Case summaries for April 11-17, 2025

Administrative | Civil | Consumer | Criminal | Post-conviction | Tax

Administrative

Expert opinion subject to cross 
A statutory pension fund provided lesser benefits for non-duty-related disability and greater benefits for duty-related disability. The degree of causation required was unclear but required no resolution on appeal. In a contested case, the fund found more credible the expert witnesses who testified that claimant’s work injury was contributory to claimant’s orthopedic disability but not causative, and that the cause of the disability was a congenital condition. The experts were not orthopedists, did not examine the claimant, and did not examine claimant’s MRIs. Those matters were subjects for cross-examination of the experts and objections to admissibility of the experts’ opinions. But the claimant waived such objections by not making them so those factors went only to the weight of the evidence. The weight of the evidence was for the fund exclusively to determine and substantial evidence supported the determination. “[W]hen the evidence before an administrative body would warrant either of two opposed findings, the reviewing court is bound by the administrative determination, and it is irrelevant that there is supportive evidence for the contrary finding.” The fund denied duty-related benefits and granted non-duty-related benefits, and the circuit court and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. 
(Overview summary) 
Aaron Stock vs. Policemen's and Firemen's Retirement Fund of the City of Richmond Heights, Missouri 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87329

Civil

Change of venue did not affect change of judge 
The purposes of wits of prohibition included preventing unauthorized exercises of judicial authority. Timely motions for change of judge were automatic with two exceptions related to change of venue. Change of venue was not identical to transfer. Transfer was the defendant’s remedy for any action filed in an unlawful venue, and had to occur when there was no response to a motion, or when there was consent to a motion. Consent to a motion was the first exception barring a change of judge. The plaintiffs filed their action in the wrong circuit, the defendants filed a motion for transfer, the plaintiffs filed no response, and the wrong circuit granted the motion and transferred the action to the correct circuit. That transfer occurred for lack of response, not consent, so the first exception did not apply. The second exception was when a motion for change of venue had to accompany a motion for change of judge but relators did not file any motion for a change of judge in the wrong circuit, so that exception did not apply. Nevertheless, the correct circuit denied the timely motion for automatic change of judge. The Missouri Court of Appeals made permanent its writ of prohibition barring the respondent circuit court judge from anything but granting the motion for change of judge. 
STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel. RUDY TAPIA and DOUGLAS ROGERS, Relators v. THE HONORABLE DEREK ANKROM, Judge of the Thirty-First Judicial Circuit, Greene County, Missouri, Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District - SD38681

Consumer

AG’s MMPA subpoena authority discussed 
Judgment on the pleadings was due when the face of the pleadings’ allegations showed that a party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Competing motions admitted the allegations of their opposing motions. Circuit courts did not consider the pleadings’ proposed conclusions or any matter outside the pleadings. The State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts did not have exclusive authority over the sale of health care services. Health care services were within the definition of merchandise for the Merchandising Practices Act. The act authorized the attorney general to conduct investigations “in the public interest” by subpoena, called a civil investigation demands. Demands, had to seek relevant information and be not overbroad, like any other administrative subpoena generally, and specifically had to set forth any statute at issue. Demands could issue to any person, not just a person suspected of violating the act, and did not have to allege any specific violation. Demands could not require production of protected health information. Demands were subject to orders enforcing or setting aside by circuit court action. In an action to set aside a demand, the demand met all procedural requirements and expressly sought no protected health information. The circuit court denied the petition and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
Planned Parenthood Great Plains vs. State of Missouri ex rel. Attorney General Andrew Bailey 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District - WD87008

Criminal

No self-defense in burglary 
The elements of self-defense included having no duty to retreat. The duty to retreat applied to anyone unlawfully entering on or unlawfully remaining on another person’s property, which was also an element of burglary in the first degree, of which a jury found the defendant guilty. The guilty finding on burglary therefore negated any submission of the self-defense instruction. The legal file showed that the defendant preserved the matter for appeal by proffering proposed instructions. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri vs. Mark Randal Pullum 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD86670

AG may intervene in vacatur of conviction 
Any person aggrieved by a judgment had standing to appeal. In a civil action to vacate or set aside a criminal conviction, the state was a party and appeared through the attorney general. An amended judgment granting relief aggrieved the state because the state had an interest in the finality of criminal judgments. Therefore, the attorney general had standing to file a notice of appeal on the state’s behalf from a judgment vacating or setting aside a conviction. The Supreme Court of Missouri re-transferred the action to the Missouri Court of Appeals. 
(Overview summary) 
In re: Circuit Attorney, 22nd Judicial Circuit ex rel. Christopher Dunn, Respondent. 
Supreme Court of Missouri – SC100878

Inconsistent verdicts resolved 
In any criminal action, the U.S. Constitution’s Sixth Amendment required counsel in all critical phases. Whether critical phases included a preliminary hearing did not matter because the defendant delayed the preliminary hearing by 18 months without securing counsel, retained or appointed, and so waived any Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the preliminary hearing. When the defense submitted one instruction, and the circuit court submitted another, preservation of error required both support for the one and an objection to the other. When the same allegations described a greater offense and a lesser included offense, the offense submitted to the jury had to be the offense charged, not the lesser included offense. “[I]t is for the prosecutor – not a fact-finder – to choose the offense(s) for which the defendant will be prosecuted.” A jury verdict was not binding until the circuit court accepted the verdict and discharged the jury, the latter of which did not happen, so the circuit court was free to reject an inconsistent verdict of acquittal and proceed through resolution of the inconsistencies and sentencing after a corrective instruction. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. David Thompson, Appellant. 
Supreme Court of Missouri – SC100790

Post-conviction

No allegation of prejudice from plea counsel’s performance
Appellate courts only reversed circuit courts on clear error. Movant’s appeal could not expand on the motion so the Court of Appeals restricted its review to the claim in the motion most closely resembling the movant’s point relied on. Ineffective assistance of counsel meant substandard performance that prejudiced movant. As to performance, movant cited plea counsel’s investigation into the judge’s attitude toward Alford pleas and plea counsel’s advice on the entry of an Alford plea. Alford pleas were the same as any other guilty plea: valid if knowing and voluntary. So prejudice occurred if plea counsel’s performance made the guilty plea less than knowing and voluntary, and if movant otherwise would have pleaded not guilty and gone to trial. Movant did not make such allegations. Movant alleged that, but for counsel’s investigation and advice, movant would have entered a “straight” or “unqualified” guilty plea. That allegation did not describe the prejudice that supported post-conviction relief. No clear error occurred when the circuit court denied relief, so the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
CHAD R. EMMERSON, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38538

Tax

Municipal court reforms upheld again 
A judgment enjoined enforcement of certain special or local statutes as unconstitutional under an analysis later held erroneous. When the Supreme Court of Missouri restored the correct analysis, the plaintiffs sought relief from the injunction. Relief was possible only when enforcing the judgment was no longer equitable, and equitable considerations did not include a change in judicial analysis, while finality and law of the case barred use of the other analysis. The grace period that the statutes granted for transition would not apply when restoring the standards and courts were not as suited to draft similar provisions as the Missouri General Assembly was. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief so the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
City of Normandy, et al, Respondents, vs. Mike Kehoe, in his official capacity as Governor of Missouri, et al., Appellants. 
Supreme Court of Missouri – SC100295