Case summaries for Jan. 23-29. 2026

Attorneys | Civil | Constitutional | Criminal | Employment security | Evidence | Family | Legislative | Personal injury | Post-conviction | Real estate | Schools

Attorneys

Lawyer disbarred 
The Supreme Court of Missouri regulated the practice of law including attorney discipline; reviewing de novo the findings, conclusions and recommendations of disciplinary panels. The respondent lawyer was subject to discipline for repeatedly lying to clients and his employer and mishandling client funds. Considering the many aggravating factors and few mitigating factors, “Disbarment is the only reasonable response.” Unreported orders did not constitute any authority and lawyers should not cite them. The Court disbarred the respondent lawyer. 
(Overview summary) 
In re: Brian Todd Goldstein, Respondent 
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101182

Civil

The scope of the pleadings excluded more but included less 
Circuit courts could not grant more relief than sought but could grant less. In an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs claimed adverse possession of a lot of land, the circuit court found for plaintiffs in part, and found for the defendant appellant as to the rest. That relief did not exceed the scope of the pleadings. The remainder of appellant’s brief was so deficient as to points relied on and argument that an opinion would require developing theories for the appellant, which appellate courts will not do, so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed those challenges. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 
TERESA J. WILLIAMS and DAVID WILLIAMS, wife and husband, Plaintiffs-Respondents v. WILLIAM and PHYLLIS DECKER, 2001 DECKER FAMILY TRUST, STEPHEN DECKER, Trustee, Defendants-Appellants 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD38974

Constitutional

Incarceration Reimbursement Act okay 
The appellant preserved a constitutional challenge by raising it with a citation to the argued provisions before judgment. The Incarceration Reimbursement Act allowed the State to recover the costs of incarceration damages paid in settlement of an action under United States statutes because the State and its employees were not the defendants in the action, so the reimbursement did not reduce the award. Missouri savings statutes maintained the reimbursement after repeal of the act. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri ex rel Andrew Bailey, Missouri Attorney General vs. Ronnie Pope 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87652

Criminal

Alternative perpetrator evidence rejected 
The foundation for evidence of an alternative perpetrator included a “direct connection,” meaning some action by the proffered alternative perpetrator connected to the offense. The defendant’s alternative perpetrator had an intimate relationship with the victim, had committed domestic violence, owned a firearm, and was investigated by police; but none of that connected the alternative perpetrator to the offense. And “the overwhelming physical, electronic, and video surveillance evidence directly connects Williamson, and no other person, to Victim’s murder." Procedure in a conviction that the defendant did not appeal could not constitute error in the conviction that the defendant did appeal. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri vs. Dale Lawrence Williamson 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87733

Plain error review of invited error declined 
Counsel for the parties do not expect, and may “appropriately” resent, circuit court intervention sua sponte in the presentation of their cases; accordingly, to refrain from sua sponte intervention was rarely error. No sua sponte mistrial was necessary when the State impeached the defendant with the defendant’s prior inconsistent statements because such impeachment did not constitute a comment on the right to remain silent. On the contrary, the defendant “was under no duty to speak [but,] having spoken, he enjoys no license to lie.” Constitutional provisions gave the defendants the right to jury findings on facts that enhanced their sentences, while a Missouri statute allowed such findings by judicial notice, and the defendant agreed to and received both. Any error was therefore invited, the defendant’s objection at sentencing was too late to preserve a constitutional challenge, and the only possible challenge remaining was under plain error review. Plain error review was discretionary and invited error weighed against such review, so the Missouri Court of Appeals declined. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri vs. Johnathan Mosley 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87726

Parole eligibility corrected 
Sentences as spoken prevailed over sentences as written and variances constituted clerical errors. The circuit court’s written sentence included a minimum number of years before parole eligibility that was unauthorized by statute and did not appear in the spoken sentence. The Missouri Court of Appeals remanded the action for correction nunc pro tunc to conform the written sentence to the spoken sentence. 
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. JERRY GAGE, Defendant-Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD38490

Wrong jury instruction, no plain error 
The defendant’s statement of “no objection” to the jury instructions did not waive plain error review. Plain error’s elements included an obvious error and a resulting in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. The State charged the defendant with forgery by using, possessing for the purpose of using, or transferring with the knowledge or belief that it would be used, a writing as genuine. The defendant did not contest that allegation so, when the circuit court erroneously submitted instructions for forgery by authenticating a writing, no manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulted. No plain error occurred and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. MONIKA GEAN GRAY-EL, Defendant-Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD38991

Various instructional errors explained
Instructional errors included variances from the allegations in charging instruments, sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict directing instruction, and sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict. But all three were separate issues with separate standards, so their appearance in the same point relied on rendered the point multifarious so the points were unpreserved. Preservation was not necessary for appellate courts to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict but the Court of Appeals could not resolve the multifarious points without advocating for appellant and so dismissed them. The evidence was sufficient to support instructions on first degree robbery and third degree assault as a principle, not merely as an accomplice, so those instructions did not constitute error. And the record showed strategic reasons why defendant did not object to those instructions. No plain error occurred as to those instructions so the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. KENNETH LEE CANDAY, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD38867
 

Employment security

Appellant’s deficient brief required dismissal 
When deciding an appeal required an appellate court to advocate for an appellant, appellate courts dismissed the appeal. Rules governing appellate practice required the appellant’s brief to include a fair and concise statement of the relevant facts and refer to the record by page number; to set forth points relied on in a specified format; and to include a preservation statement, the standard of review, and application of law to fact in each argument. Failure to comply with those rules required dismissal. 
(Overview summary) 
Anteria Pratt vs. Harry S Truman Children's Neurological Center, Employer, and Division of Employment Security 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD88082

Evidence

Complete picture distinguished from propensity 
The character and admissibility of evidence that the defendant committed an uncharged offense depended on the purpose for which it was offered. If offered to show a defendant’s natural tendency to commit the offense charged, the evidence constituted propensity evidence, which was generally inadmissible. Offered to show a complete picture of the events, like the defendant’s relationship with the victim, the evidence was admissible. That described testimony about the defendant’s sexual experience with an underaged child other than the victim. That evidence was not subject to exclusion as cumulative of other grooming evidence because that other evidence related to different instances. And the State minimized unfair prejudice by only briefly addressing the matter in opening argument, questioning the victim, closing argument, and rebuttal. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. David K. Duncan, Sr., Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED113148

Family

Status quo ante property division affirmed 
“[A]dopting a faulty proposed judgment … may indicate a lack of judicial consideration.” Nevertheless, in actions for dissolution of marriage, circuit courts did not have to divide property evenly. Property division had only to be fair and equitable under circumstances that included the source of funds and marital misconduct. “These factors alone are sufficient to support” a property division that returned the parties to their status quo ante the marriage, and the appellant’s improved post-marriage earning power strengthened that conclusion. The same standards applied to the division of debt. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded the marital residence to the respondent, did not remove the appellant’s name from the mortgage, and ordered the respondent to hold the appellant harmless on that debt. 
(Overview summary) 
Alexander Cooper Komes, Appellant, v. Jason Joseph Grote, Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District - ED113243

Legislative

Departure from original purpose sinks initiative bill
In challenges to legislation, the burden of proof was with parties challenging the legislation’s lawfulness and, when such parties prevailed, on any party seeking severance. Expenditure of State revenue pursuant to legislation conferred standing on a taxpayer to challenge whether such legislation was lawful, including as to procedural requirements like maintaining legislation’s original purpose. Original purpose meant “the bill’s ‘earliest title and contents’ at the time the bill is introduced.” Legislation introduced to address the judicial review of ballot summaries eventually granted the attorney general standing in actions unrelated to ballot summaries. That standing provision legislation constituted an original purpose violation. The State did not sufficiently allege that the standing provision was dispensable to the legislation’s passage, and the record showed otherwise, so severance was not possible. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the circuit court and entered judgment invalidating the legislation entirely.
(Overview summary)
Sean Soendker Nicholson, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, vs. State of Missouri, et al., Respondents/Cross-Appellants
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101308

Personal injury

Third party's evidence not needed for defamation 
The standard for a directed verdict was whether the plaintiff offered substantial evidence supporting each element of the claim, assuming that the jury believed the evidence and inferences favoring the plaintiff at the close of the plaintiff’s case in chief, and assuming that the jury ignored contrary evidence and inferences. Appellate review of a directed verdict considered only the theories raised in the motion. The elements of a claim for defamation included a false statement that damaged the plaintiff’s reputation. The element of damage required evidence and the plaintiff’s own testimony was sufficient. The plaintiff testified that multiple statements of the defendants cost him access to workspace, entry to a coffee house, a speaking engagement, and access to his own residence. “Assigning weight to evidence to decide what and whom to believe is the reserved role of the jury. It plays no part in the purely legal enterprise of ruling on a motion for directed verdict.” The circuit court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant, so the Supreme Court of Missouri vacated that judgment and remanded for a new trial. 
(Overview summary) 
Mouna Apperson, f/k/a Nicholas Apperson, Appellant, vs. Natasha Kaminsky, et al., Respondents 
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101020

Post-conviction

Habeas corpus issued on late probation revocation 
A challenge to revocation of probation was not under rules on post-conviction relief, it was by petition for writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus was subject to review by writ of certiorari, which required the circuit court certified the record to an appellate court. An appellate court determined whether the evidence as a whole supported the issuance of a writ and whether a circuit court abused its discretion. A circuit court had authority to revoke probation only as long as a term of probation. A term of probation was subject to extension only if a circuit court manifested its intent to conduct a revocation hearing before expiration and made “every reasonable effort … to notify the probationer and to conduct the hearing prior to the expiration of the period.” For certain felonies, earned compliance credits shortened probation, except while a violation report or motion to revoke was pending. The petitioner’s probation ended before the circuit court, and court appearances after that did not constitute invited error, because those appearances gained petitioner no strategic advantage. “Thus, if any party invited error, it was the State in seeking to revoke Nail’s probation ten years after she was entitled to discharge.” Outstanding restitution barred early release for some offenses but not petitioner’s offenses. Discharge was mandatory. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri ex rel. Catherine L. Hanaway vs. The Honorable Page Bellamy, Associate Circuit Judge, and Janet Horine, Circuit Clerk 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD88167

Stipulation was sound strategy 
The movant did not show that any relief was due when trial counsel presented no expert opinion on secondary touch DNA transfer when the movant had failed to present a factual basis for such an event, and did not show what the opinion would have been, and a favorable opinion would have been cumulative. A stipulation to a chain of custody reduced the number of State’s experts testifying and constituted sound trial strategy refuted the movant’s claim of inadequate assistance. Overwhelming evidence negated any prejudice from trial counsel’s choice against trying to impeach the victim’s credibility. Alarm was not an element of sexual misconduct by exposure of genitals to a child, so the appellate counsel’s performance did not prejudice the movant in arguing absence of alarm. Appellate review of a motion was limited to rulings on the motion, which was limited to the trial and judgment, so “rulings relating to the … motion proceedings are arguably not cognizable in this appeal.” Even if they were, no error occurred when the circuit court did not admit exhibits filed but not offered, and no prejudice resulted because the circuit court reviewed those exhibits. 
(Overview summary) 
Dan R. Lawrence vs. State of Missouri 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87532

Choice of instructions was sound strategy 
The approved instruction defining “knowingly” was optional, and trial counsel offered lesser included offense instructions with a definition of “recklessly,” while focusing on the degree of injury. That was a reasonable strategy that negated substandard performance. And the movant showed no prejudice because the definition for knowingly used that term in its ordinary sense. No prejudice occurred when trial counsel chose not to object to cumulative evidence because cumulative evidence was not prejudicial, even when inadmissible. 
CLARENCE EDWARD PORTER, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD38865

No promises, no misadvice 
No evidentiary hearing on a motion was due before denying relief when the record refuted the movant’s allegations. At the movant’s plea hearing, the movant stated that no promises induced his guilty plea. That testimony contradicted the movant’s allegations of misadvice on parole eligibility. The circuit court denied relief without a hearing and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
JOHN A. PENDERGRASS, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD38876

Appointed counsel mandatory even for untimely motion 
Circuit courts had to appoint post-conviction counsel for indigent defendants. That was true even when the initial motion was untimely filed because an untimely filing could be excused, and post-conviction counsel could make that case. The circuit court dismissed the movant’s initial motion, filed with an affidavit of indigency, for untimely filing without appointing post-conviction counsel. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated that judgment and remanded the action for appointment of post-conviction counsel. 
KENNETH R. CORCRAN, Movant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD39156

Real estate

Statute applied to existing covenants 
The defendant homeowners’ association had a restrictive covenant barring solar panels. A new statute forbad such restrictions. Constitutional provisions barred legislation “impairing the obligation of contracts” or “retrospective in its operation.” That did not protect contracts from changes in public policy. The public policy favoring solar power, and the time between the bill’s passage and effective date, supported a prospective effect for a ban on restrictive covenants against solar panels. “Under the new statute, one aspect of that restriction is no longer enforceable.” The new statute allowed covenants to reasonably regulate solar panels but a limitation on placement was not reasonable. The circuit court erred in concluding that the new statute applied only to covenants made after the new statute’s effective date so the Supreme Court of Missouri entered declaratory judgment for plaintiffs. 
(Overview summary) 
Colleen Eikmeier and William S. Love, Appellants, vs. Granite Springs Home Owners Association, Inc. A Missouri Not-For-Profit Corp., Respondent 
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101152

Schools

No allegation of protected status, no discrimination 
The Human Rights Act barred race-based, retaliatory, and associational discrimination in public accommodations. The plaintiff parents of a student brought such actions against a school district. The elements of the plaintiffs’ actions included denial of public accommodations, and plaintiffs failed to allege that they had experienced any denial of any facility by the defendant, or any retaliation against them based on their race, or their son’s race. The circuit court dismissed the petitions and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
SEAN MABINS and DARLINE MABINS, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. MISSOURI STATE HIGH SCHOOL ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, by and through its Board of Directors MARK LINNEMAN, TRAVIS DITTEMORE, DANIEL CLEMENS, KEVIN SMITH, JOSH HOENER, JOSH SCOTT, CRAIG GIBBS, DAVID JONES, HEATHER HELSEL, and AARON VITT, and SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SPRINGFIELD R-12, NATE THOMAS, SCOTT PHILLIPS, and JOSH SCOTT, Defendants-Respondents 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD38982, SD38993