lawyers he admires. Now being one himself, he encouraged new trial lawyers to continue trying cases and learning from the good and the bad moments.

“The stakes are high for clients who go to trial, and they deserve advocates whose skills have been forged through experience, so it’s important to seek out opportunities,” he said.

Spradlin

Spradlin is a founding partner of Spradlin Kennedy Richman, where she practices in criminal defense, expungements, and personal injury law. She is also the city prosecutor for Grandview and Pleasant Hill and volunteers as a pro bono lawyer for Legal Aid of Western Missouri’s Volunteer Attorney Project.

She has received numerous professional accolades since graduating from the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. She is on the executive board for the Association for Women Lawyers of Greater Kansas City and is a mentor for the AWL Denise Henning Connection Program.

As a first-generation college graduate and the first lawyer in her family, Spradlin said receiving this year’s Lon O. Hocker Award was particularly meaningful as it “reflects my family’s hard work, selflessness, and support — which brought me here.”

“This award also reminds me of the responsibility that comes with practicing law,” she said. “I hope to use this opportunity to continue serving others, to be an example of what’s possible, and to help make the path a little easier for those who follow.”

Spradlin said her passion for law comes from the ability to help and protect individuals through resolving conflicts. While some cases may not be the most financially successful or newsworthy, she added, these “quiet” cases often remind her why she chose to become a lawyer.

“… [T]hose quiet victories are where the purpose behind this profession feels most real: when someone feels heard, when a wrong is made right, or when the truth is finally acknowledged,” Spradlin said. “That is the kind of service that lasts.”

Goodwin, Matthes, and Spradlin will accept the Lon O. Hocker Award in Kansas City during the Annual Meeting of The Missouri Bar and Judicial Conference, Sept. 16-18.

Click here to learn more about annual awards presented by The Missouri Bar, the Missouri Bar Foundation, and other entities. Read about other 2026 award winners here. 

Meet Kennedy Womack, a member of the 2025-2026 Missouri Bar Leadership Academy class! A graduate of the University of Cincinnati College of Law, Womack is an associate attorney at Stange Law Firm, PC in Columbia, providing free legal representation in family law cases, including those involving divorces, paternity, and custody proceedings. She was previously a family law staff lawyer at Mid-Missouri Legal Services, where she primarily represented survivors of domestic and sexual violence.

Every year, The Missouri Bar brings together a select group of new and young lawyers to serve on the Leadership Academy. Each class completes a service project, engages in leadership workshops, networks with leaders in Missouri’s legal profession, and attends bar meetings. Following graduation, members continue to serve The Missouri Bar in an active capacity for two years. 

Womack recently chatted with The Missouri Bar about this year’s Leadership Academy project to even better engage with young lawyers, her advice to new lawyers, and the special photo of her grandfather in her office.

Why did you decide to apply for Leadership Academy?

“I believe wholeheartedly that being an attorney is a privilege to not be taken for granted, and we should use that privilege to give back in any way we can … I felt that Leadership Academy was the best way to do so, as it provides the opportunity to complete a service project that directly benefits the bar and its members, which will in turn benefit the state of Missouri and its people.”

Why should new lawyers consider applying for Leadership Academy?

“Leadership Academy is not just an opportunity to grow in conventional ways — you will grow in ways you never knew you could. Since becoming a member of this year’s class, I have grown as an attorney in my practice, a leader in the bar, and a human overall … This has been one of the most incredible experiences of my life, and I will just say that if you are on the fence about applying — do it!”

This year's class service project centers around learning about new lawyers’ needs, wants, and perceptions of The Missouri Bar. How do you see this work shaping the bar’s overall ability to continue helping lawyers even better serve their clients?

“When new lawyers are given the opportunity to be heard and in turn, supported, they will feel much more confident as practitioners. Entering the legal profession can be daunting and, at times, overwhelming, but if new attorneys feel that they have mentorship and guidance through their bar, they can lean on that and be better advocates for their clients.

“With that, The Missouri Bar offers many helpful resources that new attorneys may not be aware of that can be extremely useful to their practice as well, and bridging the gap between attorneys and their bar creates opportunities for newer attorneys to utilize these resources that will benefit their clients.”

Why did you want to become a lawyer?

“I wanted to become a lawyer because I recognized that change comes from being an advocate in the justice system for those who need someone by their side … [E]very individual deserves a lawyer who will give their all every time they step into the courtroom to fight for them … I push myself to do the best I can every day for every client, and I love having the chance to do this work.”

What advice would you give to new lawyers?

“Always remember that you belong here. We all know that familiar feeling of imposter syndrome, especially as a new attorney. You leave law school, take the bar exam, and suddenly you are in front of a judge in a hearing against an attorney who has practiced 25 years, and you feel like a fish out of water. You ask yourself, ‘Do I really belong here?’ The answer is ‘yes’ … Just show up prepared, be the best advocate you can be, and learn from every experience.”

What is one interesting/unique thing in your home/work office that brings you joy?

“My grandfather passed away last year, and I was very close to him. He gave me a photo before he passed away, and I have kept it on my desk ever since. It is a photo of him after his first jump out of an airplane in the Army — he was 101st Airborne Division, otherwise known as “Screaming Eagles.” … I always look at the photo of him when I get overwhelmed or stressed, and how he would tell me to persevere because my clients need me to fight for them.”

Editor’s note: These answers have been edited for clarity and conciseness. Learn more about Leadership Academy here.