The flag: Negligence claims against religious organizations, more
Vol. 81, No. 5 / September-October 2025
Compiled by W. Dudley McCarter, former president of The Missouri Bar and partner in the St. Louis law firm of Behr, McCarter, Neely & Gabris.
FIRST AMENDMENT BARS NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS AGAINST RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS BASED ON SEXUAL ASSAULTS
Doe by T.N. v. First Baptist Church of Pierce City, 2024 WL 4023691 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).
Plaintiff Jane Doe, by next of friend, T.N., appealed from the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of First Baptist Church of Pierce City on her negligence claim relating to sexual assaults she allegedly suffered while in the care FBC. The Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District affirmed the judgment.1
In Gibson v. Brewer,2 a boy and his parents accused a member of a diocese’s clergy of sexual abuse and sued the diocese for, inter alia, negligent hiring/ordination/retention, negligent failure to supervise, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and independent negligence of the diocese.3 The circuit court dismissed these negligence claims because they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the court’s decision:
[T]he First Amendment of the United States Constitution, specifically the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, prohibit courts from entertaining certain negligence claims against religious organizations where the
analysis of the issues would require a determination on ecclesiastical matters.4
The Court observed that “[q]uestions of hiring, ordaining, and retaining clergy … necessarily involve interpretation of religious doctrine, policy, and administration.”5
“Such excessive entanglement between church and state has the effect of inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment” and “would result in an endorsement of religion, by approving one model for church hiring, ordination, and retention of clergy … Adjudicating the reasonableness of a church’s supervision of a cleric — what the church ‘should know’ — requires inquiry into religious doctrine” and, as with the negligent hiring/ordination/retention claim, “would create an excessive entanglement, inhibit religion, and result in the endorsement of one model of supervision.”6
In First Baptist Church, the plaintiff asserted that First Baptist Church of Pierce City, a religious institution, had a duty to supervise the youth ministries program members to protect minors from sexual abuse. The court ruled, under Gibson, “[i]n order to determine how a ‘reasonably prudent [Southern Baptist student ministries program]’ would act, a court would have to excessively entangle itself in religious doctrine, policy, and administration.”7
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION DENIED TO EMPLOYEE DISCHARGED FOR MISCONDUCT
Valhalla Restaurants, LLC v. Page, 705 S.W.3d 776 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).
Valhalla Restaurants, LLC d/b/a McDonald’s appealed the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s decision holding that Kiara Page, the claimant, was eligible for unemployment benefits. The Missouri Court of Appeals- Southern District reversed the commission’s decision after finding that McDonald’s presented “competent and substantial” evidence that Page was discharged for misconduct connected with her work.8
A claimant is not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits when they were discharged for misconduct connected with their work.9 An employee who deliberately disregards an employer’s reasonable directive may constitute misconduct, barring a claimant from recovering unemployment benefits.10 This includes conduct that “disregards the standard of behavior that an employer has a right to expect.”11
The court found, “Substantial, competent (and undisputed) evidence on the record as a whole supports a finding that Claimant engaged in misconduct connected with her work ...”12
PROOF OF ACTUAL REPUTATIONAL HARM IS REQUIRED IN DEFAMATION ACTION
Apperson v. Kaminsky, 2025 WL 309526 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).
Mouna Apperson appealed the trial court’s judgment granting Natasha Kaminsky and Adriane Norman’s motions for direct verdict on Apperson’s defamation claims. The Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District affirmed the trial court’s judgment.13
Defamation law is meant to protect an individual against harm to their reputation.14 To prevail on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove 1) the publication of, 2) a defamatory statement, 3) that identifies the plaintiff, 4) that is false, 5) that is published with requisite degree of fault, and 6) that damages the plaintiff’s reputation.15
The Supreme Court of Missouri has made clear that “proof of actual reputational harm is an absolute prerequisite in a defamation action.”16 To establish actual damages, a plaintiff must present evidence that is not “too speculative and must be founded upon more than the plaintiff’s embarrassment or perception of their own reputation.”17
In Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,18 the Supreme Court of Missouri found the evidence the plaintiff proffered consisted of “conclusory statements that her reputation was injured and her feelings of how her reputation was tarnished,”19 but the plaintiff did not offer any quantifiable evidence of her alleged injury.20 In Taylor v. Chapman,21 the Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District similarly found the plaintiff was unable to prove actual damage to her reputation in her defamation case. That court noted that while the plaintiff testified that her “integrity had been tarnished,” she did not proffer testimonies from others that her reputation had been damaged, ultimately failing to support her claim.22
Like in Kenney and Taylor, the only evidence Apperson presented to satisfy the element of reputational harm was solely based on his conclusory testimony of his perception of injured reputation.23
Notably, Apperson did not put forth any witnesses or other evidence to support his conclusions to show how each individual statement directly caused injury to his reputation … Apperson’s conclusory assertions his reputation was damaged as a result of Kaminsky and Norman’s statements fall short of what is required to present a submissible case of defamation ...24
LAWYERS NOT LIABLE TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ACTS ARISING OUT OF CLIENT REPRESENTATION UNLESS LAWYER COMMITS TORTIOUS ACT
Branson’s Nantucket, LLC v. Timeshare Law Office, LLC, 708 S.W.3d 496 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).
Branson’s Nantucket LLC appealed the circuit court judgment dismissing with prejudice its action against lawyers Joshua Neally and Jennifer Hardy and law firms Timeshare Law Office LLC and Neally Law LLC (collectively “defendants”) for tortious interference with a business expectancy and civil conspiracy. Branson’s Nantucket LLC alleged that the defendants interfered with its contracts with vacation owners by instructing them to cease making payments to them. The Missouri Court of Appeals- Southern District affirmed the judgment in Branson’s Nantucket, LLC v. Timeshare Law Office, LLC.25
Generally, lawyers are not liable to a third party that is not the lawyer’s client because the lawyer is not in an attorney-client relationship with the third party.26 However, Missouri also recognizes a privilege to protect lawyers when acting for clients because “[i]f attorneys cannot act and advise freely and without constant fear of being harassed by suits and actions at law, parties could not obtain their legal rights.”27
Wrongful means include threats, violence, trespass, defamation, misrepresentation of fact, restraint of trade, or any other wrongful act recognized by statute or common law.29 The Branson’s Nantucket court stated the evidence “did not support a claim that Defendants engaged in any fraud, collusion, or malicious or tortious acts such that their conduct would fall within the exceptional circumstances rule.”30
Endnotes
1 2024 WL 4023691 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).
2 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. banc 1997).
3 Id. at 243-44.
4 Id. at 244, 246-50.
5 952 S.W.2d at 246-47.
6 First Baptist Church, 2024 WL 4023691 at 3 (quoting Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at
246-47).
7 Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 249.
8 Valhalla Restaurants, LLC v. Page, 705 S.W.3d 776 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).
9 Hite v. PNK (River City), 406 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (citing
§ 288.050.2.)
10 Dixon v. Stoam Indus., Inc., 216 S.W.3d 688, 693 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007).
11 Simpson Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Rels Comm’n, 901 S.W.2d 312, 314
(Mo. App. S.D. 1995).
12 Valhalla Restaurants, 705 S.W.3d at 786.
13 2025 WL 309526 (Mo. App E.D. 2025).
14 Smith v. Humane Soc’y of United States, 519 S.W.3d 789, 798 (Mo. banc 2017).
15 Id.
16 Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 809, 817 (Mo. banc 2003)
(emphasis added).
17 The Fireworks Restoration Co. v. Hosto, 371 S.W.3d 83, 87 (Mo. App. E.D.
2012).
18 100 S.W.3d 809, 817 (Mo. banc 2003).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 927 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996).
22 Id. 544-45.
23 2025 WL 309526 (Mo. App E.D. 2025).
24 Id. at 7.
25 708 S.W.3d 496 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).
26 Sheffield v. Matlock, 587 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019).
27 Peck v. Chouteau, 3 S.W. 577, 581 (Mo 1887).
28 Branson’s Nantucket LLC, 708 S.W.3d at 506 (quoting Macke Laundry Serv. Ltd.
P’ship v. Jetz Serv. Co., Inc., 931 S.W.2d 166, 177 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996))
29 Nazeri v. Mo. Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 317 (Mo. banc 1993); Macke,
931 S.W.2d at 182.
30 Branson’s Nantucket LLC, 708 S.W.3d at 512.