Case summaries for May 22-28, 2026

Appellate | Civil | Constitutional | Criminal | Family | Personal injury | Post-conviction | Probate | Real estate | Workers' compensation

Appellate

Appeal from associate division was trial de novo in circuit court
Statutes determined whether and how an appeal from a civil judgment was possible. For special statutory landlord-tenant actions in associate division, the statutes allowed a trial de novo in circuit court. That applied to an action to set aside a default judgment in such an action. In an action for rent and possession, the plaintiff respondent obtained a default judgment, the defendant appellant filed an action to set aside the default judgment, and the circuit court denied relief. The appellant filed a notice of appeal instead of seeking trial de novo. In the absence of a judgment from a trial de novo, the Missouri Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction, so it dismissed the appeal. 
(Overview summary) 
Sandra K. Farrell, et al., Respondents, v. HGP Management, LLC, Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113926

Deficient brief required dismissal 
The rules governing appellants’ briefs protected the impartiality of appellate courts. The appellant departed from those rules as to points relied on, argument, preservation statement, and citations to authority. The departures were so great that the Missouri Court of Appeals could not rule on the appellant’s challenges without constructing them for the appellant. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. 
STACEY BROOKS, Claimant-Appellant v. LICENSE OFFICE SERVICES, LLC, Employer, and STATE OF MISSOURI, DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Respondent-Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD39398

Certification for appeal reversed 
Appeal was possible only from a final judgment, meaning a judgment that resolved all claims as to all parties, unless the circuit court certified an interlocutory judgment for appeal finding no just reason for delay. But circuit courts could only certify rulings that disposed of a “judicial unit,” meaning events unrelated to the rest of the action. The appellant’s action sought a variety of relief on a variety of theories, on one of which the circuit court ruled, and issued an injunction. The circuit court certified the ruling for appeal and the Missouri Court of Appeals stayed the injunction. But ruling and the remaining matters related to one set of facts: standards governing appellant’s operation of a landfill. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, dissolved the stay, and remanded the action. 
(Overview summary) 
Pettis County Development Company, LLC and Presidio Environmental Services, LLC vs. Pettis County, Missouri 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD88538 consolidated with WD88559

Appellant’s theory did not determine standard of review 
The insured’s automobile policy excluded from coverage any injury to a resident of the insured’s household. In an action to enforce the policy, the insurer claimed that exclusion for the insured’s child. The circuit court determined that the child was not a resident of the insured’s household. That determination was a finding of fact subject to deference on appeal. The appellant could not make that finding subject to de novo review by characterizing it as a misapplication of law. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Shelter Mutual Insurance Company vs. Trevor Hill, et al. 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD88065

No record, no appeal 
A summary judgment granted in part on evidence offered outside the summary judgment record was really a bench-tried case. The appellant had to file the record on appeal but failed to file a transcript of, and the exhibits offered at, the evidentiary hearing. The appellant’s brief failed to comply with the rules governing the statement of facts and the points relied on to such a degree that speculation or advocacy were necessary to determine appellant’s argument. The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. 
(Overview summary) 
La'Tanya Renee Smith vs. John Pruitt Killian, Public Administrator, Personal Representative: Mona Warren 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD87955

Civil

Statute of limitations on enforcing contracts for money owed applied 
When circuit courts granted a motion to dismiss without providing any reasoning, the reasoning was presumptively on the grounds set forth in the motion. The plaintiffs had to initiate any action for enforce a contract within five years of the breach, except that the plaintiffs had 10 years to enforce a written contract for the payment of money. The plaintiff alleged a written contract for services to the defendant’s property with provisions for the defendants to pay the plaintiff’s “customary labor and material charges," which constituted “an admission of a debt due and unpaid.” Dismissals for failure to timely file a petition practically ended the litigation in circuit court, even when not labeled as “with prejudice” and so were subject to appeal. The circuit court erred in applying the five-year statute of limitations, so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the action. 
(Overview summary) 
NW MO Tow & Recovery, INC. vs. Michael Gillis, et al. 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD88320

Good cause and a meritorious defense shown 
Default judgment was possible on failure to file an answer. Among the ways to set aside a default judgment was a separate action. Final judgments in such actions were subject to appeal. In such an action, the elements included good cause for the default. Good cause for the default included anything short of recklessness. Recklessness did not describe the appellant’s attempts to address the petition, summons, and premature discovery in the underlying action. The elements also included a meritorious defense to the defaulted claim. The claim was wrongful death, and the appellant alleged facts showing, if found true, that appellant was not liable. The circuit court denied relief from the default judgment so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed that judgment and remanded the action. 
(Overview summary) 
Brian Dorrell vs. Corbin Langner 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD88155

Sheriff’s return uncontradicted 
Grounds to set aside a default judgment included the circuit court’s lack of personal jurisdiction. The circuit court’s determination of personal jurisdiction was subject to review with deference to the findings of fact but de novo as to application of the law. Personal jurisdiction required service of process, which could happen by delivery to a person in charge of the defendant’s office at the time. That the person who received service claimed to be in charge of the office at the time of service was undisputed. The sheriff’s return presumptively demonstrated service by that method subject to clear and convincing evidence contradicting the return, which did not include a mere denial. Whether that person was in charge of the office at any other time was irrelevant. Nevertheless, the circuit court set aside the default judgment, so the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed that judgment and remanded the action for reinstatement of the judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Lorrie McNowelly, Individually and as a Representative of the Estate of Lee McNowelly vs. Sodecia Automotive Kansas City, LLC 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD88000

Constitutional

Governor could call an extraordinary session 
Constitutional provisions describing communications between the governor and the General Assembly gave the governor authority to proclaim an extraordinary session on “extraordinary occasions[.]” Those provisions granted “a great deal of discretion” to the governor. An extraordinary session was any session that was not a regular session. Extraordinary occasions were not limited to unusual events or events arising between sessions. In an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, the plaintiffs sought to prevent any legislation pursuant to the governor’s proclamation from taking effect. The circuit court denied relief, and the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Missouri State Conference, et al., Appellants, vs. Governor Mike Kehoe, et al., Respondents 
Supreme Court of Missouri – SC101541

Criminal

Predatory sexual offender status found without jury 
To preserve an allegation of error for appellate review, "an objection stating the grounds must be made at trial, [and] that same objection must be included in the motion for new trial[.]” The appellant did not meet those requirements, leaving review in the Missouri Court of Appeals’ discretion for plain error. No plain error occurred when the circuit court determined that the appellant was a predatory sexual offender because that determination only required the circuit court to find what the appellant’s previous conviction was. That determination did not require a jury. The circuit court did not err in finding grounds to enhance the sentence, so the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri vs. Timothy Patrick O'Brien 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87865

Competence to stand trial affirmed
The defendants were presumptively competent to participate in the defense when the trial started and had the burden to show otherwise. Circuit courts had to address competency whenever it arose and could order the appointment of a mental health professional for a mental examination. Two mental health reports and the circuit court’s observations supported the circuit court’s finding that the appellant was competent. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. SHANNON ROANNE WARD, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39056

Fraud convictions affirmed
Judges had to preside over their cases unless recusal was necessary. Recusal was not necessary because no partiality appeared in a charge of tampering with the judge was pending in another action, nor in the denial of extraordinary privileges in jail. “Defendant’s petulance and belligerence toward the trial judge and others in the courtroom did not need to be rewarded.” Prior inconsistent statements did not, alone, show perjury. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding an unauthenticated document. “Intent to defraud is rarely capable of proof by direct evidence and may be – and usually is – proven entirely by circumstantial evidence.” Circumstantial evidence showing the defendant’s intent to defraud included preparing and filing forged and altered documents. The Missouri Court of Appeals declined plain error review of (1) whether double jeopardy occurred because, in charges of forgery, each separate writing forged or altered constituted a separate unit of prosecution; (2) whether the circuit court should have allowed self-representation after a signed waiver of counsel and multiple Faretta hearings; (3) whether the circuit court erred in refusing to appoint the defendant’s choice of private counsel because the circuit court had authority to appoint the public defender’s office only; (4) the exclusion of a video for irrelevance, lack of foundation, and discovery violation when the defendant challenged only relevance on appeal; (5) the circuit court’s response to a jury question to which defendant agreed; (6) a sentence that was in the range of the offense as charged and found guilty, though the circuit court thought a higher range applied; and (7) jail time credit because that was a Missouri Department of Corrections decision. The Court of Appeals remanded the action to correct the sentence nunc pro tunc and otherwise affirmed the convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. ADEN XAVIER WARR HARPER, Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38807

Family

Custody modified permanently for military parent 
To raise an issue for the first time in a post-trial motion did not preserve error so appellate courts could review such matters only for plain error. Plain error meant an obvious error resulting in manifest injustice. No manifest injustice occurred when the circuit court failed to describe its order as temporary, even though the Deployed Serviceperson’s Protection Laws allowed only a temporary modification of child custody for the actively deployed appellant. That was because further modification was possible so the modification was not permanent. And the appellant did not allege that the appellant was deployed, so no obvious error occurred. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Michelle Yetter (F/K/A Speed) vs. Jason Napier 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88093

Personal injury

Recreational Use Act immunity discussed 
In any claim, a defending party could prevail on summary judgment by establishing, beyond genuine dispute, facts that negated an element of the claim. A claim for negligence included a duty of care from the defendant to the plaintiff. The Recreational Use Act negated that duty for “landowners who open their land to the public free of charge for recreational use.” That described the defendant Missouri Department of Conservation, according to facts that the defendant established without genuine dispute. The act provided an exception to immunity for gross negligence, which the plaintiff appellant argued, but supported only with conclusory opinions, which did not raise a genuine dispute. The circuit court dismissed the action. That judgment was subject to certification because the defense was unavailable to the other defendant. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Fred Cay and Tina Cay, Appellants, v. Mark Polson and Missouri Department of Conservation, Respondents 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113814

No waiver of sovereign immunity shown 
A default judgment for failure to timely file an answer was discretionary and not mandatory. The circuit court did not err in setting aside an interlocutory default judgment when the defendant had otherwise defended the action by pursuing discovery and negotiations. In any claim, a defending party could prevail on summary judgment by establishing, beyond genuine dispute, facts that negated an element of the claim. The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity barred suit against the state and its entities with limited exceptions for insured risks. An exception for proprietary functions applied to municipalities, not state entities. Facts and disputes of fact came into the record only in the numbered paragraph procedure with supporting evidence, but that procedure allowed corrections, and the circuit court did not err in allowing the defendant movant to replace an obsolete exhibit with a current version. The current version’s supporting affidavit authenticated that exhibit. The exhibit was an insurance policy. The defendant established that the defendant was a state entity with insurance that did not waive sovereign immunity. The plaintiff appellant alleged lack of consideration for that policy, but offered no evidence, and so raised no genuine dispute. The circuit court granted summary judgment, which mooted a pending motion to compel discovery, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Tim Eby, Appellant, v. The Board of Curators of The University of Missouri, Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113499

Defendant’s verdict affirmed on negligent entrustment of a firearm
A defending party could prevail on summary judgment by establishing facts that negated an element of the claim unless the non-moving party raised a genuine dispute as to those facts. Establishing and disputing facts required evidence admissible at trial so hearsay did not count. Facts material to a claim for negligent entrustment included entrustment and proximately caused damage. The movant established facts that negated the movant’s entrustment of a firearm to the shooter, and the shooter’s possession of some firearm from an unknown source did not raise a genuine dispute as to those facts. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the movant, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Cindy Sehorn, as Representative of the Wrongful Death Class of Sara Beth Maloney Pursuant to SEC.537.080 R.S.MO. vs. Richard L. Mitchell 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD88462

Post-conviction

No objection to multiple acts verdict directors was reasonable strategy 
Claims for ineffective assistance of counsel required the movants to show prejudice resulting from deficient performance. Deficient performance virtually never included reasonable strategy. Reasonable trial strategy included choosing not to call a witness whose testimony could have undermined the defense on cross-examination, especially when the movant agreed with that choice. Reasonable trial strategy also included choosing not to object to the verdict directors in a multiple acts case when the defense strategy relied on credibility rather than details distinguishing the incidents. Prejudice meant a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent the alleged deficiency. No prejudice resulted from the appellate counsel’s choice not to brief a discovery violation where none occurred. The State was not required to characterize a witness as an expert, to disclose statements that did not exist, or to disclose generalized testimony. The circuit court denied relief, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 
ALAN HANELINE, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District – SD38945

Probate

Earlier discovery of assets did not preclude later discovery of assets 
Rulings disposing of petitions for discovery of assets were subject to appeal on final disposition of the estate or by interlocutory appeal. The appellant filed petitions, earlier and later, for discovery of assets. The circuit court dismissed the earlier petition for failure to join the estate’s personal representative. The appellant elected against such an appeal, but that fact was irrelevant to the Missouri Court of Appeals’ authority in an appeal from the estate’s final disposition challenging the dismissal of the second petition. The second petition was dismissed for collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel barred re-litigation of claims already made and decided against the same parties. Judicial estoppel barred the personal representative from arguing that parties were the same in both petitions and the petitions addressed different claims. The circuit court erred in dismissing the second petition under collateral estoppel, so the Court of Appeals reversed that order and remanded the action. 
(Overview summary) 
In the Estate of: Darrell L. Hardin; Dawn Hardin vs. Troy L. Dietrich, Personal Representative of the Estate of Darrell Lynn Hardin 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88262

Real estate

Lis pendens constituted slander of title 
The parties entered into a contract for the sale and lease-back of real property. The lease-back, as the defendant buyer knew, was to give the plaintiff seller time to replace the subject property with a larger property for an expanding business. In any claim for breach of contract, the claimant had to show a material breach of the contract’s provisions. The contract provided that the defendant buyer had a duty to draft and present to the plaintiff seller a lease with provisions described in the contract. The defendant buyer drafted and presented a lease with different provisions, which supported the plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract. And the defendant buyer never complied with any of the other contract’s provisions either, which showed that the defendant buyer never intended to go through with the deal. That finding supported the plaintiff seller’s claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. Fraudulent misrepresentation negated any limitation of the plaintiff seller’s damages to the earnest money. The defendant buyer counter-claimed for specific performance and charged that the plaintiff seller had already terminated the contract, citing the plaintiff seller’s duty to deliver statements on the status of leases on the property. But the contract did not provide termination on those facts and the defendant buyer did not follow the contract’s termination procedure. Also, such statements were not material because the plaintiff seller and the sole tenant shared the same individual owner. Further, the buyer asked for any such statement. Pursuant to the counter-claim, the defendant buyer filed a notice of lis pendens on the property, clouding the title. Such notices were absolutely privileged when filed to adjudicate valid claims, but not when filed in relation to a bad faith claim. Bad faith claims included defendant buyer’s counterclaim for specific performance of a contract that defendant buyer asserted to have already lawfully terminated. That conclusion supported plaintiff seller’s claim for slander of title. Equity required awards on all theories — breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and slander of title — and did not require apportionment among those theories. Damages included direct damages, consequential damages, and attorney fees. The record supported the circuit court’s measures of damages, including the earnest money and increased expenses from delays in procuring the replacement property. Whether the defendant buyer knew the replacement property’s identity was irrelevant. The circuit court entered judgment for the plaintiff seller and awarded attorney fees to the plaintiff buyer for the appeal. 
(Overview summary) 
CBAM, LLC, Respondent/Plaintiff, v. Alps Acquisitions, LLC, Appellant/Defendant. 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – ED113496

Workers compensation

Line of duty and workers' compensation claims were separate actions 
In any action, the law of the case doctrine provided finality to rulings unchallenged or affirmed on appeal. But that doctrine applied only to that action and did not bar re-litigation in a separate action. A claim on the Line of Duty Compensation Fund and a claim for workers’ compensation were both within the authority of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. But those claims had separate statutes of limitations and separate elements, so each was a separate action. The appellant claimant did not show that earlier decisions of the commission to the contrary changed that result. Therefore, the doctrine did not require the commission to find the same facts on the workers compensation claim as it found on the Fund claim. Nor did the appellant argue any error in the commission’s application of the statute of limitations to the claim on the fund. The commission denied the claim, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. 
(Overview summary) 
Patrick Brian Williams, Deceased, Jennifer Williams vs. City of Kansas City, Missouri Fire Department, Employer, and Missouri Division of Workers' Compensation as Administrator of the Line of Duty Compensation Fund 
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District – WD88291