Developments in the law regarding warrantless arrests
Vol. 75, No. 6 / November - December 2019
One of America’s key safeguards is the constitutional requirement that arrests must be based upon probable cause.
by Brian Malone
One of America’s key safeguards is the constitutional requirement that arrests must be based upon probable cause.
Both the Missouri and U.S. Constitutions mandate that arrest warrants be based upon probable cause and be supported by an oath or affirmation. Probable cause exists if “a reasonably prudent and cautious person would believe that the suspect has committed an offense.” However, there is no constitutional requirement that arrests can only be made after a judge issues a warrant. Police officers can make an arrest without a warrant under certain circumstances. While this authority is limited, officers and the cities that employ them can face significant liability if this power is exercised improperly, to say nothing of the devastating consequences to persons wrongfully arrested.
Some recent cases examined officers’ authority to make arrests based upon entries in a law enforcement database that a person is “wanted” in another investigation. A “wanted” is different than a warrant issued by a judge. A “wanted” is entered by an officer conducting an investigation that isn’t necessarily concluded and in which the suspect can’t be immediately located. There might be probable cause to arrest, but the officer who encounters a person and sees that he or she is “wanted” generally won’t know for sure.
Should an officer rely on a “wanted” entered into a law enforcement database by another officer to make an arrest? State v. Pate, from the Missouri Court of Appeals in 2015, and U.S. v. Holloman, from a federal magistrate court in 2017, reached different conclusions. In 2018, a federal district court ruled in Furlow v. Belmar, et al. that officers of the St. Louis County Police Department could make arrests based upon wanteds so long as there was probable cause to arrest when the wanted was entered. Though the court in Furlow found the practice to be constitutional (at least with regard to the cases before the court), the St. Louis County Police Department has revised its policy regarding “wanteds.” Moving forward, St. Louis County police will only enter a person as wanted for felonies. St. Louis County police officers who learn that a person is wanted are now required to contact the investigating officer to discern the probable cause utilized to enter a person as wanted. As of this writing, some of the plaintiffs’ claims in Furlow – relating to whether their arrests were lawful – remain pending in the district court. However, the judge in Furlow has ruled that if a wanted was entered based on probable cause, there is no Fourth Amendment violation.
This article will examine the constitutional framework for warrantless arrests and the Missouri statutes that limit the authority of police officers to make them.
Supreme Court Precedent
In Gerstein v. Pugh, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[m]aximum protection of individual rights could be assured by requiring a magistrate’s review of the factual justification prior to any arrest, but such a requirement would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement. Thus, while the Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest warrants when feasible … it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant.” “Under this practical compromise, a police officer’s on-the-scene assessment of probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate’s neutral judgment evaporate.” “Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.” In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the Supreme Court stated that this judicial determination of whether probable cause exists must occur within 48 hours after arrest. In Missouri, state statute § 544.170 RSMo 2016 shortens this period to 24 hours.
In U.S. v. Watson, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that exigent circumstances are not required to make warrantless arrests, and that Congress could enact statutes granting authority to law enforcement officers to make warrantless arrests. “Congress has plainly decided against conditioning warrantless arrest power on proof of exigent circumstances. Law enforcement officers may find it wise to seek arrest warrants where practicable to do so, and their judgments about probable cause may be more readily accepted where backed by a warrant issued by a magistrate. But we decline to transform this judicial preference into a constitutional rule when the judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather than to encumber criminal prosecutions with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a warrant, whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like.” As in Watson, courts in Missouri have held that “warrantless arrests upon probable cause for felonies or misdemeanors may constitutionally [be] authorized by statute.”
In Whitley v. Warden, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an arrest made by a police officer who received a radio bulletin describing two robbery suspects and their vehicle. The radio bulletin stated that a judge had issued an arrest warrant for the suspects, but the arresting officer had no knowledge of the facts supporting probable cause. “Certainly police officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause. Where, however, the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest.”
In Terry v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that officers could make brief investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion, a lower standard than probable cause. The Supreme Court of Missouri explained the scope of Terry in State v. Goff, stating that the “Fourth Amendment … permits police officers to briefly stop an individual if the officer ‘observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot….’ Such a stop, often referred to as a ‘Terry stop,’ applies to stops of both individuals and automobiles. Missouri courts have repeatedly applied the Terry rule, stating that to conduct a Terry stop, a police officer must have ‘a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that those stopped are engaged in criminal activity.’” Terry does not authorize warrantless custodial arrests, which must be supported by probable cause.
U.S. v. Hensley held that officers could rely on a radio or computer bulletin describing a suspect to make a brief, investigatory Terry stop, even if the notice omits the specific facts supporting reasonable suspicion. “[R]eliance on that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check identification […] to pose questions […], or to detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further information.” However, Hensley stopped short of permitting officers to make arrests based upon computer notations. Unlike in Whitley, there had not been an arrest warrant issued by a judge in Hensley. The computer notice in Hensley “asked other departments to pick up and hold Hensley for St. Bernard. Our decision today does not suggest that such a detention, whether at the scene or at the Covington police headquarters, would have been justified. Given the distance involved and the time required to identify and communicate with the department that issued the flyer, such a detention might well be so lengthy or intrusive as to exceed the permissible limits of a Terry stop.”
Collective Knowledge Doctrine
While state law and the U.S. and Missouri constitutions permit officers to make arrests when they observe offenses (and, therefore, are aware of the facts supporting probable cause), officers need not be personally aware of all facts supporting probable cause, so long as the officers working as a team collectively possess information supporting probable cause. This is referred to as the “collective knowledge doctrine.” In State v. Sullivan, the court stated that “‘probable cause is determined by the collective knowledge and the facts available to all of the officers participating in the arrest; the arresting officer does not need to possess all of the available information.’” The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized “a well-established Fourth Amendment principle: ‘When multiple officers are involved in an investigation, probable cause may be based on their collective knowledge and need not be based solely on the information within the knowledge of the arresting officer as long as there is some degree of communication.’”
State v. Pate and U.S. v. Holloman
In State v. Pate, the court upheld a warrantless arrest by an officer from Cuba, Missouri, in Crawford County based upon a wanted entered by a detective from the University City Police Department in St. Louis County. The wanted related to an allegation of armed robbery in University City. An officer in Cuba made contact with the defendant, saw the wanted in his computer, and arrested him. The court stated that “‘[i]nformation supplied by one police department can provide the probable cause for an officer in another police department to make an arrest.’ Radio bulletins, telephone calls, computer records, and police flyers have all been upheld as permissible means of authorizing officers to arrest, so long as the individual officer disseminating the information had probable cause to arrest at that time.” The court found that computer records “can also support an investigative stop, rather than an arrest, where police have reasonable suspicion the person stopped has committed a crime, rather than probable cause.” However, for an arrest based on such information to be constitutional, “the State must show that the officer who provided the information had probable cause that would have enabled the officer to make the arrest himself. If it is later apparent that the officer requesting assistance in arresting the accused did not have probable cause for the arrest, evidence obtained incident to the arrest may be suppressed…. The crux is whether the communication was supported by probable cause, and here it was. While an arrest warrant would have provided clear evidence of probable cause as opposed to the tenuous nature of a ‘wanted,’ the Cuba police department’s reliance on the ‘wanted’ was lawful under the circumstances here.”
The opinion in Pate is silent as to whether the arresting officer in Cuba possessed any understanding of the circumstances justifying the wanted, and makes only a cursory reference to arrests based on collective knowledge. If the arresting officer in fact lacked information about the basis for the wanted, the collective knowledge doctrine would arguably be inapplicable because the doctrine applies “as long as there is some degree of communication” between the officers. Under 8th Circuit precedent, the collective knowledge doctrine applies only “‘between officers functioning as a ‘search team’ and [does not apply to] officers acting as independent actors who merely happen to be investigating the same subject.’”
In U.S. v. Holloman, a federal judge reached a different conclusion. The court granted a motion to suppress after an arrest by a City of St. Louis officer based upon a wanted entered by another city officer conducting an unrelated investigation. The arresting officer was investigating a tip regarding a felon possessing a firearm. His computer showed that another officer had entered the suspect as “wanted” for a rape investigation. He confirmed that the wanted was still active, but had no independent knowledge of the basis for the wanted. When the officer confronted the suspect, he told the suspect he was under arrest “and that he had an active warrant for statutory rape second.” He searched the suspect’s girlfriend’s apartment and found a firearm, leading to federal charges.
The court concluded that the arresting officer could lawfully have conducted a Terry stop, but that by arresting the suspect “based on an ‘active warrant for statutory rape’ and detaining him at the scene to further a separate investigation, police exceeded the permissible scope articulated in Terry and Hensley.” Because the “officers are not ‘functioning as a team’ but instead are ‘acting as independent actors who merely happen to be investigating the same subject,’ it would be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to consider as ‘collective knowledge’ information known to officers acting independently.” Therefore, an arrest based solely on the wanted was unconstitutional because it lacked probable cause.
The court in Holloman ruled that the arresting officer “could, without violating the Fourth Amendment, stop Holloman to check identification, pose questions, or detain him briefly while attempting to obtain further information.” However, “[d]etaining a suspect for the sole purpose of enabling authorities to interrogate the suspect about other possible crimes, as [the arresting officer] did here, is a practice the Eighth Circuit has found to be ‘objectionable’ and violative of the Fourth Amendment.”On one point, Pate and Holloman agree – if a wanted is not supported by probable cause, an arrest based solely on a wanted would be unconstitutional. In Pate, the court noted that Hensley permits officers to rely upon radio or computer bulletins, but Pate didn’t delve into whether the bulletin justified an arrest or merely a Terry stop, or whether the officers were working as a team. In Holloman, the court noted that Hensley stated that a computer bulletin can justify a Terry stop, but not an arrest. The court in Holloman was skeptical that probable cause existed when the wanted was entered. In Pate, the court made the post hoc determination that probable cause existed when the wanted was entered. However, the arresting officer wouldn’t have known whether probable cause existed when the arrest was made.
Furlow v. Belmar
In 2018, a federal court ruled in Furlow v. Belmar that arrests by St. Louis County officers based upon wanteds were valid because the wanteds entered by the investigating officers were supported by probable cause. The court noted that the St. Louis County Police Department adopted a policy that a wanted cannot be entered unless there is probable cause to arrest. The court noted that Hensley permitted an officer to make a Terry stop based upon a radio bulletin. “It follows that a wanted based on probable cause that a subject committed some offense is sufficient to support a warrantless arrest for that offense, even though the wanted lacks a description of the circumstances and facts supporting probable cause.” Unlike in Holloman, the court’s opinion did not analyze whether the officers were working as a team to determine if their “collective knowledge” supported probable cause. The court in Furlow seemed persuaded that, so long as probable cause existed when the wanted was entered, it’s not necessary that the officers be working as a team or be in close communication with one another. However, if the arresting officer doesn’t communicate with the officer who entered the wanted, the arresting officer is taking a risk by assuming that probable cause to arrest exists.
In another opinion issued after an amended complaint was filed, the court in Furlow denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, finding that as to one plaintiff, the undisputed facts did not establish probable cause to arrest when the plaintiff was entered as wanted, and that disputed facts precluded summary judgment for either party. The court entered summary judgment in favor of St. Louis County and Police Chief Jon Belmar on the issue of their liability as government entities/officials for Fourth Amendment violations, based on its earlier order “finding that the lack of a prompt judicial determination of probable cause does not render the Wanted system unconstitutional.”
Missouri’s Limitations on Warrantless Arrests
While warrantless arrests are constitutional so long as probable cause exists, Missouri law places additional limitations on officers’ authority to make warrantless arrests. Therefore, when an officer encounters a person who is “wanted” by an officer from another department, the officer must consider whether he or she has statutory authority to make an arrest. Missouri law limits both where officers can make warrantless arrests, and the circumstances under which officers can make warrantless arrests. Generally, “when a law enforcement officer leaves his territorial jurisdiction, his status is transformed into that of a private citizen.” “It is well established as a general rule that, in the absence of statute, municipal police officers have no official power to apprehend offenders beyond the boundaries of their municipality.” Missouri has enacted several statutes authorizing officers to make warrantless arrests within their jurisdictions for offenses which they personally observe. However, “warrantless arrests made by municipal officers outside the boundaries of their municipality are – in the absence of some express statutory exception – illegal.”
Outside their jurisdictions, § 544.157, RSMo, permits officers to make warrantless arrests anywhere in the state if in “fresh pursuit” of a suspect. Section 70.820.6, RSMo, permits officers to arrest persons they observe using force to create a substantial risk of death or serious injury, or committing a dangerous felony anywhere in the state. Section 70.820.5, RSMo, states that officers employed within any “county of the first classification with a charter form of government … may arrest persons who violate any provision of state law within the boundaries of any county of the first classification or [the City of St. Louis].” Therefore, an officer from a department within St. Louis County could make arrests throughout St. Louis County, the City of St. Louis, and any other first-class county.
The aforementioned Missouri statutes only authorize warrantless arrests for offenses committed in an officer’s presence. However, § 544.216, RSMo, permits an officer to make a warrantless arrest of a person who the officer observes violating a law, or a person “who such officer has reasonable grounds to believe has violated any ordinance or law of this state … over which such officer has jurisdiction” [emphasis added]. In City of Fredericktown v. Bell, the court emphasized that § 544.216 “only increases an officer’s power of warrantless arrest to include both offenses committed in his presence and those which he has reasonable grounds to believe have been committed. There is no express indication that [§ 544.216] was intended to … authorize extra-jurisdictional arrests.” Therefore, a warrantless arrest can only be made if: (1) the offense was committed in an officer’s presence and within such officer’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) an officer has reasonable grounds to believe the suspect violated a law “over which such officer has jurisdiction.” When an officer encounters a “wanted” person, option (1) is inapplicable because the officer didn’t see the person violate a law. If a person is “wanted” for an offense that was committed outside an officer’s territorial jurisdiction, option (2) would be inapplicable, regardless of whether there are reasonable grounds or probable cause to believe the person violated the law, because the offense would not be one over which such officer has jurisdiction.
Section 544.216 adds another complication for police departments to consider if they intend to make arrests based on wanteds issued by other departments. In both Furlow and Holloman (but not Pate), the arresting officers and the officers entering the wanteds were employed by the same department, so the issue of officers making arrests based upon wanteds from other jurisdictions wasn’t considered in those cases. Since the limitations in § 544.216 on authority to make warrantless arrests wasn’t addressed in Pate – in which an officer from the City of Cuba in Crawford County made an arrest based on a wanted arising from an offense in University City in St. Louis County – it’s questionable whether the arresting officer in Pate had “reasonable grounds to believe [the suspect] has violated any ordinance or law of this state … over which such officer has jurisdiction.”
Section 544.170, RSMo – The Twenty-Four Hour Rule
Once a warrantless arrest has been made, Gerstein and County of Riverside mandate that an officer must promptly present the accused to a judge to determine whether continued detention is warranted. While § 544.170, RSMo, permits police to detain a person arrested without a warrant for up to 24 hours, Missouri courts have held that this statute “addresses only the length of time an arrestee can be held without being formally charged; it does not address probable cause for an arrest.” As stated in Pate, this statute is a recognition that “‘[c]ourts cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays in transporting arrested persons from one facility to another, handling late-night bookings where no magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of an arresting officer who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the premises of an arrest, and other practical realities.’” Section 544.170 merely “sets a limit on the amount of time the police may detain a suspect, whose arrest is otherwise lawful, while determining whether there is enough evidence of a crime to present the suspect to a judge or prosecutor to begin criminal proceedings.” An “arrest for the primary purpose of furthering an ulterior goal is unreasonable under the fourth amendment…. ‘[a]n arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.’ Therefore, any interpretation of § 544.170 that includes authority for making investigative arrests would clearly be unconstitutional.”
An arrest that exceeds an officer’s statutory authority would be unlawful. However, it would not necessarily rise to a constitutional violation if the arrest was supported by probable cause. As the 8th Circuit stated in Rose v. City of Mulberry, “a police officer who makes an arrest that is based on probable cause but who is prohibited by state law from doing so does not violate the Fourth Amendment…. The Court held that although a state may provide more protection from warrantless arrests than the federal Constitution, that enhanced protection does not govern the scope of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. If state laws could define the contours of the Fourth Amendment, its protections would ‘vary from place to place and from time to time.’”
The federal court’s ruling in Furlow appears to move away from requiring that the officers be in close communication to consider their collective knowledge in evaluating probable cause. Furlow and Pate would permit an arrest based on a wanted so long as there was probable cause when the wanted was entered, without regard to whether the officers had been in communication. Since Furlow is still pending, an appeal could certainly alter the framework for analyzing probable cause for warrantless arrests. The officers’ collective knowledge, and the degree to which they must be in communication, is likely to be at issue if Furlow is appealed. If Furlow is affirmed, the collective knowledge doctrine will likely be deemphasized in favor of an analysis of whether probable cause existed at the time a person was entered as wanted.There are a few other key takeaways from Missouri’s statutes and the cases discussed above:
- If a person has been entered as wanted, any officer from any department could briefly detain this person to conduct a Terry stop.
- If the officer entering a wanted and the arresting officer are working as a team, then an arrest is permissible, so long as the officers collectively have information supporting probable cause. However, under Furlow, it appears unnecessary that the officers be working as a team, or be in close communication, so long as there was probable cause when the wanted was entered.
- There is an unavoidable risk in making an arrest based solely upon a wanted because a court could later determine that there was not probable cause when the wanted was entered.
- A police department could mitigate this risk by adopting a policy that a wanted can only be entered if probable cause exists, or that officers contact the officer who entered the wanted prior to making an arrest to determine if probable cause exists. If no such policy exists, or the wanted was issued by another department, the arresting officer would have no way to know if probable cause exists.
- When an officer encounters a person who is wanted, the officer should consider whether the offense for which a person is wanted is an offense over which the officer has jurisdiction, as required for an arrest under § 544.216.
1 Brian Malone is a shareholder at Lashly & Baer, P.C., in St. Louis. Malone advises cities, school districts, library districts, and other governmental bodies in Missouri.
2 Amendment IV, U.S. Const.; Mo. Const. art. I, § 15.
3 State v. Stokes, 710 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986).
4 469 S.W.3d 904, 2015 WL 5433815 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015).
5 2017 WL 9750963 (E.D. Mo. 2017). The magistrate judge’s decision was upheld by U.S. District Court Judge Catherine Perry, 2018 WL 1166557 (E.D. Mo. 2018).
6 4:16-CV-00254, Opinion, Memorandum and Order dated October 5, 2018.
7 Christine Byers, A Man Lost a Lawsuit Over his Warrantless Arrest, but St. Louis County is Making Changes Anyway, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 2, 2019.
9 4:16-CV-00254, Opinion, Memorandum and Order dated October 5, 2018, pgs. 23-24; see also 4:16-CV-00254, Opinion, Memorandum and Order dated March 15, 2019, pg. 3 (“In its Previous Order, this Court held that wanteds are a type of warrantless arrest, and therefore permissible only if the wanted is based on probable cause.”).
10 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) (internal citations omitted).
11 Id. at 113-14.
12 Id. at 114.
13 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
14 All statutory citations are to RSMo 2016 unless otherwise stated.
15 423 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1976).
16 Id. at 423-24 (internal citations omitted).
17 State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 236 (Mo. banc 1982).
18 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
19 Id. at 568.
20 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
21 129 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Mo. banc 2004) (internal citations omitted).
22 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985).
23 Id. at 232.
24 Id. at 235.
25 49 S.W.3d 800, 808 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
26 United States v. Robinson, 664 F.3d 701, 703, 2011 WL 6221549 (8th Cir. Dec. 15, 2011).
27 469 S.W.3d at 907.
29 Id. at 910 (internal citations omitted).
30 Id. at 911, n3.
31 Id. (internal citations omitted).
32 Id. at 910.
33 United States v. Robinson, 664 F.3d at 703, 2011 WL 6221549 (8th Cir. Dec. 15, 2011).
34 Id. at 704 (internal citations omitted).
35 2017 WL 9750963, p. 3.
38 Id. at *4. The government later dismissed the felon in possession case.
39 Id. at *10.
40 Id. at *8.
41 Id. at *10.
42 Id. at *11.
43 2017 WL 9750963 at *13.
44 The defendant was prosecuted by the state for the offense for which he was wanted. As of this writing, the state case is pending. See Case No. 1722-CR01774-01, Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. The federal court’s opinion noted that Holloman “made a confession” regarding the statutory rape charge after he was arrested on the wanted and that the confession was included in the warrant application. 2017 WL 9750963 at *12. In state court, the judge denied a motion to suppress on the grounds that the detective who entered the wanted had probable cause to arrest at the time the wanted was entered. Order, October 29, 2018, p. 5.The court did suppress statements of the defendant that were recorded by the police after his right to counsel was invoked. Order, October 29, 2018, p. 7.
45 4:16-CV-00254, Opinion, Memorandum and Order dated October 15, 2018, p. 3.
46 Id. at p. 23.
47 Id. at p. 24.
48 4:16-CV-00254, Opinion, Memorandum and Order dated March 15, 2019, p. 13.
49 Id., p. 14.
50 State v. Devlin, 745 S.W.2d 850, 851, 1988 WL 16161 (Mo. App. E.D. Mar. 1, 1988).
51 City of Advance ex rel. Henley v. Maryland Cas. Co., 302 S.W.2d 28, 31-32 (Mo. 1957).
52 See § 85.561, RSMo (officers in third-class cities can make warrantless arrests for offenses occurring in their presence); see also § 85.610, RSMo (similar authority for officers in fourth-class cities); § 80.410, RSMo (similar authority for officers in towns and villages); § 84.090, RSMo (City of St. Louis); § 84.440, RSMo (Kansas City); § 479.110, RSMo (officer who makes warrantless arrest for ordinance violation committed in his or her presence must subsequently file written complaint before municipal judge); and § 455.085, RSMo (officers may make arrests for domestic violence offenses if they have probable cause “whether or not the violation occurred in the presence of the arresting officer.” If an officer doesn’t make an arrest and is called back within 12 hours, the officer shall make an arrest, if probable cause exists). Sheriffs and deputy sheriffs “as peace officers, have the right to make arrests, without warrant, in misdemeanors committed in their presence flagrante delicto. This is a power possessed by them virtute officii (5 C. J. 396), and is a common-law power…. An offense may be said to have been committed in the presence or view of a peace officer when the officer hears the disturbance created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene, and in like manner where the offense is continuing at the time the arrest is made.” State v. Peters, 242 S.W. 894 (Mo. 1922); see also § 59.110, RSMo.
53 State v. Galazin, 58 S.W.3d 500, 508 (Mo. banc 2001) (J. White, dissenting).
54 Jackson County, Jefferson County, St. Charles County, St. Louis County, and all municipal police departments in such counties.
55 “‘Reasonable grounds’ is virtually synonymous with ‘probable cause.’” Auck v. Director of Revenue, 483 S.W.3d 440, 444, 2016 WL 720621 (Mo. App. E.D. Feb. 23, 2016).
56 761 S.W.2d 715, 717, 1988 WL 118380 (Mo. App. E.D. Nov. 8, 1988). Emphasis added.
57 Section 544.216, RSMo.
58 State v. Ard, 11 S.W.3d 820, 827, 2000 WL 21386 (Mo. App. S.D. Jan. 12, 2000).
59 State v. Pate, 469 S.W.3d 912-13, 2015 WL 5433815 (Mo. App. E.D. Sept. 15, 2015) (internal citations omitted).
60 United States v. Roberts, 928 F. Supp. 910, 933, 1996 WL 335492 (W.D. Mo. June 17, 1996).
61 Id. (internal citations omitted).
62 533 F.3d 678, 680, 2008 WL 2668798 (8th Cir. July 9, 2008) (internal citations omitted).