Case summaries for June 7-13, 2024

Appellate | Civil | Criminal | Elections | Employment | Employment Security | Personal Injury | Workers' Compensation

Appellate

Duty to assemble the legal file was on appellant
Rules imposed a duty to file a record on appeal, which had to include the legal file, which had to include the pleadings on which the circuit court tried the action. That duty was appellant’s alone, and no other party and no appellate court had any such duty. Failure to comply was grounds for dismissing the appeal. The circuit court dismissed appellant’s initial petition for, among other reasons, failure to state a claim. Appellant failed to include the initial petition in the legal file and included only a proposed amended pleading, which the circuit court never allowed. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview Summary)
Larry Rice, Appellant, vs. Midland States Bank, and Midland States Bancorp, Inc., Respondents
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED112264

Damages awarded for appeal of consented revival
In an action under workers’ compensation, the parties entered a settlement agreement, later registered as a judgment with the consent of appellant. Respondent employee sought revival of the judgment, which the circuit court granted. Appellant employer appealed the judgment of revival but had no standing to do so because the appellant suffered no prejudice from the judgment of revival. “The obligations and entitlements contained in the [registered judgment] were no different the day after it was revived from the day before it was revived” so the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of revival and awarded damages for a frivolous appeal.
JOE DAVID HUDSON, Plaintiff-Respondent v. JOPLIN REGIONAL STOCKYARDS, INC., Defendant-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD37986

Civil

Reversal negated law of the case
When an appellate court reviewed a circuit court judgment, any matters not appealed were final under the law of the case doctrine, except those matters negated by reversal. But reversal of a judgment entirely negated the judgment entirely, including all rulings in that judgment. In an earlier appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment entirely because the respondent had made certain admissions. Those admissions were relevant only to the reversal of summary judgment and that reversal negated any binding effect of the admissions on remand. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in submitting those matters, admitted only for the reversed summary judgment, to the jury for determination. That procedure did not violate Equal Protection. Whether the circuit court should have granted summary judgment for appellant, appellant did not preserve for appeal.
(Overview Summary)
Michael Eivins vs. Missouri Department of Corrections
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD86435

Criminal

Earlier judgment reversed because of later unappealed judgment
Respondent filed two actions related to the sex offender registry. One action sought removal from the registry and resulted in an earlier judgment granting such relief. The other action sought a declaratory judgment that the Missouri registration statute was unconstitutional, resulted in a judgment that denied such relief, and cited a federal statute mandating lifetime registration. No party appealed the later judgment, but the earlier judgment was on appeal, so “[a]s a result, we must address competing judgments [.]” Without addressing the merits of either judgment, and without finding any error, the Court of Appeals held that the later judgment required that “the [earlier j]udgment must be reversed and remanded to the [circuit] court with instructions to deny . . . removal from the sex offender registry.”
(Overview Summary)
L.F.A., Respondent, vs. Missouri State Highway Patrol, Criminal Records Repository, Appellant, and Lt. Col. Gregory, Acting Chief of Police, St. Louis County Police Department, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED111406

Plain error declined for insufficient offer of proof
One rule allowed an information to charge offenses in the alternative in one count. Another rule allowed the filing of an amended information that did not add or change charges and did not prejudice defendant’s substantial rights. An amended information, setting forth a count by choosing one of the of alternatives in the original information’s count, did not violate either rule. Defendant’s initial appearance did not constitute an arraignment, or any other critical stage of litigation, so no appointed counsel was necessary. When victims testified that the defendant committed sexual misconduct that was not charged, but those facts did not constitute “the most unusual or exceptional circumstances” under which a circuit court should intervene sua sponte, the Court of Appeals declined plain error review. The Court of Appeals declined plain error review of evidence excluded as to which defendant made no offer of proof to “show what the evidence will be, the purpose and object of the evidence, and each fact essential to establishing admissibility.” An objection that exhibits were repetitive did not preserve an objection to foundation.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent vs. JOHN A. SHUTTERS, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District - SD37951

Elections

Guilty plea disqualified candidate
Qualifications for office appeared in constitutional provisions and statutes. A statute barred from office any person who pleaded, or was found, guilty of a felony. An appellant pleaded guilty, the circuit court found appellant guilty and imposed sentence but suspended execution, and the governor pardoned the appellant. The appellant filed a candidacy for the county commission. In an action for declaratory judgment, the county clerk sought a ruling on the appellant’s qualification for office. The circuit court did not err in ruling that the appellant’s guilty plea disqualified the appellant from office. The pardon did not change that result because the pardon negated the conviction but not the guilty plea. The appellant failed to preserve an Equal Protection challenge to the statute.
(Overview Summary)
Cass County Clerk Jeff Fletcher, Respondent, v. Herschel Young, Appellant
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC100594

Employment

Religious exemption applied
The Human Rights Act bars employment discrimination based on age but exempts from its operation any entity “owned or operated by religious or sectarian organizations.” A religious or sectarian organization operated defendant employer, as the defendant established beyond genuine dispute, with adequately numbered paragraphs and adequate citations to supporting evidence. That evidence showed that Roman Catholic Church entities founded, funded, controlled, approved governing documents of, and supervised daily operations of, the employer. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment for the defendant.
(Overview Summary)
Mercy Health East Communities, Mercy Health, Mercy Clinic East Communities, and MHM Support Services, Respondents, vs. Jeanette Layton, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED111924

Certification for KCPD disability explained
Statutes that govern retirement from the Kansas City Police Department included benefits that varied according to whether a disability was duty-related or not, and whether the disability was permanent or likely to become permanent or not, as determined by a Board of Police Commissioners. That determination required the certification of a physician on a Retirement Board. A certification from a psychologist retained by the Retirement Board did not support a determination on permanency, and the circuit court did not err in so ruling. But that ruling required a further remedy: a remand to properly determine appellant’s benefits based on a certification from a physician on the Retirement Board. The Court of Appeals entered a judgment modified accordingly.
(Overview Summary)
Joshua M. Krasovec vs. KC Board of Police Comm., Et al., Police Retirement System of Kansas City
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD85910, Consolidated with WD85935 and WD85938

Employment Security

Notice negated good cause
A regulation allowed a rehearing on allegations of good cause. Good cause did not include a party’s failure to appear in accordance with notice that the Division of Employment Security served on that party. No cited authority required the Division to send any other document to anyone, including the party’s counsel, who entered an appearance after service of the notice. No abuse of discretion occurred in the denial of rehearing.
(Overview Summary)
Christine M. Kohlberg, Respondent, vs. Big Bend Orthodontics, LLC, Appellant, and Division of Employment Security, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED111989

Judicial review for commission rulings only
Appellant argued that an administrative appeals tribunal erred in dismissing appellant’s claim, after a hearing on the merits, as untimely. But that ruling had already been argued successfully to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. The commission then decided the merits of the claim, and only the commission’s decision was subject to judicial review at the Court of Appeals, so only the merits were before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the commission’s ruling. Whether the appeals tribunal’s error on timely filing entitled appellant to a rehearing before the appeals tribunal, the appellant did not preserve for appeal.
(Overview Summary)
Samantha B. Bourne, Appellant, vs. Division of Employment Security, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED111790

Personal Injury

Differential diagnosis discussed
In a civil action, a statute sets forth the foundation for expert evidence, including reliability, but reliability does not require an expert’s experience with identical facts. In an action for medical negligence, expert evidence on causation could consist of a differential diagnosis. A differential diagnosis ruled in “all scientifically plausible causes of the . . . injury” damages, and “then ‘rules out’ the least plausible causes of injury until the most likely cause remains.” Plaintiff’s expert testimony was inadequate as a differential diagnosis, but other evidence supported a finding of causation, including a report from a medical examiner’s office and a certified copy of decedent’s death certificate, the latter of which was admissible evidence of decedent’s cause of death by statute. A verdict director must set forth only ultimate facts. The ultimate fact in an action for negligence are the courses of conduct alleged. A verdict director setting forth five disjunctive courses of conduct did not include forbidden evidentiary detail. Whether the circuit court erred by submitting aggravating circumstances damages to the jury was moot because the jury awarded none and any effect on compensatory damages was speculative. 
(Overview Summary)
Debbie Pyzyk, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Gateway Psychiatric Group, LLC & Gordon Robinson, M.D., Defendants/Appellants
Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District - ED111709

Defense prevails in defamation case
In a claim for defamation, constitutional provisions absolutely privileged statements of opinion, especially in the context of a dispute—including any “pejorative statements [,]” “vituperative language [,]” “imaginative expression [,]” and “rhetorical hyperbole”—short of an accusation of criminal conduct. And an accusation of criminal conduct, even such an accusation falsely or insincerely held, was also privileged when the accusation alleged facts supporting the accusation. As to such factual allegations, substantial truth absolutely privileged otherwise defamatory allegations. Only an opinion that implied the existence of unstated facts supported an award of damages. In a statement to shareholders, officials of defendant entities opined that plaintiff had “committed fraud or, at the very least, misrepresented” based on their review of specified documents from plaintiff; and facts unrelated to plaintiff’s falsification of those documents did not show that defendants’ allegations were false. On those facts the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment for the defendants.
(Overview Summary)
Deann Totta vs. CCSB Financial Corp., Et al.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD86312

Workers’ Compensation

Occupational diseases counted toward second injury fund award
On a claim to the Second Injury Fund for permanent and total disability based on a preexisting permanent partial disability, statutes defined a compensable injury. One statute excluded any occupational disease except as provided otherwise, and another statute provided otherwise: that an occupational disease is a compensable injury. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission did not err in granting an award from the Second Injury Fund based in part on the claimant’s pre-existing occupational disease.
(Overview Summary)
Treasurer of the State of Missouri - Custodian of the Second Injury Fund vs. Diana Penney
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District - WD86684