Case Summaries for Oct. 2-8, 2026

Administrative | Appellate | Civil | Contract | Criminal | Family | Probate

Administrative

No substituting lay opinion for expert opinion
A licensing agency decided license applications under an objective system that assigned numerical scores to questions on the applications. The agency required contracted scorers to possess qualifications for scoring, making their scores a form of expert opinion. The agency repeatedly emphasized that identical answers merited identical scores. Nevertheless, the scorers assigned differing scores to identical answers on which the agency denied the applications. On review at the Administrative Hearing Commission, the applicant showed what the disputed scores should have been through expert evidence that the agency did not contest. Moreover, the record impeached the qualifications of the agency contractor scorers. “The [agency] did not present any expert testimony of its own on any issue.” The Commission re-determined the disputed scores using neither the method of the scorers nor the applicant’s experts. Instead, the Commission substituted its own lay opinion based on its perception of what the scorers’ subjective intent was: the score most frequently appearing. No evidence supported that method, resulting in an unreasonable and arbitrary decision. Nevertheless, the circuit court affirmed the Commission’s decision. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the action to the circuit court, ordering the circuit court to grant the applications. After transfer to the Supreme Court of Missouri and re-transfer to the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals re-issued its opinion.
HIPPOS, LLC, Petitioner-Appellant v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SENIOR SERVICES, Respondent-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38218

Appellate

No final judgment while related claims remained pending
Appeals were possible from final judgments and from judgments less than final when circuit courts certified that there was no just reason for delay. Certification was possible for judgments that disposed of all claims “by or against” a party; or disposed of a claim arising from facts, transactions, or occurrences distinct from those giving rise to remaining claims. The plaintiff claimed damages against the defendant gym for a slip and fall. The gym counterclaimed litigation expenses from the plaintiff, and claimed litigation expenses from the plaintiff’s spouse, both under provisions of the same contract. The partial judgment disposed only of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant and stayed the rest of the action. That left unresolved claims by and against all parties, all claims arose from the same event, and the stay was only necessary because the facts and claims were related. The partial judgment was not subject to appeal so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Charles Voyer, Appellant, v. LTF Club Operations Company, Inc., d/b/a Lifetime Fitness, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114229

Civil

Motion for leave to amend was pending when circuit court issued summary judgment
Circuit courts were to freely grant leave to amend pleadings. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The appellant plaintiffs filed a response to the motion for summary judgment, and timely filed a motion for leave to amend the petition that added an alternate theory of recovery that the motion for summary judgment did not address. The plaintiffs also filed notice of calling up the motion. Nevertheless, the circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant while the motion for leave was pending. Failure to rule on the motion for leave constituted an abuse of discretion because abuse of discretion included failure to give careful consideration and the record showed no consideration. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment for the defendant and remanded the action for a ruling on the motion for leave.
GREGG HARDING and ANDREA DAWN HARDING, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. DENNIS J. YOUNG, individually and in his capacity as the Trustee of the Dennis J. Young Revocable Trust, Defendant-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39291

Contract

Contracts were valid under Grain Dealer Law and Grain Warehouse Law
Statutes derogated the common law only to the extent expressly stated. The Grain Dealer Law and the Grain Warehouse Law both required grain dealers and grain warehouses to post a bond against claims. Both also provided for deferred price contracts, meaning contracts under which title to grain transferred at a price to be determined later, but did not alter the common law of contracts as to consideration. The bonds did not secure grain under deferred price contracts. The parties had a storage contract that they modified with deferred price contracts. But the latter had no supporting consideration, so they were invalid and did not alter the storage contract. The appellant seller’s claims constituted dealer claims and storage claims against the bonds. The circuit court ruled otherwise, so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed that judgment and remanded the action.
STATE OF MISSOURI EX. REL. ANDREW BAILEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI and, CHRIS CHINN, DIRECTOR of the MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Plaintiffs-Respondents And, MANEVAL, INC. and CARSON MANEVAL, Respondents-Respondents v. FRIEDEN FARMS, LLC., and BRYNLEE FRIEDEN, Intervenors-Appellants
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39068

Criminal

No recusal needed
Recusal was discretionary with the circuit judge who was conducting the trial and subject to review for abuse of discretion. Circuit judges were presumptively impartial, so parties challenging judges’ partiality had the burden of proof on the whole record to show an appearance of impropriety. An appearance of impropriety required more than negative or hostile remarks. It required personal enmity toward one party or favor to another. The “‘repeated[] chastise[ment]’ of Defense Counsel” during rulings, some on the same issues, did not meet that standard. Also, admonitions to both parties and relatively lenient sentencing undercut defendant’s argument. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. BOYD EUGENE WILSON, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38952

Family

Presumption of marital property not rebutted
All property acquired during marriages was presumptively marital property. Rebuttal required clear and convincing evidence, which could include acquisition before the marriage. That was a matter of fact, the findings on which were subject to deference on appeal. The record supported a finding that the parties acquired real property with funds from their jointly-owned business, making it marital property. Exclusion could also occur after full disclosure of assets by written agreement. No written agreement appeared in the legal file, which the appellant had to assemble, only in the appendix to the appellant’s brief. The appendix was not part of the legal file. And the agreement did not exclude any marital property; it only provided for the respondent to receive one sum on marriage and another on divorce. Also, the appellant was not a party to the agreement. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
In Re the Marriage of: Wafa Al Mandalawi v. Ali Alobaidi
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88087

Probate

Thomas Hart Benton trust litigation resolved
Unlike actions for accounting, in action for breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff beneficiaries had the burden of proof. Will and trust documents — not statutes — defined the defendant trustee’s duties and authorities, which the trustees presumptively executed prudently. Within the bounds of acting “arbitrarily, fraudulently, dishonestly, or with an improper motive [,]” the trust gave the trustee broad discretion in the disposition of trust assets, so the statute governing the disposition of encumbered property did not apply. The trustee had authority to disclaim all interests in an asset then in a third party’s possession, and nothing required the trustees to give notice to the beneficiaries. When the beneficiaries showed self-dealing that harmed the trust or the beneficiaries, the no-further-inquiry rule dispensed with proof of damages to void a transaction. But a relationship between a trustee and a purchaser of trust assets did not necessarily constitute a conflict of interest and the plaintiffs did not show any harm. The record supported the circuit court’s findings that: when the trustee disposed of the trust’s paintings, prudent practice in the sale of art used informal means of valuation and did not require contemporaneous appraisals; the beneficiaries did not show that the trustee failed to consult with co-trustee; the beneficiaries did not show which works were subject to copyright and any damages from the trustee’s failure to copyright; and that the trustee was liable for engaging in a conflict of interest. The circuit court denied relief on those claims and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Anthony Gude and Cybele Benton McCormick, and Richie P. Guerin, Successor Trustee of the Jessie Benton Dynasty Trust v. UMB Bank, N.A.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87870 (consolidated with WD87871 and WD87890)