Case summaries for Nov. 14-20, 2025
Each week, The Missouri Bar provides links to all hand downs published online during the past seven days by the Supreme Court of Missouri and the Missouri Court of Appeals. The Missouri Bar has created headings and summaries for each case. Summaries are not part of the opinions of the Court. They have been prepared for the convenience of the reader and should not be quoted or cited.
Attorneys | Administrative | ADR | Appellate | Evidence | Family | Orders of protection | Post-conviction | Probate | Real estate
Attorneys
Incorrect signatures resulted in unauthorized practice of law
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not bind this court[.]” Voluntary dismissals occurred only as rules provided. Rules provided that any document served had to have the signature of a self-represented party, which could not include a legal entity, or local counsel; and set forth acceptable electronic signature formats. A voluntary dismissal bore only the signature of counsel pro hac vice, and lacked local counsel’s signature in acceptable form, so that voluntary dismissal constituted the unauthorized practice of law, was null, and did not end the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction was not waivable. Prompt correction could relate back to cure such defects but not when it would deprive respondents of attorney fees. Respondents’ motion for attorney fees was “akin to a counterclaim” and subject to the circuit court’s ancillary jurisdiction, but did not constitute a claim, so the order granting awarding attorney fees was not a final judgment subject to appeal.
(Overview summary)
Oak Ridge Property Management, LLC, et al., Appellants, vs. Robert P. Greene, et al., Respondents
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District - ED113519
Administrative
Agency discretion affirmed
Respondent agency had authority to bar employment of health care personnel for patient neglect. The appellant registered nurse was required to check on a patient experiencing alcohol withdrawal, failed to do so, and falsified related records. An agency witness’s testimony at a contested case hearing on statutory factors for the agency’s consideration did not constitute a usurpation of agency authority. The agency’s exercise of discretion — a permanent bar — constituted an application of the statutory factors to the evidence, did not constitute error, and was not subject to substitution with any court’s discretion. The circuit court nevertheless reversed the agency as to the duration of the bar, so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, and affirmed the agency decision.
(Overview summary)
Bradley Hult vs. Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87540 (consolidated with WD87558)
ADR
Rams dispute was outside of arbitration
Whether disputes were subject to an action in circuit court or arbitration depended on the petition and the parties’ arbitration provision. The parties’ arbitration provision in a contract for the lease of real property did not cover a dispute over the lease’s provision for an option to purchase, because that dispute arose from a release provision in a settlement contract. The settlement contract and its release provision were the subject of the petition in circuit court, and the circuit court had not determined the merits of the release, so the release could not support appellants’ arguments. The circuit court did not err in denying appellants’ motion to compel arbitration.
(Overview summary)
St. Louis Regional Convention and Sports Complex Authority, Respondent, v. The Rams Football Company, LLC, et al., Appellants
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED113374
Appellate
Point relied on must specify a ruling, not a result
Rules governing appellate briefing made sure that appellate courts ruled on appellants’ arguments only so, when an appellant’s argument was unclear, appellate courts would not speculate. Any appellant had to show how they preserved each point for appellate review, identify the standard of review, enunciate a theory for reversal, and challenge an erroneous ruling that led to the judgment rather than challenge the judgment itself. A point relied on “[i]dentifying the ultimate result of the trial, the entry of judgment[,] is defective.” The appellants failed each of those requirements, so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
VINCENT TALDONE, et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents v. H.C. SHEPHARD, et al., Defendants-Appellants
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD38883
Evidence
No prejudice from exclusion of cumulative evidence
The elements of reversal included an erroneous ruling that was outcome-determinative. Exclusion of evidence could never be outcome determinative when the excluded evidence was cumulative of other admitted evidence. The defendant offered an expert witness to testify that a fire’s origin was not arson because its origin was indeterminable but a State witness had already testified that the fire’s origin was undetermined. The expert’s testimony was cumulative, so excluding it was not outcome-determinative and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s arson conviction.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. JAMES LEE HOPKINS, III, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD38670 and SD39097 (Consolidated)
Family
Termination of parental rights affirmed
The appellant’s brief did not comply with rules, but the deficiencies did not impede review and the rights at stake were grave, so the Missouri Court of Appeals did not dismiss the appeal. The appeal did not include a re-weighing of evidence. A motion to amend the judgment was necessary to preserve error as to findings required by statute, and “the plain language of the meticulously detailed ‘factor analysis’ performed by the trial court in its judgment” satisfied that requirement. Circuit courts could terminate parental rights on findings described by statute, including statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence and the child’s best interest by a preponderance of the evidence, and the same evidence could be relevant to both. And, for both, a finding of a single factor was enough to withstand appellate review. Failure to rectify a dangerous condition had support in evidence showing why the juvenile division assumed and continued authority over the child. The circuit court correctly projected the future from the past. A finding on that ground mooted error as to any other ground. The adequacy of a social service plan was not a defense. A social study investigative report was necessary on the child’s best interest, and was not admissible as to the statutory grounds, but was cumulative of other evidence. And the parent did not preserve that issue or include the report in the record on appeal. Also, parent’s objections to parts of the report could not exclude the whole. The Court of Appeals remanded the action to determine an attorney fees due parent’s appointed counsel.
(Overview summary)
In the Interest of: K.M.D. and R.M.D. Juvenile Officer vs. S.M.D
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87912 consolidated with WD87913
Orders of protection
No plain error in lack of cross-examination
To preserve a constitutional matter for appellate review, the appellant had to raise the matter “at the first opportunity in the circuit court[,]” which the appellant did not do, leaving only plain error review. The elements of reversal for plain error included an error that was so fundamental as to undermine “the very foundation of the process” and change the result. The process for a full order of protection included confrontation of adverse witnesses, which the circuit court did not afford, because it did not tell the pro se defending party when he had the opportunity to cross-examine the represented claimant party. And the appellant did not show that the lack of cross-examination changed the outcome at trial. The result was the same when characterizing the error as statutory.
(Overview summary)
K.L.H., Respondent, v. N.R., Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED112951
Post-conviction
Evidentiary hearing was necessary
A hearing was necessary before ruling on any motion that alleged facts unrefuted in the record and describing ineffective assistance of counsel or a violation of due process. The movant alleged that trial counsel failed to strike a biased venire person. No hearing was necessary on that claim, because the venire person only indicated an inclination to believe a specific acquaintance, and the State’s law enforcement witness merely provided a foundation for a recorded interview and did not testify to a substantive element of the charged offense. The movant alleged that he told trial counsel of a witness who was available and willing to testify in contradiction to the State’s witnesses. The movant also alleged that the State failed to disclose an item of evidence, and the circuit court made a finding of fact that the evidence was disclosed, but that finding had no support in the record. On those two claims, a hearing was necessary before ruling. The record showed that late filing of the amended motion was due to post-conviction counsel’s miscalculation, which demonstrated abandonment, obviating the need for a remand and inquiry.
AUSTIN TYLER GRAY, Defendant-Movant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District - SD38721
Probate
Will filed too late
Nothing barred an heir from appointment as personal representative. Statutes governing the probating of wills described the application for application for letters of administration, supplements to that application, and notice that letters of administration have issued. That notice started the time to file a will for probate unless the notice was defective. The notice was not defective because the application was not defective and did not require any supplement. Even if a supplement was necessary, the supplement would have extended the time for filing a will, and would not have started a new time. The appellants filed a purported will too late, rendering it null.
(Overview summary)
In the Matter of Edward L. Eisenstein, Deceased Margaret Delacy vs. World Wildlife Fund, Missouri Botanical Garden, Cousteau Society, The Nature Conservancy, and Ecohealth Alliance, Inc., Successor-In-Interest to Wildlife Preservation Trust International
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87821
Commissioner orders needed judge’s confirmation
The Missouri Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over final judgments of circuit courts. Circuit courts had authority under the Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act to review orders in a case transferred from a Georgia State court and could do so through a probate commissioner. But probate commissioner orders were not final unless confirmed in a timely manner by a probate division judge. The commissioner denied motions to set aside Georgia court orders, reconsider, and reopen the action. The judge’s orders, confirming those commissioner orders, were untimely so the action and the motions remained pending in circuit court. The Court of Appeals “firmly” dismissed the appeal, remanded the action to circuit court, and instructed the probate division to timely renew and confirm all the orders that were the subject of the appeal.
(Overview summary)
In the matter of: Lauren Micaela Taylor
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED113222
Real estate
Withdrawal of application mooted appeal
Appellate courts generally do not hear matters that are moot, including matters as to which practical relief is no longer possible. the relator filed an application on behalf of a landowner seeking to split a tract of land. On denial of the application, relator sought a writ of mandamus compelling a grant of the application. But the application was no longer pending because landowner withdrew the application, and also withdrew relator’s authority to pursue the application, which was likely the relator’s real grievance. And no split was possible since condemnation of the tract for highway construction. The appeal was moot so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Phoenix Hospitality, INC. vs. Timothy Teddy
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87596
Missouri land was subject to Missouri law
Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim tested only whether the claimant alleged facts on which courts could award relief if those allegations were true and not by determining whether the allegations were true. “The [circuit] court’s role in determining whether to dismiss a claim requires a pleadings-only analysis that does not extend to evidence outside the pleadings.” The circuit court heard evidence, and made findings of fact, on a party’s claim to quiet title. An action to quiet title was subject to the jurisdiction and substantive laws of the State in which the subject property lay. The subject property was in Stoddard County, so Missouri Courts had jurisdiction to hear the quiet tile action, the terms of a trust governed by another State’s laws notwithstanding. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the ruling on the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, vacated all subsequent rulings, and remanded the action to circuit court for further proceedings.
SCARLETT NORRIS ADAMS, AS TRUSTEE OF THE SCARLETT NORRIS ADAMS REVOCABLE TRUST, DATED APRIL 9, 2013, Appellant/Cross-Respondent v. ELIZA LAMM, Respondent/Cross-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District - SD38729 and SD38730 (Consolidated)
