Case summaries for July 31-Aug. 6, 2026

ADR | Appellate | Criminal | Education | Post-conviction | Probate

ADR

The record negated an assignment of an agreement to arbitrate
Orders denying motions to compel arbitration were subject to interlocutory appeals, and the law of the case doctrine barred re-litigation of matters decided on appeal. The appellant had filed an earlier interlocutory appeal from the order denying the appellant’s motion to compel arbitration, but dismissed the earlier appeal, so law of the case did not bar a later appeal. Appellate courts reversed circuit courts only on errors “materially affecting the merits of the action.” A circuit court had to make written findings of fact on matters specifically requested by a party, or could generally set forth the grounds for its judgment if generally requested, but failure to do so was harmless error. The Missouri Court of Appeals denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal. The movants to compel arbitration had the burden of proof, including as to standing. Standing to enforce an arbitration agreement was in a party to the agreement or a party’s assignee. The contemporaneous execution of the documents could make the documents into a single contract when the realities of the situation showed that the parties intended that result. The buyer’s order between buyer and seller included an arbitration clause but the appellant movant lender was not a party to the buyer’s order and the seller never assigned it. The seller assigned to the lender only the installment payment contract, which had no provision for arbitration, between the buyer and seller. Those facts supported a finding that the seller never intended to assign the installment payment contract — and arbitration agreement — to lender. That finding was in accord with the circuit court’s ruling, so was presumptively implied in that ruling, and found deference on appeal. The circuit court denied the motion to arbitrate and the Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling. 
(Overview summary)
Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC, Appellant, v. William P. Wentz, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED113914

Appellate

No transcript, no appeal
When the appellants challenged the evidentiary grounds for rulings, review of those rulings required review of evidentiary hearings, which circuit courts preserved in transcripts. Transcripts were, therefore, part of the record on appeal that the appellants had to file. The appellant challenged the evidentiary basis for the circuit court’s ruling and failed to file the transcript. After three extensions of time to file the transcript, the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. 
(Overview summary)
Rachel Whitehead v. Zackery Todd Moore Jr.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88216

Criminal

Transferred intent applied
The elements of assault in the first degree as charged included causing serious physical injury knowingly. Knowingly meant awareness that the defendant’s conduct was practically certain to cause the result that occurred. The defendant shot into a group of people walking toward him, which was practically certain to injure someone even if the defendant did not know for certain whom and hit someone in a car. Stipulating to the admission of evidence waived even plain error review of the evidence’s admissibility. The Missouri Court of Appeals remanded the action to the circuit court for an order nunc pro tunc to conform the written sentence with the spoken sentence and otherwise affirmed the convictions.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. KALEB M. RAMSEY, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39007

Education

Some allegations stated a claim in contract, others did not
On the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff prevailed if the petition alleged any facts supporting relief under any theory, regardless of the plaintiff’s characterization of the claim and the prayer for relief. The plaintiff student claimed that the defendant university breached a contract because the defendant falsely represented that all six years of its joint BA/MD program were accredited as medical school courses when only the last four were so accredited. But the plaintiff alleged no such promise and did not allege the loss of any benefit. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant broke its promise to separately report grade point averages for separate programs of undergraduate and medical degrees, but the plaintiff’s program was a joint program of undergraduate and medical degrees. The plaintiff’s claim for breach of implied contract was subject to the statute of limitations for “’[a]ll actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied’ unless excepted.” That time started when the plaintiff had reasonable notice of substantial damage. The plaintiff recognized the damage when the defendant changed the remedies for failure to meet the program’s requirements part-way through the plaintiff’s program but did not timely file the petition. The plaintiff alleged a continuing injury but not a continuing wrong that would extend the time to file. The circuit court dismissed those claims and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that part of the judgment. As for the rest of the judgment, the circuit court erred in dismissing allegations of “objective, specific, and express representation” “sufficiently concrete to support a contractual promise” in which the damage was not ascertainable until later. The Court of Appeals reversed those rulings and remanded the action.
(Overview summary)
Joshua Carter v. The Curators of the University of Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87975

Post-conviction

No plea bargaining, no prejudice
The elements of a claim for ineffective assistance of plea counsel included a reasonable probability that a plea bargain would have reduced the sentence imposed. The movant alleged that the plea counsel failed to persuade the movant to accept an offer from the State to plead guilty to lesser charges. But the record showed that the movant refused to plea bargain and turned away three plea deals because the movant maintained his innocence and was confident of a jury acquittal. Those facts showed that the movant rejected the State’s offers because of the desire for acquittal, not the plea counsel’s advice, and no advice from the plea counsel would have made any difference. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
(Overview summary)
Jeromy Jenkins v. State of Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD88078

Previous appellate review nixed relief
The rules governing motions were the rules in effect on the date of sentencing. The initial motion and amended motion both charged trial counsel with ineffective assistance for failures to object as to the location of the events alleged. The initial motion cited the omission of the county from the verdict director. The amended motion cited evidence related to that county. The latter was a new charge, not a mere refinement of the former. And the amended motion was late, so failure to object to evidence about the county was not before the circuit court and could not be subject to appellate review. As to the omission of the county from the verdict director, appellate review already found no error, so that matter was barred from post-conviction relief. The movant also charged trial counsel with failure to disclose a witness, resulting in exclusion of that witness’s testimony. That matter was subject to appellate review for fundamental unfairness, and none appeared, so no prejudice was possible post-conviction. “[F]undamental unfairness in the context of a preserved error on direct appeal is a lower standard of review for reversible prejudice than the standard for reversible prejudice in a post-conviction relief proceeding” so when an appellate court “found no reversible prejudice from the exclusion of [the witness’s] testimony on direct appeal, that exclusion cannot support a finding of prejudice in this post-conviction relief proceeding” for failing to disclose that witness. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed that judgment. 
(Overview summary)
Richard L. Kerksiek v. State of Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD87889

Probate

Circuit court could not order parental visitation during guardianship
Parties had to raise constitutional matters at the first opportunity, which the plaintiff failed to do, and so waived issues of due process. The death of one co-guardian left the other co-guardian in place and no new ruling was necessary to continue the guardianship. Appellate courts did not re-weigh the evidence presented in circuit court. In an action to change guardian, the circuit court found the defendant’s evidence more persuasive, and that evidence negated the plaintiff’s allegations of harmful restriction and isolation, so the judgment was not against the weight of the evidence. Guardianship vested custody and control of wards in guardians. Circuit courts could order parental visitation for a minor ward only when the circuit court had ordered guardianship because the parents were unwilling, unable, or unfit. That was not the basis for the guardianship of the plaintiff’s child, and the plaintiff’s child was not a minor, so the circuit court had no authority to order visitation. The circuit court denied relief and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
IN THE MATTER OF: REAGAN NOELLE DILLARD, an Incapacitated and Disabled Person, SUSAN DILLARD, Appellant v. SHERRY DILLARD, Guardian and Conservator, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39166

No-contest clause discussed
Circuit courts enforced no-contest clauses of trusts, imposing forfeiture of benefits for the conduct proscribed in the clauses. The settlor broadly barred disputes over administration and narrowly specified real property under contract to sell. In the plaintiff successor trustee’s action for declaratory judgment on the terms of the trust and the contract to sell, the beneficiaries challenged the contract with allegations of the settlor’s mental incapacity. The contract was part of the trust’s distribution plan. A challenge to the contract thus constituted a challenge to the administration of the trust. The circuit court ruled that the challenge was a violation of the no-contest provision and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.
In re the Matter of: THE JACK L. WASHBURN TRUST AGREEMENT DATED DECEMBER 30, 2015, AS AMENDED, NORMAN E. ROUSE, TRUSTEE, Petitioner-Respondent v. JACQUELINE SUE EMMERT and PATRICIA L. COLVIN, Respondents-Appellants and JACK DAVID WASHBURN, Respondent-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD39163