Case summaries for March 27-April 2, 2026

Appellate | Contracts | Criminal | Employment | Evidence | Local government | Personal injury | Post-conviction

Appellate

No transcript, no appeal 
Every appellant’s brief had to state whether and how the appellant preserved error, set forth each error under each theory in a separate point relied on, restate each point relied on at the beginning of the argument discussing that point, and refer to the record by page number in the statement of facts and argument. The appellants had to compile the record and, when challenging a judgment’s evidentiary basis, include any transcript from any evidentiary hearing. The appellant failed to comply with those requirements. Those requirements were necessary to preserve judicial impartiality and give notice of any theory for reversal. “Additionally … we have been unable to locate one of the cases with the citation provided or by use of the party name.” After notice, opportunity, and failure to correct, the Missouri Court of Appeals granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal. 
(Overview summary) 
In the Interest of: D.S.G., Individually and by His Next Friend, Laura Jo Fretwell, and Laura Jo Fretwell, Individually vs. Jon Frederick Gue
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87845

Contracts

Forum selection clause was not enforceable
Courts did not hear actions not ripe for adjudication, meaning allegations too uncertain to assess the facts, and the petition alleged events that had occurred and damages that had accrued, so the action was ripe. Petitions also had to allege facts describing a claim for relief; and the defendant did not show that the petition lacked any element of breach of contract, fraud, fraudulent inducement, tortious interference with a contract, and interference with a business expectancy; so the petition stated a claim. The circuit court ordered the action heard in a Delaware court of general jurisdiction, because the contract selected Delaware courts that lacked subject matter jurisdiction, but courts could not re-write contract provisions even when such provisions were impossible to enforce. Neither the doctrine of forum non conveniens nor comity required filing in Delaware because Missouri courts were the more convenient forum in that the defendant solicited Missouri business. “If [the defendant] finds Missouri entities appealing to its economic appetite then Missouri courts can fulfill its legal tastes as well.” The circuit court abused its discretion when dismissing the action, so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed that judgment and remanded the action. 
(Overview summary) 
Kogent Holdco, LLC and Katalyst Holdco, LCC, Appellant, v. Carl Zeiss Meditec, Inc., Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED113482

Criminal

Pre-trial motion to suppress was insufficient 
The defendants had to object and make a motion for suppression at trial so that circuit judges could rule on the evidence presented on the motion at trial. A pre-trial motion to suppress was, alone, insufficient. And, even if sound trial strategy supported the defense’s use of the evidence that was subject to the motion to suppress, introducing such evidence rendered the admission of that evidence invited error. The Missouri Court of Appeals declined to review such invited error. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri vs. Christopher M. Marshall 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87258

Employment

Gender and disability claims not stated 
Any petition had to state a claim for relief by alleging ultimate facts, meaning more than conclusory assertions, on which the law granted a remedy, and failure to do so was grounds for dismissal. The Human Rights Act provided private rights of action for employment discrimination and hostile work environments based on gender and disability. The plaintiff asserted a gender-based hostile work environment, but described only isolated incidents, rather than the severe and persuasive harassment that constituted a hostile work environment. Disability meant having, or being treated as having, an impairment of a major life function. The plaintiff alleged that she had pregnancy complications that were only temporary, and subject to accommodation by remote work or other jobs, which did not describe disability. The circuit court did not err in dismissing the claims for employment discrimination and hostile work environments based on disability. The circuit court also did not err in implicitly denying leave to amend the petition when the plaintiff never proposed any amendment. But the circuit court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim based on pregnancy for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. While courts had no authority to grant any remedy until the plaintiff had exhausted any available administrative remedy, and the act provided an administrative enforcement action, the plaintiff alleged adverse employment actions based on pregnancy complications, and so did not have to amend her notice to include her eventual firing. The circuit court erred in holding otherwise, and was proffered no other grounds for dismissal, so the Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal of and remanded that claim to the circuit court. 
(Overview summary) 
Chelsea Elder, Appellant/Plaintiff, v. The Washington University - St. Louis, Respondent/Defendant 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District - ED113610

Evidence

Probity and prejudice discussed
Point relied on and arguments preserved nothing for review that cited events at trial generally instead of specific rulings and failed to apply the standard of review. Abuse of discretion was more than disagreement with the circuit court’s ruling; it was a test of any reasonable person could have made that ruling. Even then, reversal required appellants to show that the ruling was so prejudicial as to be outcome-determinative. The exclusion of evidence was not grounds for reversal unless the evidence’s relation to the issues and probative value was clearly greater than the risk of confusion and prejudice. Confusion and prejudice were likely with evidence of settlement preparations because juries could confuse negotiation positions with legal or factual merit. Without explanation of any non-hearsay purpose, plaintiffs offered a memorandum that included layperson’s hearsay opinion and was prepared for settlement negotiations 20 years earlier. Plaintiff also offered a settlement contract setting forth the defendants’ joint efforts at remediating ground contamination after the events at issue. Neither plaintiff’s expert’s use of the memorandum to prepare an opinion, nor plaintiff’s characterization of the memorandum as a business record or prior inconsistent statement, made the memorandum admissible over considerations of probity and prejudice. The record supported a defendants’ opening statement description of the plaintiff’s evidence so the documents did not constitute opened-door evidence. The circuit court excluded the documents from evidence, barred plaintiff from using the settlement on direct examination of plaintiff’s expert to impeach anticipated testimony of defendants’ expert, and barred plaintiff from using the memorandum to cross-examine a defendants’ expert. None of those rulings constituted an abuse of discretion. Also, plaintiff made no offer of proof as to what the experts’ testimony on the memorandum would have been. And the proffered evidence was cumulative of other evidence entered without objection. When plaintiffs never asked a defense expert’s opinion about contamination at a specific well, the expert’s opinion on that matter was not a new opinion. Asking the expert during a deposition generally for all opinions was insufficient. “A party cannot claim surprise based on ‘new opinions’ as to matters about which the expert witness has not been asked during discovery.” The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling plaintiffs’ objection to the opinion testimony. The circuit court entered judgment for the defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
CRYSTAL GRAY, individually and as NEXT FRIEND of minors C.G., E.G., and Connie Gray, as Class I Beneficiaries of WILLIAM GRAY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. MODINE MANUFACTURING COMPANY and HAMILTON SUNDSTRAND CORPORATION, Defendants-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38369

Local government

Collection of judgment against city discussed 
Judgments denying a writ of mandamus were subject to review for abuse of discretion. Judgments granting a writ of mandamus were subject to review like any other civil judgment: “sustained unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law.” Judgments against incorporated cities were subject to collection by taxes to satisfy those judgments as ordered by writs of mandamus. Writs of mandamus issued only to compel the performance of duties for which the law prescribed the conditions and manner of performance even without the writ. The circuit court ordered debtor city to pay a judgment from existing city funds, which no law required. And circuit courts could issue such writs only after an unsatisfied attempt at execution by levy on city property — even though levying on city property was generally barred. The circuit court erroneously declared or applied the law, so the Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the action. 
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. REBECCA VARNEY, Relator-Respondent v. CITY OF EDGAR SPRINGS, MISSOURI, ET. AL., Respondents-Appellants 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District - SD38838

Personal injury

Instruction described contributory negligence and not assumption of the risk 
The parties were entitled on request to any instruction for which the jury had enough evidence to find that the instruction’s proffered facts were true. The Federal Employer’s Liability Act provided that railroads were liable to their employees for workplace negligence, subject to employee contributory negligence, but not subject to assumption of the risk. Assumption of the risk meant consenting to risks that the employer created. Contributory negligence meant that the employee created additional risk. Additional risk included failing to keep a lookout for and yield to, oncoming trains in a railyard. The evidence supported an instruction on that matter and the instruction did not constitute an assumption of the risk defense. 
(Overview summary) 
Ronnie Inglis vs. BNSF Railway CO 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87866

Post-conviction

No evidentiary hearing was necessary to deny DNA testing 
On any motion for DNA testing, circuit courts issued show-cause orders. But no evidentiary hearing on a show-cause order was necessary when the motion, or “the files and records of the case[,] conclusively showed that the movant is not entitled to relief.” The elements of a claim for post-conviction DNA testing included that DNA was unavailable for trial but the movant had six months to procure DNA testing. The elements also included a reasonable probability that exculpatory results would have resulted in acquittal, but other evidence supported the convictions. The circuit court did not err in denying relief. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Darrell Bolden, Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED113948

Choice among mutually exclusive strategies was reasonable 
No claim resolved on direct appeal was grounds for post-conviction relief. The movant first claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a relevance objection to an exhibit. The Missouri Court of Appeals had already found no plain error in the admission of that exhibit on relevance grounds. That ruling barred the movant’s first claim. The movant also claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present general self-defense and self-defense under the castle doctrine. On charges of unlawful use of a weapon and assault in the fourth degree, the elements included the use of force. Trial counsel chose to negate the use of force, and that choice was reasonable because evidence supported it. Reasonable strategies negated charges of ineffective assistance of counsel. That applied to selection of a reasonable trial strategy that excluded other reasonable trial strategies. Each of the movant’s preferred defenses conceded the use of force, making them mutually exclusive with trial counsel’s chosen trial strategy. The circuit court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Leonard H. Burst, Jr., Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED113827

Reasonable reliance not shown 
Circuit courts could deny relief when the record refuted the movant’s allegations. The elements of ineffective assistance of counsel included substandard performance, which the movant’s praise of counsel refuted. The elements of ineffective assistance of plea counsel included a guilty plea entered not knowingly and not voluntarily. Such was the case when plea counsel made a positive representation about sentencing, upon which the movant relied on mistakenly but reasonably. The movant did not reasonably rely on any representation that the movant would receive probation when plea counsel characterized probation as “extremely unusual” and “completely rare[.]” The circuit court denied relief, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Gregory V. Thornton, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED113502