Case summaries for June 12-25, 2026

Administrative | Appellate | Civil | Corporations and other entities | Criminal | Employment | Evidence | Family | Local government | Personal injury | Post-conviction | Real estate

Administrative

Primary jurisdiction doctrine applied 
When the General Assembly assigned authority over facts to an executive-branch agency, claimants had to exhaust that administrative remedy before seeking relief in circuit court, and circuit courts refrained from exercising their jurisdiction over such matters under the “primary jurisdiction” doctrine. The Public Service Commission had exclusive primary authority to determine whether a public utility charged more than allowed. So, any theory of recovery premised on over-earning, like the plaintiff appellant’s claims for breach of contract and Merchandising Practices Act violations, had first to find resolution of the over-earning allegation before the Commission. The circuit court dismissed the claims without prejudice under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Dismissal without prejudice constituted a final judgment when the grounds for dismissal were incurable by further pleading, or plaintiff chose against further pleading, or — as with the plaintiff’s claims — both. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Bryan Buck, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. Union Electric Company, d/b/a Ameren Missouri, and Ameren Corporation, Respondents 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113772

Appellate

Without transcript, appeal dismissed 
Rules of appellate procedure required the appellants to file a brief that included argument supported by citations to authority and a statement of facts with references to the record on appeal. The record on appeal had to include transcripts of any “portions of the proceedings and evidence not previously reduced to written form and necessary to determination of the issues on appeal.” The issues on appeal included factual support for the ruling appealed. The circuit court’s findings of fact stood on evidence presented at a hearing, but the appellant did not provide a transcript of that hearing, and the appellant’s references to the record and authority were inaccurate, depriving the appellant’s challenge of legal and factual support. The Missouri Court of Appeals could not review the appellant’s challenge so it dismissed the appeal. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri vs. James Frederick Wilson 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD87896

Deficient appellant’s brief required dismissal 
Pro se appellants were not subject to penalty for self-representation but were also not exempt from briefing rules necessary to maintain judicial impartiality. The appellant did not follow rules governing statements of facts, points relied on, and arguments, including preservation statements and standards of review. Each theory for reversal had a distinct and mandatory analysis that the appellant failed to follow. Reviewing the appeal would require a court to construct arguments for the appellant so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. 
(Overview summary) 
J.C.T., Appellant, v. A.N.G., Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113730

Civil

Judgment could only award damages to a party 
“Trial courts only have the authority to grant relief for or against parties to an action.” The plaintiff brought an action for ejectment against John Miller, Jr. However, the “John Miller, Jr.” who answered and litigated was really John Miller III. John Miller III was not occupying the property and never joined the action. Nevertheless, John Miller III filed a counterclaim for unjust enrichment based on repairs made to the property, prevailed on the counterclaim, and received an award. Because John Miller III was never a party, the circuit court had no authority to make that award and vacated the judgment as to the award. 
(Overview summary) 
Laura A. Hayes, Appellant, v. John Miller, Jr., et al., Respondents 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113836

Amended judgment was too late 
After the issuance of judgments that disposed of all issues after all parties, circuit courts retained authority in the action for a set time, subject to post-judgment motions. In an action for discovery of assets and injunctive relief, a trustee sought to recover trust assets. The circuit court resolved a preliminary injunction barring transfer of assets when the judgment ordered the transfer of assets. The circuit court resolved the discovery of assets when it found wrongful distribution of assets and ordered the assets restored to the trust. No party filed any post-judgment motion. The circuit court had no authority to issue an amended judgment after the time set by rule. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the amended judgment and remanded the action to the circuit court with directions to re-enter the judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Robert L. Herron, Sr., et al., Appellant, v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, et al., Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113254

Corporations and other legal entities

Allowing unlicensed representation was plain error 
Limited liability companies were legal entities separate from their owners that could only do anything through an individual. Only a licensed lawyer could represent any legal entity. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the defendant’s LLC and the defendant. The defendant was not a licensed lawyer, so the filing was a nullity and the circuit court had no authority to grant it. “By filing the joint motion on behalf of the [LLC] and himself, he invalidates the entire pleading despite his right to self-representation.” Plain error occurred when the circuit court granted the motion. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded that action. 
(Overview summary) 
Christopher Prosser, Appellant, v. Daniel Kellas d/b/a Over There Land Company, Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113891

Criminal

Sentence not corrected 
The defendants could waive the right to counsel. To make sure that such waivers were knowing and intelligent, rules and statutes set forth a procedure that included a Faretta hearing and a written form, the use of which raised a presumption of valid waiver. The defendant did not rebut that presumption. Advice on potential defenses was not necessary to an otherwise thorough colloquy. The Missouri Court of Appeals remanded the action to circuit court only to conform, by order nunc pro tunc, the sentence as written to the sentence as spoken on some counts. As to other counts, the Court of Appeals did not address clerical errors in the written sentence in the defendant’s favor because the State did not appeal. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri vs. Lydell R. Walker 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD87744

Judgment corrected by nunc pro tunc 
Clerical errors in judgments were subject to correction by orders nunc pro tunc solely to show what happened in circuit court. The sentence in the written judgment was 999 years. The sentence authorized were confinement for terms of either 10 to 30 years, or life. The sentences as announced were consecutive life imprisonments. The Missouri Court of Appeals remanded the action for an order nunc pro tunc conforming the sentence as written to the sentence as spoken. 
(Overview summary) 
Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois, Plaintiff; Erica Doss vs. Janae Bruce 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD87680

Reversible error in opening statements was hard to show 
As to whether an argument in opening statement constituted reversible error, the analysis was similar to closing arguments, except “the impact of the prosecutor’s opening statement diminishes after the parties introduce evidence and give their closing arguments.” When the State’s opening statement approached the limits of propriety, the circuit court refrained from intervening sua sponte, and the Missouri Court of Appeals declined plain error review on those facts. When a witness blurted inadmissible evidence, the remedy was in the circuit court’s discretion. A witness mentioned the defendant getting out of prison and the defendants asked only for a mistrial. Mistrial was not necessary for the brief, isolated, and vague mention while mistrial was a drastic remedy. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial and the defendant sought no other remedy, like a curative instruction. “To violate the rule prohibiting evidence of other crimes or misconduct by the accused, the evidence must show the accused committed, was accused of, was convicted of, or was definitely associated with, the other crimes or misconduct.” Even then, such evidence was admissible to give a complete picture of the events at issue. A witness testified that they feared the defendant, the defendant tried to impeach that testimony, and the State responded with limited evidence of defendant’s violent past. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting that evidence. And other “extensive” evidence of the defendant’s guilt negated prejudice from those evidentiary rulings. The Court of Appeals remanded the action to the circuit court, only for nunc pro tunc conformance of the sentence as written to the sentence as spoken, and otherwise affirmed the convictions. 
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. FABAYAN L. LARRY, Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD38987

Resisting arrest conviction affirmed 
On a charge of resisting arrest, the State’s burden included showing that the defendant knew or should have known that the defendant was being arrested. The State showed that element with evidence that the arresting officers told the defendant that defendant was under arrest and physically subdued the defendant. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. JEREMY RUIZ-TOMASSINI, Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD39058

Scope of cross-examination explained 
Criminal defendants who chose to testify were subject to cross-examination. “The scope of cross-examination of a defendant is not limited to a categorical review of matters stated or covered on direct-examination but may cover all matters within a fair purview of the direct-examination.” The State alleged that the defendant violated a full order of protection by approaching the victims in a grocery store. The defendant took the stand and testified that he felt threatened by the victims, so he filed 22 petitions for orders of protection in one year against victims, none successful. That testimony brought orders of protection into the scope of direct for cross-examination. The State could ask about approaching a victim by whom he felt threatened. The State also questioned the defendant about the petitions that defendant had filed. That evidence primarily related to charges of harassment on which the defendant received an acquittal, so the defendant showed no prejudice. The record supported convictions for violation of a protective order and for resisting arrest by physical force with overwhelming evidence of guilt, negating any prejudice from the challenged cross-examination. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. 
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. HAROLD EDWARD LEE, Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD39159

No plain error in sentence assessed without a jury 
The defendant’s sentence was subject to enhancement for persistent offender status, which was defined by earlier convictions, and which was a matter of fact for jury. But the defendant did not preserve any error on that point so only plain error review was possible. The elements of plain error review included an error that was obvious, affected a substantial right, and resulted in manifest injustice. Even then, review for plain error was discretionary. An unauthorized sentence always constituted obvious error. The defendant charged that the circuit judge found that the defendant had prior convictions, based on matters outside the record, and enhanced the defendant’s sentence. As proof, the defendant referred to the circuit judge’s mention of the defendant’s other “bad decisions” as set forth in a sentencing report. Those bad decisions, in the context of the circuit judge’s statement, could have referred to the defendant’s choice of associates, litigation strategy, or commitment to rehabilitation, so defendant showed no error. The circuit judge did not have to explain the sentence and the defendant did not seek clarification that would have shown — and preserved — error. And, even if error occurred, the circuit judge presumptively ignored matters outside the record, so the defendant could show no prejudice. Further, even if the defendant had shown those elements facially, the Supreme Court of Missouri would have declined plain error review because the defendant offered no more than speculation. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Desmond Harris, Appellant 
Supreme Court of Missouri – SC101233

Plain error was the same for a structural error as any other 
Instructions had to define certain words, and the elements of first-degree assault as charged included serious physical harm, for which the instructions did not include a definition. The defendant’s sentence was subject to enhancement for persistent offender status, which was defined by earlier convictions, and which was a matter of fact for jury determination. But the defendant did not preserve any error on those points so only plain error review was possible. The elements of plain error review included an error that was obvious, affected a substantial right, and resulted in manifest injustice. Even then, review for plain error was discretionary. All that applied even to structural error, so structural error did not necessarily constitute manifest injustice. Omitting the definitional instruction was an error, but did not cause manifest injustice, because the existence of serious physical injury was not the defense. An unauthorized sentence constituted error. But certified court records raised an inference that defendant was a persistent offender, and the defendant did not show that a jury would have imposed a lesser sentence, so the defendant could not show any manifest injustice. The Supreme Court of Missouri declined plain error review and affirmed the convictions. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. John D. Otis, Appellant 
Supreme Court of Missouri – SC101190

Exclusions and exceptions to Rape Shield statute discussed 
The Rape Shield statute allowed evidence of a victim’s prior accusations of sexual assault for the purpose of impeaching victim’s credibility, including by showing a motive to fabricate allegations, if the accusations were false and the victim knew they were false. To show that the victim’s prior accusations were false, the defendant offered only inadmissible and inconclusive evidence. The statute admitted such evidence under a res gestae situation, but the defendant did not show that the evidence was related to allegations. The fair trial exception did not apply to impeachment. Curative admissibility supported the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence to counter inadmissible evidence, but the State’s evidence was not inadmissible. The record showed that the circuit court understood the evidence at issue and intended the error to be preserved so the absence of a full offer of proof did not negate preservation of error. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Joshua Wooten, Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113976

First-degree statutory sodomy conviction affirmed 
The elements of first-degree statutory sodomy as charged included hand-to-genital contact, which the State showed with the victim’s testimony. The victim’s failure to use “anatomically correct language” did not alter that result. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and remanded the action only for an order nunc pro tunc conforming the sentence as written to the sentence as spoken. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Jeffrey Sawtelle, Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113554

Self-defense negated 
The State had the burden to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s claim of self-defense. “Self-defense only provides a defense … when the danger is imminent, not when the victim is in retreat.” Self-defense with deadly force included an element of reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to avoid death, serious injury, or a forcible felony. The State rebutted that reasonable belief with evidence that the defendant shot victim four times: twice while victim was fleeing and twice more while victim was on the ground. The defendant “shrewdly” waived jury sentencing, including findings of fact supporting an enhanced sentence, so the Missouri Court of Appeals declined plain error review of the sentence and affirmed the convictions. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Daryl Clemmons, Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113421

Employment

Summary judgment filings showed claims partly time-barred 
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party prevailed by establishing facts, the facts that legally entitled the moving party to a favorable decision. If that happened, the non-moving party could avoid summary judgment by raising a genuine dispute as to the established facts. Parties could only establish or dispute facts with support by citation to admissible evidence. The defendant’s amended answer pleaded the applicable statutes of limitations, and plaintiff did not allege a continuing violation, so all events outside the filing period were time-barred. Whether events were time-barred depended on when the event occurred, so allegations and supporting evidence had to specify those times. The appellants always had the burden of showing reversible error. Otherwise, appellate review of summary judgment was de novo, so whether the circuit court relied on materials outside the summary judgment record was irrelevant on appeal. The record showed that some events were time-barred and others were not, but the circuit court dismissed the entire action, so the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment in part and reversed in part. 
(Overview summary) 
Amber Ledbetter vs. Jackson County, Missouri 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD88095

Evidence

Hearsay exclusions and exceptions discussed 
In voir dire, two venire persons indicated difficulty following instructions, both changed their answers but only one credibly. The two were therefore not similarly situated and the circuit court did not err in rejecting a Batson challenge on that basis. An excited utterance constituted an exception to the rule against hearsay because the utterance was during and because of a stressful event. Inconsistent testimony did not prove perjury; it merely presented a credibility determination for the jury’s resolution and the appellate court's deference. Imperative statements only commanded someone to do something. Questions, unless disguising an assertion, only sought information. Neither asserted any truth, and so could not be offered for the truth of any matter asserted, and so did not constitute hearsay. Statements offered only to explain later police conduct, and statements of then-present intent to do something later, were not offered for the truth of the statements and so were not hearsay. The State had the burden on self-defense, which it carried with evidence that defendant was the initial aggressor, which the jury believed, and appellate courts did not re-weigh. That included evidence of prior uncharged offenses by defendant against victim. The associated instruction was approved and presumptively correct. No evidence supported an instruction on an initial aggressor’s withdrawal from the conflict. The State’s closing argument could include any inference that the record reasonably supported. Appellate courts need not rule on plain errors alleged on circumstances that, the record showed, did not occur. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri vs. Damon E. Goodrich 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD87003

Family

No challenge to supported facts on appeal 
Circuit court findings were due deference in appellate courts. In an action to terminate parental rights, the elements included a specified basis for termination and the child’s best interests as shown by specified factors. The latter was the subject of the appellant’s challenge, arguing that those findings were against the weight of the evidence. Such a challenge required the appellant to set forth all the evidence offered in support of those findings. The appellant failed to do so and merely argued against the findings. The circuit court terminated appellant’s parental rights and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 
IN THE INTEREST OF L.M.M., GREENE COUNTY JUVENILE OFFICE, Respondent v. W.D.P., Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD39281

Custody and support modified 
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act provided that a State gained jurisdiction over a subject matter when the parents and child resided there. The movant’s relocation to Missouri constituted a substantial change in the circumstances necessary to modify custody. The movant showed the best interests of the child with evidence that the movant allowed more frequent and meaningful contact with non-movant than the non-movant with the movant. Disputes over the better school for the child were for the circuit court to resolve. In determining child support, circuit courts could impute earnings to an unemployed parent, but nothing showed that the movant was less than truly disabled. The non-movant wanted to show that one of the respondent’s allegations was false, but the respondent already agreed that the allegation might be false and other evidence showed that it was, so refusing to compel evidence showing that the allegation was false was no basis for reversal. The exclusion of cumulative evidence was always harmless even if erroneous. 
(Overview summary) 
Brandi Hunter, Appellant, v. Frank Bernhard, Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113642

Granting one adoption petition barred another 
Grandparents and foster parents each brought actions for adoption of a child. The circuit court granted the foster parents’ petition first. And the grandparents could not have appealed the foster parents’ judgment because the grandparents lacked standing in the foster parents’ action. That judgment mooted the grandparents’ petition. Because appellate courts do not review the merits of moot actions, the full merits of the adoption will never receive review. The appellants could have avoided that outcome if the circuit court had granted intervention or consolidation, but grandparents sought neither. The circuit court dismissed the grandparents’ action and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
In the Matter of: O.S. 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113259

No challenging credibility on appeal 
Appellate courts deferred to circuit court determinations of credibility and did not re-weigh the evidence. Unless a judgment shows otherwise, appellate courts assumed that circuit courts found the facts in accordance with their rulings, so no “detailed findings of fact” were necessary unless requested. In an action for dissolution of marriage, the appellant did not request findings of fact, and the record supported the circuit court’s property valuations. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Sheri R. Goodwin, Respondent, v. Shawn R. Goodwin, Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113589

Local government

Injunctive relief and inverse condemnation against levee districts discussed 
“[S]ummary judgment tests ‘simply for the existence, not the extent’ of genuine issues of material fact [,]” meaning “evidentiary issues are actually contested, are subject to conflicting interpretations, or … reasonable persons might differ as to their significance.” In an action for injunctive relief against a levee district, seeking alterations to protect adjacent landowners, statutes governing the operations of the district provided an adequate remedy at law, defeating injunctive relief. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendants as to injunctive relief. Inverse condemnation was a taking resulting from a nuisance by an entity with the power of eminent domain. Natural events could not support inverse condemnation, but the plaintiff landowners also alleged a fault of the defendant levee district in lowering its levee. The plaintiffs thus raised a genuine dispute as to causation that thwarted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for the defendants. 
(Overview summary) 
Kipping Farms, LLC, et al. vs. Wakenda Levee District of Carroll County, Missouri 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD88277

No recovery of fees for recycling not done 
The plaintiff filed an action for money had and received because the defendant city retained recycling fees without conducting any recycling. Sovereign immunity barred suits against the State and its political subdivisions. Sovereign immunity was not an affirmative defense, it was the rule, so the plaintiffs had to allege facts describing an exception. Exceptions existed only by statute and incorporated common law, and a city charter provision authorizing the collector of revenue to file suit did not constitute a waiver. Statutes authorized suit on contracts that were — and voided contracts that were not — authorized, wholly executory, written, and signed. And that exception’s negative implication barred equitable claims like quasi-contract, quantum meruit, and money had and received. Taking contrary to law constituted an exception but the plaintiff alleged no such law or fact. Proprietary functions were another exception but disposal of waste was a governmental function. 
(Overview summary) 
State ex rel. City of St. Louis, Relator, vs. The Honorable Joseph P. Whyte, Respondent 
Supreme Court of Missouri – SC101315

City had sovereign immunity from indemnification of police board’s liability 
Plaintiff sought indemnification, for judgments against city employees, from the city. Actions against the city were subject to sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity barred suits against the State and its political subdivisions. The city could not waive sovereign immunity by implied consent so failure to raise sovereign immunity in circuit court was no bar to raising sovereign immunity on appeal. Sovereign immunity was not an affirmative defense, it was the rule, so the plaintiff’s prima facie case included pleading an exception. Exceptions existed only by statute and incorporated common law. The plaintiff alleged no facts describing an exception to sovereign immunity. The circuit court dismissed the action and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Michael J. Holmes, Appellant, vs. Kenneth Zellers, Catherine Hanaway, Mayor Cara Spencer, Bettye Battle-Turner, Richard Gray, Thomas Irwin, Erwin Switzer, Francis Slay, and City of St. Louis, Respondents 
Supreme Court of Missouri – SC101250

Personal injury

DHSS employee had official immunity 
Courts decided a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim by determining whether the non-moving party’s allegations described facts on which the law allowed relief on any theory. The appellant plaintiffs’ theory was that the defendant, a Department of Health and Senior Services investigator, had defamed the plaintiffs by reporting financial exploitation of a senior. But persons making discretionary decisions within the scope of their authority on behalf of government had protection from suit, under the doctrine of official immunity, absent a specific intent to cause injure. The plaintiffs did not allege any specific intent to injure the plaintiffs, only generalized malice or bad faith. Official immunity was an affirmative defense, but could appear on the face of a pleading, so the defendant could raise official immunity in a motion to dismiss without having filed an answer. The circuit court did not have to grant leave to amend, and the plaintiffs did not seek leave to amend, so the circuit court did not err in granting no leave to amend. The circuit court dismissed the petition, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
JENNIFER L. GOURLEY and ROBERT L. CREWDSON, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. JEFFERSON B. GOURLEY, DONALD MANN, and LESLIE ALBRECHT, Defendants-Respondents 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD39126

Post-conviction

Affirmative misadvice explained 
The elements of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel included deficient performance by counsel. The movant alleged that trial counsel advised the movant that the movant’s waiver of the right to testify was subject to appeal. But the circuit court was free to disbelieve the movant and found that the movant had misinterpreted trial counsel’s advice, which the record supported. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
DERONE BOOKER, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD38874

Plea bargain was knowing and voluntary 
On charges of second-degree murder, defenses included imperfect self-defense, which — if found by the trier of fact — reduced the facts to involuntary manslaughter. Imperfect self-defense was the use of force on an unreasonable belief of necessity to protect oneself. The movant alleged that counsel failed to inform movant of that possibility. But the record showed that movant took an Alford plea knowingly and voluntarily to avoid the risk of a longer sentence. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Mitchell Odom, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113663

Record on abandonment inquiry was insufficient for review 
Whether the circuit court could consider an amended motion, or only the initial motion, depended in part on timely filing of the amended motion. Appointed counsel’s failure to timely file an amended motion could constitute abandonment, which excused the untimely filing, so circuit courts had to conduct a hearing to determine whether abandonment occurred. With inapplicable exceptions, that hearing had to be on the record so that appellate courts could determine whether the circuit court reviewed the right motion. The circuit court made its abandonment determination based solely on unsworn statements of counsel, which did not constitute an adequate record for appellate review. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the action to the circuit court to make a record on abandonment. 
(Overview summary) 
Tyrone Butler, Jr., Movant/Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent/Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113628

Real estate

Probate statutes of limitation did not bar claims 
A defending party could prevail on summary judgment by establishing facts that constituted the elements of an affirmative defense. The probate code’s statutes of limitations barred actions only against “the estate, the personal representative, the heirs, devisees and legatees of the decedent” to recover on a decedent’s pecuniary debt. Those statutes did not bar any action against any other person, or to recover specific property, or to recover property of which equity deemed the plaintiffs to be the owner, which described all of the appellant plaintiffs’ claims. The Statute of Frauds barred enforcement of contracts for the sale of land without a writing, but had exceptions to protect equity, which described some of the plaintiffs’ claims. A defending party could also prevail on summary judgment by establishing facts that negated any one element of the claim. The elements of adverse possession included hostile occupation for ten continuous years. The 10 years need not have occurred immediately before the claim. The defendants failed to negate those allegations by reference to the petition. Nevertheless, the circuit court granted defendants’ summary judgment. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the summary judgment and remanded the action to circuit court. 
JACOB MARSHALL and SAMANTHA MARSHALL, Appellants v. LEIGH MARSHALL and DEANNA NEEDHAM, Respondents 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD39112

Notice of termination was sufficient 
To charge that a circuit court “erred as a matter of law” did not articulate any theory for reversal. Every point relied on had to cite one, but no more than one, theory for reversal. Some of the plaintiff appellant’s points relied on cited none and others cited more than one. The latter were multifarious, as in one point claiming that a ruling was both unsupported by the evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. Other points were unaccompanied by argument. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed all points except one. A written lease contract’s provision for attorney fees applied only to the contract’s parties. In an action for unlawful detainer, delivery of a demand for possession was necessary only as to an intruder occupant. The defendants were tenants. A month-to-month tenant was entitled to a 30-day notice of termination, which the plaintiff landlord provided, the parties’ confusion over the tenancy’s characterization notwithstanding. Damages included double rent for holdover months. The circuit court held otherwise, so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment as to unlawful detainer and entered judgment on that count for the plaintiff. 
(Overview summary) 
Lifetime Property Investments, LLC., Appellant, v. DKIS, LLC, RMSM, LLC, and Rebecca Medlin, Respondents 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113432