Case summaries for April 25-May 1, 2025

Appellate | Business | Civil | Criminal | Elections | Employment | Employment security | Evidence | Family | Personal injury | Post-conviction | Probate | Workers compensation

Appellate

Points not preserved, not analyzed 
The circuit court had discretion to deny the filing of a second amended petition. Plaintiffs discovered the facts supporting new claims five months before bringing those claims and did not explain the delay. On those facts, denying plaintiffs’ motion to file a second amended petition did not constitute an abuse of discretion. In an action for declaratory judgment and to quiet title based on a grantor’s mental capacity, any plaintiff had the burden to show mental incapacity by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and such evidence had to include something more than the common infirmities of old age. No evidence was necessary to support a judgment against a plaintiff. Any appellant had to preserve any trial court error for direct appeal by raising it in circuit court and set forth how that happened in circuit court. Appellant plaintiffs charged error under a statute that they did not mention in circuit court and did not set forth a preservation statement in their brief. Civil judgments were subject to two theories of challenge on appeal. One theory was that no substantial evidence supported the judgment, in which appellate courts did not consider evidence contrary to the judgment. The other theory was that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence, under which appellate courts considered evidence that was contrary to the judgment. But that theory required any appellant to set forth all evidence favoring the judgment and to resolve all conflicts in favor of the circuit court’s findings of fact. Appellants failed to do so, rendering their arguments “analytically useless.” Taxing costs in favor of the party prevailing in circuit court was a ministerial duty of the circuit clerk, but the circuit clerk never executed that duty because the circuit court denied costs, contrary to both statute and rule. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for an award of costs. 
CHRISTINE BELL-KAPLAN, Appellant/Cross-Respondent v. MARY C. SCHWARZE, et al, Respondents/Cross-Appellants 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD37656 and SD37668 CONSOLIDATED

Intertwined claims refuted certification 
Judgments subject to appeal were specified interlocutory rulings; final judgments, meaning a ruling that disposed of all claims as to all parties; or rulings that did not constitute a final judgment but that the circuit court certified for appeal. Certification for appeal required a disposition of all claims as to one party, or all parties as to one claim, where such claims were distinct. A distinct claim was a claim sharing no factual determinations with remaining claims. The rulings appealed left remaining claims that shared a common issue of fact with the claims disposed. The certification was erroneous so the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. 
(Overview summary) 
RFJ Auto Properties, LLC vs. Knipp Real Estate, LLC, Knipp Real Estate II, LLC Fletcher Automotive No. 28, LLC Corwin Imports of Jefferson City, III, Timothy F. Corwin 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87304

Inadequate brief and omitted transcript required dismissal 
To protect the appellate courts’ neutrality and impartiality, the rules of appellate procedure applied to counsel and pro se litigants alike. Those rules required appellants to file the record on appeal, which had to include a transcript so appellate courts could review the evidence at trial, which appellant did not file. Rules governing the appellant’s brief set forth requirements for a table of cases, a statement of facts, points relied on, and argument. Appellant’s failure to follow those rules would have required the Court of Appeals’ advocacy to conduct a meaningful review. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. 
(Overview summary) 
Wasim Alagha vs. Cottle Automotive Repair, Inc., d/b/a Automotive Specialist 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87255

Business

Agency instruction was due on tortious interference claim 
Directed verdicts were due only when no factual dispute remained for the jury’s determination. At the close of a plaintiff’s evidence, a defendant’s choice to present evidence negated a motion for directed verdict, and preservation of error required a motion for directed verdict at the close of all evidence. All evidence included, not just a defendant’s evidence, but also a plaintiff’s rebuttal evidence. At the close of plaintiffs’ rebuttal evidence, defendant appellants moved for a directed verdict on some claims but not others. Those others were not preserved for review but the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of reviewing them because they might arise again on remand. The elements of a claim for tortious interference included the existence of a valid contract or business expectancy, and statutory requirements for contracts with governmental entities constituted a defense; but only for a governmental entity and not for a private entity like defendants. And the elements of a claim for tortious interference included interference, so no such claim could lie against a party to a contract, which included the parties’ agents, so agency was an affirmative defense; but whether defendants were agents of a party was in dispute. Claims for tortious interference could not lie against parties to contracts or business expectancies, and legal entities could act only through their agents, so agency was a defense to a claim for tortious interference; but whether defendants had agency relationships with a party was in dispute. Also, the elements of a claim for tortious interference included the absence of justification, meaning legally protected conduct achieved by without improper means; but whether improper conduct occurred was in dispute. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying directed verdicts on claims of tortious interference, and the instructions as submitted had support in the record. Defendants could not challenge on appeal an instruction’s language that they proffered nor to the absence of an instruction they did not proffer. The circuit court did not err in denying instructions on matters already included as elements of the claim in the verdict director nor on words understood by jurors of ordinary intelligence. As to a claim for conversion, the approved instruction correctly stated the law. Appellants dd not show that a change in statute required a change in an approved instruction. But the dispute over agency also supported the submission of an instruction on agency, so the circuit court erred in denying approved instructions, and the Court of Appeals remanded for a new trial on the affirmative defense of agency. 
(Overview summary) 
Reyna Hotel Corporation, et al. vs. Lotus Hospitality Management, LLC, et al. 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD86858

Civil

Multiple theories, one recovery 
When the verdict form directed a single award on multiple theories of recovery, the award could have been for any theory, so appellant had to challenge all theories and instructions. Otherwise, even if appellant defendant succeeded on appeal as to one theory, the unchallenged theories kept still supported the judgment. And stating “no objection” to the instruction waived any review. On claims of disability discrimination and hostile work environment in employment, appellant defendant challenged only one of the claims, so appellant could not show prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and remanded the action for the circuit court to determine the amount of statutory attorney fees due for the appeal. 
(Overview summary) 
Pedro Carrillo vs. Missouri Department of Corrections 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD86862

Lack of notice made judgment irregular
Rule allowed relief from a judgment that was irregular, meaning “achieved in a manner materially contrary to the law’s established procedures for the orderly administration of justice.” Established procedures for the orderly administration of justice included notice of a trial setting, as required by constitutional provisions, Supreme Court rules, and circuit court rules. The circuit court gave notice of a hearing on a motion for temporary custody and child support but conducted a trial on the merits of the action. The circuit court denied appellant’s motion to set aside, which constituted an abuse of discretion, so the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the action to circuit court for a new trial.
In Re the Marriage of: Cortney Bender and James Bender CORTNEY BENDER, Petitioner-Respondent vs. JAMES BENDER, Respondent-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD38534

Criminal

Probation mandated after 120-day program 
The writ of mandamus issued to bar orders in excess of authority including denial of probation. The circuit court imposed sentence, suspended execution, and placed relator in a 120-day program. After receiving a 30-day report that relator was progressing, the circuit court could either place relator on probation or impose sentence. The latter could happen only if, before a deadline, the circuit court conducted a hearing and concluded that probation would be an abuse of discretion. The circuit court ordered execution of sentence without a hearing and the circuit court’s authority expired with the deadline. The Court of Appeals issued its preemptory writ of mandamus requiring release from custody and probation under the Board of Probation and parole’s provisions. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri, ex rel. Jacqueice Wynn, Relator, vs. Honorable Scott Alan Lipke, Circuit Judge, Respondent. 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD113476

Evidence absent but sufficient, constitution was inapplicable to statutes 
Appellant juvenile was subject to the circuit court’s authority if the State showed that the juvenile committed conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a criminal offense. Offenses of which elements included possession of a substance required support in chemical analysis and identification of the substance possessed. On a charge of possessing liquid THC, the State presented sufficient evidence of the chain of custody. Constitutional provisions that treated THC the same as marijuana did not apply because statutes treated THC and marijuana differently. The State charged possession of over 35 grams of marijuana, but offered expert testimony only that juvenile possessed some kind of cannabis, which included industrial hemp and marijuana. The expert did not say that the material was marijuana but the defense stated that the expert had said that the material was 40 grams of marijuana, supplying the circuit court with grounds for finding that juvenile possessed over 35 grams of marijuana. The State charged possession of drug paraphernalia in the form of rolling papers and introduced no evidence that juvenile possessed rolling papers. That showed a variance between the charges and the evidence but juvenile did not preserve that argument and showed no plain error, in that juvenile showed no impairment of the defense. And the record showed that juvenile possessed other paraphernalia. Also, juvenile’s closing argument, that rolling papers were now legal, constituted an admission, supplying the circuit court with grounds for finding that juvenile possessed rolling papers. Drug possession findings supported findings of guilt for unlawful use of a weapon. 
(Overview summary) 
In the interest of: J.J.M., Appellant. 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD112433

Self-defense disproved 
Self-defense was a special negative defense that provided absolute justification for any homicide. To raise the issue, defendant must present evidence in support. If there was “undisputed and uncontradicted evidence clearly establishing self-defense [,]” acquittal was required as a matter of law. Otherwise, the State had the opportunity to refute self-defense with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The State carried that burden with the following evidence. Defendant was armed with a pistol and victim had a baby seat. Victim threw the baby seat at defendant. A few seconds later, defendant shot victim three times in the back and once in the chest. By the time defendant shot victim, defendant did not reasonably believe he was faced with “imminent death, serious physical injury, or a forcible felony.” 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Deonte M. Robinson, Appellant. 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD112322

Information and evidence were sufficient 
An information had to tell the defendant what offense was charged and how defendant committed each element sufficiently for defendant to prepare a defense. An approved charge accomplished that. Unless the information was wholly insufficient, the remedy for missing details was a motion for a bill of particulars, which defendant did not file, and so waived. And the information sufficiently alleged that defendant failed to protect the child victim from physical abuse. That allegation had support in evidence of the victim’s injuries and inferences as to defendant’s opportunities to prevent them. 
STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. JORDAN NICCOLE WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD38308

Possession not shown 
Possession of a thing meant awareness of the thing and control over it, which could be joint with an automobile passenger, and which the State could prove with circumstantial evidence. The evidence showed that methamphetamine within the driver’s reach but more within the reach of the passenger who was on methamphetamine, who also possessed drug paraphernalia. The State offered no evidence that driver owned the car or had touched the methamphetamine’s container. Refusing consent to a search was not evidence of guilt. The State’s evidence was insufficient to attribute possession to the driver. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri vs. James Keith Eggleston 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD86924

Recess instructions okay 
The defense waived any direct review of objection that it did not timely make, leaving only plain error review, which required a showing that an obvious error prejudiced defendant to a degree of manifest injustice of miscarriage of justice. The defense did not object to the content of the instruction on juror conduct during recesses, an abbreviated version of the instruction was expressly allowed by statute. The circuit court read the full version to the jury before swearing in and before each of seven recesses, and gave an abbreviated version before the remaining three recesses. Speculation on the jurors’ thought process was no substitute for showing a manifest injustice of miscarriage of justice. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri vs. Daniel R. Overstreet 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD86881

Elections

Initiative’s summary statement and fiscal note summary were okay 
The Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over post-election challenges to elections that changed the statutes. That did not include challenges to the substantive validity of an election result, like clear title and single subject, so the Supreme Court dismissed those claims. Post-election contestants had the burden of showing that an irregularity cast doubt on the election result sufficient to support setting aside the results. Summary statements had to impartially set forth the major consequences of passage. Passage of Proposition A reset the baseline for the Consumer Price Index to raise the minimum wage as described in the summary statement. “The 100-word limit of a summary statement inherently means the summary statement will not address all aspects of a proposed measure.” Fiscal note summaries had to, consistently with the fiscal note and impartially, set forth the costs to State and local government. Neither the fiscal note nor the fiscal note summary had to set forth de minimis and speculative costs, nor any private costs. And contestants offered nothing to show that the summary statement or fiscal note summary misled voters. 
(Overview summary) 
Raymond McCarty, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Missouri Secretary of State, et al., Defendants. 
Supreme Court of Missouri – SC100876

Employment

Claim for aiding or abbetting not stated 
Petitions in circuit court had to state a claim or face dismissal. The Human Rights Act barred employers from committing, or retaliating for complaining about, gender discrimination. The Act allowed damages but required any such claim to be filed first before the Human Rights Commission, which had a certain time to pursue the claim for, or issue a right-to-sue letter to, the claimant. Claimant followed that procedure but received neither result in a timely manner from the Commission. The Act also forbad any person to aid or abet gender discrimination or retaliation, so claimant sued the Commission for aiding or abetting her employer’s violation. But aiding or abetting meant supplying substantial encouragement or assistance, which could not occur after the discrimination happened. And the Commission did not destroy claimant’s action against the employer, it merely delayed the action, which did not constitute an independent harm. The circuit court did not err in dismissing the claimant’s petition against the Commission for failure to state a claim. 
(Overview summary) 
Barbara Vega vs. Missouri Commission on Human Rights 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87191

Employment security

No appeal for ruling not made 
An employer could file a response to a claim late if they showed good cause, which the Labor and Industrial Commission found as to appellant claimant’s employer, and ordered a remand to hear the merits of the claim with employer’s participation. While the good cause issue was pending, a deputy prematurely—and therefore without authority—ruled on the merits of the claim. Appellant appealed both rulings, but only argued the merits of the claim, so the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as to good cause. The result was that the remand hearing on the merits of the claim could occur. “We expect the Division to discuss today’s ruling with its deputies so that the Division does not unnecessarily complicate proceedings for claimants such as Employee in the future.” 
(Overview summary) 
Ruqaiyah Hunter vs. Division of Employment Security 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87311

Evidence

Prejudicial error explained 
On the exclusion of evidence, defendant had to make an offer of proof for preservation of error. Error was reversible only when it resulted in prejudice. Prejudice from an erroneous admission of evidence was prejudicial only when outcome determinative. “A finding of outcome-determinative prejudice expresses a judicial conclusion that the erroneously admitted evidence so influenced the jury that, when considered with and balanced against all evidence properly admitted, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted but for the erroneously admitted evidence.” On a charge of murder in the first degree, defendant offered defense of another person. In support, Defendant offered a witness’s testimony about a threat from that other person to victim. That testimony was not relevant to defense of that other person and was not within the state-of-mind rule. But no prejudice resulted from the admission of that hearsay because the hearsay was cumulative of other evidence. 
(Overview summary) 
State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Mark J. Matlock, Appellant. 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District – ED112290

Family

No support for educational expense award 
Judgment on a motion to modify a parenting plan and child support was subject to review for abuse of discretion. No abuse of discretion occurred when the circuit court rejected appellant’s challenge to the presumed child support amount based on additional travel expenses because the judgment showed that the circuit court generally considered all the evidence and specifically considered travel expenses. The presumed child support amount covered a child’s ordinary living expenses, including education, and any further award of expenses had to be extraordinary. Zero dollars was the circuit court’s finding as to extraordinary expenses, so an additional award for educational expenses was duplicative, and the Court of Appeals reversed that award. 
(Overview summary) 
Jonathan Hereth vs. Brandy Hereth 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD87174

Personal injury

Statute of limitations barred inmate’s action 
Plaintiff offender had one year from the date of injury to file an action for damages against the Department of Corrections. That limitation also applied to an action against the State because the State acted only through its departments and employees. “It would be illogical to allow offenders to circumvent [the statute of limitations] by filing a suit against the state that would be barred against its agent, the department.” The circuit court did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings against the plaintiff. 
(Overview summary) 
Trent Berhow, Appellant, vs. State of Missouri, Respondent. 
Supreme Court of Missouri – SC100809

Continuing care exception did not apply 
Whether a statute of limitations has run is generally a question of law, and summary judgment was due when a defendant established the facts beyond genuine dispute showing that the statute had run. The time limit for a plaintiff to file an action for negligence against a health care provider was two years from the date of the negligent act with exceptions that included continuous care. Care was continuous until ended by events that included the end of treatment for the condition being treated. Treatment for later discovered complications did not revive care for earlier conditions. Defendants established beyond genuine dispute that care for a coronary artery bypass graft ended after a post-surgical visit. Neither a later examination, test, and recommendation for an associated sternal dehiscence did not raise a genuine dispute as to those facts. The circuit court’s characterization of the sternal dehiscence as later complications did not constitute a determination of disputed facts. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment against plaintiffs. 
(Overview summary) 
Frank Wolfe and Karen Wolfe vs. Courtnye Allyson Walker, M.D., et al. 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District - WD87357

Post-conviction

Performance was relevant, understanding of strategy not used was irrelevant 
The circuit court’s credibility determinations received deference in appellate courts. The record supported a finding that the State made no promises to any witness in exchange for favorable testimony. Counsel was never ineffective for choosing a reasonable strategy even to the exclusion of another reasonable strategy. Defendant argued self-defense, which was mutually exclusive of imperfect self-defense, so trial counsel was not ineffective for choosing not to pursue both. Trial counsel’s incomplete understanding of the law was irrelevant when trial counsel’s performance met professional standards. And no prejudice resulted because the jury received an instruction on involuntary manslaughter anyway. As to whether a bullet’s path was probative of self-defense, trial counsel’s argument was effective and, in view of ample other evidence, movant did not show that a different emphasis would have changed the outcome. 
(Overview summary) 
Damion Thomas, Appellant, vs. State of Missouri, Respondent. 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District – WD112551

Other relief was available, habeas relief barred 
Writs of habeas corpus addressed issues of circuit court jurisdiction. Circuit courts had authority to impose criminal sentences. Sentences in excess of a statutory maximum were in excess of authority, not jurisdiction, and were subject to remedies other than habeas corpus. Guilty pleas waived statutory rights and, when made less than knowingly and voluntarily, were subject to post-conviction relief. Failure to exercise those remedies barred relief by writ habeas corpus with limited exceptions that did not apply to petitioner. 
(Overview summary) 
In re Robert J. Branson, Petitioner, vs. Michael Shewmaker, Warden, South Central Correctional Center, Respondent. 
Supreme Court of Missouri – SC100870

No prejudice shown 
On a claim for effective assistance of counsel movant had to show that counsel’s substandard performance caused movant prejudice. Prejudice meant that counsel’s lapse caused a reviewing court to be less than confident that movant would have been convicted otherwise. Movant’s speculations about what might have been found if trial counsel had investigated security camera footage other than that used at trial did not show any prejudice. Not seeking severance of a felon in possession of a firearm charge did not prejudice movant because no details of the felony came before the jury. Objecting to admissible evidence of witness tampering, even if successful, would not have overcome other evidence of guilt. 
ANTOINE HARRIS-APPLEWHITE, Appellant vs. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD38254

No prejudice from instructions 
Ineffective assistance of counsel meant that counsel’s substandard performance was outcome-determinative. “It is not ineffective assistance of counsel to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another reasonable trial strategy.” In a criminal action, the special negative defense of diminished capacity could reduce the degree of the offense on which the jury found defendant guilty. Trial counsel investigated whether any condition prevented movant from deliberating and chose against that defense in the light of ample evidence showing deliberation. The circuit court timely remedied a faulty instruction, so no prejudice occurred, and a motion for mistrial would not have succeeded. The corrected instruction’s description of accomplice liability adequately required the jury to find the element of deliberation. 
BRANDY B. SHADDOX, Movant-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District – SD38318

Probate

Standing and waiver barred appeal 
A petitioner for conservatorship and guardianship had standing to appeal the judgment, but only as to disability and incapacity, so the Court of Appeals dismissed points challenging other rulings. And appellant waived any argument that the sister’s disability and incapacity were partial, because appellant’s petition had alleged that the sister’s disability and incapacity were total, so the Court of Appeals denied those points. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. 
(Overview summary) 
In the Matter of Queen Johnson Doze; DeAndre Doze vs. Mariah Doze 
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District - WD86809

Workers’ compensation

No load factors allowed, PTD not shown 
In a claim against the Second Injury Fund, the elements included permanent total disability from a later injury and an earlier disability that met certain qualifications. Those qualifications included a degree of disability equal to 50 weeks. Only 46.4 weeks applied to one of claimant’s disabilities. Load factors or synergistic effects to increase the number of weeks applied only to claims for permanent partial disability under earlier statutes. Without the enhancement of non-qualified earlier injuries, claimant could not carry the burden of proof. 
(Overview summary) 
James Eckardt, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, vs. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Respondent/Cross-Appellant. 
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC100784

Occupational disease could not qualify as a pre-existing disability 
In a claim against the Second Injury Fund, the elements included permanent total disability from a later injury and an earlier disability that met certain qualifications. Those qualifications included causation by a compensable injury, which did not include occupational diseases. Without the non-qualified earlier injuries, claimant could not carry the burden of proof. 
(Overview summary) 
Treasurer of the State of Missouri – Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Appellant, vs. Diana Penney, Respondent. 
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC100693