Case summaries for Jan. 9-15, 2026

Appellate | Attorneys | Civil | Criminal | DWI | Evidence | Health | Personal injury | Post-conviction | Tax

Appellate

Conditional judgment was not final 
Judgments were subject to appeal when final, meaning a judgment that left nothing for further determination. That did not describe a conditional judgment, meaning a judgment that conditioned its orders on facts outside the record. In an action for declaratory judgment, the circuit court ordered one party to convey an easement to another party when that other party performed under a contract. Whether that performance occurred was not in the record, so the judgment was conditional, not final and subject to appeal, so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. 
(Overview summary)
Marty Niffen, et al., Respondents, v. Michael Feinstein, et al., Appellants.
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED113227

Attorneys

In attorney discipline, Supreme Court of Missouri drew its own conclusions 
Attorney discipline depended on culpability: “The baseline discipline is disbarment for intentional misconduct, a suspension for knowing misconduct, and a reprimand ‘for isolated instances of negligent misconduct[.]’" In an action for attorney discipline, a stipulation between the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel and the attorney bound the parties but not the Supreme Court of Missouri. The Supreme Court of Missouri disagreed with the parties’ characterization of respondent attorney’s conduct as merely negligent. The Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that that attorney knowingly assisted the client in an intended fraud in the client’s son’s action for dissolution of marriage. Tipping off counsel for the adverse party did not negate that “conscious awareness” of the circumstances. The Supreme Court of Missouri suspended the attorney indefinitely, with leave to apply for reinstatement in six months, and stay of that discipline pending a year of probation. 
(Overview summary)
In re: Mark W. Arensberg, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101157

Civil

Motion to set aside default was too late 
Parties in default alleging good cause for defaulting, and a meritorious defense to the defaulted claim, move to set aside a default judgment within one year of the entry of the default judgment. Entry, not notice, of the judgment started the time running; and, besides, defaulting parties had no right to further notice. The month after the deadline, the defendant filed a motion to set aside, which was too late. The underlying action was pursuant to the Human Rights Act, which allowed the prevailing plaintiff an award of attorney fees. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to set aside and remanded the action to determine the attorney fees award. 
(Overview summary)
Celestina Gamez, Respondent, v. Easyex Mo OFallon, LLC, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113623

Establishing and disputing facts in summary judgment explained 
To prevail on summary judgment, the movant party had to establish, beyond genuine dispute, facts on which the law required a favorable ruling for the movant. In a claim for negligence, the elements included a breach in the duty of care owed from the defendant to the plaintiff. The movant defendant did not establish that any hazard was open and obvious. The defendant established that the defendant did not manage the parking lot where the plaintiff fell, but those facts did not negate the defendant’s duty to avoid creating tripping hazards, so those facts did not entitle the defendant to a favorable judgment. The defendant also established that the plaintiff released the parking lot’s owner but the release’s plain language established that the release did not apply to the defendant. To establish or dispute facts, parties could use affidavits as follows, “Affidavits in support of [or in opposition to] summary judgment must be based on personal knowledge, set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated therein.” Both parties failed to meet that standard in part, and how much of an affidavit to strike for such failure was within the circuit court’s discretion. Nevertheless, the non-movant plaintiff raised a genuine dispute as to the defendant’s liability by citing discovery implying the creation of a hazard. Because the material facts were in genuine dispute, the circuit court erred in entering summary judgment for the defendant, so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the action. 
(Overview summary)
Cari Bossow-Murdock vs. Premier Parking Services, Inc
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87719 consolidated with WD87745

Criminal

Reasonable resistance discussed 
The elements of sexual abuse in the first degree included forcible compulsion, meaning physical force sufficient to overcome reasonable resistance. The State showed forcible compulsion with the victim’s testimony on how the defendant placed the defendant’s hand and placed the victim’s hand. Forcible compulsion could occur even if the application of physical force did not meet with initial resistance, at least when there was no opportunity to resist. Reasonable resistance included the victim freezing, retracting the victim’s hand, and leaving the room. Reasonable resistance did not include resistance that would have been futile or provoked more injury. 
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Christopher M. Grimes, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED113311

Defendant opened the door to evidence of bond violations 
The circuit court could admit other inadmissible evidence that the State offered to counter a matter raised first by the defendant; so, when the defendant raised the conditions of the defendant’s bond, the State could offer evidence of the defendant’s bond violations. Evidence of escape was admissible to show consciousness of guilt, and the defendant’s explanation went only to the weight of such evidence. Prejudice from the erroneous admission of evidence the defendant meant that a finding of guilt was not reasonably likely without the disputed evidence. That did not describe the firearms-related literature and paraphernalia found in the defendant’s possession when compared to “the weighty and material evidence the State presented to the jury to support his conviction.” Plain error review was discretionary, and inviting error in general — specifically, complaining of an instruction that the defendant submitted — supported a determination to decline plain error review. The defendant had the right to jury findings on his status as a prior and persistent offender status, but waived that right by admitting to those facts, so no plain error occurred when the circuit court made those findings. 
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Mark R. Perry, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED113016

Lesser included offense clarified 
Failure to appear at trial constituted flight that showed consciousness of guilt. The foundation for admitting a text message included evidence that the putative sender was also the author, more than ownership of the sending number, but less than anything unduly burdensome. For that purpose, identifying information in the disputed texts was sufficient, and the weight assigned to such evidence was for the jury. And that evidence was cumulative of other evidence admitted without objection so no prejudice resulted. The foundation for admitting expert evidence included a witness whose qualifications could include experience or training, but experience and training so outdated as to confuse the jury did not meet that standard, so the circuit court did not err in excluding testimony from the defendant’s proffered expert witness. And the proffered evidence was cumulative of other evidence, negating prejudice. When supported by the record, instructions were due on request for lesser included offenses. Offenses were lesser included offenses only of “the immediately higher offense within which the lesser offense is included.” The circuit court gave a lesser included offense instruction that referred to a different higher offense. Whether prejudice resulted depended on whether the incorrect instruction nevertheless tested the element distinguishing the omitted offense. Because the circuit court also submitted the correct higher offense instruction, and the jury presumptively read all the instructions, the instructions tested the distinguishing element: knowledge as to the victim’s ability to give consent. The elements of burglary in the second degree included either knowingly entering unlawfully or knowingly remaining unlawfully. The submitted instruction found the defendant guilty if the defendant either “knowingly entered,” or “remained unlawfully,” which constituted plain error. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the conviction on burglary in the second degree, otherwise affirmed the judgment, and remanded the action. 
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jeffrey Lematty, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED112791

Plain error review declined 
The elements of plain error included manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulting from an obvious error. The defendant’s questions of a witness opened the door to evidence about the defendant’s use of firearms, and the jury acquitted the defendant of armed criminal action, so the defendant did not show that the evidence on firearms was outcome-determinative. The defendant did not show that any plain error occurred, so the Missouri Court of Appeals declined plain error review. 
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. ROBERT MUTTER, Respondent-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District - SD38757

DWI

No jury finding necessary on persistent offender status 
A challenge to a statute as facially unconstitutional was negated by “any set of circumstances under which the statute is constitutional.” Constitutional provisions protected the right to a unanimous jury finding on any fact that enhanced a potential sentence, including persistent offender status for driving while intoxicated. The elements of that status included two convictions on separate occasions, which the circuit court found without, and did not reveal to, the jury before a verdict in the guilt phase. But the jury could rule on the same issue in the same way in the sentencing phase, in which case no constitutional violation would occur. The procedure was not unconstitutional on its face, so the respondent circuit court lacked authority to dismiss a charge on that basis, and the Supreme Court of Missouri made permanent its writ of mandamus requiring the circuit court to set aside the dismissal. 
(Overview summary)
State ex rel. Catherine Hanaway, Relator, vs. The Honorable Craig Hellmann, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101132

Evidence

Character evidence was inadmissible
Parties could impeach a witness’s credibility with evidence of the witness’s truthfulness and veracity, which constituted character evidence, and so required knowledge of the witness’s general reputation in a relevant community. The defendant only offered evidence purporting to show that a State’s witness had lied in specific instances. And the defendant’s offer of proof did not show any lie. No abuse of discretion occurred when the circuit court excluded that evidence. 
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Kenneth Daub, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED113125

Evidence surrounding defendant’s flight was admissible 
The elements of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree included recklessness. On that charge, the State made a submissible case with evidence that the victim suffered injuries, the defendant was in the Mark Twain National Forest where the body was concealed, that the defendant tampered with evidence, and that the defendant fled with her children, hiding out in Mark Twain National Forest. Evidence of uncharged bad acts was generally inadmissible to show propensity and admissible to show “motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or plan, the identity of the defendant on trial, or a coherent picture of the overall events.” Evidence of the children’s resulting condition was relevant to a complete picture of the events surrounding the victim’s death; to tampering with physical evidence; and to the defendant’s motive, intent, and consciousness of guilt. The “tipping point” at which such evidence became more prejudicial than probative was within the circuit court’s discretion to determine, the defendant failed to identify that tipping point, and so the defendant showed no abuse of discretion. The rule against hearsay barred in-court evidence of out-of-court statements offered to show the truth of the matter stated. The State offered evidence relating the victim’s accusations toward the defendant to show discord and motive, and not to show that those accusations were true, so that evidence was not hearsay. And the statements were cumulative of evidence received without objection, so no prejudice resulted. The foundation for expert testimony included showing that the testimony was “relevant, reliable, and proffered by a qualified expert [,]” which the State provided, so no Daubert hearing was necessary — at least when the testimony related to a preliminary, not a conclusive, chemical test. The circuit court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict as to involuntary manslaughter in the first degree. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the acquittal and remanded the action for the circuit court to accept the verdict and sentence the defendant; and affirmed convictions on tampering with physical evidence.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent/Cross-Appellant v. DANISHA RACHELLE PRICE, Defendant-Appellant/Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District - SD37979 and SD37987

Health

SAFE Act and Medicaid ban okay 
A challenge to a statute’s constitutionality that sought a blanket ban on enforcement constituted a facial challenge because that remedy only applied when the statute could operate constitutionally under no conceivable set of circumstances. That standard thwarted appellants challengers’ challenges to expert evidence and findings of fact. Constitutional provisions protected equal protection, due process, and the gains of industry. The Save Adolescents from Experimentation Act and associated Medicaid ban barred performance of, and Medicaid payment for, gender transition treatments for minors. The act and the ban did not violate equal protection because the act addressed “medical use and age, not sex or transgender status [,]” and so made no suspect classification; and the act bore a rational relation to the State’s interest in “safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor [.]” The act did not violate due process because neither minors nor their parents had any fundamental right to health care deemed inappropriate for a minor by the Missouri General Assembly. The act did not violate gains of industry because no medical provider had the right to administer unlawful treatments. The circuit court held that the act and ban were not unconstitutional and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary)
E.N., individually and as next friend and on behalf of her minor child, N.N., et al., Appellants, v. Mike Kehoe, in his official capacity as Governor for the State of Missouri, et al., Respondents.
Supreme Court of Missouri – SC100933

Personal injury

No recovery in police chase 
A defending party without the burden of proof was entitled to summary judgment if it established beyond genuine dispute that the claimant party was unable to show an element of the claim. The elements of negligence included causation, meaning not only causation in fact, but also legal — or proximate — cause. The summary judgment record showed the speed, distance, and duration of its employee’s pursuit of the driver who collided with the plaintiff’s decedent; and that the pursuit was in violation of the defendant’s Highway Patrol’s policy. The plaintiff offered expert testimony that the pursuit caused the decedent’s death. But that testimony was mere speculation and conjecture. Because summary judgment depended on legal entitlement to a judgment, appellate review was de novo. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendant. 
K.A.C. by and through, ASHLEY ACOSTA, NEXT FRIEND, and MICHAEL CRITES, JR., Appellants v. MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, ET AL., Respondents
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District - SD38943

Post-conviction

Trial counsel’s choice of theory and witnesses was okay 
The elements of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel included counsel’s substandard performance, which evidence of a reasonable trial strategy negated. Reasonable trial strategy included the trial counsel’s choice to avoid calling an alibi witness whose testimony the defendant contradicted. Reasonable trial strategy also included the trial counsel’s choice to avoid alleging an alternate perpetrator who no evidence directly connected to the offense. 
(Overview summary)
Harry Little, Appellant, vs. State of Missouri, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED113257

Reasonable strategic choices at sentencing negated relief 
A claim of prosecutorial misconduct addressed on direct appeal was not subject to post-conviction relief. The movant charged ineffective assistance of trial counsel at sentencing. The elements of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel included substandard performance in protecting the movant’s right to a fair trial. Fair trial did not include preserving matter for appeal. A post-trial report required for determining proportionality did not affect the trial. American Bar Association guidelines for the composition of a death penalty defense team did not govern. Standard performance included reasonable choices of strategy and never required cumulative evidence or a meritless argument. Meritless arguments included a challenge to the statute barring a defense of voluntary intoxication. The circuit court did not err in failing to disqualify the prosecutor in the underlying case from representing the State on the motion for making a “send a message” argument. Residence in the region where the offense occurred did not disqualify the circuit judge in the underlying action from ruling on the motion. As to whether trial counsel failed to keep an exhibit out of the jury’s view, the circuit court’s findings received deference. Using the State’s evidence to support a defense was a reasonable strategic choice. Opting not to call an expert witness whose testimony was equivocal was a reasonable strategic choice. “Trial counsel was not obligated to hire a third mental health expert.” A victim impact statement delivered in the form of a third person’s poem was not hearsay, so a hearsay objection would have been meritless. Lay witnesses could testify that defendant was not intoxicated on the day of the offenses, so an objection would have been meritless. An objection based on characterizing defendants as “the devil” would have been meritless because the State made no such argument. The elements of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel also included the reasonable likelihood of a different outcome. It was not likely that lay testimony on the everyday difficulties of the defendant’s life would have outweighed the aggravating circumstances of the defendant’s guilt. One witness made one hearsay statement that parents kept their children indoors after the movant’s offenses; it was not reasonably likely that the “inconsequential” and irrelevant hearsay statement caused the jury to sentence defendant to death. 
(Overview summary)
Craig M. Wood, Appellant, vs. State of Missouri, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC100874
 

Tax

Payment of lien mooted lien’s appearance on title 
In an action to quiet title, the circuit court found in the appellant’s favor subject to a tax lien that a third party later satisfied. The satisfaction of the lien left no effective relief available to the appellant and the underlying issue, the priority and enforcement of liens for unpaid sewer charges, would not evade appellate review. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot. 
(Overview summary)
WMAC 2013, LLC, Appellant, v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED113312