The Business Premises Safety Act needs clarification
Vol. 82, No. 1 / January-February 2026
Ty Kalleck is a lawyer with Rouse Frets White Goss Gentile Rhodes, P.C. in Leawood, Kansas. His practice primarily focuses on commercial and higher education litigation and regulatory compliance for higher education institutions.
The Business Premises Safety Act1 was enacted in Missouri in 2018 and codified common law principles regarding the duty of a business to protect invitees2 from the criminal acts of third persons.3 The act is one of the first to codify such common law principles and generally holds true to the no-duty rule4 and its exceptions.5
However, the act employs peculiar and contradicting language, which arguably deviates from a mere codification of Missouri’s business premise liability jurisprudence. Specifically, the act provides no duty to protect third parties from criminal acts unless the business knows or has reason to know that such acts are reasonably likely to be committed in a “particular area” of the premises — a phrase not previously used in Missouri common law, especially when analyzing the “special circumstances” exception to the no-duty rule.6 Moreover, the definition of “business” provided by the act seems confusing at best and contradictory at worst.
These two issues provide the basis for this call to the Missouri General Assembly to clarify the act.
Defining “particular area”
The Business Premises Safety Act reads as follows:
There is no duty upon a business to guard against criminal acts or harmful acts on the premises unless the business knows or has reason to know that such acts are being committed or are reasonably likely to be committed in a particular area of the premises and sufficient time exists to prevent such crime or injury. In the absence of such a duty, no civil action for damages shall lie against a business for injuries sustained by a person in connection with criminal acts or harmful acts committed by another person on the premises.7
Upon first glance, the act summarizes when, and if, a business owes a duty to protect against criminal or harmful acts in Missouri.8 But an issue arises with the phrase “committed in a particular area of the premises.”9 This phrase, “particular area,” has not been used in prior Missouri cases, introducing uncertainty as to its impact.
Before the act’s enactment, for an injured party to prove a business owed a duty, it was required to show one of two exceptions: (1) special relationships10 or (2) special circumstances.11 Embedded in the special circumstances exception was that the business had “knowledge” of prior similar third-party criminal acts that occurred on the premises — not a specific showing that acts are to be committed in a particular area of the premises.12 To establish knowledge of such criminal acts, Missouri courts would analyze whether the prior similar criminal acts were sufficiently numerous, recent, and similar in type.13 Notably, this “does not require identical acts in identical locations.”14
In effect, this new phrase in the act may impact litigation. Litigants will now be required to analyze whether the prior similar third-party criminal acts were conducted in identical locations or a particular area of the premises. Practically, this may provide the business with additional arguments, grounded in statutory language, for early dispositive motions such as a motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to allege the injury occurred on the particular area of the premises; to narrow discovery of prior similar acts to the particular area of the premises; or possibly to restrict admissible evidence in trial to that of the particular area of the premises via evidentiary motions or objections.
This issue is illustrated in Brooks v. KC Canyon Creek Apartments, LLC.15 In Brooks, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against the apartment complex and the individual employees after the deceased was fatally shot in 2022 in the apartment complex parking lot.16 The plaintiffs claimed the defendants failed to prevent and deter criminal activity at the complex, despite having reasonable notice that criminal activity was occurring.17 The plaintiffs alleged 235 property crimes and 152 violent crimes were reported at the complex between 2017 and 2022, with some resulting in lawsuits alleging inadequate security.18 The individual defendants moved for a motion for judgment on the pleadings, stating they did not have a personal duty as employees to protect invitees of the apartment complex.19 While the Brooks court granted the individual defendants’ motion for reasons other than that at issue in this article, the case is one of the first of its kind to occur under the purview of the act.20
Based on the language of the act, it may have been argued that the plaintiffs couldn’t discover or produce admissible evidence at the Brooks trial that 235 property crimes or 152 violent crimes were reported at the complex, generally, because those crimes may not have occurred in the particular area of the parking lot (i.e., occurred in the apartment’s leasing office, a tenant’s apartment, the complex’s public gym, etc.).
Defining “business”
A second issue is the need for clarity in the definition of “business,” as the act’s applicability hinges on it. “Business” is defined as:
Any commercial or agricultural enterprise including, but not limited to, sales, services, manufacturing, food service, entertainment, property management or leasing company, or any other entity, whether for profit or not for profit, which opens, operates, or leases property that is open to the public, whether for charge or free of charge, and includes all employees and agents thereof. The term “business” shall not include commercial residential or lodging operations.21
The existing exclusion of “commercial residential or lodging operations” from the definition of “business” excludes all commercial residential or lodging operations from the act’s reach. What is confusing about this exclusion is the potentially missing comma (and one might argue the Oxford comma, too) between “commercial” and “residential” and the lack of any clear definition or meaning of “commercial residential” operation or “lodging operation.”22
Even more confusing, and assuming the Missouri General Assembly intended commas, the reading of “commercial[,] residential[,] or lodging operations” seems to negate a seemingly all-encompassing definition of “business.”23 In other words, a “commercial operation” or a “residential operation” as express exclusions seem to contradict the included “commercial enterprise” or “any other entity which operates property that is open to the public.” This would gut the act all together. On the other hand, the absence of commas confuses the reader, because a “commercial residential” operation may be taken as a potential mixed-use building or hotel, which in turn, according to the “business” definition, makes the act applicable to a business premise liability dispute at a “commercial enterprise,” for example.
This confusion is exacerbated when Missouri common law and the act are compared in an effort to explain and understand the definition of “business.” For example, the special relationship exception to the general no-duty rule in common law includes an innkeeper-guest relationship (i.e., motel or hotel) but excludes a landlord-tenant relationship (i.e., rental property).24 But the act itself is not that clear, blurring the lines between innkeeper-guest and landlord-tenant relationships to be included within “business” (“any commercial … enterprise … property management or leasing company, or any other entity … which owns, operates, or leases property that is open to the public”25), but then attempting to distinguish the two relationships when excluding both of the relationships from the definition of “business” (“The term ‘business’ shall not include commercial residential or lodging operations.”26). It remains that the Business Premises Safety Act’s definition of “business” is confusing at best and contradictory at worst.
Interestingly, Missouri is one of very few states to enact a statute that specifically addresses business premises liability in the context of third-party criminal acts; moreover, Missouri is the only state to enact a statute which imposes a duty in negligence on a business for criminal acts of third parties upon finding certain criteria. Most states continue to rely on common law to determine whether a business owes a duty of care in negligence for third-party criminal acts. This is certainly true for Missouri’s neighbors: Kansas,27 Illinois,28 Oklahoma,29 Iowa,30 Nebraska,31 Tennessee,32 and Kentucky.33
Although Arkansas has codified the general no-duty rule, it maintains its reliance on the “foreseeability” test for a business to have a duty in negligence to protect its invitees from third-party criminal acts.34 Arkansas provides that a “criminal act committed on real property by a third party is not foreseeable in any circumstance by a person having an interest in the real property, including without limitation: (1) An owner; (2) A landlord; (3) A tenant; or (4) A lienholder.”35 Arkansas further narrowed its focus on businesses by codifying the following:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person having an interest in real property shall not be liable to a licensee, invitee, trespasser, employee, agent, or any other person for the unforeseeable criminal acts of a third party committed on his or her real property.36
Compared to Missouri, the “business premises liability act” in Arkansas allows for a broad application in that it applies to all persons “having an interest in the real property.”37 In other words, Arkansas does not attempt to define what a “person” or “business” is, like Missouri does. This broad application, and its current reliance on common law for exceptions to the general no-duty rule, allows for litigants — including lawyers — to better understand who is liable for criminal acts by third parties on certain premises.
Arkansas also does not attempt to inject language limiting liability to a particular area of the premises, as Missouri does.38 Rather, the only limitation of the Arkansas statute is that it does not establish, repeal, expand, or reduce the common law doctrine of infra hospitium or respondeat superior.39 This, too, allows for a clear application of the act, as compared to Missouri’s.
Florida has also enacted a quasi “business premises liability statute,” or at least language to suggest a move to codify statutory clarifications for business premises liability.40 While not as extensive as Missouri’s statute, Florida’s statute provides:
Notwithstanding s. 768.81(4), in an action for damages against the owner, lessor, operator, or manager of commercial or real property brought by a person lawfully on the property who was injured by the criminal act of a third party, the trier of fact must consider the fault of all persons who contributed to the injury.41
Florida then provides statutory protection for “convenience businesses,” by creating a presumption of law for a convenience business which “substantially implements the applicable security measures listed in ss. 812.173 and 812.174.”42 Florida has clearly defined “convenience business” as “any place of business that is primarily engaged in the retail sale of groceries, or both groceries and gasoline, that is open for business at any time between the hours of 11 p.m. and 5 a.m., and that is licensed …”43 and has defined the security measures for the convenience business to follow in order to fall within the presumption of law.
Florida has demonstrated that a “business” (or a “convenience business”) can be defined, but neither Florida, nor any state for that matter, has enacted a statute like Missouri’s demonstrating an attempt to codify (1) a general no-duty rule; (2) exceptions to the no-duty rule, such as those based on special relationships or special circumstances on a particular area of the premises; or (3) any affirmative defenses. But Missouri can certainly look to Florida for its ability to clearly define “business.”
Conclusion
Overall, Missouri stands alone in its statutory treatment of business premises liability against third-party criminal acts. Turning to other states’ law, and even Missouri long-standing common law, is not helpful in defining “particular areas on the premises” and “business.” Given the confusing language and that the Business Premises Safety Act is one of the first of its kind, this call suggests Missouri’s General Assembly clarify its meaning under the act. The usage of “committed in a particular area of the premises” presents a potentially significant impact that, without clarification, may unfold only through costly litigation for both individuals and businesses across Missouri. This notion is further compounded by a confusing, and arguably contradicting, definition of “business.”
Endnotes
1 MO. REV. STAT. § 537.785 et seq. (2025).
2 See, e.g., A.R.R. v. Tau Kappa Epsilon Fraternity, Inc., 649 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (discussing the difference in the standard of care between an invitee and licensee).
3 M.B. v. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., 661 S.W.3d 342 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022).
4 Harner v. Mercy Hospital Joplin, 679 S.W.3d 480 (Mo. banc 2023) (stating that generally, businesses have no duty to protect invitees from the criminal acts of unknown third persons); see also Wieland v. Owner-Operator Services, Inc., 540 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Mo. banc 2018) (“A duty to protect against the criminal acts of third parties is generally not recognized because such activities are rarely foreseeable”).
5 In addition to the act holding true to the no-duty rule, the act codifies Missouri jurisprudence discussing recent crimes to the injury at issue: “sufficient time exists to prevent such crime or injury.” See e.g. Simmons v. Keat Properties, LLC, 17 S.W.3d 259 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (discussing that a 2010 incident is not recent enough to put the defendant on notice of negligence acts of third parties for an injury that occurred in 2020).
6 See, e.g., supra n. 3.
7 MO. REV. STAT. § 537.787.1 (2025).
8 Supra n. 1, at § 537.785(2), (3). Note that the act only applies to criminal or harmful acts and does not apply to other premises liability claims, such as trip and falls, objects falling, and/or dog bites.
9 Supra n. 7.
10 See, e.g., Earley v. Dunn, 670 S.W.3d 47 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (the special relationships exception “include[s] those in which a party entrusts himself to the protection of another and relies upon that person to provide a place
of safety… Under this exception, the relationship alone gives rise to the duty”).
11 Elkins v. Academy I, L.P., 633 S.W.3d 529 (Mo. App. S.D. 2021) (the special circumstances exception provides that when a business knows or has reason to know the third person is harming or about to harm an invitee on the business’s premises, a duty arises).
12 See, e.g., Brown v. Schunck Markets, Inc., 973 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998) (discussing that only those prior incidents that occurred on the same premises can be considered).
13 See Simmons v. Keat Properties, LLC, No. ED 112785, 2025 WL 898912, at *2 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025), reh’g and/or transfer denied (May 19, 2025).
14 Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
15 Brooks v. KC Canyon Creek Apartments, LLC, 2024 WL 3015748 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Brooks is one of the first published cases in Missouri involving a third-party criminal act which occurred after the Business Premises Safety Act was enacted in 2018.
21 MO. REV. STAT. § 537.785.2(2) (2025).
22 See e.g. Lance Philip Timbreza, The Elusive Comma: The Proper Role of Punctuation in Statutory Interpretation, 24 QLR 63, 91 (2005) (Providing that a restrictive clause, which is essential to the meaning of the work being modified, should not be set off by commas.).
23 See e.g. Peter Jeremy Smith, Constitutional Grammer, and the Straight-Face Test: What if Conan the Grammarian Were A Strict Textualist?, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 7, 9 (1999) (“A nonrestrictive clause is ‘one that does not serve to identify or define the antecedent noun,’ but rather merely ‘adds information about the person, thing, or idea to which the phrase or clause refers.’ [Accordingly,] nonrestrictive clauses must be set off by commas.” Nonrestrictive phrases give added information that do not alter the essential meaning of the sentence if the clause is omitted.).
24 Supra n. 2 (explaining that the “special relationship” exception to the no-duty rule includes “innkeeper-guest, common carrier-passenger, school-student, and sometimes employer-employee, but do[es] not include the landlord-tenant relationship.”).
25 Supra n. 1.
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 253 Kan. 540 (1993) (adopting the “totality of the circumstances” test for foreseeability in determining whether a business had a duty in negligence to protect an invitee from a third party’s criminal conduct).
28 See, e.g., Osborne v. Stages Music Hall, Inc., 312 Ill. App. 3d 141, 244 Ill. Dec. 753, 726 N.E.2d 728 (2000); see also Flores v. Ziemek Corporation, Inc., et al., 2023 IL App. (1st) 221276-U, ¶ 1, appeal denied, 221 N.E.3d 348 (Ill. 2023) (affirming summary judgment on premises liability claim in the absence of evidence that plaintiffs were invitees, criminal conduct was reasonably foreseeable).
29 See, e.g., Snow v. TravelCenters of America, LLC, 2023 OK CIV APP 8, 527 P.3d 741.
30 See, e.g., Hoffnagle v. McDonald’s Corp., 522 S.W.2d 808 (Iowa 1994) (discussing a negligent security claim); see also Marchionda v. Embassy Suites Franchise, LLC, 359 F. Supp. 3d 681 (S.D. Iowa 2018) (applying Iowa law).
31 See, e.g., Perry v. Buchanan, 31 Neb. App. 715 (App. 2023) (relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 (1965)).
32 See, e.g., Est. of Smith v. Highland Cove Apartments, LLC, 670 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023); see also Wortham v. Kroger Ltd. P’ship I, No. W2019-00496-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 4037649, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020).
33 See, e.g., Isaacs v. Smith, 5 S.W.3d 500 (Ky. 1999) (imposing a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable harm); see also Walmart, Inc. v. Reeves, 671 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2023).
34 See, e.g., Boren v. Worthen Nat. Bank of Arkansas, 921 S.W.2d 934 (Ark. 1996) (relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 344 (1965) for the “foreseeable test”). See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 18-11-108 (2025).
35 ARK. CODE. ANN. § 18-11-108(a)(1)-(4) (2025).
36 ARK. CODE. ANN. § 18-11-108(b) (2025) (emphasis added).
37 Id.
38 See supra n. 7.
39 Supra n. 30, at § 18-11-108(c) (providing that “[t]his section does not: (1) Establish or repeal the doctrine of infra hospitium…; and (2) Expand or reduce the obligation or liabilities of an employer or principal for criminal acts committed under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”).
40 FLA. STAT. § 768.0701 (2025).
41 Id.
42 FLA. STAT. § 768.0705 (2025).
43 FLA. STAT. § 812.171 (2025).