Case summaries for Aug. 28-Sept. 3, 2026

Appellate | Civil | Criminal | Evidence | Elections | Juvenile | Orders of protection | Personal injury | Post-conviction | Workers' compensation

Appellate

Time for appeal from special order after judgment explained
Appellate courts had authority only as statutes and rules provided. All judgments were orders, but not all orders were judgments. Special orders after judgment were not judgments so the time to appeal judgments did not generally apply to special orders after judgment. Specifically, judgments were effective after entry and special orders after judgment were effective immediately on entry. Special orders after judgment included any order on enforcement of, or collateral attack on, any judgment. That described the appellant’s motion for satisfaction of judgment. The appellant did not file the notice of appeal in time so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Kenneth Chailland, II, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Speed and Specialties Autobody, LLC, Defendant, and Jesse Woodrow Long, Defendant/Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114213

Theory not raised in circuit court barred in appellate court
“A defending party is entitled to a summary judgment if it demonstrates: … that there is no genuine dispute as to the existence of the facts necessary to support movant’s properly pleaded affirmative defense.” Affirmative defenses were also subject to affirmative defenses, also called affirmative avoidance, and all had to be pleaded or were waived. That applied to estoppel. In its amended answer and motion for summary judgment, the defendants cited statutes of limitation and alleged facts relevant to those statutes. The plaintiff did not file a reply mentioning estoppel and so waived that theory. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred because estoppel prevented the defendants from raising statutes of limitations. The circuit “court never ruled on that issue and it has been waived.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
CLINT A. WILKERSON, in his capacity as SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE OF THE MIKE ALAN WILKERSON TRUST DATED 8/9/1995, and in his individual capacity, Plaintiff-Appellant v. SCOTT L. WILKERSON and KIMBERLY D. WILKERSON, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39231

Fictitious citations resulted in dismissal
Appellate rules protected the appellate courts’ neutrality. Those rules included a duty of candor. Filing an appellate brief constituted a certification that all theories were not frivolous. The appellant’s brief violated multiple rules, including citation to inapplicable authorities. “Most notably, three cases in [appellant]’s brief are completely fictitious.” Unable to conduct any meaningful review, the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Willie C. Fortune v. CTA Certified Transmission
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88370

Civil

Class action certification denied over predominance
The elements of class action certification included predominance of common questions of law and issues of fact over individual matters among the class. “[A]n extensive analysis of state law variances” was necessary “to demonstrate class certification did not present insuperable obstacles.” Separate arbitration agreements and divergent statutes applicable to members of a proposed nationwide class showed the opposite. The circuit court denied certification and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Crown Asset Management, LLC, Respondent, v. Lisa Lawson, Appellant, v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., Respondent.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114220

No meritorious defense stated
The elements of an action to set aside a default judgment included a meritorious defense. A meritorious defense meant “an arguable theory” of defense to the plaintiff’s claim as described in allegations of fact with supporting evidence. A verified answer merely setting forth denials of the plaintiff’s allegations was insufficient. The circuit court erred in setting aside the default judgment so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and ordered the circuit court to reinstate the default judgment.
(Overview summary)
Gregory Ernst, et al., Appellant, v. Tainter Landscape, LLC, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED114018

Good cause to set aside default not shown
Parties could set aside a default judgment on showing a meritorious defense to the claim and good cause for the default. Good cause included negligence but not recklessness. Recklessness included “a deliberate choice to risk the possibility of a default judgment” like ignoring litigation, especially at upper management levels. The defendant had notice of the subject matter, and the action, and that neither the defendant’s insurer nor the defendant’s own lawyer would defend the action. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling.
HARRY MENKE, Plaintiff-Respondent v. JAI GANESH LAXMI LLC, d/b/a LIBERTY LODGE, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39201

Criminal

Accomplice liability shown for attempted offense
An attempted offense meant a substantial step showing a firm purpose to complete the offense. The State carried its burden on that element with evidence that the defendant drove the vehicle that circled the crime scene where the victim was killed by the defendant’s associate. No plain error occurred when the circuit court admitted a surveillance video that was “highly probative and otherwise displayed . . . strong indicia of reliability.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. James C. Armstrong, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113515

Recklessness shown
The elements of involuntary manslaughter included criminal recklessness, meaning to consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk. On that element, the State carried its burden of proof with evidence that the defendant passed six miles of lighted signage toward slowed and stopped traffic at 50 or 60 miles per hour without trying “to slow, stop, or swerve his vehicle [.]” The State showed that the defendant was the driver with a judicial admission that the defendant caused the wreck and evidence that the defendant matched the description of the only person in the vehicle. “An in-court identification . . . is not always required.” The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. ADMIR KULOVAC, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39130

CDL did not bar expungement
Unambiguous statutes required no construction. Holders of a commercial driver’s license were ineligible for expungement of driving-related offenses. When the driver committed a driving-related offense, the driver did not hold a commercial driver’s license. Therefore, the driver was not barred from expungement. Neither the appellant’s later receipt of a commercial driver’s license, nor other standards for expunging other offenses, nor statutes preserving records of offenses, altered that result. The circuit court expunged the driver’s record and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
D.P.U. v. Director of Revenue, State of Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88190

Elections

Certification of insufficiency for initiative and referendum proposals was insufficient
The only possible pre-election challenges to an initiative petition before a vote were those related to form like the one-article limit, and single-subject limit for new articles, for constitutional amendments. On receipt of proposed initiative petition forms, the Missouri Secretary of State must certify ballot titles and summaries within “a strict statutory deadline.” On receipt of an initiative petition with signatures, the Secretary of State must examine the petition and signatures and certify sufficiency or insufficiency of compliance with the Missouri Constitution and statutes. A certificate of insufficiency required “a certificate stating the reason for the insufficiency.” On an initiative petition with signatures, the Secretary of State issued a certificate of insufficiency. The certificate did not set forth reasons for insufficiency. Failure to set forth reasons preserved no challenge to the initiative petition for judicial review. The face of the petition showed compliance with the one-article and single-subject limits, and it was too late to change the ballot title and summary already certified. The Supreme Court of Missouri ordered the initiative petition certified and placed on the ballot with the title and summary as already certified.
(Overview summary)
Claire Harris, et al., Appellants, vs. Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity as the Missouri Secretary of State, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101806

Legislative re-districting map was subject to referendum
“[T]he United States Constitution permits a state to authorize a referendum as to legislation drawing new congressional districts,” and the Missouri Constitution allowed the voters to subject any legislation to referendum with limited exceptions. An exception for re-districting applied only to state re-districting, which was a separate process. An exception for “the immediate preservation of the public peace” required an emergency clause, which the legislation did not have. An exception “for the maintenance of state institutions” applied only to appropriations. Therefore, the General Assembly’s congressional re-districting legislation was subject to a referendum. Pending that referendum, the legislation did not take effect and only “shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise.” The circuit court declared otherwise, so the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed. The Court ordered the initiative petition certified and placed on the ballot and barred the use of the legislation unless approved by the voters.
(Overview summary)
Richard von Glahn, Appellant, vs. Denny Hoskins, in His Official Capacity, et al., Respondents.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101805

Certification mooted declaratory judgment action
Courts did not rule on actions that were moot, meaning that no live dispute or effective relief remained. In an action for declaratory judgment, the parties litigated whether certain signatures counted toward the number required for an initiative petition to reach the ballot. The Missouri Secretary of State’s certification stated that the number of signatures was sufficient even without the disputed signatures. That certification mooted the litigation, but the circuit court issued judgment. The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated that judgment and entered judgment of dismissal.
(Overview summary)
People Not Politicians, et al., Appellants, vs. Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins, et al., Respondents.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC101801

Employment

Substantial identity of interest forgave misidentification of employer
Summary judgment was available only to parties who showed the right to a favorable ruling on undisputed material facts. In actions under the Human Rights Act, attorney fee awards to employers were possible in actions brought “without foundation,” meaning on frivolous claims. That did not describe the state of the summary judgment record as to confusion over employer’s identity, especially when the parties genuinely disputed whether that identity was reasonably ascertainable, and an initially named defendant and the eventually named employer shared a substantial identity of interest. The claimant’s substitution of parties was timely and related back to the initial filing. The circuit court entered summary judgments against the claimant, and the Missouri Court of Appeals vacated those judgments and remanded the action to the circuit court.
LOGAN NUMBERS, Appellant v. 76 MALL INN, INC., and GRAND COUNTRY FUN SPOT, LLC, Respondents
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39172

Evidence

No prejudice shown
Appellate courts reviewed not merely for error but also for prejudice. Prejudice in the admission of evidence meant a reasonable likelihood of acquittal without the disputed evidence. That did not describe sympathetic background testimony, even if not relevant logically or legally; as shown by jury deadlock on one of the charges. It also did not describe a surveillance video, even if not subjected to a sufficient foundation, that the defense cited in evidence and argument. Accomplice liability for an offense required the State to show participation in the offense, which the State did with evidence of where and when defendant and victim were together. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Antonio Steed, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113711

Juvenile

Due process was satisfied
In actions for protective custody, parents had the right to receive certain documents in discovery and present evidence at hearings. But the juvenile officer did not offer any documents, and the circuit court excluded no evidence relevant to the judgment, at any hearing so no due process violation occurred. The circuit court encouraged circuit courts to be accessible to pro se litigants, abjured the Division of Children’s Services to participate in appellate proceedings, and affirmed the judgment.
(Overview summary)
In the interest of: E.S.W.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113858

Orders of protection

Domestic abuse not shown
In an action for a full order of protection, the plaintiff argued that the defendant committed domestic abuse by battery, which required proof of physical harm. “Neither party testified that [plaintiff] suffered pain, bruising, soreness, injury, visible marks, or impairment of bodily function, or required medical treatment.” And the plaintiff also argued that the defendant committed domestic abuse by assault, which required evidence that the plaintiff feared for her physical safety. “[T]here was no evidence [plaintiff] received threats of physical harm or actions of physical violence.” The plaintiff also argued that the defendant committed domestic abuse by harassment, which required evidence of substantial emotional distress. The evidence showed that the defendant was “‘annoying and boorish,' [but] his conduct would not cause ‘substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person.’” The record also showed that the circuit court issued the full order to separate the parties before their conflict escalated further. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the action with instructions to dismiss.
E.M., Petitioner-Respondent v. H.M.M., Respondent-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39109

Personal injury

Pleading of punitive damages against SLEF prohibited
Writs of prohibition were discretionary remedies for actions in excess of authority. The State Legal Expense Fund covered the defense of State employees, and was an exclusive remedy, in actions for money damages based on official activities. Relators were a judge and another State employee, both defendants in an underlying action seeking money damages for conspiracy and abuse of process, so relators were within the Fund’s scope. In an earlier action, the relator could not get a writ barring such action but no opinion accompanied the denial, so it did not address the merits. Governing statutes expressly barred punitive damages against the Fund, which also barred prayers for relief in the form of punitive damages. The respondent circuit judge in the underlying action nevertheless ordered that the plaintiff in the underlying action could amend the petition to seek punitive damages. The Missouri Court of Appeals made permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition barring the circuit court from enforcing that order.
STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. JUDGE STEVEN A. PRIVETTE, and ALICE BELL, Relators v. THE HONORABLE JAMES K. JUSTUS, SENIOR JUDGE, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38977

Post-conviction

No extra time for newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence
Time limits for filing were mandatory and failure to comply waived all relief with few exceptions. Those exceptions did not include newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence. Newly discovered and previously unavailable evidence were not grounds for post-conviction relief though they might support a writ of habeas corpus or a pardon. The circuit court dismissed the motion and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Mark David Adams, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113896

Workers’ compensation

Reduction in disability rating affirmed
On the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s administrative review of administrative law judge rulings, no deference was due. The Commission’s findings of fact were subject to deference on judicial review. Expert testimony was not necessary to sustain such findings and lay testimony could suffice. The record showed that the Commission did not exceed its authority by relying on one source of proof to the exclusion of all others. The record supported a finding that part of the claimant’s continuing disability was due to the claimant’s failure to perform rehabilitative exercises, rather than the claimant’s job-related injury, even crediting the claimant’s testimony. Clarification could occur before the Commission, not in the Missouri Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision.
(Overview summary)
Bradley Barnett v. Kawasaki Motors MFG Corp USA and Sentry Casualty Company
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88459