Case summaries for Sept. 20-26, 2024

Appellate | Civil | Criminal | DWI | Elections | Employment security | Insurance | Post-conviction | Workers' compensation

Appellate

Artificial intelligence called out
The claimant’s appellate brief cited inapplicable or fabricated authorities, likely generated by artificial intelligence. “We strongly caution that ‘[c]iting nonexistent case law or misrepresenting the holdings of a case is making a false statement to a court[;] [i]t does not matter if [generative A.I.] told you so.’” Federal regulations published under the authority of the Family Medical Leave Act required an employee claiming time off under the act to file timely and complete requests, which the claimant did not do, and that failure to comply was grounds for the employer to deny the request. The employer’s denial of a request for leave on such facts had support in the record, resulting in unexcused absences in violation of employer policies, which constituted misconduct connected with work.
(Overview summary)
Royce Jones, Appellant, vs. Simploy, Inc., and Division of Employment Security, Respondents.
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District - ED112394

References to the record and citation to Authorities Required
Appellate rules required an appellant to file a complete record on appeal, which include a transcript, to which the appellant’s statement of facts must refer by page. The appellant’s point relied on had to cite a ruling, state a legal reason why that ruling was erroneous, explain why that reason required reversal, and list supporting authorities. The argument had to re-state the point relied on and cite the supporting authorities, state how the appellant preserved the error, and set forth the standard of review. Failure to comply with those requirements impeded appellate review so the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.
(Overview summary)
Republic Finance, LLC, Respondent, v. Quintin Ray, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District - ED112283

Civil

Civil contempt no relief from judgment
Constitutional provisions barred the ex post facto or retrospective application of statutes. Statutory provisions enacted in 2005, and repealed and re-enacted in 2006 and 2017, required lifetime supervision and tracking for persons convicted of certain offenses. Which offenses those were was the subject of a consent judgment for a permanent injunction that the relator entered into with the plaintiff in the underlying action. In the underlying action, the plaintiff brought an action against the relator for civil contempt, alleging that the permanent injunction represented an ex post facto or retrospective application of statutes. The respondent issued an order to show cause why the respondent should not hold the relator in contempt. But contempt was a remedy for enforcing a judgment, not for requiring a departure from a judgment based on the judgment’s invalid application of statutes. An invalid application of statutes was subject to declaratory judgment, but the plaintiff did not seek that remedy, and the respondent did not order it. Because the respondent had no authority to order contempt on the facts alleged in the underlying action, the Missouri Court of Appeals made permanent its preliminary writ to the respondent and barred any further order in the underlying action except to vacate the show-cause order and dismiss the underlying action.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri ex rel. Missouri Department of Corrections vs. The Honorable Daniel R. Green, Circuit Judge
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District - WD87421

Criminal

Constructive possession shown
On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts examined the evidence presented at trial, not the evidence absent from trial, and did not reweigh the evidence. Whether of controlled substances or of related paraphernalia, possession included the same elements: knowledge of the nature of the thing at issue and control, either actual or constructive. On a charge of trafficking, a finding of constructive possession had support in evidence that the defendant frequently entered the location where contraband and related paraphernalia, larger than for personal use, was located; that defendant possessed a large amount of cash; and defendant’s inconsistent explanations and later admissions.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri vs. Cortez Cave
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District - WD86334

Waiver of counsel was not invalid
Constitutional provisions gave criminal defendants the right to have or to knowingly and intelligently waive assistance of counsel. To knowingly and intelligently waive assistance of counsel required that a defendant understood the rights waived and had a chance to sign a written form as prescribed by statute. That statute required the form to set forth the maximum possible sentence, but the appellant signed a form that omitted that information. The Missouri Court of Appeals vacated the conviction and remanded the action for a new trial.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent v. CHRISTOPHER W. SMITH, Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals , Southern District - SD38054

Sentences on alford plea upheld
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion for continuance based on a need to examine testimony, with which the movant was already familiar, and against which the defendant’s counsel was able to argue. The Missouri Court of Appeals declined to review the circuit court’s reliance on a sentencing assessment report for plain error because no error was facially clear, evident, or obvious. The defendant’s violence and lack of remorse, and the victim’s continuing fear, supported the circuit court’s sentences.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Dustin E. Homan, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District - ED112054

No support for self-defense instruction
The circuit court may submit a self-defense instruction only on substantial supporting evidence. The defendant alleged self-defense while in a custodial interview but did not offer any such evidence at trial. And, even if the defendant had offered the interview account at trial, it showed the defendant to be the initial aggressor and that the victim’s use of force was lawful, which negated self-defense. The circuit court did not err in submitting no self-defense instruction sua sponte.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Keith L. Hill, Appellant.
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District - ED112000

DWI

Driver was huffing gasoline
On a charge of driving under the influence of a drug, circumstantial evidence, meaning evidence that supports an inference, could be sufficient. Statute provided the foundation for admissibility of expert testimony, including the factors that determine reliability. Under those standards, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of an expert, by training and experience, on the effects of gasoline intoxication generally. Specifically, an opinion that driver was intoxicated on gasoline fumes did not likely make any difference in the jury’s findings, given other evidence of intoxication. The driver offered statements of his own and a non-expert witness that the driver was suffering from drug abuse or mental illness, which the circuit court excluded. The driver’s arguments on appeal were different from those offered on appeal, so the driver did not preserve any error, and overwhelming evidence of guilt made the rulings not outcome-determinative.
(Overview summary)
State of Missouri vs. Scott Alan Schwarz
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District - WD85884

Elections

Amendment 3 remained on ballot
Constitutional provisions required any initiative to have a single subject, meaning a “readily identifiable and reasonably narrow central purpose.” Such a purpose could relate to a wide variety of unrelated matters, and negate an unknown number of statutes, yet remain properly connected. Nothing required an initiative petition for amending the Constitution to recite the full text of — or even identify — every statute potentially subject to being struck by the courts and, if it did, that requirement would be unconstitutional as an impediment to the initiative process. Whether the statutes governing challenges to initiative petitions were unconstitutional, for providing too little time to resolve such action and all appeals, was moot because the time was sufficient in the instant case. The reason that statutes required state officials to make final rulings on the form of an initiative early in the process was to minimize disruption in the process.
(Overview summary)
Mary Elizabeth Anne Coleman, Kathleen Anne Forck, Hannah Sue Kelly, and Marguerite Ann "Peggy" Forrest, Respondents, vs. John R. Ashcroft, Respondent, and Missourians for Constitutional Freedom and Anna Fitz-James, Intervenors-Appellants.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC100742

Employment security

Knowing element of misconduct shown
In a claim for employment security benefits, the statutes provided an affirmative defense for misconduct connected to work, the elements of which included the mental state of knowing. Knowing conduct included carelessness to a degree that manifested culpability. Culpability was manifest in a truck driver’s three collisions with stationary objects, two of those collisions in one day, and without taking additional precautions afterward. Those findings did not constitute a shift in the burden of proof from employer to claimant. Statutory provisions related to uniform enforcement of employer policies did not apply to statutory provisions on misconduct.
(Overview summary)
Robert K. Bennett, Appellant, vs. Cord Moving and Storage Co., and Division of Employment Security, Respondents.
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District - ED112508

Insurance

Cash value “based on” factors were exclusive
The plaintiffs brought an action for breach of insurance contracts. No authority required or allowed the plaintiffs to refer any issue to the Missouri Department of Insurance before filing an action in circuit court. The time for filing was five years from the last ascertainable damage, and damage was not ascertainable from annual reports from the insurer to insureds because those reports did not disclose the factors in the variables, so the circuit court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a time bar. For certification of a class, the issue of individual damages did not predominate over common questions of fact and law, especially where the calculation of damages was common to all. As to de-certifying the class, the defendant’s incomplete record prevented defendant from showing that it preserved on appeal the argument it raised before trial; and a post-judgment motion was too late. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s universal life insurance policies miscalculated the policies’ accrued cash value. The policies calculated cash value by a formula that deducted certain variables so that the higher the variable, the greater the deduction, and the less the cash value. The variables were “based on” specified factors, unambiguously meaning based exclusively on those factors, so additional factors in the deduction breached the insurance contracts. Otherwise, no insured could ever know the cash value. The circuit court excluded evidence of additional factors, so no error occurred in excluding expert testimony based on those factors, which the defendant’s offer of proof showed it was. When the plaintiffs argued in closing on the absence of such evidence, the defendant did not object, so the circuit court did not err in denying a motion for new trial on those grounds. The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment that established beyond dispute how the defendant had inflated the factors, including a failure to recalculate periodically as the policies required, and thus understated the cash value of the policies. The defendants’ response to the plaintiffs’ motion sought to raise a genuine dispute of material fact but, even if it had, it would merely have thwarted the plaintiffs — genuine disputes of material fact did not entitle defendants to a judgment on the merits. Therefore, the defendant’s motion was not inextricably intertwined with plaintiffs’ motion, and the denial of defendants’ motion was not subject to appeal. The jury’s award had support in the plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony and exhibits. Statute provided pre-judgment interest on damages, the formula for which was undisputed and therefore liquidated, and a dispute as to a variable in that formula did not render the damages unascertainable. Remanded for the circuit court to calculate the pre-judgment interest due.
(Overview summary)
David B. Karr, Individually and On Behalf of Others Similarly Situated vs. Kansas City Life Insurance Company
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District - WD86550 Consolidated with WD86566

Pleadings described tolling but not insuring
A petition in circuit court had to state a claim for relief by alleging the facts that supported a plaintiff’s verdict. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim assumed that the petition’s allegations were true and had to clearly establish a bar to the action without exception. The plaintiff alleged a tolling of the statute of limitations by describing an agreement to delay action in the context of communications with the defendant. Proof of the agreement was unnecessary at that stage of litigation. By contrast, the petition did not describe any direct claim against an insurer for an insured’s conduct.
(Overview summary)
Engineered Sales Acquisition Corporation, Appellant, vs. Missouri American Water Company, and Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America, Respondents.
Missouri Court of Appeals-Eastern District - ED112315

Post-conviction

Third-party interference excused untimely filing
Timely filing was an element of the movant’s claim, but untimely filing is subject to excuse under the doctrine of third-party interference. Third-party interference requires proof that a pro se inmate took all steps reasonably possible to file timely and the active interference of a third party beyond the inmate’s control frustrated those efforts. The movant showed by prison mail room affidavit that the movant received no legal mail during a certain period, despite the clerk’s timely mailing, which demonstrated that he never received the mandate that would have started the time for filing. As to the merits, the movant was less successful in showing ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel exercised sound strategy in advising the movant not to testify because the movant had convictions involving cruelty to children and animals, and multiple explanations for how the victim was shot in the back of the head.
(Overview summary)
Terrell A. Smith vs. State of Missouri
Missouri Court of Appeals-Western District - WD86187

No appointment, no abandonment doctrine
The circuit court ordered the circuit clerk to give notice to the Missouri Public Defender’s Office of an appointment to represent the movant, but no notice issued. Therefore, the Public Defender’s Office never received an appointment, and the abandonment doctrine did not apply to an amended motion filed late. The circuit court had no authority to rule on the amended motion, only on the initial motion, which was not identical to the amended motion. One of the initial motion’s claims remained undetermined, so no final judgment was before the Missouri Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and remanded the action to circuit court.
JAMES DARRON BEERBOWER, JR., Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District - SD38019

Denial of prosecuting attorney’s motion to set aside or vacate affirmed for Williams
Constitutional provision vested exclusive appellate review in the Supreme Court of Missouri for any judgment imposing a death sentence, and an appeal of any such judgment automatically stayed execution. Those provisions did not apply to any civil action authorizing a collateral attack on a criminal judgment. A statute provided a civil action in which a prosecuting attorney, at the relation of the movant defendant, may seek to vacate or set aside the defendant’s criminal conviction. The motion did not stay execution. The standard of proof in circuit court was clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence, or constitutional error at the original trial, that undermined confidence in the verdict. The circuit court denied relator prosecuting attorney’s motion and the Supreme Court of Missouri ordered transfer of based on the general interest or importance of the issues. Issues not raised in circuit court were not subject to appellate review. That included constitutional issues like time to prepare for hearing first raised in a motion to amend, which the record refuted anyway, in that the relator used less than the time allotted for the relator’s case in chief and made no showing of what evidence would have been presented with more time to prepare. The prosecuting attorney abandoned a claim of actual innocence based on DNA evidence because physical evidence showed that the perpetrator wore gloves, and no DNA evidence showed an alternative perpetrator. Destruction of exculpatory evidence was always a violation of due process, but destruction of merely possibly exculpatory evidence was a violation of due process only if done in bad faith. The record supported findings that DNA evidence showed no alternate perpetrator, so later contamination by law enforcement was irrelevant, fingerprint and was so incomplete as to be useless, and law enforcement officers did not exercise bad faith in destroying that evidence. Batson challenges to the original criminal jury trial were already subject to final judgments, successive challenges based on inadequate findings of fact were unpreserved by a motion to amend, and appellate courts presumed that the circuit court found the facts in accordance with the conclusions of law. Claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were already subject to final judgments. “Concessions” of the relator as to conclusions of law were not binding on the courts. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the judgment denying relief, denied the motion for stay of execution, barred post-opinion motions, and ordered mandate issue immediately.
(Overview summary)
Prosecuting Attorney, 21st Judicial Circuit, ex rel. Marcellus Williams, Movant/Petitioner, v. State of Missouri, Respondent. and State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Marcellus Williams, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Missouri - SC100764

Workers’ compensation

Schoemehl benefits discussed
Any claim was subject to the statutes in effect when the injury occurred. That included Schoemehl benefits: a dependent spouse’s death benefits when a claimant awarded permanent total disability benefits died from a cause unrelated to the injury. The Missouri Labor and Industrial Relations Commission purported not to rule on Schoemehl benefits, which was error, but harmless, because the commission determined all the facts necessary to such a claim. A statute mandated the circuit court to enter judgment on an award without deviation and the circuit court did not err in doing so.
AMIE ELSWORTH, Claimant-Respondent v. WAYNE COUNTY, MISSOURI, Employer-Appellant and MISSOURI ASSOC. of COUNTIES, Insurer-Appellant
Missouri Court of Appeals-Southern District - SD37237