The flag: Long-arm statute, Missouri Human Rights Act, and more

W. Dudley McCarter, a former president of The Missouri Bar, is of counsel with the firm of McCarthy, Leonard, Kaemmerer and Miller.

For personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the defendant’s conduct must fall within Missouri’s long-arm statute

Cox v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon, WD87512 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).

Jeffrey Cox, one of the representatives of a class action lawsuit (collectively, the borrowers), appealed the circuit court’s order and judgment granting The Bank of New York Mellon’s motion for summary judgment, arguing the exercise of personal jurisdiction over BNYM would not comply with due process. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, affirmed the judgment.¹

“The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient when personal jurisdiction is contested.”² To assess personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, Missouri courts use a two-prong test:³ (1) the defendant’s conduct must fall within Missouri’s long-arm statute under § 506.500, and (2) the defendant “must have sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri to satisfy due process.”⁴

The appellate court noted that the borrowers “have not set forth any disputed material facts to establish that BNYM transacted business in Missouri or used or possessed Missouri real estate that would subject it to specific jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.”⁵ BNYM does not have any “officers, directors, employees, or offices in Missouri, it did not sell any products or services in Missouri, and it did not loan money to Missouri consumers.”⁶

… [T]here is no genuine issue as to the material facts that BNYM, neither individually or through an agent, engaged in at least one of the acts enumerated in the long-arm statute subjecting it to personal jurisdiction in Missouri.

Private membership club is exempt from the Missouri Human Rights Act

Littlefield v. Norman Rigdon Post No. 5896, 723 S.W.3d 874 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).

Rayne Littlefield appealed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Norman Rigdon Post No. 5896 for Veterans of Foreign Wars, claiming the court erred in finding the VFW exempt from the definition of employment discrimination claims. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed the judgment.⁷

Littlefield argued that the VFW is not a “bona fide private membership club” that is exempt from the Missouri Human Rights Act’s definition of “employer” solely because it holds public events advertised on its website.⁸

Missouri courts have not yet defined “bona fide private membership club” under the MHRA, “making this a matter of first impression.”⁹ Thus, the court “must construe exemptions to remedial statutes like the MHRA narrowly.”¹⁰

Federal courts have considered many factors to determine whether a group is a bona fide private membership club, including:

(1) the genuine selectivity of the group, (2) the membership’s control over operations of the establishment, (3) the history of the organization, (4) the club’s purposes, (5) the use of facilities by nonmembers, and (6) whether the club advertises to the public to solicit members or promote the public’s use of its facilities.¹¹

“Courts consider an organization’s membership selection process as the most important factor in finding a club is a bona fide private membership club.”¹² To become a VFW post member, the applicant must have honorably served in a foreign war, insurrection, or expedition.¹³ “These criteria demonstrate the exceedingly selective nature of VFW membership,” the court noted.¹⁴

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Littlefield, VFW remains a bona fide private membership club in spite of its public events and advertising. Four of the six factors [considered by the federal courts] support the finding that VFW is a bona fide private membership club. Additionally, the most important factor — selectivity of the membership — leads one to the same conclusion.¹⁵

Requirements for registering a foreign judgment are mandatory

Sophia Chu v. Nanna, ED113487 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).

William Nanna appealed the circuit court’s order denying Nanna’s motion to dismiss Sophia Chu’s motion to register a foreign judgment. Because Chu failed to comply with the statutory requirements for filing a verified petition, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, reversed the circuit court’s judgment.¹⁶

The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Law, under § 511.760 and Rule 74.14, governs the registration of foreign judgments in Missouri. Section 511.760 states “any judgment, decree or order of a court of the United States or of any state or territory which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state” qualifies as a “foreign judgment” under the UEFJL.¹⁷ Registration of a foreign judgment happens when an authenticated copy of the judgment is filed in the circuit clerk’s office.¹⁸ “Compliance with the statutory procedure has been regarded as being mandatory.”¹⁹ Section 511.760.3 adds:

A verified petition for registration shall set forth a copy of the judgment to be registered, the date of its entry and the record of any subsequent entries affecting it, all authenticated in the manner authorized by the laws of the United States or of this state, and a prayer that the judgment be registered.

The Court of Appeals found that the circuit court erred in denying Nanna’s motion to dismiss Chu’s motion to register the foreign judgment because Chu failed to comply with the statutory requirements for filing a verified petition.²⁰

Inverse condemnation is sole avenue for recovery from a city for property damage

State ex rel. City of Osage Beach v. Koeppen, SD38855 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).

The Grand Harbour Condominium Owners Association, Inc. filed a lawsuit against the City of Osage Beach alleging two counts of negligence, a claim of nuisance, a claim of trespass, and a claim for ejectment.²¹ The city sought a writ of prohibition to order Hon. Aaron G. Koeppen to not proceed further other than to grant the city’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, held that Grand Harbour’s sole avenue of recovery was through an inverse condemnation action.²²

Article I, § 26 of the Missouri Constitution mandates that “private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”²³ The Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in Ferguson v. City of Sunrise Beach²⁴ and reaffirmed that “[i]nverse condemnation is the exclusive and proper remedy for an alleged nuisance or other damage caused to private property by an entity having the power of eminent domain.”²⁵ “The fact that the nuisance is alleged to have been caused by the public entity’s negligence is immaterial.”²⁶

Endnotes
1 Cox v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon, WD87512 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025).
2 Id. at 10 (citing Bryant v. Smith Interior Design Grp., Inc., 310 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Mo. banc 2010); Ingram v. Johnson & Johnson, 608 S.W.3d 663, 687 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020)).
3 Andra v. Left Gate Prop. Holding, Inc., 453 S.W.3d 216, 225 (Mo. banc 2015); Noble v. Shawnee Gun Shop, Inc., 316 S.W.3d 364, 370 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).
4 Andra, 453 S.W.3d at 225.
5 Cox, WD87512 at 17-18.
6 Id. at 19.
7 Littlefield v. Norman Rigdon Post No. 5896, 723 S.W.3d 874 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).
8 Id. at 879.
9 Id. at 880.
10 Id.; See also Lampley v. Missouri Comm’n on Human Rts., 570 S.W.3d 16, 23 (Mo. banc 2019)
(internal quotation omitted) (“Remedial statutes should be construed liberally to include those which are within the spirit of the law and all reasonable doubts should be construed in favor of applicability to the case.”)
11 Id. at 881 (citing Quijano v. Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1980); Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1276 (7th Cir. 1993)).
12 Id. at 882 (citing Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1276).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 883; See also Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1276.
16 Sophia Chu v. Nanna, ED113487 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).
17 MO. REV. STAT. § 511.760.1(1).
18 Berman, Deleve, Kuchan & Chapman, LLC v. 417 Rentals, LLC, 598 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020).
19 HBE Leasing Corp. v. Eckilson, 769 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Mo. App. S.D. 1989).
20 Chu, ED113487. See also Am. Indus. Res., Inc. v. T.S.E. Supply Co., 708 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Mo. App. E.D. 1986) (“… strict adherence to the statutory requirements has great importance where one attempts to enforce the liability imposed by another jurisdiction on a citizen of Missouri through registration of a foreign judgment. This court is reluctant to uphold the dismissal of what may be a valid judgment; the requirement of verification, however, is sound practice and should be enforced.”).
21 State ex rel. City of Osage Beach v. Koeppen, SD38855 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).
22 Id.
23 Ferguson v. City of Sunrise Beach, 710 S.W.3d 620, 625 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
26 Heins Implement Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 859 S.W.2d 681, 693-94 (Mo. banc 1993).